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Russia, one of the most ethno-culturally diverse countries in the world, provides 
a rich case study on how globalization and associated international trends are 
disrupting and causing the radical rethinking of approaches to inter-ethnic cohe-
sion. The book highlights the importance of television broadcasting in shaping 
national discourse and the place of ethno-cultural diversity within it. It argues that 
television’s role here has been reinforced, rather than diminished, by the rise of 
new media technologies. 
Through an analysis of a wide range of news and other television programmes, 
the book shows how the covert meanings of discourse on a particular issue can 
diverge from the overt significance attributed to it, just as the impact of that dis-
course may not conform with the original aims of the broadcasters. The book 
discusses the tension between the imperative to maintain security through cen-
tralized government and overall national cohesion that Russia shares with other 
European states, and the need to remain sensitive to, and to accommodate, the 
needs and perspectives of ethnic minorities and labour migrants. It compares the 
increasingly isolationist popular ethno-nationalism in Russia, which harks back to 
‘old-fashioned’ values, with the similar rise of the Tea Party in the United States 
and the UK Independence Party in Britain. 
Throughout, this extremely rich, well-argued book complicates and challenges 
received wisdom on Russia’s recent descent into authoritarianism. It points to a 
regime struggling to negotiate the dilemmas it faces, given its Soviet legacy of 
ethnic particularism, weak civil society, large native Muslim population and over-
bearing, yet far from entirely effective, state control of the media.
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Introduction
A clash of two Russias, a tale of 
two cities
Two Russias
This book is ultimately concerned with the conditions and prospects for state-
hood in Russia. It intervenes in the debate around that issue by providing a 
 country-specific case study of a phenomenon whose wider import transcends 
state boundaries: the fate of complex multicultural policies in the age of glo-
balization, and the role of the broadcast media in shaping it. Broadly speaking, 
this is a study of the contemporary media’s role in fostering or hindering com-
munity cohesion. Specifically, the book explores Russian state-aligned televi-
sion’s approaches to ethnicity, race and nationhood, contributing to our grasp of a 
highly topical issue – the nature and effectiveness of the tools used by the leaders 
of the largest transition state, still at an early stage of its formation, to forge a 
sense of belonging among its citizens. The book argues that the importance of 
both elite and popular understandings of nationhood to Russian political culture 
and policy-making has been seriously underestimated in the scholarly literature, 
and that milestone events such as the Ukraine conflict of 2014 cannot be fully 
understood without reference to it. For the first time in post-communist studies 
we attempt to bring together two theoretical strands: one addressing the nature of 
Soviet Russian imperialism and nation-building, and the second treating Russian 
television news as a consensus-management tool. To introduce the rationale for 
our dual focus, and to set the scene for the book, we begin in medias res: with 
a brief extract from a television talk show discussion, and a single, ephemeral 
news report.
First, the talk show.
Following the now infamous Pussy Riot episode in February 2012, Channel 1’s 
V kontekste (In Context) discussion programme, hosted by the leading televi-
sion personality Maksim Shevchenko, featured a debate about the incident in its 
edition of 15 March 2012.1 The guests included a representative of the Ortho-
dox Church, Maksim Kozlov; a leader of a moderate human rights group, Ol’ga 
Kostina; an art critic, Marat Gel’man; and a liberal campaigner, Kseniia Sobchak. 
In an exchange between Kozlov – who, in raising the stakes over Orthodoxy’s 
supremacy in  Russia, applies the same sardonic label to the women of Pussy Riot 
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as that applied earlier by Shevchenko himself – and Sobchak, who invokes the 
waning mantra of official multi-confessionalism, they state:
Kozlov: We have two cultures. One is connected to the great Russian culture 
… And there is another one, which for a long time will have these ‘maid-
ens’ (devits) as its symbol. This is a clash of civilizations (tsivilizatsionnyi 
konflikt) between traditional Russian culture and this alluvial, film-like layer 
(s etim nanosnym plenochnym sloem).
Sobchak: I think that today a conflict is taking place – here you are right. But, 
in my opinion … the powers that be are advancing Orthodoxy as their core 
ideology in what is a multi-confessional country … 2
Huntington’s ‘civilizational clash’ rhetoric, along with the related – but not 
 identical – term ‘conflict of cultures’, has, as we shall later find, been used in 
reference to the rise of tension between Russians and North Caucasians (as well 
as Central Asians).3 It is this which provides the most obvious hint at the links 
between our dual concerns. For although Kozlov is referring to Russia’s ‘civi-
lizational conflict’ with the deleterious western values adopted by counter-cul-
tural forces like Pussy Riot, he clearly perceives Russia as a community bound 
together by ‘traditional Russian culture’. His view therefore has implications for 
 inter-ethnic relations within Russia. It is this that alerts Sobchak, who identifies an 
unresolved tension within the Kremlin’s entire nation-building discourse: between 
the vision of Russia as a multi-ethnic, multi-confessional society of equal  citizens 
and that of Russia as a national state in which Russian culture, language and 
Orthodoxy have primacy.
On the face of it, while the Pussy Riot incident became a leitmotif for the 
opposition protests which followed the controversial 2011 parliamentary elec-
tions and Vladimir Putin’s re-election as president in March 2012, and which 
seemed momentarily to mark the dramatic and unexpected birth of a ‘Russian 
Spring’, it appears to have little relevance to the issue of ethnic cohesion in Rus-
sia. Indeed, conventional wisdom, and the weight of scholarly discourse, would 
have it that state television coverage of inter-ethnic relations is at most a side-
show in the drama at centre stage in Russia: that which pits Vladimir Putin’s 
 semi-authoritarian and increasingly paranoid regime against the forces for dem-
ocratic change emboldened by the mobilizing potential offered by new social 
media platforms such as Twitter.4 An indication of this conventional wisdom at 
work can be found in the contrast between the feverish excitement awakened in 
BBC journalists by the post-election protests in late 2011 and in 2012 – and, 
indeed, by precursors to those protests, including the outcry over the November 
2010 re-sentencing of the dissident businessman Khodorkovskii – and the BBC’s 
deafening silence about the terrifying race riots which occurred in Moscow only 
one month after the Khodorkovskii trial.5
Why, one might wonder, should things be otherwise? The parlous and inflam-
matory state of inter-ethnic relations in Russia is arguably a secondary issue, 
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unlikely to be resolved until the primary tumour ravaging the body of Russian 
society is excised. Moreover, state television appears on the surface to offer the 
least promising tool of excision. Ever subject to the baleful influence of the Krem-
lin, and seemingly run by its acolytes, it is now struggling to keep pace with 
the paradigm shifts in media technology and practice, particularly inasmuch as 
their main beneficiaries are precisely those younger, more educated, metropolitan 
Russians who lead the political protest movement. It is, however, precisely these 
assumptions that we seek to challenge.
For the brief and inconsequential exchange between Kozlov and Sobchak is 
but one thread in a tapestry of connections, covert and overt, that tie the subject of 
inter-ethnic relations to that of Russia’s political future. On one hand Kozlov and 
Sobchak are, mutual antagonism notwithstanding, both striving to attain the common 
ground of a broad societal consensus which will enable them to express their dis-
agreement, and which is the precondition for civil society. On the other, our analysis 
indicates that it is issues bearing an ethnic tinge – in particular the widespread con-
cern over corruption and the abuse of power – which provide the territory over which 
the battle to formulate, and to claim ownership of, that common ground takes place.
The central importance, and elusiveness, of the consensual idiom required 
for dialogic exchange, and thus for the Habermasian rational public discourse 
without which Russia will never achieve a stable civil society, is broached later 
in the V kontekste discussion. In a significant contribution, Kozlov articulates 
a meta-description of the course of the entire conversation. Spoken from the 
Orthodox position, his willingness to subject himself to a debate with those 
calling for broader freedoms draws both the discussion itself and the demand 
for democracy that his opponents advance within it inside the bounds of the 
consensual realm:
This action was a conscious provocation … against the slowly maturing con-
sensus in our society. Against the fact that, whilst we are maximally different, 
we can reach agreement with one another if we gather together the founda-
tions of some shared concepts.6
The action he refers to is, of course, not an ethnic conflict, but what he and signifi- 
cant sections of Russian society perceived to be a provocation against traditional 
Russian values (the shocking ‘punk prayer’ performed in Moscow’s Cathedral of 
Christ the Saviour). What he demonstrates all too starkly is the paradox that to 
include and unify is necessarily to exclude and divide: a community built around 
shared, consensual values must possess clearly defined boundaries and, thus, rules 
of entry. For Slavoj Žižek, democracy’s very claim to universality is based on an 
original, now suppressed, ‘founding act’ of expulsion. It does not require a leap 
of faith to recognize that among the most clearly enunciated rules of admission 
and exclusion are those relating to the markers of ethnicity. Thus, Žižek goes on 
to trace the original act of exclusion in the past to what he terms the ‘social symp-
tom’ in the present, ‘the part which, although inherent to the existing universal 
order, has no “proper place” within it (say, illegal immigrants)’.7
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Indeed, the paradox of consensus overlaps with the second way in which 
inter-ethnic relations insert themselves at the core of the struggle for Russia’s 
future: before joining that battle, it is vital to establish the identity of the state on 
behalf of which it is being waged. Sobchak is in no doubt that the Russia whose 
future she is fighting for is characterized by an inclusive multi-confessionalism 
(and, by extension, multi-ethnicity). Kozlov, by contrast, perceives his nation in 
an altogether more exclusionary manner. His ‘false’ Russia is primarily intended 
to invoke deleterious western influence, but his reference to traditional Russian 
cultural values extends to the non-Orthodox peoples of the North Caucasus. In 
this context, indeed, Kozlov’s divisive rhetoric is not restricted to the Orthodox 
Church. Aleksei Naval’nyi, the de facto figurehead of the democratic protest 
movement, is himself not averse to marching under such banners as ‘Stop Feeding 
the Caucasus’ and ‘Russia for the Russians’, a contradiction to which we return in 
a later chapter. Somewhat inconveniently, democratic transformation and ethnic 
inclusivity do not always coincide; to what extent the former is dependent on the 
latter is a debatable point well beyond Russia, of course, but it is a debate with 
particularly acute consequences for that country.
Nonetheless, the very fact that Kozlov and Sobchak presented their contrast-
ing visions within a discussion show broadcast on Russia’s leading state tele-
vision channel is indicative of a level of dialogic exchange which, although 
tame by western standards, belies the broadcaster’s image as a mere purveyor 
of Kremlin propaganda. Such licence is not often accorded to political issues 
on Channel 1 (though until the Ukraine crisis it was more frequent than some 
western commentators might imagine), and the fact that deep discord over the 
significance of events which bring ethnic and cultural difference into sharp 
relief is one of a number of exceptions brings us to the third factor linking the 
topic of our book to issues of civil society and Russia’s political future. For, 
as we shall find, the terrain of inter-ethnic difference has the capacity to blur 
into and contaminate adjacent, but separate, fields. This is true in the ‘positive’ 
sense of fostering pluralism within public discourse (the Kremlin’s own ambiva-
lence over inter-ethnic cohesion policy facilitates the airing of disagreements 
of the sort demonstrated by the V kontekste clash). But it also has a profoundly 
‘negative’ dimension, as indicated by the ethnicizing of consensus-building. 
The question of which of the two tendencies will eventually prevail is key to 
Russia’s future.
It is also apparent – and the V kontekste exchange suggests as much – that 
television will have more of a say in determining the answer to the question than 
might be supposed. This, then, takes us to the core of the second challenge to 
percieved wisdom that we are posing. Here too there are three ways in which to 
interrogate the received view. First, although television is losing ground to other, 
freer and more flexible media in terms of its relevance to Russian civil society, 
it stubbornly remains the information source of choice for the majority of Rus-
sians,8 just as Putin’s presidency retains more than respectable levels of support 
beyond the rarefied world of the metropolitan intelligentsia.9 Transforming Russia 
will be impossible without changing the outlook of the many millions of ordinary 
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 Russians who continue to watch, enjoy and generally trust Channel 1 and other 
state broadcasters.
Second, as the V kontekste clash also illustrates, it is on television rather than 
via the Internet or new social media forms that the encounter between official 
and sub-official thinking of the sort represented by Kozlov, Kostina and, indeed, 
the host Shevchenko and the counter-cultural views of Sobchak, Gel’man and 
others is most likely to occur. Without such dialogues, any genuine transfer 
of power is likely to involve violence. Television’s vital mediatory capacity 
extends beyond its function as a site for dialogue. It is precisely because it 
appeals to (and, in Russia, is oriented towards) a mass audience that it also 
serves as the point at which official diversity management policy must engage 
with the xenophobic fears and prejudices of a general populace resentful at an 
influx of post-Soviet migrant workers over which the Kremlin struggles to assert 
control. Again, it is difficult to underestimate the associated responsibilities that 
state-aligned broadcasting acquires.
The fact that national television’s function in broadcasting to mass audiences 
is now threatened by new media narrowcasting modes (including satellite and 
cable television) adds to its responsibilities. As Evgenii Morozov has argued, far 
from offering a basis for national, democratic renewal, web-based communication 
and social media platforms have a tendency to fragment societies into closed, 
self-affirming communities of the like-minded.10 For all its lack of agility, prohib-
itive expense and propensity to orient itself towards state orthodoxies, television 
remains one of the most effective tools for maintaining the vast, imagined commu-
nity that is the modern nation. Moreover, it does so not merely by stating the fact 
of its existence, but by performing it through the very genres it adopts (in his own, 
limited way, Kozlov is both naming the ‘maturing consensus’ to which he refers 
and enacting it by striving to draw hostile interlocutors onto common ground). If 
officially sanctioned discourse fails to develop this role considerably further than 
the limited manner in which it is fulfilled in V kontekste (we shall refer more than 
once to the importance of television’s ‘performative’ function), one Russia may 
literally become two and then multiple Russias, even as the prospects for national 
democratic renewal recede.
Two cities
Some of the preceding discussion would not be out of place in a wider European 
context. In order to signal the position we will be adopting in relation to this over-
lap, and to present the remaining issues which our book addresses, we turn to a sec-
ond introductory example – this time taken from Channel 1’s sister broadcaster. On 
19 September 2010, as the repercussions of France’s expulsion of Roma migrants 
who had travelled from Romania resonated across Europe’s airwaves, the Rus-
sian state broadcaster Channel Rossiia’s Vesti news bulletin ran a report on the 
crisis, describing how one Moscow-based Roma encampment was responding by 
co-writing a protest letter to French president, Nicolas Sarkozy. Shot from inside 
the encampment, it commences with a snapshot of a contented, legally compliant 
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community at ease with its non-Roma neighbours, and enjoying a life superior to 
that of its European equivalents or its less fortunate domestic cousins:
Rustam lives in Moscow … and runs a music school for gypsy children. He 
is sure that he owes his success to his qualifications: ‘What can they do, these 
uneducated gypsies? Go and earn money on the streets! But if they know 
English, French, mathematics, they can easily find work’. Viacheslav Valen-
tinovich is their neighbour: ‘As you see, we get along well … Everything is 
fine, unlike in Romania’.
But as the ‘baron’ of the encampment phones his anxious relatives in Paris, he 
comments revealingly: ‘If we can’t give some sort of support to gypsies in France, 
then we could probably also be told that people like us are not needed here.’ This 
seemingly off-the-cuff remark offsets the lyrical musings with which the jour-
nalist concludes: ‘How can one not love gypsies if all the world’s best songs are 
gypsy songs?’, he asks with a rhetorical flourish, accompanied by the briefest 
snatch of a traditional gypsy ballad.
The Roma story translates the European issue into local idiom but also provides 
an interpretative key, ensuring that it is read according to the code implicit in the 
principle of ‘inter-ethnic strife’ (mezhnatsional’naia rozn’), a Soviet notion that 
applies to Russia ‘virtually’ (as something that happens elsewhere, or threatens to 
occur in the future), and which is outlawed under Russian legislation.11 In an elision 
reflecting Russia’s confused policy surrounding race, ethnicity and nationality, 
mezhnatsional’naia rozn’ translates as ‘inter-nationality strife’, though it covers 
what in English is normally termed ‘ethnic conflict’. Vesti’s implicit invocation 
of the concept is intended both to indicate the relative harmony between Russian 
gypsies and non-gypsies and to warn that those relations might deteriorate.
The offbeat story of the Moscow baron encapsulates several of our book’s cen-
tral concerns. First, it confirms that Russia is one of many European countries shar-
ing the migration-related concerns generated by the new wave of globalization. (It 
is vital to point out, however, that – since Russia’s significant gypsy population 
has been established for centuries – Rossiia’s attempt to link Moscow to Paris, and 
to locate its report in the context of global migration trends, reflects a misleading 
elision, to which we shall return.) With the Soviet Union receding into history, and 
despite the heavy hand of Putin, even news agendas and media formats operate 
in a globalized environment and bear more than a passing resemblance to those 
found elsewhere; fly-on-the-wall reportage featuring ordinary people at the centre 
of events is reassuringly familiar, for example. Television’s power to engage audi-
ences with the embodied, lived experiences of those like themselves is no more 
lost on Russian newsmakers than it is on their western counterparts.
Yet Russia sees itself as different. The implication of the Rossiia reporter’s privi-
leged access to the baron’s home, and of the concerned phone call to Paris, is that 
Russian inter-ethnic relations are more harmonious than those responsible for the 
plight of the Roma in France. Reality tells a different story; migration flows to Rus-
sia are second only to those to the United States and anti-migrant and  anti-minority 
attitudes, underpinned by a post-imperial angst and attendant suspicion of ‘the 
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 ethnic other’, are no less pronounced than in other European countries with colo-
nial legacies: the baron’s less-than-subtle warning hints at as much.12
Our gloss on mezhnatsional’naia rozn’ confirms that approaches to inter-ethnic 
cohesion in Russia continue to reflect the lingering influence of Soviet policies on 
nationality, representing the most ambitious attempt ever to transform a sprawling 
centripetal empire into a multicultural, federal state. In this far-reaching Soviet 
experiment, affirmative actions in support of minority cultures went hand in hand 
with repressions, and both policy lines at times implicitly reflected the percep-
tions of fixed, unchanging ethnic characteristics transmitted from generation to 
generation. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the inept stereotyping of the 
reporter described above, and his reluctance to sacrifice the evocative connota-
tions of the term ‘gypsy’ (tsygan) for the politically correct ‘Roma’ appellation 
common throughout Europe, should betray an unfamiliarity with the careful lan-
guage of ‘respect for minorities’ now well established in the official discourses 
and quality press of west European nations – though, as hysteria in the UK in early 
2014 about a feared EU-generated wave of Roma migration from Bulgaria and 
Romania testifies, this is far from fully embedded in the consciousness of those 
nations’ popular media.
The most glaring consequence of Russia’s communist past, however, is the con-
tinuing absence of western-style parliamentary democracy and a strong ‘fourth 
estate’, and thus, as we suggested earlier, of a public sphere united around consen-
sual values. Under Putin in particular, and contrary to the relative licence accorded to 
programmes like V kontekste, news bulletins such as Vesti have become constrained 
in what they can report and how they may report it.13 Significantly, of the 29 other 
stories that Vesti ran in the autumn of 2010 covering the Roma crisis, only one dealt 
with problems in the relationship between Russia and its large Roma community, 
despite genuine concerns about such problems among ordinary Russian citizens.14
Our Moscow–Paris conversation reveals a further legacy of the Soviet era: the 
stubbornly persistent tendency of the state-aligned media to construct Russian 
identity in relation to a western, as well as an ‘ethnic’, ‘other’.15 The predomina-
tion of reports on discrimination endured by Roma minorities elsewhere highlight 
a transparent effort to exploit European ‘misfortunes’ to Russian advantage, a 
strategy in relation to the representation of gypsies deriving from the late imperial 
period in Russia.
What is most revealing about Vesti’s instrumental approach to the Roma crisis 
is what it conceals. The narrative progression of the report generates a three-way 
contrast pitting a well-integrated Russian Roma community against: (i) its Euro-
pean counterparts; (ii) images of an alienated domestic underclass plagued by 
criminality and poverty; and (iii) other, unnamed minority communities lacking 
the gypsies’ romantic qualities. It is unclear whether the baron ‘let slip’ his com-
ment about the domestic implications of the crisis (one of the perils of vox pop 
is that ordinary people do not always adhere to their ‘script’), or whether he was 
primed to do so. (The airing of occasional warnings that currently stable domestic 
situations might deteriorate is characteristic of official discourse.) The reporter 
clearly aims to juxtapose the European crisis with a somewhat more ‘harmoni-
ous’ situation in Russia. Yet behind this one-dimensionality is a thinly disguised 
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polemic including the notion that disharmony reigns supreme in Russia too – for 
some of Europe’s most explosive conflicts are those involving ethnic Russians and 
North Caucasians or Central Asian migrants. Gypsies thus provide a foil for what, 
as we shall show, was one of the perennial non-dits of Russian state broadcasting, 
but which, as we also indicate, has emerged from the shadows with a vengeance 
following the 2012 presidential elections. Moreover, the reporter’s own harmoni-
ous presence in the community instigates a productive interplay between same-
ness and inclusion (an ethnic Russian implicitly addressing a viewing community 
of ethnic Russians, he is welcomed by his hosts) and exclusion and difference (he 
is reporting on the community because it is ethnically ‘other’) which serves as a 
model for exploring inter-ethnic relations at the national level.
There is, then, a disjunction between what the report ‘says’ (that Europe has a 
problem with migrants), what it ‘implies’ (that Russia boasts comparatively cohe-
sive inter-ethnic relations) and what it ‘does’: both overtly (enacting the ‘coming 
together’ of communities through its narrative structures and modes of address) and 
inadvertently (pre-empting perceptions of a rather different reality, and in so doing 
conferring credence on that reality). The implications of the disjunction for national 
cohesion and the condition of Russian public discourse are only too apparent.
Concentrated here, then, are some key questions motivating the chapters to fol-
low, all of which ultimately serve to illuminate the relationship between Russian 
television’s diversity management function and the prospects for civic renewal 
that is our overarching concern: (i) how does Russia’s status as a post-imperial 
European state shape its broadcasters’ representations of problems arising from 
accelerating population movements, and from transnational flows of media for-
mats and content? (ii) How does Russia’s Soviet legacy differentiate its approach 
to such problems from those of its European neighbours? (iii) How do the latter 
two factors combine to detach referential (‘saying’), associative (‘implying’) and 
performative (‘doing’) meanings?
Contemporary Russia is, in fact, a new state, struggling to stabilize and unify 
a plurality of identities in flux following the sudden disintegration of a vast, 
multi-ethnic empire and to formulate policies capable of dealing with the com-
bustible aftermath of that event. That it is doing so at a time when many European 
states are facing doubts about the efficacy of multiculturalist policies in amelio-
rating the consequences of the demise of their own empires only adds to the com-
plexity of the situation. The broader European context is in fact central to the 
rationale for this study, which we now present, before positioning it in relation to 
the existing body of relevant scholarship.
Rationale and the state of the field
The case for the study that we are undertaking is, as the preceding discussion has 
intimated, as multi-faceted as it is compelling. It has a number of dimensions to it:
1 Russia, one of the most ethno-culturally diverse countries in the world, pro-
vides a distinctive angle as to how globalization is disrupting and causing the 
radical rethinking of approaches to inter-ethnic cohesion.
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2 Russia’s authoritarian, centripetal state, weak civil society and high vulner-
ability to a variety of extreme, fundamentalist ideologies lends it particular 
importance in this context, since it tests to the limits the ability of the state, 
and of the nation-building led by public service broadcasters (PSB), to with-
stand the pressures that they currently face across the European continent.
3 Prominent among those pressures are global terrorism and an increasingly 
sophisticated network of international crime syndicates. These factors have 
contributed to the steady ‘securitization’ of advanced European democracies, 
to the point that some have suggested that the ‘state of exception’ justifying 
the incremental erosion of individual freedoms is inherent to the inner logic 
of democracy itself,16 or that ‘minorities’, far from retreating into their com-
munities – and aided by global communications – increasingly assert them-
selves as transnational ‘majorities’.17 In Russia as elsewhere, the media play 
a crucial role in fostering the climate of fear that feeds the voracious security 
culture. This makes it all the more necessary to delineate ‘democratic’ and 
‘authoritarian’ mediations of national and international security issues.
4 The influx of migrants from predominantly Muslim countries as a particularly 
controversial contributor to securitization has coincided with the emergence 
of a covert ‘new racism’, a prejudice based on a pseudo-rational hostility to 
alien customs and beliefs rather than a blind hatred of biological difference: 
both more liable to infiltrate mainstream public opinion and no less damaging 
to the fabric of society.18 As the European country with the largest domestic 
Muslim population and the largest number of migrants from predominantly 
Muslim societies (mostly of the former Soviet Central Asia and Transcau-
casia), Russia is highly prone to these trends. Islam has a different status in 
Russia than in western Europe, since in the former it is legally recognized as 
one of the country’s ‘traditional religions’, alongside Orthodox Christianity, 
Judaism and Buddhism. The Muscovite state had begun incorporating large 
regions with a predominantly Muslim population as early as the sixteenth 
century. Due to the nature of Russian imperial expansion, these regions are 
located on the state’s periphery rather than dispersed throughout the ‘host’ 
community (the primary economic migration of Muslims to the Russian 
heartlands is thus of a peculiar, ‘internal’ variety). The ways in which this 
complex set of similarities with and differences from other European societ-
ies play out in the broadcast media have import well beyond Russia.
5 The free flow of capital unleashed by 1980s deregulation culminated in the 
2008 global financial crisis which, along with mass immigration, has pro-
vided part of the backdrop for a revival of neo-conservative traditionalism 
founded on a retrenchment into a more inward-looking, protectionist nation-
alism and an embrace of the ‘old-fashioned’ values of family and church (cf. 
the American ‘Tea Party’ and the UK Independence Party phenomenon in 
Britain). An exploration of the Russian variant on this transnational phenom-
enon is as likely to enhance our understanding of the latter as of the former.
6 The co-existence of this isolationist popular nationalism with the neo- 
imperial nationalism of Putin’s regime, strikingly manifested in the popularly 
supported annexation of the Crimea in 2014 and reflected in the long-term 
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Eurasian Union project about which Russia’s citizens tend to be far less 
enthusiastic, reflects several contradictory faces of Russian nationhood. An 
understanding of how these contradictions are mediated is crucial for assess-
ing Russia’s current and future political trajectories.
7 Finally, the future of the Putin regime, of Russia’s fledgling civil society and 
of the Russian Federation itself depends on how the challenge of achieving 
society’s inter-ethnic and inter-faith cohesion is met. The country’s political 
culture is shaped by a public discourse contaminated with the threat of seces-
sion of the Islamic North Caucasus, growing conflicts between non-Russian 
‘migrants’19 and their ‘host’ communities and the dual toxins of national-
ist extremism and a now rampant anti-western phobia. The responsibility of 
journalists to mitigate such dangers, hampered as they are by an embattled, 
repressive state, is onerous. The price of failure could, as we began to see in 
2014, be paid by the rest of Europe.
In light of its varied and far-reaching significance, it is therefore surprising that 
Russian television’s approach to inter-ethnic cohesion remains a blind spot in the 
scholarly literature, especially since there is an abundance of research relating to 
western Europe.20 The media’s influence on the playing out of ‘crises of multicul-
turalism’21 is even greater in post-communist countries than in western Europe, 
given the residual control that the state maintains here. Yet the majority of relevant 
publications are non-scholarly reports by various human rights agencies.22 The 
body of scholarly works on media coverage of ethnicity-related matters in Rus-
sia and other post-communist countries remains small and, rather than offering a 
comprehensive and systematic analysis of the subject, usually focuses either on 
specific incidents or on single issues (such as representations of migrants or Roma 
communities). Moreover, for logistical reasons which render the intensive study 
of television problematic in other contexts, these works also tend largely to rely 
on evidence from print media and the internet.23
The dearth of antecedents to our study is explained partly by the specificities of 
the disciplinary intersection at which it is located: Russian Studies is traditionally 
conservative in its attitude to emerging fields such as media studies – a legacy of 
its historical concern with the seemingly weightier ethical and ideological issues 
raised by the twentieth century’s most influential totalitarian regime and its after-
math. Even now, when the Russian media are subjected to analysis, the focus is 
typically on matters pertaining to press freedom, state manipulation and electoral 
politics.24 When covering Russia, west European media outlets are more com-
fortable highlighting issues of press freedom and political repression than migra-
tion-induced tensions in multicultural policies, since the latter do not fit familiar 
stereotypes of a Russia entirely foreign to domestic (i.e. west European) preoc-
cupations. Yet the way in which these issues unfold could have consequences for 
Russia’s political future far greater than the fate of this or that celebrated pro- 
democracy ‘dissident’. Indeed, while many observers of the post-Soviet world 
(and other regions) make the implicit and normative assumption that political 
trajectories in these regions must invariably culminate in western-style  democracy, 
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we might caution that there is little historical or contemporary evidence to support 
such a view. Indeed, a central part of our purpose is to challenge it.
Aims and objectives
In addressing the blind spots outlined above, we focus on Russian national televi-
sion’s mediations of the shifts and contradictions in government policy on ethnic 
diversity and the currents of populist xenophobia and nationalist extremism which 
infiltrate it from below, assessing how issues of inter-ethnic cohesion are affecting 
the balance, the emotional texture and the lexicon of the public discourse that is 
the corollary of these clashes. Even Russia’s highly regulated media system (about 
which we will say more in Chapter 1) must accommodate a circulation of mean-
ings emanating from official, sub-official and unofficial sources. Kremlin pro-
nouncements at once internalize and moderate the often more extreme positions 
of Duma deputies, or those of parallel sources of legitimacy such as the Orthodox 
Church.25 They also draw on the influences of ideologically convenient academic 
and pseudo-academic writings and of popular and subcultural discourses whose 
connotative inflections they fail to anticipate. We illuminate the nature of that 
circulation as it relates to issues of inter-community cohesion.
Key to the dynamics of the circulation is the relationship between approaches 
to issues within news bulletins and how they are exacerbated or mitigated in the 
non-news programming whose porosity provides sub-official discourses a point of 
access to the official sphere. Yet despite their predominance in the Russian view-
er’s diet, genres such as the talk show, fictional drama and comedy series rarely 
feature in existing news and current affairs-oriented studies of the  post-Soviet 
media.26 Just as important to the task of capturing the multi-directional mediatory 
trajectories of ethnicity discourses, and just as marginal within the scholarly litera-
ture, is the interpretation of state policies adopted by regional broadcasters.27 We 
will make good a portion of both gaps.
We remain attuned throughout to the dual legacy of Russian imperialism and 
Soviet communism whose outlines we present in more detail in our first chapter. 
We will also maintain an implicitly comparative perspective, attempting wherever 
possible to locate Russian television’s struggle to mediate the competing forces 
surrounding issues of ethnicity and nationalism within European media culture. 
We estimate the extent to which it deviates from trends prevalent in western 
broadcasting on one hand, while asking whether the Russian case challenges our 
assumptions about the very normative status of those trends on the other. We pay 
particular attention to the complex re-articulation of race, ethnicity, religion and 
culture which has occurred in the wake of globalization, and to the crisis in liberal 
values and the waning credibility of multiculturalism played out in media systems 
across the continent.
Our study also opens out in the direction of contemporary Russian society 
more generally. With or without Putin, Russia must confront two monumental 
 challenges: the achievement of stable relations between communities, some of 
which are characterized by mutual perceptions of radical ‘otherness’, and the 
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development of a vibrant civil society in which the media facilitates the expres-
sion of ideological difference. The shared legacy of communism and the now dra-
matically changing dynamic of Russia’s relationship with its neighbouring states 
should ensure that our findings illuminate issues of ethnic tension in Europe’s 
other transition societies.
The final context which we address lies beyond academic study altogether. For 
if, by analysing what in Russia is something of an ‘outlier’, we uncover fresh 
lenses through which to view other European broadcasters’ role in fostering/hin-
dering community cohesion, we will contribute, albeit modestly, to shaping how 
they see their own responsibilities and identify their own blind spots.
Theory and method
At the heart of the book lies a variant of critical discourse analysis which adopts 
the Bakhtinian principle that audio-visual communication, like language, is 
socially situated and shot through with the aftertaste of the ideological struggles 
which motivate it. It is also informed by a belief in the importance of the histori-
cal precursors which leave their indelible mark on its rhetorical structures. As 
qualitative research, the analysis locates the meanings it mines in the discursive 
shifts and nuances pervading individual texts, rather than in the broad aggregate 
patterns recovered by data-led quantitative approaches. It privileges significant 
difference over recurring norm, though the distinction is far from absolute. Battles 
over the representation of inter-ethnic cohesion and the inflammatory sentiments 
they expose are fought precisely on the territory of covert meaning, repressed 
historical precedent and lexical nuance.
The study draws on the concept of ‘mediation’, which Roger Silverstone 
describes as ‘the fundamentally uneven, dialectical process in which institutional-
ized media are involved in the general circulation of symbols in social life’.28 We 
remain cognizant of mediation’s dialectical aspect and of the fact that, whatever 
manipulation it is subject to by the political elite, television operates squarely in 
the broader realm of culture. Even under Putin, the key to achieving the societal 
consensus capable of sustaining hegemonic pre-eminence over the plurality of 
competing opinions characterizing the Russian public sphere is appropriation of 
the definition of what passes for ‘consensus’. In the process, culture becomes what 
Jesus Martin-Barbero describes as the ‘strategic battlefield in the struggle to define 
the terms of the conflict’, for ‘there is no hegemony – nor counter  hegemony – 
without cultural circulation … no imposition from above which does not imply an 
incorporation of what comes from below’.29
There is little question that the Putin regime, too, implicitly recognizes that a 
consensus as complex as that relating to inter-ethnic relations cannot be merely 
‘communicated’, no matter how sophisticated the medium, and that, far from 
being tainted by ‘degradation’, it is national television’s capacity to straddle the 
official realm and that of the unofficial discourses prevailing in culture at large 
which make it such a useful consensus-management tool.
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But ‘cultural circulation’ cannot, by definition, be controlled. The tensions 
that this contradiction generates intersect with a related Gramscian paradox: for 
if hegemonic consensus relies on the circulation of meanings ‘from above and 
from below’, the dynamism of the process depends on the constant renewal of the 
antagonisms between those meanings. Thus, as Ernesto Laclau, whose account 
of populism informs several chapters, argues, populism is not a fixed ideological 
constellation ‘but … proceeds by articulating fragmented and dislocated demands 
around a new core’.30 He stresses the need for heterogeneity, but argues that it ‘has 
as one of its defining features a dimension of deficient being or failed unicity’.31 
The demands must remain discrete, yet contain within them an unfulfilled urge 
towards unity. The populist impulse situates itself at the core of the creative ten-
sion pitting the need for the revitalizing dynamism of difference and antagonism 
against the urge for unity and subordination. For a semi-authoritarian government 
suffering a crisis of legitimacy, the imperative to navigate the treacherous waters 
of populism is particularly acute.
As broadcasters negotiate the paradoxes structuring media environments, a gap 
opens up in which their status as performers of communicative acts is decou-
pled from their function as purveyors of messages. This gap is best approached 
through J. L. Austin’s notion of ‘performativity’ in speech acts, and in particular 
through his distinction between locution (the words spoken), illocutionary force 
(what the speaker is attempting to achieve) and perlocutionary effect (the conse-
quence flowing from the utterance).32 These acquire new dimensions when what is 
at stake is the mediated representation of a multi-ethnic nation. For representation 
always involves the performative claim to hegemony over the definition of the rep-
resented reality favoured by one discourse, against that of competing discourses; 
the trace of differences between them is never effaced from the object of represen-
tation. The battle for representational rights is waged at the borders between the 
discourses. In Bakhtin’s words, ‘meaning lives on the boundary between its own 
context and another, alien context’.33
The hegemonic power embodied in representation is associated with the drive 
to reorient the hybrid voices inhabiting all discourse towards what Bakhtin calls 
the unifying, centripetal discourse.34 For dialogism is not restricted to hybridity 
within speech; even apparently single-voiced utterances are oriented towards an 
unnamed external collocutor. This has particular salience for a state broadcaster 
the subtext of whose utterances is directed at rebuffing hostile opponents.
The final element in our toolset is the genealogical prism through which we cap-
ture the reconfiguration and reinvention of the imperial and Soviet legacies within 
the current context. The genealogical prism also illuminates the chain of wider 
associations which media representations are likely to trigger among viewers who 
share a set of perceptions rooted in this legacy. Much of the historical background 
informing this prism is presented in our next chapter. But if, in operating the 
genealogical tool, we emphasize the historical contingency of ethnicity, we must 
simultaneously stress that notions of ethnicity, race and nation are always contin-
gent in a more immediate sense, too; they are articulated for  particular  purposes 
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by particular groups and applied to situations and events which may, in other 
contemporary contexts, lack those meanings. Here we draw on the work of Rogers 
Brubaker, whose argument that ethnicity, race and nationhood are ‘perspectives 
on the world rather than entities in the world’ complements Bakhtin’s insistence 
on the contextual dialogism of all meaning. It is an argument that underlies every 
chapter in this book.
Brubaker’s reminder that when politicians, journalists and members of soci-
ety throughout the world talk about ‘ethnic groups’, they tend to impose the 
category of ‘ethnicity’ onto disparate people who in reality usually have little 
in common,35 immediately comes to mind when we encounter in contemporary 
Russian public discourse the term ‘ethnic diasporas’ in reference to people of 
Caucasian or Central Asian origin who reside in Moscow or St Petersburg. But 
Brubaker’s analysis of the variable and contingent nature of groupness enables 
us to go beyond the now obvious argument that ethnicity, race and nationhood 
are constructed, setting the agenda for exploration of how these categories are 
constructed, reified and naturalized.36 Our book pursues this same agenda by 
analysing how Russian television’s representations constitute reified ethnicity as 
a powerful social agent.
It should by now be self-evident that our own understanding of the terms ‘eth-
nic’, ‘national’ and ‘racial’ differs radically from that of the broadcasters we ana-
lyse. For reasons of convenience, however, this does not mean that whenever we 
import instances of their usage into our discourse we feel obliged to place every 
such instance in scare quotes. As Edward Said commented, ‘labels purporting to 
name very large and complex realities are notoriously vague and at the same time 
unavoidable’.37 We remain acutely aware of the problematic status of the termi-
nology that Russian broadcasters are prone to use with neither discrimination nor 
consistency. Rather than cluttering the text with endless typographical reminders 
and other caveats (which, however, we do not altogether eschew when we deem 
them to be necessary), we hope the reader accepts that the need for that awareness 
can be taken as axiomatic.
Brubaker further warns us against treating ethnicity, race and nationalism as 
separate subfields of inquiry, and emphasizes instead their interconnectedness.38 
Again, this is relevant to the Russian case, where the word ‘nation’ (natsiia) is 
utilized not only to define the entire Russian Federation as the imagined com-
munity of all its citizens (grazhdanskaia rossiiskaia natsiia) but, in line with the 
Soviet approach, continues to be used interchangeably with the term ‘ethnos’. 
In the latter usage both ‘nation’ and ‘ethnos’ describe another type of imagined 
collectivity – a sub-state community of people who claim common ancestry, spe-
cific cultural traditions and even supposedly common behavioural characteristics. 
Race in the rigidly biological sense is explicitly utilized by marginal activists.39 In 
Kremlin-sponsored discourse, race is not explicitly evoked, yet it is nevertheless 
implicitly present. The genealogical prism, then, gives our apparatus the historical 
perspective vital for an understanding of how our topic is shaped by the unique 
Soviet legacy. The apparatus will be supplemented by other tools keyed to the 
particular issues under scrutiny.
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In order to extend the findings derived from a preliminary statistical analysis 
of news recordings and to corroborate, contextualize and enrich the theoreti-
cally informed close readings which form the greater part of the book, we con-
ducted interviews with 16 prominent television journalists. They work primarily 
for Channel 1 and Rossiia, but some also for NTV, two independent broad-
casting companies and the main channel of the Siberian republic of Buriatiia 
(see below). Among them were leading television personalities such as Dmitrii 
Kiselev, depu ty director of the All-Russian State Television and Radio Company 
(2008–12) and since August 2012 anchor of one of Russia’s most widely viewed 
television news programmes, Vesti nedeli, as well as director of the newly estab-
lished Russian information agency Russia Today as of December 2013; Ark-
adii Mamontov, the highly controversial journalist from the Rossiia channel; 
and a prominent presenter and political commentator from Channel 1, Maksim 
Shevchenko. They were happy to allow us to refer to them by name in this book. 
As one might expect of employees of Russian state television, they are loyal to 
the government and act as executors of state policies. Yet they are also bold char-
acters whose semi-radical views play a crucial role in maintaining viewer ratings. 
It became clear during the course of our interviews that their personal views and 
interests have a significant influence on what they say and present on screen. They 
are, as we shall see, much more than merely the passive mouthpieces of their 
political masters.40
We scheduled the interviews for late 2012 and early 2013 to ensure that they 
took place after we had already conducted a preliminary analysis of our broadcast-
ing sample. This allowed us to ask questions about the context for significant shifts 
which we had noted in the coverage of specific issues. We also asked journalists to 
comment on our interpretations of individual broadcasts. Our interviewees – who, 
despite the provocative nature of some of our questions, often spoke with virtually 
no inhibition – offered us important insights into the actual processes by which 
news and other television programmes are produced, including the important role 
played by self-censorship, which most Russian journalists exercise with great 
skill. In the absence of explicit written guidelines on how to cover sensitive issues 
such as those followed by the BBC, our interviewees’ explanations of unwritten 
rules in the coverage of ethnicity-related issues proved useful for our analysis. The 
information we obtained through the interviews, and the findings we derived from 
it, are deployed in a supporting capacity and are dispersed throughout the book 
rather than presented in one discrete section.
The approaches we adopt reflect our respective disciplinary backgrounds, com-
bining aspects of cultural theory with a strong commitment – to the extent that 
our evidence allows it – to the careful tracing of lines of empirical causation, 
and offering complementary synchronic and diachronic accounts of the intertex-
tual affinities and contrasts and affinities in the media texts we analyse. Thus, 
we seek both to locate those texts within an associative network of parallel and 
paratextual cultural meanings and to explicate their genealogical influences and 
historical antecedents. At times the synthesis is managed within a single chap-
ter; elsewhere it takes shape over several. The different critical idioms deployed 
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require  divergent lexicons and styles of writing, the tensions between which are 
hopefully productive and contribute to the scope and subtlety of our argument.
Purely qualitative research cannot adequately convey the accumulated mean-
ings generated in a two-year recording period. Striking the right balance between 
close readings of small numbers of texts and engaging with the volume dimension 
is a challenge. We have addressed it through the very structure of our book, whose 
chapters alternate between: (i) broad-ranging analyses of themes drawing on mul-
tiple news bulletins; (ii) case studies based on the coverage of specific events (the 
‘Manezhnaia’ disturbances in December 2010, annual celebrations of the Day of 
National Unity; the Pussy Riot scandal of 2012); and (iii) an ‘intermediate’ cate-
gory centring on particular television genres (the talk show; the fictional drama). 
The events providing the focus for two case studies (Manezhnaia and Pussy Riot) 
are located at opposite ends of our corpus (2010 and 2012 respectively). The third 
(Day of National Unity) examines coverage from 2010, 2011 and 2012. These 
case studies thus facilitate the diachronic analysis of shifts in the tendencies that 
our thematic chapters uncover.
Two intertwined themes run throughout this book. First, we demonstrate the 
pivotal role of television in contributing (with varying degrees of success) to 
the transformation of particular occasions and incidents into ‘media events’. The 
latter we define, after Couldry and Hepp, as ‘situated, thickened, centering per-
formances of mediated communication that are focused on a particular thematic 
core, cross different media products and reach a wide and diverse multiplicity of 
audiences and participants’.41 We identify four sub-genres of media event, corre-
sponding to four different sets of relationship between the phenomenon’s com-
ponent elements (‘media’ and ‘event’): one more closely aligned with Dayan and 
Katz’s original definition of the term as an occasion when media and state openly 
collaborate in constituting a carefully planned, ritualized event as an official occa-
sion of nation-building value (the Day of National Unity celebrations);42 a second 
reflecting Couldry and Hepp’s recasting of the original definition, encompassing 
minor, unplanned disruptions to normality which media and state then covertly 
collude in inflating into major societal stand-offs (the Pussy Riot scandal); a third 
drawing on Couldry and Hepp’s identification of the media event’s inherently ago-
nistic nature, incorporating unanticipated major disturbances in the mitigation of 
whose consequences the media are assigned the key role (the Manezhnaia riots); 
and a fourth, ‘endogenous’ type in which a media product itself generates signif-
icant societal conflict (the scandal over the 2010 reality television serial, Shkola). 
Together these different sub-genres provide the architecture for the argument we 
develop in the book.
The second theme is the role of television in generating different, and often 
conflicting, modes of combining national unity and ethno-cultural diversity – the 
two features which, according to Kremlin-sponsored discourse, in equal measure 
distinguish Russia as a distinct type of community. The ‘media events’ we discuss 
lay bare the contradictory nature of these combinations and reveal the inability 
of the state-aligned media to reflect this ideal systematically in their coverage. 
Demonstrating the instability and fluidity of different combinations of unity and 
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diversity throughout the broadcasts we analyse, we also note a pronounced shift 
towards one particular combination during Putin’s third presidency.
We preface our interpretative readings with some basic statistical analyses of 
our recorded data, enabling us to identify the key tendencies that emerge from it. 
Their purpose is not to generate our overarching arguments (these emerge from 
the subsequent chapters); the book does not centre on a comprehensive, multi-as-
pectual ‘content analysis’ informed by the full battery of statistical tools available 
to social scientists who research media trends. Instead, it offers an introduction 
to the corpus and a point of reference for the more focused analyses to follow. A 
complete account of its design will be provided in Chapter 2.
Sources
Located at the intersection of the official policy positions of the state and the 
beliefs and concerns of citizens, the news bulletin has a unique mediatory capacity 
and is our primary source of material. With its immersion in the routine patterns 
of the everyday, it also offers access to representation in its typifying dimension: 
the production of ethnicity discourses in their recurrent, ‘representative’ mode. 
Over a two-year period (September 2010 to August 2012) we recorded alternating 
three-month blocks of the main evening news bulletin of the two state channels: 
Vremia (Channel 1) and Vesti (Rossiia). Since both Vremia and Vesti provide a 
full archive of broadcasts dating back several years on their respective websites, 
we were able to access reports relevant to our topic which fell in between our 
three-month recording blocks or outside the corpus altogether. After our record-
ing period finished, we continued to monitor Channel 1 and Rossiia’s coverage 
through the channels’ web archives until the summer of 2014. We also used web-
sites to view reports relating to the events and issues in question on NTV, REN 
TV and Dozhd’ TV.
If we imagine a spectrum running from the unofficial discourses generated by 
popular culture to the Kremlin’s rehearsed policy statements, news bulletins, par-
ticularly those on Channel 1, tend to occupy a position considerably closer to the 
latter than the former. Other genres belong elsewhere on the spectrum. Russian 
talk shows and documentaries rarely stray too far from the official line, but their 
vernacular style of delivery, pseudo-dramatic modes of presentation and inclusion 
of figures from beyond the mainstream render them a filter for unorthodox view-
points. Comedy formats and fictional dramas likewise serve as gateways to the 
popular mythologies, narratives and stereotypes which rarely find their way into 
news bulletins. With their location at the margins of that realm and away from the 
political spotlight, they also provide space in which mainstream positions can be 
interrogated or developed to their logical conclusion. We draw on all these forms.
While national television is our primary focus, the regional dimension can-
not be altogether bracketed out. The way in which the Putin government’s 
nation-building effort is interpreted at the edges of the Russian Federation will 
tell us much about its inner coherence and outward effectiveness. We devote 
one chapter to the coverage of Vesti-Buriatiia (Buriatiia News) broadcast by the 
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Buriatiian State Television and Radio Company based in Ulan-Ude, Buriatiia, 
one of Russia’s autonomous republics, on the eastern shores of Lake Baikal 
in Siberia. Buriatiia has a large Buddhist population, reflecting its previous 
colonial status. It is an ethnically diverse republic which includes a majority 
Russian contingent and is overwhelmingly loyal to Moscow, but as we shall 
see, Vesti-Buriatiia expresses that loyalty in a quite distinctive manner. For this 
programme we obtained a news recording set, organized on the same principles 
as those for Vremia and Vesti.
Chapter outline
In putting the rationale we have outlined into practice, we divide the book into 
three parts. In the first, we analyse national news reports which tend (though not 
exclusively) to cleave closely to the stated government position, and through 
which broadcasters strive to manage issues – anticipated and unanticipated – 
 arising from ethno-cultural difference. In Part II, we explore how difference plays 
out at the margins of the official sphere, focusing on: (i) non-news genres whose 
relative distance from the centre of power accords them greater licence to breach 
official mantras (fictional dramas; comedy series); (ii) regional television news 
bulletins which reflect the geo-political context in which they operate. Part III 
deals with the radical changes in coverage of issues of ethnicity during and after 
the transition to Putin’s controversial third term as president.
Preceded by Chapter 1, which offers an overview of the historical background 
to our topic and of the current state of Russian television broadcasting, Part I 
opens with our second chapter, in which we present in numerical form the data 
derived from the full set of daily recordings. We identify the broad patterns and 
trends that these data bring to light, and thus the themes which guide us in sub-
sequent chapters. Drawing on these themes, Chapter 3 analyses Russia’s Day of 
National Unity (DNU), celebrated on 4 November, as a failed media event of 
the first, collaborative, kind. We examine broadcasters’ approach towards DNU’s 
interpretation of the ‘Unity in Diversity’ mantra and of the meaning of Russian 
nationhood, tracing the shifts that have occurred since DNU was introduced, and 
its inexorable decline into irrelevance. Chapter 4 situates the relationship between 
news broadcasting, multiculturalist nation-building and the media’s management 
of growing inter-ethnic tension in the context of a media event of the second, ago-
nistic, type: the Manezhnaia riots, which became a defining moment in the recent 
history of inter-ethnic relations in Russia.
In Part II, the emphasis shifts to the refraction of inter-ethnic cohesion issues 
and policies through perspectives emanating from culturally and geographically 
peripheral realms. Chapter 5 reads recent Russian fictional drama and comedy 
series in terms of their function as a gateway through which competing subcul-
tural prejudices and counter-discriminatory discourses infiltrate the spaces of 
official culture; we treat the most controversial of these programmes, the 2010 
Channel 1 serial Shkola, as a media event of the endogenous variety since it was 
itself the source of raging societal conflict. Chapter 6 considers the discursive 
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strategies which Vesti-Buriatiia utilizes in order to address the republic of Buriati-
ia’s borderland position and to negotiate its cultural and religious diversity.
Part III explores the febrile environment of Russian electoral politics, focus-
ing on the lead up to, and aftermath of, the 2012 presidential election. Chapter 
7 begins by noting how, at first glance, news coverage of the campaign down-
played the importance of the ‘national question’. We consider why this should 
be the case, arguing that it was in fact far more important to key actors on both 
government and opposition sides than has been acknowledged. In Chapter 8 we 
demonstrate how a collusive media event co-ordinated by the Orthodox Church 
and the state media generated from the Pussy Riot affair a public scandal linked 
to the production of a highly exclusionary form of Russian-ness. Our concluding 
chapter explores the paradoxical relationship between an increasingly repressive 
Kremlin and federal broadcasters whose demonization of the dual figures of the 
migrant and the (radical) Muslim signalled a newfound capacity to drive rather 
than be driven by official rhetoric, and a retreat from the last vestiges of the diver-
sity management function.
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1  Television and nationhood
The broader context
In this chapter we set out the context, both historical and contemporary, for our 
subsequent analysis of Russian television broadcasts. The disciplines which this 
book brings together – empire and nationalism studies and media studies – are 
vibrant fields of scholarly inquiry. It is, therefore, necessary to outline where we 
stand on the key debates, particularly on the role of the imperial and Soviet lega-
cies in contemporary politics of belonging in Russia and the specific role televi-
sion plays in fostering or hindering community cohesion world-wide. We reject 
the view which claims that Russian developments are unique; yet we acknowl-
edge that – as is the case with any country – in Russia global processes take 
specific forms, depending on local circumstances. Throughout the book we aim 
to capture the interaction between the global and the local, and this chapter links 
the Russian case to existing analysis of the relationship between television and 
nationhood in other parts of the world.
Identity, empire and the ‘national question’
When watching Russian television today one is struck by the frequency with 
which broadcasters evoke the category of ethnicity in discussing current affairs. 
As we will see, it is only in a minority of cases that what in Russia is called 
mezhetnicheskie otnosheniia (inter-ethnic relations) constitutes the main subject 
of news. But ethnicity, even if implicitly, often frames the discussion of social and 
political events. Such an ethnicized view in itself is not specific to Russia. The 
notion of a world divided into discrete ethno-cultural communities, often assumed 
to be homogenous, dates back to nineteenth-century Romantic nationalism, which 
shaped the way Europeans came to see the world for years to come. It is not only in 
Russia that this legacy persists. In fact, its underlying assumptions can inform the 
arguments of both promoters and critics of Europe’s policies of multiculturalism.1
In the Russian case, the ethnicized vision of the world has been significantly 
strengthened by Soviet policies, which defined nationality (natsional’nost’) not as 
citizenship but as ethnicity (ethno-cultural identity), which was institutionalized 
at the sub-state level and turned into a key marker of social accounting.2 It is no 
coincidence that Rogers Brubaker’s argument that ethnicity, race and  nationhood 
are ‘perspectives on the world rather than entities in the world’ – an argument 
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which informs our understanding of ethnicity here – was, in part, based on his 
study of the Soviet experience.3 The Soviet government’s top-down policies, 
which imposed ethno-national labels on people who did not by and large think 
of themselves in ethnic and national terms, rendered the constructed nature of 
ethnicity and nationhood in particularly vivid colours.
Russia’s historical legacy is above all linked to the imperial nature of the state. 
Its beginnings are usually dated to the sixteenth century. Soviet leaders depicted 
the USSR as anti-colonial, claiming equality of all its nationalities. Yet retrospec-
tively, the Soviet state is also widely perceived as an empire in which the periph-
eries were subordinate to and exploited by the centre.4 Today the description of 
historical Russia as an empire often has a pejorative meaning, but in Russia itself 
the imperial past is not infrequently evoked with pride.5
The post-1991 Russian Federation has retained the Soviet approach of insti-
tutionalized and territorialized ethnicity. It contains 21 ethnic republics and four 
further autonomous ethnic districts named after a particular nationality and repre-
sented as this nationality’s homeland. In most cases a sense of ‘groupness’ and its 
imaginings in national terms are a result of Soviet policies.6 The continuing exis-
tence of separate administrative units for non-Russian nationalities allows Russian 
politicians to boast about the country’s strong support for minority cultures. The 
Russian–Chechen war waged by both El’tsin’s and Putin’s governments, not to 
mention the recent annexation of Crimea, reminded the world about the colonial 
origins of Russia’s relationship with its peripheries.
Still, imperial imaginings alone do not tell us the full story of Russia’s construc-
tion as a community, either in the past or post-1991. In her penetrating analysis 
of how ‘the congruence of nation with state has historically been resisted’ by 
the Russians, Nancy Condee concludes that the ‘Russia of Tsarist, Soviet and 
even post-Soviet times as an “imagined community” is not a nation’.7 She further 
argues that observers’ presumption that ‘imagined community’ is a ‘nation’ for the 
Russians can only hinder our ‘understanding of Russia’s discursive formations’, 
and she urges scholars to employ analytical strategies which would help to capture 
Russia’s ‘imperial particularity’. Condee is right in her critique of the deployment 
of the term ‘nation’ as ‘the default category’ for defining collectivity in the modern 
world.8 Yet her broad argument about the Russian imagined community not being 
a nation glosses over the complexity of long-term pursuits to forge collective iden-
tities in Russia.
Condee’s conclusion implies that ‘Russia’ is always a clearly defined category. 
She explains that she uses it as a shortcut for the Tsarist empire, the USSR and 
post-Soviet Russia, all of which, she contends, are not nation-states but empires.9 
This (at first glance obvious) definition of what Russia is overstates its congruence 
with the empire, and obscures the fact that since the nineteenth century members 
of the Russian elites have been attempting to separate the Russian nation from 
the empire, defining this nation in multiple ways in terms of its geography (which 
rarely coincided with the entire imperial state) and membership.10  Vigorous 
attempts to distinguish ‘Russia’ from the entire state, now in its Soviet  incarnation, 
were resumed by national(ist) intellectuals in the 1960s. The geographical space 
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of this imagined Russian nation and its membership were again contested.11 The 
identification of ‘Russia’ with the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic 
(RSFSR) was one such definition, yet it was far from dominant; still, in his often 
instrumental struggle against the ‘imperial’ Soviet centre, El’tsin benefited from 
this tradition of separating ‘Russia’ from the larger state, exploiting it during the 
1990 and 1991 elections.12
Since the demise of the USSR, vigorous debates have raged about what a nation 
is in the Russian context and how the collectivity called the Russian Federation 
(the former RSFSR) should be defined.13 The fact that most Russian actors speak 
about contemporary Russia in terms of ‘nationhood’ should be taken seriously 
when studying the discursive formation of the imagined community. After all, 
Aleksandr Prokhanov’s insistence that he is an imperialist is primarily intended 
to shock, as are most other aspects of this writer’s public performances. In turn, 
the term ‘liberal empire’ – proposed in 2003 by a leading member of El’tsin’s first 
administration, Anatolii Chubais – failed to catch on.14 Significantly, in 2014, in 
contrast with the western media’s utilization of the Russian imperialism frame in 
coverage of Russia’s annexation of the Crimea, Channel 1 and Rossiia represented 
the Crimea as a core of the Russian nation, where the ethnic Russian spirit (russkii 
dukh) was stronger than in the Russian Federation itself.15
By refusing to recognize the Russians’ own attempts to define themselves in 
national terms – which today, if not historically, is the dominant way of consti-
tuting the Russian imagined community discursively – we imply that there exists 
a single normative experience of nation-building. Instead we should recall John 
Hall’s observation that the umbrella term ‘nationalism’ describes highly varied 
processes, which are shaped by their specific temporal and geographical settings.16 
Furthermore, by rejecting the significance of the current Russian discourses of 
nationhood, we unwittingly reify the category of the nation, implying that it is an 
entity defined by a set of objective characteristics. As we argued in the Introduc-
tion, we do not share this view. When describing today’s Russia as an empire we 
should also recall Michael Hechter’s conclusion that only post factum can it be 
determined whether nation- or empire-building has occurred.17 The membership 
of communities defined as national is fully equalitarian and non-hierarchical only 
in imagination, not in reality. The legacy of empire, with its tradition of Orien-
talizing the ethno-cultural ‘other’, is alive in the west too. Public fears about the 
threat to European values emanating from migrants from countries which used to 
be colonial domains of Europe testify to that.18
The construction of a compound identity for the peoples of Russia, with the 
help of an authoritative discourse of nation-building, has been part of Vladimir 
Putin’s broad agenda of strengthening the Russian state in the new millennium. 
It is significant, not least in terms of policy implications, that – in contrast to 
the Soviet period – in today’s official discourse the compound identity is now 
imagined as national, rather than supranational or imperial. The discourse empha-
sizes that the process of globalization has not made the nation-state a remnant 
of the past.19 It is too early to dismiss the current community-building project as 
a  failure. Yet it is important to analyse the effectiveness with which it is being 
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implemented, because the territorial unity of the Russian state in part depends on 
it. Whether the Russian Federation is able to remain within its current borders is 
of importance not only to Russia, but to the world at large.
Given the especially contradictory nature of the identity-forging strategies of 
the Soviet regime, the power of the imperial legacy and the recent beginnings 
of the current community-building project, it comes as no surprise that it is sur-
rounded by acute uncertainties. The official discourse of the nation emanating 
from the Kremlin since 2000 has been eclectic and – similarly to the situation 
across the entire post-Soviet region – marked by a strong tension between civic 
and ethnic definitions of nationhood and the resulting high degree of terminologi-
cal laxity and conceptual ambiguity. On the one hand, the regime has put major 
efforts, at least at the discursive level, into promoting a vision of Russia as a 
multi-ethnic, civic community (mnogonatsional’naia rossiiskaia grazhdanskaia 
natsiia), which is claimed to derive its power from Russia’s historical experiences 
of multi-ethnicity and multi-confessionalism. On the other, the primacy of the 
Russian language and culture, including Orthodox Christianity, as the binding 
force of the state-framed national community is also highlighted.20
What further complicates the situation is that the discourse of the  pan-Russian 
civic community is itself contradictory. One variant of this discourse leaves the 
Soviet legacy of managing multi-ethnicity uninterrogated, or even sees it in a 
positive light. Another variant is critical of the Soviet Union’s ‘multi-ethnic 
regime’, which legally and institutionally endorsed multiple ethnic categories, 
thereby encouraging public manifestations of ethnic particularism. This model 
of a civic national community, while accepting people with diverse ethnocultural 
backgrounds as citizens, sees the Soviet institutionalization of ethnicity as overtly 
detrimental to community cohesion. Many politicians in Moscow are concerned 
about the legacy of the Soviet Union’s ‘multi-ethnic regime’, but they are also 
aware that policies which openly reject the Soviet model of institutionalized eth-
nicity will not be accepted by the elites of Russia’s ethnic autonomies, which have 
existed since Soviet times.21
The political leadership does not have a monopoly on the discourse of the 
nation, in whose invention intellectuals invariably play a leading role. Intellectual 
discourses are highly heterogeneous, embracing ideas ranging from definitions 
of Russia as inseparable from its [former] empire to Russia as a community of 
ethnic Russians where minorities have no place.22 The concept of a democratic 
political nation of Russia’s citizens has been consistently promoted only by a 
few public figures.23 Politicians recognize the role of intellectual discourses in 
 nation-building and they instrumentally utilize particular intellectual constructs, 
depending on the requirement of the moment.24
The contradictions are not only within the Kremlin-sponsored discourse itself; 
there is also a mismatch, which is not unique to Russia, between the official rhet-
oric of multi-ethnic harmony and societal xenophobia. The latter seems to have 
grown since the mid-2000s.25 Riots in the Karelian town of Kondopoga in 2006 
set the pattern for future similar incidents in other Russia’s cities. Expressions 
of  public discontent tend to follow an ordinary fight that leads to a fatality: the 
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involvement of representatives of non-Russian minorities triggers an interpreta-
tion of the events through the lens of ethnic conflict and the ineffectiveness and 
perceived corruption of the authorities handling the case leads to mass demon-
strations or riots that feature extreme nationalist slogans and demands to expel 
members of minorities, irrespective of their citizenship status. The Kondopoga 
scenario was replayed in the centre of Moscow in December 2010 and in the Ural 
town of Sagra in July 2011. In July 2013 alone, three similar clashes took place in 
various parts of Russia.26
Such developments, which the state-aligned media cannot ignore, contradict the 
optimistic interpretation of inter-ethnic relations in Russia which Putin  articulated 
during his presidential election campaign in 2012, when he contrasted ‘the crisis of 
multiculturalism’ in the west with Russia’s history of peaceful  co-existence of dif-
ferent nationalities.27 In fact, many parallels can be drawn between  post-imperial 
Russia and post-imperial Europe. Political actors and members of society at large 
both in Russia and in the wider world often assume that ethnic origin determines a 
person’s cultural belonging, which in turn impacts on his or her public behaviour, 
and so arguments about the cultural incompatibility of various groups of peo-
ple are employed in the discussion of social, political and economic issues.28 In 
Russia such perceptions and practices are particularly strong, in part due to the 
influence of the following four aspects of its historical legacy:
1  The first aspect is the contradictory relationship between the Soviet regime’s 
aim to construct an overarching, ostensibly civic, pan-Soviet identity among 
citizens and the simultaneous cultivation of people’s separate ethno-cultural 
identities at the sub-state level, which we mentioned earlier. In Terry Martin’s 
words, post-1917 Bolshevik leaders decided to confront ‘the rising tide of 
nationalism’ by promoting the national consciousness of the state’s ethnic 
minorities ‘and by establishing for them [at the sub-state level] many of the 
characteristic institutional forms of the nation-state’. 29 Significantly, in the 
centralized Soviet state – which was called misleadingly, yet purposefully, a 
federation – the borders of its administrative units were drawn along ethnic 
lines. Soviet leaders believed that the eventual fusion ( sliianie) of the state’s 
numerous nationalities could be achieved only when the ethno-national 
demands of the minorities had been satisfied; yet, in reality, many affirmative 
actions aimed at minorities undermined and at times took precedence over the 
pan-Soviet community-building.
Two major consequences of this legacy are felt today. One is the fear felt among 
elites and within wider society that the USSR’s disintegration, to which the Soviet 
policies on nationalities are believed to have contributed, could be replayed in 
the Russian Federation.30 The war in Chechnya seems to have confirmed to the 
current leadership that Soviet-style ethnic federalism continues to pose a threat 
to Russia’s unity. In reality, Russia’s ethnic autonomies never enjoyed the same 
rights as the USSR’s Union republics. National institutions of the former were 
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less developed, were economically even more dependent on Moscow and had a 
far more Russified population. Furthermore, whereas in the USSR ethnic Rus-
sians constituted around half of the population, in the Russian Federation they 
enjoy a majority of 82 per cent. The lesser ability of Russia’s ethnic republics to 
act as independent national homelands of their titular nationalities, as compared 
to the USSR’s Union republics, can be interpreted in different ways: it can be seen 
as indicating that the danger of disintegration is lower in Russia compared to the 
Soviet Union, or alternatively it can be assumed that if Russia’s disintegration 
were to occur the process would be violent, in contrast to the peaceful develop-
ments in 1991, as the potential lines of disintegration would be more vigorously 
contested. The Putin administration has chosen to highlight the second interpreta-
tion, stressing Russia’s insecurity and thereby justifying the need for authoritarian 
policies.31
A further consequence of Russia’s administrative structure, rooted in the Soviet 
past, is the continuing tendency, particularly among the ethnic Russian majority, to 
associate representatives of non-Russian minorities solely with ethnic autonomies 
within Russia, rather than seeing them as equal citizens of the state as a whole. 
This tendency shapes perceptions of individuals particularly from the North Cau-
casian republics, when they reside outside these autonomies in the cities of central 
Russia, as ‘visitors’ (priezzhie) or ‘migrants’ (migranty), even though they are 
bona fide citizens of the Russian Federation.
2 Historically, the ideological underpinnings of state policies also strongly empha-
sized the separateness of people of different ethnicities and nationalities. From 
the 1930s onwards, the official understanding of the nation had been that of a 
primordial entity whose members had a common ancestry.32 In the course of 
the implementation of state policies – both those supportive and repressive of 
minorities – immutable characteristics were at times assigned to every member 
of a national group, to one of which every citizen of the USSR was perceived 
as belonging. Scholars disagree on whether, despite the Soviet regime’s official 
rejection of the racist ideology of Nazi Germany, the Soviet policies on nation-
ality had racist undertones.33 They do agree, however, that the highly ambivalent 
Soviet discourse of belonging offered a specific interpretation of the tension, 
common across Europe, between exclusive and inclusive understandings of 
membership in a state-framed community and between belief in the societal 
power to change human behaviour and perceptions that certain ‘deviances’ were 
so deeply rooted that their bearers could only be purged from society.
Today, both the primordial view of the nation as an ethnocultural community with 
common ancestry and the tendency to perceive people as carriers of immutable 
ethnocultural characteristics which mark certain political discourses elsewhere in 
the world are present in Russia in a particularly strong form, and the conflicting 
Soviet perceptions of ethnicity and nationality are supplemented by west Euro-
pean and pre-revolutionary Russian theories of race. We discuss this issue in 
detail in Chapter 4.
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3  Historical legacy also impacts on the situation of the ethnic Russian majority. 
Current ethno-nationalist leaders talk incessantly about historically rooted dis-
crimination against Russians in their own state, extrapolating the situation of 
the 1920s – when the official discourse branded the Russians as the oppressor 
nation – to the entire Soviet period, and claim continued discrimination even 
today. In reality, the 1930s Soviet propaganda presented the Russians as first 
among equals in the family of Soviet nationalities, triggering among non-Rus-
sians the opposite perception of Russia’s privileged position in the Soviet state.34
The fact that Russians were encouraged to identify above all with the USSR as 
a whole, rather than to perceive the RSFSR as their primary national homeland, 
was widely seen as another sign of privilege. Yet Russian nationalists insist that 
this peculiarity turned ethnic Russians into stateless people and that this state of 
affairs persists in contemporary Russia. According to this line of argument, it is 
discriminatory against ethnic Russians that the state today is defined by the civic 
term rossiiskaia, and, while containing ethnic republics (that is, national home-
lands) for various minorities, it still lacks any clearly designated territory which 
the ethnic Russian majority can regard as truly its own.35
Such arguments significantly heighten the tension between civic and ethnic 
aspects of nationhood that exists in most nation-building projects. Because of the 
salience of these arguments, leading politicians increasingly feel compelled to 
evoke the special status of the ethnic Russian majority, despite the fact that it is not 
stipulated by the constitution and its official acknowledgement has the potential to 
be damaging to the country’s ethnic cohesion.36
4 Finally, most discourses of nation in today’s Russia, both official and opposi-
tional, are marked by a reluctance to reflect critically on the country’s impe-
rial and colonial legacy, with its highly unequal power relations between the 
centre and the periphery. The post-colonial perspective has little public res-
onance.37 Instead, among the most dominant perspectives on Russian past 
are multiple variants of the ideology of Eurasianism, first articulated by a 
group of Russian émigrés in the 1920s. As we discuss in Chapter 6, this ideol-
ogy mythologizes Russia’s experiences of multi-ethnic statehood, rather 
than critically assessing them.38 The lack of reflection on the imperial and 
colonial origins of Russia’s ethnic diversity both undermines the potential 
appeal of the concept of a civic Russian nation among leaders of Russia’s 
ethnic autonomies, encouraging its perception as Russification in disguise,39 
and perpetuates the relentless ‘othering’ of certain minorities by the ethnic 
Russian majority.
Television: Roles and responsibilities
Historically, the media have been at the heart of every nation-building project 
as they disseminate particular imaginings of the community, of its supposedly 
shared values and its constitutive ‘others’.40 By selecting certain issues to be 
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 covered as news and by framing news reports in one way or another, the media 
also significantly contribute to building community consensus around particular 
perceptions, accommodating a plurality of voices.41 Since the 1960s, television 
has become the main source of news for Europeans.42 Today, because of the spread 
of the ‘narrowcasting’ modes favoured by many new technologies, television’s 
unique capacity to ‘broadcast’ to an entire ‘imagined community’ paradoxically 
acquires still greater value. With its capacity to unite householders around the 
television set, the medium would seem to have been designed for nation-building 
purposes, for imagining the nation as an extended family. This value relates not 
only to domestic community-building, but also to the foreign policy ambitions of 
the political elites, as (national) television is watched widely by an ever-growing 
émigré population abroad to which national governments attempt to reach out. 
It is, therefore, unsurprising that in its attempts to establish a strong vertical line 
of power (vertikal’ vlasti), Putin’s leadership from the outset decided to align the 
main television channels closely with the Kremlin.43
With its audio-visual mode, television favours spontaneous forms of rep-
resentation which operate at a subliminal level and which enable it to exploit 
the techniques of ‘banal nationalism’ (the trivial, barely perceptible markers of 
nationhood).44 The unifying effect of such techniques is the corollary of their 
power to alienate and exclude, and the impact of this process on societal percep-
tions of ethno-cultural diversity can hardly be overstated. Television’s heightened 
iconicity and ability to address mass audiences in a common lexicon also confers 
a sense of representational authenticity, both in the sense of reproducing reality in 
credible, photographic form and that of conveying what is ‘representative’ of it. It 
also elides the distinctions between issues of race as reflected in visual attributes, 
and those of ethnicity conveyable in verbal narratives about cultural specificities. 
By the same token, broadcasters have the potential to shape their representations 
through their own practices. By selecting a journalist from a minority community 
to report an ethnic cohesion issue, by preferring one lexical term over another to 
describe it or by choosing to combine a verbal narrative with a particular visual 
image, a newsmaker is able to inflect the way that the issue is portrayed.
The rise of television coincided with the decline of the great European empires, 
and with the flows of post-imperial migration which so changed the ‘look’ of 
European nations in the latter half of the twentieth century. In Europe, television 
was for much of that period synonymous with public service broadcasters (PSBs), 
the most notable example of which remains the BBC. Committed to standards of 
impartiality, free speech and objectivity, PSBs nonetheless also sought to embody 
specific ‘national values’ which tautologically (and paradoxically) included 
respect precisely for democracy, free speech and an independent press.45
The hidden contradiction at the heart of the PSB mission is occasionally 
exposed, including in the context of coverage of inter-ethnic cohesion issues. In 
2006, for instance, the BBC provided covertly filmed evidence supporting the 
prosecution of Nick Griffin, leader of the neo-fascist British National Party, for 
inciting anti-Muslim violence; when Griffin was exonerated, the BBC was left 
stranded between its adherence to multicultural tolerance and its commitment 
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to free speech and an independent judiciary.46 More recently, in 2013 a BBC1 
interview with Tommy Robinson, then leader of the English Defence League, 
prompted audience complaints that the interviewer had been ‘too aggressive’ in 
his attempts to reassure viewers by presenting a coruscating exposure of racist 
prejudice, after the corporation had previously drawn criticism for giving airtime 
(in the interests of free speech) to Robinson, whose far-right group had mounted 
a number of demonstrations in the wake of a British soldier’s murder in Lon-
don by two Islamist fanatics.47 The contradictions are exacerbated by the fact that 
PSBs must track, without fully endorsing, cohesion policies pursued by their host 
states, and by the fact that these policies – and the public consensuses that they 
reflect – shift such that there is frequently a time lag before PSBs ‘catch up’. For 
example, the BBC’s continuing preference for ‘reassuring’ white male newsread-
ers and reporters during the 1970s, a period in which, influenced by the US civil 
rights movement, state policy was shifting towards diversity, brought temporary 
opprobrium upon the broadcaster.
‘Public consensus’ is itself something of a myth, and societies are character-
ized by multiple splits – between rival contingents within ruling elites, between 
elites and the populace and within public groups. Even as a culture of diversity 
was sweeping European establishments, currents of subcultural hostility to ethnic 
difference and anxiety over the dilution of national identities were given spo-
radic, but vivid, expression by ‘rogue’ politicians. When the new impetus given 
to migration flows by financial deregulation coincided with the end of the Cold 
War and the emergence of Islam as the preferred anti-hegemonic ideology of the 
dispossessed, those currents acquired new strength – at the very point at which 
anti-discrimination policies were bearing fruit, but the reaction against a failing 
multiculturalist model was strengthening.48
The first decade of the twenty-first century was a time in which new media 
communication platforms achieved pre-eminence. Thus, the securitization of 
the European public sphere has been underpinned by the ease with which trans-
national tropes such as the Danish cartoons of Prophet Mohammed, the French 
hidjab controversy and the Swiss minarets conflict circulate via the globalized 
communication system;49 it was only in 2013 that the debate over whether Mus-
lim medical staff should be permitted to wear the niqab while treating patients 
in UK hospitals entered the British media, having hit the French headlines in 
2007. Such themes enter the news agenda and structure news output, as the three-
way clash between securitization, Europe’s commitment to secular states and its 
 post-Enlightenment traditions of tolerance for cultural difference is played out in 
living rooms across the continent.
The advent of new media forms has bolstered both Islamist fundamentalism 
and the extreme right-wing groupings for which Muslims are now the primary 
target. Far from fostering global homogeneity, digital technology often has the 
opposite effect: closeting users in self-reaffirming virtual communities detached 
from the public sphere. PSBs bear particular responsibilities here: that of coun-
tering the prejudices peddled by such communities, even as they gain currency 
beyond their bounds, and that of continuing to provide the main mechanism for 
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binding nations together as new media influences fracture them down multiple 
axes (gender, class, ethnicity, age).
Television and diversity in Russia
The very term ‘public service broadcasting’ is difficult to apply to a context in 
which ‘public service’ as we understand it does not exist and where, even in its 
commercial variant, broadcasters operate under the watchful eye of – and some-
times under direct instruction from – a semi-authoritarian state keen to deploy 
television to implement its own agenda. This situation reflects the emergence of 
Russian television from a Soviet system in which the media were controlled fully 
by the party state, and in which they were seen as a tool of policy rather than as 
the space of the public sphere.50
Russia has three main national television broadcasters: Channel 1, Rossiia 
and NTV (Nezavisimoe Televidenie, or Independent Television). In 2012, Dmitri 
Medvedev initiated the launch of a new national broadcaster, OTR (Obshchest-
vennoe Televidenie Rossii), as a more open platform for the airing of national 
issues of importance, but it has so far failed to gain a substantial viewership; it 
is at best ignored and at worst regarded as a sham. Technically only part-owned 
by the state, Channel 1 follows the Kremlin’s line particularly closely. It is also 
external-facing, as it broadcasts to communities of so-called Russian compatriots 
(sootechestvenniki) outside Russia’s state borders, many of whom do not have 
Russian citizenship but speak the Russian language. This trans-border reach of 
Channel 1 adds a crucial foreign policy dimension to its remit, which accounts for 
the extra caution with which it treats sensitive issues.51
Nonetheless, and despite their symbiotic relationship with the Kremlin, the 
large industrial interests holding the controlling stake cannot disregard issues of 
commercial viability (the channel relies on advertising revenue). This enables it to 
deliver the high-quality output which means that its political messages are deliv-
ered in a polished manner. But that revenue is in part dependent on high viewing 
figures, and therefore on responding to popular preferences. This tension means 
that Channel 1’s propaganda function is encumbered by its need to consolidate its 
viewing audience.
Rossiia, which replaced Soviet Channel 2, is fully state-owned. Curiously, the 
financial constraints under which it operates mean that it plays second string to 
Channel 1 as regards its information management function. It is therefore accorded 
less attention from its political overseers, paradoxically leading to a wider range 
of political perspectives than might be expected. Rossiia has been assigned the 
task of integrating local interests with the national perspective, thereby playing a 
particularly important role in promoting a national cohesion agenda.
NTV was Russia’s first independent television channel, and built its reputa-
tion via a path-breaking critique of the first Chechen war. It was taken over by 
Gazprom, the state energy giant, in 2001 and has now fallen into line with other 
broadcasters in maintaining an editorial stance close to the government, though 
the residue of its earlier bold informality remains evident in much of its output.52 
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NTV relies more heavily on audience ratings than Channel 1 and experimental 
informality is frequently deployed in support of an interpretation of the official 
line that spills over into the kind of populist nationalism which threatens the 
 government’s authority, even as it is appropriated for legitimating purposes – a 
paradox of  particular relevance to this book.
REN TV, though small, is important, since during the period analysed in this 
book it remained the only private channel with an independent voice and national 
reach.53 Owned until 2005 by Anatoly Chubais, in December of that year it was 
taken over by a consortium with ties to the Kremlin. Its audience consists primar-
ily of the metropolitan intelligentsia and it has a market share of 5 per cent. It is 
part of a wider media environment which is more varied than one might think 
from the impression given by national television on its own.
We should also mention RT (Russia Today), Russia’s relatively successful 
international broadcaster, targeted at audiences across the world and intended as a 
rival to the likes of CNN and the BBC World Service. In a highly significant devel-
opment to which we will return, December 2013 saw the dissolution of Russia’s 
respected news agency, RIA-Novosti, and its replacement with a new organization 
bearing the name Rossiia Segodnia (Russia Today) and overtly presented as a tool 
with which to improve Russia’s image in the world.
Central to the wider environment is the internet, still relatively uncontrolled in 
Russia, along with other new technologies and media platforms.54 The opposition 
protests in 2011 and 2012 owed much to the ‘crowdsourcing’ function of social 
media like Facebook and Twitter. The penetration that new media are achieving in 
Russia’s large cities is allied with the phenomenon of global media convergence. 
No Russian channel is without multiple online audience discussion forums, whose 
content, though moderated, is often critical of the government.55 More important 
are new, web-based television channels which bypass state control mechanisms 
and can operate on relatively modest resources. The most significant of these in 
Russia is Dozhd’ TV (Rain Television), established in 2010, which targets a young 
liberal audience but has grown steadily in influence, having reached an agreement 
with the BBC enabling it to broadcast BBC news bulletins and eventually acquir-
ing a presence within Russia’s cable television network. (At the time of writing 
this is under threat, owing to political pressure applied to companies distribut-
ing Dozhd’ following the channel’s ill-advised poll seeking views on whether the 
Soviet Union should have ceded Leningrad to the Nazis in order to avoid the 
terrible suffering of the Leningrad Siege).
New media developments do not necessarily represent a mortal threat to Krem-
lin supremacy; for example, the YouTube video clips sponsored by government 
sources are of infinitely superior quality to the vast majority of home-produced 
clips.56 Nor, crucially, does such threat necessarily come from the liberal wing 
of Russian politics (witness the mushrooming of various shades of nationalist 
extremist websites).57
Television’s space within the Russian media environment is, then, more com-
plex than its ownership and control structures would seem to allow. It is true 
that the news agenda is shaped quite actively by the Kremlin; our own  fieldwork 
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demonstrates that broadcasting executives have weekly meetings with their 
political masters. But, in the absence of a guiding ideology, there is uncertainty 
surrounding television’s mode of operation. The guidance lacks consistency, espe-
cially insofar as it relates to inter-ethnic relations, creating the possibility that the 
instructions might be misconstrued.58 Paradoxically, because broadcasters like the 
BBC share a set of societal values with mainstream opinion, their editorial inde-
pendence is no more likely to produce radical deviations from the government line 
than Russian state television’s obedience to a ‘master’, the underlying principles 
of whose policies it struggles fully to internalize; we identify several such devia-
tions in subsequent chapters.
Deviations of a similar kind were, however, occasionally observable even in 
Soviet television, which played an important part in community-building, cleav-
ing closely to the policies of nationality designed to maintain the integrity of a 
vast multi-ethnic state. During the 1970s, it responded to the clamour for the pro-
motion of regional (non-Russian) cultures as each constitutive republic acquired 
the right to broadcast for a limited period in its own designated national language. 
This, however, led to concerns over growth in ‘localism’.59 Indeed, television’s 
unique power to unify and centralize is offset by its equal capacity to give voice 
to those living at the peripheries. For this reason, much of the Soviet period was 
dominated by centrally produced programming intended to reinforce the image 
of a harmonious blend of multi-ethnic peoples, free to develop their own cul-
tural traditions but committed to the integrity of the Soviet Union. Elements of 
the Soviet strategies have been retained today. We discuss in this book how cur-
rent television’s imaginings of multi-ethnic harmony still occasionally utilize the 
Soviet ‘friendship of the peoples’ metaphor. Our example of a ‘peripheral voice’, 
that of the main news programme of the Republic of Buriatiia’s State Television 
and Radio Company, has its origins in the Soviet era.
But the differences with the Soviet past seem greater than the similarities. At 
Moscow State University’s Faculty of Journalism the training is now of a practical 
rather than an ideological orientation, and reflects the influences of contemporary 
western practices and pedagogical trends. The Dean, Elena Vartanova, has implic-
itly acknowledged that the nature of some aspects of its new curriculum point 
to a new culture of media freedom.60 Because they now lack an all-embracing 
Marxist–Leninist framework, Russian journalists are also more liable to project 
the grassroots opinions and prejudices of their non-journalist peers, particularly 
as formal editorial guidelines of the kind published by the BBC have been notable 
by their absence. It was only in February 2013, in response to an alarming rise in 
street-level xenophobia, that the Presidential Council on Inter-ethnic Relations – 
which was established in the aftermath of the 2010 Manezhnaia riots in 
Moscow – proposed setting up an agency to provide guidance on media coverage 
of inter-ethnic relations.61 At the time of writing these guidelines have not yet been 
made public.
Russia’s current community-building project is still a work in progress. Its 
overall vision is outlined by the ruling elite only in general terms as a continuation 
of the long-term tradition of unity in diversity across much of Eurasia, combined 
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with a central role played by ethnic Russians in state-building. Within this proj-
ect old approaches and strategies of community-building are not reproduced but 
reinvented, and the fact that, for the first time in Russian history, the community 
is envisaged by political leaders as national rather than supranational or imperial 
is a particularly important innovation. At present, television remains a key tool 
with which the elites can build community consensus, and Putin’s government has 
appreciated its importance. Despite the Kremlin’s control over the main television 
channels, broadcasters operate in a political and discursive environment which is 
significantly different from its Soviet predecessor. The current media are inevita-
bly open to infiltration by ideas and forms formerly deemed ‘alien’ and there is a 
much greater need to respond to grassroots voices external to approved discourse. 
Most importantly, in the absence of a single ideological framework, the relation-
ship between state and broadcaster is inevitably uncertain. In an interview with 
our team, leading TV personality Dmitrii Kiselev argued that the task of Russian 
broadcasters was far more challenging than that of their British counterparts, pre-
cisely because of the newness of Russia’s current nation-building stage.62 In what 
might be seen as an odd paradox, the next chapters, which consider how Russian 
broadcasters respond to the multiple challenges that they face, broadly endorse 
Kiselev’s assertion, but depart from very different premises. We now begin to 
construct those premises from an overview of our corpus of recordings.
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2 Mapping an uncertain terrain
An overview of the corpus
Framework, method, sources
In this chapter we present an overview of the body of news recordings that we 
collected over a two-year period from September 2010 to August 2012. From 
those recordings we generated a simple content analysis which enabled us to 
gain a grasp of the broad patterns and trends in coverage of inter-ethnic relations 
in Russia, to map out the contested and shifting terrain that we will be explor-
ing in more detail throughout the rest of the book and to identify some of the 
key themes and issues that inform the arguments that we advance. We should 
stress, however, that the quantitative data we analyse here is a point of departure 
for these arguments, not their underpinning base; our approach is grounded in 
the principles of qualitative research and the data provides a stimulus for, or at 
times a corroboration of, points that hopefully are independently sustainable. We 
explicate many of the patterns revealed by the data with illustrative references 
to individual stories and reports, some of which we pick up in subsequent chap-
ters. Here, then, the individual examples serve as straightforward instantiations 
of larger phenomena; elsewhere in the book, the relationship between particular 
instance and general principle is often rather more complex.
The period to which the recordings belong encompassed some important 
changes in Russia’s political landscape. The winter of 2011–12 saw the first 
major street protests experienced in Russia for nearly two decades, following 
the 2011 elections to the State Duma, the Russian parliament (the elections had 
become mired in suspicions of falsification and malpractice). Despite the unprec-
edented scale of the protests, Vladimir Putin returned to the presidency in March 
2012. Putin’s perceived manipulation of the constitution to permit him to run for 
a third term led to further mass demonstrations on the streets of Russia’s cities. 
The period leading up to Putin’s re-election witnessed the scandalous arrests of 
members of the punk collective Pussy Riot, who staged a protest performance 
on 21 February 2012 in Moscow’s Cathedral of Christ the Saviour. The upheaval 
coincided with and, at certain key junctures – a primary focus for the chapters to 
follow – intersected with deteriorating inter-ethnic relations throughout Russia. It 
was also immediately preceded by major Islamist-inspired suicide bombings on 
Moscow’s metro system in March 2010 and at Moscow’s Domodedovo airport 
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in January 2011, when the separatist insurgency that Russia had been fighting 
in its North Caucasian periphery dealt devastating blows to the (post-)imperial 
heartland. The state-aligned broadcast media bore responsibility for some of 
that deterioration, yet frequently resorted to suppressing the controversial topics 
associated with it in order to avoid fuelling the fires of conflict. Our daily news 
recordings captured some of the major milestones in this contradictory process, 
notably the media’s confused reaction to the racially motivated riots in Moscow’s 
Manezhnaia Square in December 2010.
In depicting the interpretative framework that news broadcasters applied to 
events to which they ascribed, whether implicitly or explicitly, an inter-ethnic 
dimension, we developed a coding system based on seven key thematic catego-
ries: ‘ethnic cohesion’ (reports foregrounding evidence of or celebrating inter-eth-
nic harmony); ‘the Russian Orthodox Church’ (coverage of the Church as a key 
tool for binding together the peoples of Russia’s multi-ethnic, multi-faith state); 
‘other religions’ (reporting, both positive and negative, on issues involving other 
religions, including Islam); ‘migration’ (stories centring on issues raised by pop-
ulation movements within and beyond the Russian Federation); ‘inter-ethnic con-
flict’ (stories detailing clashes, often violent, between individuals and groups, to 
which ethnic motivations are attributed); ‘separatist violence in the North Cauca-
sus’ (coverage of terrorist and other assaults on Russian interests and personnel 
launched by armed opponents of Russia’s rule in the troubled autonomous regions 
of Chechnia, Dagestan and Ingushetiia); and ‘other/miscellaneous’ (reports with 
an inter-ethnic aspect, but belonging to none of the above categories).
When coding items we used the content of the headlines under which they were 
introduced to guide us, but watched each item carefully before assigning it to a 
category. Overall, in most cases, we worked on the principle of thematic preponder-
ance; thus, an item which dealt with issues other than ethnicity would only be coded 
if the invocation (implicit or explicit) of ethnicity outweighed that of other factors. 
This approach was not always applied to reports in the category ‘separatist violence 
in the North Caucasus’. In their coverage of this topic, state-aligned broadcasters 
often denied religion- or ethnicity-related factors, using the alleged efficiency and 
effectiveness of the Special Forces and the government as the most common frame. 
Our decision to incorporate such reports into our dataset is a response to the wide-
spread tendency among the Russian public to ethnicize developments in the North 
Caucasus. Furthermore, ethnic and religious factors were at times visually under-
scored in the coverage, even if they were not verbally acknowledged. Thus, reports 
about violence in the North Caucasus give us an example of how state-aligned tele-
vision confronts interpretations which are undesirable from the leadership’s point 
of view, yet are widespread in society and promoted by those media outlets which 
the government cannot control (such as the internet).
Finally, items which dealt with more than one of our chosen categories would 
be assigned to the one which predominated, ensuring that no item was coded more 
than once. Since the coding was done overwhelmingly by one person, we did 
not carry out systematic inter-coder reliability tests, but we discussed the coding 
system as a team and at length and, when particular items seemed typologically 
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problematic, we resolved the issue together. We catalogued every news item in 
every news bulletin we watched over the two-year period, noting for each item, 
whether ethnicity-related or not, the length of time allotted to it within the bulletin 
and its position in the running order. This enabled us to gauge both the frequency 
(number of items) and the intensity (amount of time allotted) of the coverage, 
and to gain a sense of the saliency (aggregate running order position) of our topic 
within the overall Russian news agenda.1 As we watched the daily news broad-
casts, we also collected transcripts of relevant news items from each channel’s 
website (audio-visual recordings of all of the reports were also available on web-
sites, though not in the form of continuous news bulletins). We used these printed 
transcripts as a tool in the qualitative analyses at the centre of subsequent chapters, 
but only in conjunction with our own audio-visual recordings. Finally, we selec-
tively applied to those transcripts NVivo qualitative data analysis tools in order to 
gauge the frequency with which certain key terms recurred in our material, and to 
identify the contexts in which they were used.
We developed our coding typology in two stages, applying both deductive, or a 
priori, and inductive, or ‘grounded’ approaches. Thus, as a first step, we selected 
the two primary categories dominating contemporary discourse on ethnicity- 
related topics throughout the world: ‘migration’ and ‘inter-ethnic conflict’. We 
supplemented these with two categories based on our prior knowledge of the 
specific situation in Russia:2 ‘ethnic cohesion’ and ‘separatist violence’. We then 
watched selected news programmes for a month and, following an inductive pro-
cessing of that material, identified two further categories: ‘the Russian Ortho-
dox Church’ and ‘other religions’. A very small number of news items – which 
were categorized ‘other/miscellaneous’ – revealed no clear patterns and were not 
included in the interpretation of our data.
There are a number of clarifications we should make about the typology. The 
first is that the categories included news about inter-ethnic relations in countries 
other than Russia; as we shall see, these stories fulfil a vital function for news 
broadcasters in providing telling points of contrast with, and similarity to, domes-
tic events. Second, the categories are shaped both by our own understanding of the 
terms we selected to name them and by what the broadcasters themselves believe 
those terms to mean. Thus, in a Russian context, ‘inter-national’ (mezhnatsion-
al'nyi) often encompasses what we would define as ‘inter-ethnic’; the latter term 
(mezhetnicheskii) is at times used by the Russian broadcasters interchangeably 
with what we might interpret as ‘inter-racial’. (At the same time, one should bear 
in mind that the very definition of ‘ethnicity’ is notoriously difficult to pin down.) 
Moreover, the radical contingency of the term in Brubaker’s account means that 
some of the events we include in our typology have been overtly assigned an 
ethnic dimension by the broadcasters, when we might have elected not to accord 
them this designation; conversely, the ethnicity- related aspect which we perceived 
in other events is occluded by the broadcasters. Likewise, under ‘migration’ we 
include material which relates to the internal movement of Russian citizens from 
the North Caucasus to cities such as Moscow and which is covered by the specifi-
cally Russian usage of the term (vnutrenniaia migratsiia), as well as the flow to 
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such cities of foreign citizens from Central Asia and elsewhere, which conforms 
with the term in its generally accepted sense.
As we noted in the Introduction, rather than clutter our text with systemati-
cally inserted scare quotes designed to designate the critical distance we wish to 
assert from the many questionable uses of ‘migration’ and ‘ethnicity’ we find in 
our material, we have, except on those occasions where a particular usage merits 
special comment, tended to treat the terms in their undifferentiated, multi- faceted 
guise. Similarly, our statistical data relates primarily to coverage of ‘migration’ 
and ‘ethnicity’ in the sense that those terms are deployed in the Russian media. We 
do this both as a matter of pragmatic convenience (we lack the space to engage in 
elaborate, contorted discussions of the contingency of these terms at their every 
point of mention or appearance in a statistical graph) and because we are inter-
ested in building an inclusive picture of the rich variety of ethnicity-related mean-
ings, legitimate and illegitimate, accorded them by Russian television news, not 
in establishing restrictive, parsimonious definitions reflecting our own theoretical 
positions. We trust that the qualifications we provide here are sufficient to assure 
readers that we are, throughout, aware of the fraught and problematic nature of 
discourses of ethnicity in any context. Indeed, this becomes one of the major 
points of focus in the arguments we develop.
It follows from the preceding discussion that the coding we undertook entailed 
a complex navigation between broadcaster-generated and researcher-generated 
meanings. In countering any suggestion of inconsistency on our part, we venture 
the following points. First, and most importantly, we focus primarily on media 
representations, not on empirically verifiable truths. There is a deep ambiguity 
lurking at the heart of representation itself, for in claiming to depict what is repre-
sentative of reality, it invariably re-constructs or re-presents that reality. It is this 
duality that our navigation process is intended to track. Second, the data we pro-
duced from the coding process is self-contained and does not form part of a larger 
comparative project; our concern is with the complexities and contradictions of 
television news coverage in Russia, and those selective cross-national compari-
sons we do make are based on qualitative observation and not quantitative data, 
thereby minimizing our vulnerability to methodological inconsistency. Finally, 
and to reiterate, the quantitative data analysis does not actively determine our key 
arguments; it serves merely as a useful means of establishing the parameters of 
the territory on which they are to be made. Readers will judge for themselves the 
strength of those arguments, and thus the extent to which the data analysis helped 
us in laying the ground for them.
The sources for our analysis are, as we established in the Introduction, derived 
from daily recordings of two flagship news programmes: Vremia (Channel 1) and 
Vesti (Rossiia).3 (When researching subsequent chapters we supplemented these 
sources with material from other channels, including NTV, REN TV and Dozhd’.) 
Vremia is broadcast every weeknight for 30 minutes and on Saturday for 15 min-
utes, without any commercial breaks. The hour-long Sunday edition, Voskresnoe 
Vremia, is billed as an information-analytical programme and typically features 
longer, magazine-style stories from the previous week. All news items are tightly 
scripted and read with little deviation by one of the programme’s veteran anchors.
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Vesti typically runs for 40–45 minutes from Mondays to Saturdays, with one 
commercial break, after which regional channels broadcast 10–15 minutes of local 
news. The Sunday edition of the programme, Vesti nedeli, runs for an hour. Like 
Vremia’s Sunday news programme, Vesti nedeli functions as a magazine-style news 
round up. However, in contrast to Vremia’s more cautious approach based on sum-
marizing the highlights of the previous week’s news, Vesti nedeli positions itself as 
a briefing programme designed to shape the news agenda for the week ahead.
By studying our topic over a two-year period (our recordings ran from 1 Sep-
tember 2010 to 30 May 2012), we were able to acquire an acute sensitivity to the 
cumulative weight of ethnicity-related reporting in Russia and to the patterns of 
distribution and the rhythms of emphasis that it displays. Indeed, most content 
analyses centring on television, including those of the eminent Glasgow Media 
Group and of the BBC itself, are based on far smaller samples (sometimes of as 
little as a few weeks).4 Nonetheless, the sheer volume of material to be processed 
ruled out the possibility of a continuous analysis covering the whole two years. 
Instead, we recorded and analysed the material in equally spaced blocks. Thus, 
three months of recording were followed by a three-month break in recording, 
producing four recording periods which contained a total of 9,352 items viewed, 
of which 654 were coded.5 However, in order to guard against omissions and arbi-
trariness in our analysis, we continued monitoring and watching ethnicity-related 
news in between our recording blocks, relying on the two channels’ websites. The 
Manezhnaia riots and the months leading up to the presidential elections in March 
2012, for instance, occurred outside of our recording periods, but we examine cov-
erage of both in detail in Chapters 4 and 7.6 While we cannot trace the peaks and 
falls in coverage in a continuous line from September 2010 to August 2012, our 
blocks enable us to comment on broad changes in emphasis over the entire period.
In presenting our content analysis, we begin by assessing the overall presence of 
ethnicity-related news on state-aligned national television. We then look in detail 
at coverage within each coding category, beginning with those relating loosely to 
the positive promotion of the nation-building agenda (‘ethnic cohesion’, ‘Russian 
Orthodox Church’, ‘other religions’). We next discuss the reporting of migration 
issues – in many ways the fulcrum of the analysis – as we begin to focus on 
how news events liable to provoke national discontent are handled within the 
nation-building framework. Finally, we analyse items assigned to the categories 
dealing with events in which ethnically motivated discontent explodes into inter-
personal and inter-group strife (‘inter-ethnic conflict’ and ‘separatist violence’).
Inter-ethnic relations in the news
The overriding impression produced by the data we generated is that the impor-
tance of inter-ethnic relations to the government’s political agenda and to popular 
opinion was not properly reflected in the patterns of news coverage. Stories coded 
as relevant made up only a small portion of the total news coverage on the two 
channels – between 6 and 8 per cent respectively, as Figure 2.1 shows – both in 
terms of frequency (number) and intensity (time). These figures remain relatively 

















Figure 2.1  Frequency and intensity of ethnicity-related news as a percentage of the 
overall news content.
Of all the stories on inter-ethnic relations, a significant portion is accounted 
for by coverage of issues which relate to ethnicity in other nations (particularly 
migration and violent conflict) and which implicitly alleviate any impression that 
Russia is unusually plagued by inter-ethnic tensions (Figures 2.4 and 2.5). This 
is the reason why international stories feature as prominently on the domestically 
oriented Vesti as they do on Vremia.
In the context of the barrage of confused and conflicting messages that national 
television was compelled to release in reaction to unanticipated crises such as that 
sparked by the Manezhnaia riots, and of the alarming number of ethnically moti-
vated hate crimes on the streets of Russia’s cities as measured by the SOVA centre, 
the paltry airtime usually received by domestic inter-ethnic relations indicates the 
extent to which the Kremlin had been struggling with the contradictions of its own 
nation-building policy.7
Within this overall picture, however, the topic of separatist violence in the North 
Caucasus demonstrated a relatively high degree of salience, at least on Vremia, 
which follows the Kremlin’s line more closely than Vesti, and which in this case 
aimed to reaffirm this line in relation to a particularly sensitive problem. As we 
see from Figure 2.6 (depicting the number of items per coding category for each 
channel), over 40 North Caucasus-related stories featured among the first three 
items within the running order of Vremia bulletins during the recording period, 
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Figure 2.6 Salience of ethnicity-related news: Vremia and Vesti.
To explore the tensions a little further, on the one hand, the Kremlin was 
quite consistent throughout most of our recording period in promoting an image 
of multi-ethnic harmony and in underscoring ethnic diversity as the country’s 
strength. These assertions were, not unsurprisingly, highlighted in news bulletins. 
For example, a Vremia report of July 2011 quoted Putin as stating that ‘tolerance 
is in our blood’ and stressing Russia’s historical uniqueness with regard to ethnic 
relations: ‘Nowhere on the planet, not on any territory, live more than 180 nation-
alities and ethnicities. Moreover, these peoples have not migrated from other 
places … but have lived on the territory of this country since time immemorial.’8
On the other hand, the confidence exuded by these claims is not borne out 
by the fact that the level of news coverage of inter-ethnic relations actually 
dropped at politically sensitive moments. At the lowest point on Vremia in 
terms of intensity it accounted for only 4.15 per cent; this was in May 2012, 
at the time of Putin’s inauguration as president. Already prior to this, during 
the entire presidential election campaign, the media had largely refrained from 
reporting on inter-ethnic relations. During this period, most of the relevant cov-
erage related to the Russian Orthodox Church, as will be discussed. As our 
interviewees noted, during certain periods reporters received instructions not 
to report on issues of a potentially inflammatory nature, including, specifically, 
inter-ethnic relations.9
The underreporting of ethnic issues is in part connected to unresolved tensions 
deriving from the Russian Federation’s status as a multi-ethnic, multi-faith state. 
(The controversial implications of these contradictions are discussed at length in 
the Introduction and throughout the book.) Russian nationalists traditionally see 
ethnic Russians as marginalized by the state and other nationalities as favoured, 
but our word frequency analysis of the term ‘Russian’ (russkii) indicates that the 
state-aligned media are far from neglecting things Russian, the Russian language 
or Russian culture.10 In fact, as the context of those usages confirms, the Russian 
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language, Russian culture and Russian Orthodoxy have been allocated an unam-
biguous role as the key binding forces in the Federation, and the role of the state 
as a key factor in creating the pan-Russian (rossiiskaia) national community has 
remained without serious challenge throughout the Putin period. In his interview 
with us, Channel 1 presenter Maksim Shevchenko acknowledged his own responsi-
bility to contribute to resolving the duality at the heart of the Federation as follows:
We have more peoples than the whole of Europe put together. But in contrast 
to Europe, which has not seen a unified state since the Roman Empire, Russia 
has always been such. This is why our task is to figure out how to preserve 
it, how to establish a united political nation and at the same time preserve the 
diversity of ethnicities in Russia and give them the opportunity to develop 
within the country. I think that the American model might be suitable, but 
not entirely. America was set up from below, from the communities up to the 
state. We need to proceed the other way around. First there is the state, and 
now we need to figure out how to incorporate the communities within it.11 
We begin our more detailed examination of our corpus of recordings by focusing 
on the coding category designed to capture those reports most actively and delib-
erately deployed in support of the ambitious mission that Shevchenko describes: 
‘ethnic cohesion’ and national unity.
Ethnic cohesion
In terms of both intensity and frequency, and as we see from Figures 2.4 and 2.5, 
‘ethnic cohesion’ amounted to a relatively modest portion of all ethnicity-coded 
news across both channels. In percentage terms, ‘ethnic cohesion’ accounts for 
approximately 12 per cent of the intensity of news coverage relating to our topic 
area for both Vremia and Vesti (see Figures 2.7 and 2.8).
This is, of course, lower than the mean across all seven categories, but still 
high when one considers the difficulties that stories in this category raise in terms 
of their newsworthiness and potential interest to viewers (in the post-Soviet, 
semi-commercialized news environment, Russia’s state-aligned broadcasters can-
not afford to entirely ignore these issues). All of the events that we included in 
the category amounted to regularized, pre-planned, state-initiated activities such 
as festivals and anniversaries, none of which offered anything much in the way of 
spontaneous narrative content. The most significant of these events was the Day 
of National Unity (a new public holiday introduced in 2005), to which we subse-
quently devote an entire chapter of this book. Other reports related largely to tra-
ditional regional and local festivities. These stories highlighted thriving minority 
cultures and harmonious ethnic relations. The folk-cultural approach characteriz-
ing them was reminiscent of the Soviet presentation of ethnic diversity and har-
mony. While this might resonate nostalgically with viewers old enough to recall 
the Soviet period, the same is not true of the younger audience demographic that 
Channel 1 in particular has periodically hankered after.
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Figure 2.7  Intensity of each category as a percentage of all ethnicity-related news: Vremia.
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Figure 2.8 Intensity of each category as a percentage of all ethnicity-related news: Vesti.
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The only negative news item in the ‘ethnic cohesion’ category covered a 2011 
meeting of the Federation Council in which President Medvedev stated that the 
‘inflation of inter-ethnic conflict and religious dissension during the upcoming 
election campaign [would] be punishable by law’.12 This measure had received 
consistent legitimation within media discourse from earlier points in our record-
ing period, through regular reports on deteriorating ethnic relations in the west. 
Their key message – that, in Europe, ethnic cohesion is doomed – was pre sent 
in many reports belonging to other categories as well. Within all categories, 
these stories highlighted the lack of ethnic cohesion. Among them was a report 
on Angela Merkel’s speech of 2010 on the ‘absolute failure’ of multicultural-
ism, presented as a ‘failing battle’13 against an influx of migrants who do not 
speak German and have failed to integrate. Such events – David Cameron’s later 
speech on the same topic received similarly prominent attention from Vremia and 
Vesti – provided the Russian authorities with cover not only for announcements 
like Medvedev’s, but also for the harsh and uncompromising anti-migration and 
anti-Islamic rhetoric which later took hold during Putin’s third presidency, as will 
be described in Chapter 9. During our recording period in 2010 and 2011, media 
coverage of domestic community cohesion problems was generally much more 
cautious.
Dmitrii Kiselev, Rossiia’s deputy director and Vesti nedeli’s presenter, was one 
of several prominent broadcasters who heavily promoted the idea of the failure of 
multiculturalism and western European liberal values. In his interview with us, 
he explained that ‘tolerance’ is a purely western concept which is not suitable for 
Russian society:
Tolerance is not our term. That is why we don't use it often. Tolerance is a 
very cold word for a Russian. It means that one needs to endure others. The 
Russian term instead is love. We should not endure each other, but love each 
other… We are all brothers. This is the correct Russian notion.14
Kiselev was particularly passionate in his hostility toward the west, and despite 
his stance as a Kremlin loyalist, his understanding of tolerance was at odds 
with that adopted by Putin and Medvedev, who often used the term in its more 
positive, European meaning. However, Kiselev’s interpretation is more closely 
allied to the traditional Russian discourse, which juxtaposes (hollow) toleration 
with (genuine) recognition.15 His emphasis on the contrast between positive 
Russian values, which foster ethnic harmony, and hypocritical western ones, 
which inevitably lead to failure, will recur in several of the categories discussed 
below.
Russian Orthodox Church
The contrast between Russian and western values was reinforced in coverage of 
the Russian Orthodox Church. It became particularly sharp toward the end of our 
recording period, during the presidential election campaign and in the unfolding 
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case against Pussy Riot. As we discuss in Chapter 8, in that period, leading tele-
vision journalists discursively transformed Orthodox Christianity from merely an 
important national value into the very foundation of the Russian state, which had 
historically protected it from harmful foreign influences. The Church’s centrality 
to the state-sponsored nation-building project was reflected in the number of Vesti 
reports on Orthodox Christianity – more, in fact, than on any other category (see 
Figure 2.4). Furthermore, the de facto superior status of the Church compared to 
other ‘traditional religions’ of Russia was confirmed by the fact that both Vremia 
and Vesti’s coverage of Orthodoxy ran four times longer than the amount of time 
devoted to all other religions combined (see Figure 2.5). In the case of Vremia, 
which aims to act as the primary news source for Russian-speaking communi-
ties outside Russia, the prioritization of the Orthodox Church also indicates its 
importance as a national soft-power agent. In our recording period, the Russian 
government became especially keen to increase the effectiveness of its cultural 
diplomacy, in particular targeting Russian speakers across the world. The Church 
has been allotted a major role in these efforts.16
The times during which the coverage of Orthodox Christianity peaked during 
our recording period further point to the special relationship that the Church – and 
Patriarch Kirill personally – enjoys with the state and the state-aligned media. 
There were two peak months in terms of both frequency and intensity of the rele-
vant coverage: November 2011 and April 2012 (see Figures 2.9 and 2.10).
Both peaks fall at the time when the alliance between the Church and the state 
became even stronger than before, following the announcement of Putin’s deci-
sion to run for a third presidential term in September 2011. The Church’s overt 
support for Putin provoked criticism from the opposition and alternative media, 
which began featuring damaging revelations about the lavish lifestyle of the Patri-
arch and other hierarchs and examples of questionable activities through which 
the Church had attempted to increase its material wealth.17 In response the Church 
mounted a well-organized public relations campaign, in which it was closely 
assisted by state-aligned television.
Sep 2010 Oct 2010 Nov 2010 Mar 2011 April 2011 May 2011 Sept 2011 Oct 2011 Nov 2011 Mar 2012 April 2012 May 2012
Vremia 3 3 5 5 4 4 2 2 10 0 10 3







Figure 2.9  Frequency of Russian Orthodox Church-coded stories over the total recording 
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In the first step in this campaign, a revered relic was brought to Russia from 
Mount Athos – the cincture of the Theotokos (or the Virgin Mary’s belt). Its display 
in Moscow and a number of other cities attracted numerous visitors. The relic’s 
journey across Russia was systematically televised, and relevant reports accounted 
for the November 2011 rise in the coverage of Orthodoxy-related issues.18
The second peak was even more striking, as in April 2012 the Russian Orthodox 
Church accounted for more than half of all our coded Vesti reports. There were 
three reasons for this increase. One was particularly heavy coverage on both chan-
nels of the celebration of Easter, considered in the Orthodox tradition to be the 
most important holiday. Whereas in 2011 this extended only to the Easter week-
end, in 2012 it stretched over most of Passion Week. This expansion provided an 
indication of the further elevation of the Church’s status in the context of Putin’s 
re-election. Second was Pussy Riot’s alleged desecration of an Orthodox cathe-
dral, which triggered an intensification in the coverage of Church activities, with 
reports featuring the reaction of the clergy and ordinary believers to the event. 
Notably, whereas Vesti began its reporting on the case in March, further increasing 
coverage in April, Vremia delayed its first report on Pussy Riot to 19 April.19
The final reason for the rise in coverage of the Church in April 2012 was 
another major public relations initiative organized by Patriarch Kirill. This was 
the so-called prayer vigil ‘of Orthodox believers in defence of their faith’, held in 
Moscow and across the country on 22 April. With the help of the state, thousands 
of people from around Russia were brought to Moscow to pray with the Patriarch 
for the end of what he dramatically described as a ‘war’ against Orthodox Chris-
tianity, allegedly triggered by the Pussy Riot performance. As expected, Vesti and 
Vremia covered the event at length.20 This coverage actively promoted an image 
of Russia as primarily the homeland of ethnic Russians, completely marginaliz-
ing the alternative, state-sponsored, vision of a multi-confessional and multi-eth-
nic society. To some extent this marginalization could be observed throughout 
the entire recording period, as the minimal attention accorded to other religions 
attests. In terms of frequency and intensity, and in relation to events inside the 
Russian Federation, ‘other religions’ was the weakest category across both chan-
nels (see Figures 2.4 and 2.5).
Other religions
Under the category of ‘other religions’ we expected above all to see stories about 
Islam, Buddhism and Judaism, which, like Orthodoxy, enjoy official status among 
Russia’s ‘traditional religions’. Yet Buddhism had no presence at all on the federal 
news, and Judaism had virtually none; the only relevant report related to the cele-
bration of the New Year in Israel in September 2011.21
Islam was less peripheral to the news agenda. In the official discourse, Russia’s 
multicultural nature is at times described with reference to centuries of peaceful 
co-existence between Orthodoxy and Islam. This line was particularly strongly 
endorsed in the coverage of the celebrations of Muslim religious holidays in Mos-
cow. Reporting on one such celebration in September 2011, Vesti nedeli gave a 
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brief history of the life of ‘the Muslim community’ in Moscow, stressing its begin-
nings in the fourteenth century and noting that an estimated 20 million Muslims 
live in Russia today.22
Nonetheless, overall coverage of Islam was still limited, particularly on Vremia 
(six stories). On Vesti there were 21 stories, many of which were about celebrations 
of religious holidays in Russia’s predominantly Muslim regions of Tatarstan and 
the North Caucasus. As with Orthodox Christianity, the display of relics revered 
by believers was a familiar theme. In September 2011, for instance, Vesti reported 
on the arrival in the capital of Chechnya, Groznyi, of a bowl allegedly belonging 
to the Prophet Mohammed.23 These parallels helped to project an image of the 
harmonious co-existence of Orthodoxy and Islam in Russia. The message of har-
mony, in accordance with the Eurasianist outlook reflecting the official rhetoric, 
was further reinforced by repeated characterization of the form of Islam said to be 
‘historically traditional’ to Russia as ‘moderate and peaceful’. According to one 
Vesti report, spreading Islamic education drawing on the indigenous traditions of 
the religion was the best way ‘ideologically to counter radicalism and extremism’ 
penetrating Russia from abroad.24
As we will see below, with the exception of major terrorist events in the Rus-
sian heartlands, Islam was rarely evoked in the reporting of violence in the North 
Caucasus and, if references to it were made, this was usually in order to deny the 
relevance of religious factors to the events. In the recording period, inter-confes-
sional disharmony was stressed mainly in relation to western Europe, usually in the 
context of stories we placed in the category ‘migration’. These pointed to growing 
societal Islamophobia in response to western governments’ policies on multicultur-
alism, which were invariably described as failures.25 As we will see in Chapters 8 
and 9, the situation changed significantly after the end of our recording period, and 
during the first 18 months of Putin’s new presidency both channels began featuring 
negative depictions of Islam itself when covering events in western Europe. Blur-
ring the boundary between radical Islamism and Islam, Vesti also began including 
this negative view of Islam in its interpretation of developments in Russia.
Christian denominations other than Russian Orthodoxy were barely mentioned 
by state-aligned broadcasters. That all four reports on Catholicism referred to 
events outside Russia symbolically reinforced its status as a religion alien to Rus-
sian culture. Protestant communities (which, with 300,000 members, are twice 
as numerous as Catholics) were also ignored. Although the Moscow Patriarchate 
has historically been far less antagonistic to Protestantism than to the Vatican, 
the Church has been negatively disposed toward the country’s largest Protestant 
community – the Baptists – both in the past and to this day. Together with rep-
resentatives of other Protestant groups – Pentecostals and Adventists – Baptists 
were fiercely persecuted in the Soviet period, especially for their refusal to enter 
military service; discrimination against them continues today.26
Other religious groups, such as Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-Day Saints (commonly known as Mormons) and the Church of Scien-
tology, often branded negatively as ‘sects’ or ‘cults’, received minimal airtime 
on Vesti. They were portrayed as alien and destructive to Russian culture and 
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 traditions.27 In view of strong disapproval of their activities by the Orthodox 
Church, which objected to their very presence in Russia, such coverage comes 
as no surprise. Jehovah’s Witnesses were actually banned from practising their 
religion in the Soviet period; it was legalized only in 1991.28 Under the conditions 
of full religious freedom in the first half of the 1990s, the well-funded foreign 
missionaries representing these groups actively proselytized in Russia. It was 
in response to the perceived threat to its dominant position in the country from 
such proselytizing activities that the Russian Orthodox Church pushed through 
a controversial law on religion in 1997. This law singled out Orthodoxy, Islam, 
Buddhism and Judaism as religions ‘traditional to Russia’ and therefore worthy of 
state support, and at the same time imposed strict limitations on the activities of 
other religious groups.29
In short, Russia’s religious diversity, which Kremlin-sponsored discourse at 
times evokes, found little reflection in our corpus of recordings. The promotion of 
harmonious multi-confessionality was secondary to the need to highlight the cen-
tral importance of Orthodox Christianity to Russia, past and present. Indeed, the 
very term ‘multi-confessional’ (mnogokonfessional'nyi) was used only six times 
during the entire recording period, suggesting a subtle divergence between official 
Kremlin rhetoric and that of state-aligned television news, as well as contradic-
tions in the Kremlin’s own position on religion-related issues.
Migration
Similar divergences and inconsistencies were identified in relation to migration. 
In academic literature, definitions of migration are complex and often contra-
dictory. As Bridget Anderson and Scott Blinder note, there is no consensus on 
a single definition of ‘migrants’, who can be defined by foreign birth and citi-
zenship as well as by their temporary or long-term geographical mobility across 
and within national boundaries.30 The confusion increases in the context of mass 
media representations and in the discourses of politicians, who regularly politicize 
migration-related issues. Media outlets in many European countries have been 
criticized for their discriminatory treatment of migrants, for using criminalizing 
terminology and for engaging in a systematic process of ‘othering’. When cov-
ering migration, journalists throughout the world likewise tend to ethnicize the 
social and economic issues which are at the root of migration trends.31
In the absence of any reporting guidelines dealing with sensitive issues eliciting 
high societal concern, the danger that journalists will use language which discrim-
inates against minority groups further increases.32 Particularly controversial is the 
application of the terms ‘migrant’, or even ‘illegal migrant’, to Russian Federa-
tion citizens of North Caucasian origin. Even the Kremlin-sponsored discourse 
lacks consistency on this issue. On some occasions, Putin argued that no citizen 
of the Russian Federation could be called a migrant;33 on others he used the term 
‘migration’ to describe the residency of North Caucasians in Moscow and other 
cities of central Russia.34 More significantly, President Medvedev once directly 
compared North Caucasians ‘who have moved to locations where ethnic Russians 
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historically predominated’ with migrants from North Africa and the Middle East 
in Europe, concluding that ‘in contrast to Europe our migrants are internal, but 
the problems [they create] are similar’.35 Such contradictory, even inflammatory, 
pronouncements are reported without reflection or interrogation.
Likewise, television news is prone to cover stories about Russia’s tsygane 
(gypsies) as part of discussion of the impact of migration flows on Europe, even 
though Russia’s Roma communities date back centuries and their members are 
citizens of the Russian Federation.36 In the course of this book we critically reflect 
on different ways in which migration is understood and represented by Russian 
broadcasters and consider the potential social and political consequences of their 
terminological laxity.
During our recording period, news stories concerning ‘migration’ exhibited 
several striking features. From 2010 onwards, opinion polls have indicated rising 
resentment against non-Slavic nationalities.37 The popular impression of sharply 
rising migrant flows into Russia does not, however, spring from any real increase in 
migration, at least not if measured on a Russia-wide scale. According to the World 
Bank, net migration to the Russian Federation actually decreased from 2.2 million 
in 2000 to 1.1 million in 2010.38 Significantly, during our recording period, while 
the Russian print media were already featuring highly alarmist reports on migra-
tion’s effects on Russia, state-aligned television was largely avoiding opportunistic 
exploitation of these widespread perceptions. The broadcasters seemed to have fol-
lowed the Kremlin’s general view of migration as essential to the Russian economy.
As Figure 2.4 demonstrates, in terms of frequency, on Vremia ‘migration’ was 
the second least covered topic after ‘other religions’, and on Vesti it generated 
less coverage not only than ‘the Russian Orthodox Church’ and ‘separatist vio-
lence in the North Caucasus’, but also than ‘ethnic cohesion’ issues.39 During our 
first recordings between September and November 2010, migration-coded stories 
were simply absent on Vremia, and this was the period when the controversial 
deportations of Bulgarian and Romanian Roma from France were being criticized 
by the European Parliament and the European Commission. Whereas Vesti used 
the opportunity to claim much better conditions for the Roma, Vremia did not 
refer at all to the criticism provoked by the deportations.40 Overall, Vremia’s cov-
erage of migration remained minimal, with 0–2 relevant stories in 10 of the 12 
months of recordings. The amount of coverage on Vesti was slightly greater and, 
in contrast to Vremia, it featured occasional reports on clashes between labour 
migrants and locals in Russia, particularly in Moscow.41 Thus, migration was one 
of the categories in which differences between the two channels’ approaches to 
reporting became particularly noticeable.
As we can see from Figures 2.11 and 2.12, both channels pay particular atten-
tion to migration-related issues outside Russia; on Vesti the amounts of domes-
tic and international coverage of migration-related events were almost identical. 
During our recording period, the situation in Russia was positively contrasted with 
developments in Europe, where migration, it was argued, had brought about sig-
nificant societal problems. Both channels linked the migration-related  difficulties 
faced by the various countries to the theme of Europe’s deeper-seated crisis of 
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multiculturalism. Vremia and Vesti also claimed that the inevitable consequence 
of Europe’s migration policies was a sharp rise in radical right-wing sentiments 
among the population and electoral success for the far right. The message here was 
that Russia ought to do better than copy western policies of managing diversity.42
The acute shortage of positive stories about migrants elsewhere in Europe has 
been noted by observers.43 Nor did they feature prominently in Russian television 
news: following the pan-European pattern of reporting, positive examples were 
implicitly portrayed as exceptional and framed by the discourse of successful 
integration into the dominant culture. All such stories on Russian television news 
concerned EU or North American citizens who decided to move to Russia out of 
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Figure 2.12  Frequency of migration-coded stories inside and outside the Russian Federa-
tion over the total recording period: Vesti.
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Figure 2.11  Frequency of migration-coded stories inside and outside the Russian Federa-
tion over the total recording period: Vremia.
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love for the country and its people. Particular publicity was given to stories of 
celebrity migration.44
As we will see in Chapter 9, the state-aligned broadcasters dramatically changed 
their coverage of migration-related issues during the first 18 months of Putin’s 
third presidency. At the same time, certain differences between the channels have 
remained in terms of approaches to the topic. Rather than contrasting the ability to 
manage migration flows, since autumn 2012 Vesti, in particular, has begun to draw 
close parallels between developments in Russia and in western Europe.
Inter-ethnic conflict
The overrepresentation of negative examples related to western Europe was also 
noticeable in the coverage of ‘inter-ethnic conflict’. Overall, more than half of 
the news items in this category concerned developments outside the Russian Fed-
eration. Most reports were of physical violence seemingly motivated by ethnic 
or religious hostility. As we will show, such motivations were not necessarily 
really the case, but were at times perceived as such by broadcasters. On Vesti and 
Vremia, conflicts in Europe were unfailingly linked to wider social and politi-
cal issues, and especially to much-criticized policies of multiculturalism. For 
instance, Vremia reported at length on the shootings by a serial killer in Tou-
louse and Montauban which targeted French North African soldiers and Jewish 
civilians in early 2012, describing the event as a ‘jihad at the heart of Europe’ 
that once again demonstrated ‘the complete ineffectiveness of the modern Euro-
pean state’.45 The coverage of far-right Norwegian terrorist Anders Breivik’s trial 
similarly linked the failure of European immigration policies and the resulting 
spread of far-right extremism in Europe.46 Those states of the former Soviet 
Union with which Russia had troubled relationships, such as Ukraine, were also 
negatively represented. The Ukrainian police were particularly criticized for their 
allegedly lenient approach to ‘Ukrainian Nazis’, among whose victims were vet-
erans of World Wars.47 (This theme was exploited particularly actively during 
the  Russia–Ukraine stand-off in 2014.) During the recording period, failed Euro-
pean multiculturalism was again contrasted with Russia’s success in managing 
its multi-ethnic society. It was only during Putin’s third presidential term that the 
state-aligned broadcasters began to argue that, in fact, there were more similar-
ities than differences between Russia and western Europe in terms of problems 
arising from ethnic diversity.48
In contrast with their treatment of ethnic conflict abroad, the two channels sys-
tematically downplayed ethnic and/or racist aspects of violence in Russia and 
devoted little attention to them. Coverage of the trial of those accused of the 2009 
murder of well-known Moscow lawyer Stanislav Markelov serves as an exam-
ple. Markelov investigated criminal cases involving neo-Nazi groups, as well as 
human rights abuses perpetrated by Russian Army personnel in Chechnia. His 
murder was a high-profile case, which suggests that the broadcasters’ reluctance 
to offer full details of the case was a deliberate policy rather than a mere over-
sight. Vremia’s single report on the trial indicated neither the nature of the cases 
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Markelov pursued as a lawyer nor the identity of his assassins.49 Vesti’s more 
detailed coverage noted that Markelov was killed by neo-Nazis, but failed to men-
tion his investigation of human rights violations in Chechniya.50 Overall, when 
compared to data available from other sources, violence perpetrated by neo-Nazi 
and other extreme nationalist groups, including that against representatives of 
Russia’s ethnic minorities and migrants from Central Asia, was systematically 
underreported by both channels.51
Extreme Russian nationalism is a highly sensitive issue for the Kremlin and, 
following the Manezhnaia riots, it began to take more stringent measures against 
such activities.52 Previously, liberal critics of the regime had repeatedly accused 
the Kremlin of collaborating with Russian nationalists and of using radical nation-
alist groups to do the government’s bidding.53 Nationalists themselves regularly 
criticize the Kremlin for being too harsh toward ethnic Russian activists while 
allegedly displaying excessive lenience toward manifestations of extreme nation-
alism among the minorities.54 Thus, the issue represents a major challenge for 
broadcasters.
It should be acknowledged that state-aligned television coverage of ‘eth-
nic conflict’ does include examples of responsible reporting. Our interviewees 
demonstrated a clear understanding that media reporting can inflame an already 
problematic situation.55 So, in addition to paying little attention to the activities 
of extreme Russian nationalists, during the recording period the broadcasters also 
followed the Kremlin’s position that certain conflicts, particularly those involving 
Russians and Caucasians, had social origins and had nothing to do with ethnicity, 
even if the public tended to see them as ethnically motivated.56 Yet today broad-
casters inevitably have to take popular perceptions into account and engage with 
ethnicized interpretations of cases which attract heated debate on the internet and 
other media.
The conundrum emerged in coverage of the incident involving a well-known 
Sambo master, Rasul Mirzaev, who got into a fight with another young man in 
Moscow in August 2011, as a result of which the young man died. The incident 
attracted much public attention not only because of Mirzaev’s celebrity status, 
but also because he happened to be Dagestani and his opponent Russian. In the 
public discussion which followed, the case became ethnicized. The relatively light 
sentence Mirzaev received and his conviction for manslaughter rather than murder 
provoked outrage among Russian nationalists, who argued that this was yet another 
example of the state failing to defend the russkie from systematic abuse. While 
an inter-ethnic dimension was superimposed on the incident in certain talk-show 
discussions,57 throughout most of the story’s coverage news bulletins represented 
the confrontation between the two men as a private dispute which had nothing to 
do with their ethnic backgrounds.58 Yet when Mirzaev was released from detention 
at the end of the trial, Vesti became somewhat less cautious. Russian nationalist 
activists’ strong objections to the verdict were aired and the reporter demonstrated 
open sympathy for the victim’s angry father who questioned the court’s impar-
tiality.59 Vesti’s treatment of the case seems to have reflected a critical view of 
the trial’s outcome taken by the news production team. In an interview with us, 
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Kiselev criticized the court’s lenient treatment of Mirzaev and compared it with 
what he alleged to be preferential treatment of black people by law enforcement 
organs in the United States.60
Here we see how norms and perceptions prevailing in society at large can influ-
ence the frames through which events are interpreted in the media. Biases toward 
easily accessible and seemingly plausible ethnic frames which politicize social 
and political processes are common in the media of most countries, and nowhere 
more so than in Russia.61 Mirzaev’s case is just one such example. It finds its mir-
ror image in the silencing, or de-ethnicizing, of racially motivated crimes commit-
ted by neo-Nazi groups. Reporting on separatist violence in the North Caucasus, 
to which we now turn, is likewise marked paradoxically by both the occlusion and 
the over-interpretation of ethnicity as a factor in the conflict.
Separatist violence in the North Caucasus
On the face of it, there is considerable continuity between the treatment of inter-eth-
nic violence in the Russian heartlands and coverage of the separatist insurgency 
in the North Caucasus, although, as we shall see, the situation began to change 
somewhat in the second half of our two-year recording period and beyond. For the 
most part, while the ‘international terrorism’ theme continued to surface sporadi-
cally, many of the violent incidents in the North Caucasus were reported as acts of 
crime, sabotage and banditry, summarily dealt with by law enforcement agencies, 
rather than as examples of terrorism. Direct references to ethnicity and religion 
were rare, and accounts of the anti-imperial rhetoric and separatist ambitions of 
the perpetrators rarer still; the term ‘separatist’, in all of its contexts – Russian and 
international – occurred only 28 times in total throughout the entire corpus. When 
causality and motives were broached at all, economic and social factors were at 
the forefront rather than the Islamist or political dimensions. To the extent that the 
link between Islam and separatist violence was acknowledged, the term ‘Wahha-
bist’ (vakhkhabit), with its distinctly foreign (Saudi) origins (11 occurrences), was 
preferred to ‘Islamist’ (0 occurrences). References linking insurgent leaders to al 
Qaeda and the broader War on Terror were occasional and perfunctory. This is in 
keeping with trends observed in the period between 2006 and 2008 as part of an 
earlier project.62 There, too, systematic suppression of the goals of the secessionist 
movement during a period in which the radical Islamist influence upon that move-
ment had been gradually increasing only underlined the Kremlin’s paranoid fear 
that, by acknowledging the insurgents’ true motives, its loyal broadcasters might 
legitimize those motives and foster the impression that it had lost control of the 
situation.
The lack of background detail and explanatory analysis in reports on terrorist 
violence in the North Caucasus extended beyond the taboo regarding exploring 
the stated goals of the culprits. Heavy with the technical lexicon of military opera-
tions, munitions and impersonal casualty numbers, these reports tended to be con-
veniently context-free. ‘Militants’ (boeviki was the favoured term), ‘criminals’ 
and ‘terrorists’ were routinely ‘eliminated’, ‘destroyed’, ‘liquidated’, ‘neutralized’ 
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and arrested by members of the Special Forces National Anti-Terrorism Commit-
tee. The perpetual threat of indeterminate origin that the boeviki represented was 
invariably cancelled out by the equally constant authority, decisiveness and supe-
rior force of the regime as it dealt with each situation in turn. Introducing a char-
acteristically contradictory report of May 2011, the Vremia newsreader declared 
that ‘[i]n our country, especially in the Caucasus, there are boeviki attacks nearly 
every week, in spite of the fact that overall the authorities have the situation under 
control’.63 The events described occurred within a curiously disjointed tempo-
rality of discrete, self-contained incidents with minimal connection either to one 
another or to any external time line.
The approach adopted by Vremia and Vesti is not unique to Russian broadcast-
ers. In news reporting around the world (with the BBC a notable, though by no 
means consistent, exception), war reporting in general tends to provide scant anal-
ysis of the circumstances under which conflicts erupt or of the motives of the par-
ticipants.64 In discourse on international terrorism in particular, the threat posed 
is serious, indeterminate and without motive, yet never so great that it cannot 
be entirely contained by government force.65 But the legitimizing potential that 
the demonstration of such force offers is of particular value to the Russian state. 
This was reflected in our running order data. According to Russian newsmakers, 
among them a Channel 1 journalist whom we interviewed, the first three news 
items are considered the most important when establishing a news agenda.66 In the 
Russian context, these items will tend to include major domestic and sometimes 
international incidents, and events, meetings and official occasions involving state 
leaders. The fact that stories coded as ‘separatist violence in the North Caucasus’ 
made it into Vremia’s top three far more frequently than those from other cate-
gories on either Vremia or Vesti is a clear indicator of their salience for Russia’s 
primary state-aligned broadcaster (see Figure 2.6). Indeed, for Vremia, ‘separatist 
violence in the North Caucasus’ was the most dominant category across all three 
criteria of analysis (frequency, intensity and salience). Thus, for example, in terms 
of intensity it accounted for 24 per cent of the total coverage for our topic (see 
Figure 2.7). For Vesti, the corresponding figure is only 9 per cent (see Figure 2.8).
The most significant event in the ‘separatist violence’ category was an explo-
sion in the North Ossetian city of Vladikavkaz on 9 September 2010, which 
claimed nearly 20 lives and injured over a hundred people. Both channels avoided 
making reference to the ethnicity of the suicide bomber or speculating about his 
motives. Instead, the respective reports provided detailed factual accounts of what 
had occurred, the number of victims and, most prominently, the efficient work of 
the authorities. Even when they eventually referred to the identities of the terror-
ists (all of whom carry Muslim-sounding names), the reporters left ethnicities and 
the purposes of their group unexplained.67
In the Vladikavkaz report, as in many reports belonging to this category, the 
emphasis in the newsreader’s account was on the routinized reporting of technical 
details of the Special Forces operation. Often, however, the accompanying foot-
age clearly (if inadvertently) revealed ethnic and religious content. A long story 
on Vesti recounting a large-scale special operation in Ingushetia in March 2011 
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claimed that Russian forces had captured terrorists involved in organizing the 
Domodedovo bombing in January 2011, in which nearly 40 people were killed.68 
The main focus was, as usual, on the rigour and decisiveness of the authorities, 
with allusions to ethnicity notable by their absence. However, the reporter’s narra-
tive was complimented by imagery of the Qur'an and footage of men whose long 
beards and strict Islamic attire connoted the fanaticism of al Qaeda, rendering the 
broadcaster’s refusal to acknowledge the terrorists’ aims and demands all the more 
curious and contradictory. The tensions were compounded when, not long after 
this report on the large-scale counterterrorism action, Vremia ran a Sunday feature 
on Ingushetia which presented the image of a republic whose calm stability was 
‘the result of constant and successful special operations’.69
Both the ethnicization of certain conflicts and the occlusion of inter-ethnic 
factors at work in others are part of what Carolyn Nordstrom has termed the 
‘politics of (in)visibility’ in her research on post-conflict countries.70 Nordstrom 
suggests that there is a meticulous, yet contradictory, editing of news relating 
to violence in these countries such that, depending on political interests, key 
aspects of the violence are alternatively foregrounded and suppressed. In the 
North Caucasus, the two strategies can be observed side by side. Thus, on the 
one hand, according to the generalized propaganda of normalization dominat-
ing state news coverage of the region since the mid and late 2000s,71 Russia’s 
intervention in the North Caucasus eventually brought peace and prosperity; on 
the other, particular reports on Ingushetia implicitly deliver the message that 
radical Islam remains a real threat, albeit one monitored and contained by Spe-
cial Forces, whose perpetual state of alertness will ensure that Russia’s future 
remains secure.72
Around the time of the shocking assault on Domodedovo airport in early 2011, 
we begin to witness a slow and gradual shift in emphasis. Following the compre-
hensive international coverage generated by the event, it became progressively 
more difficult to entirely suppress the threat posed by North Caucasian-based rad-
ical Islamism. Indeed, reporting on the Domodedovo assault itself was littered 
with references to and ominous images of the Chechen ‘Black Widow’ (Chiornaia 
vdova or Shakhidka) fanatic who was implicated in the attack. (Two Black Wid-
ows had carried out the earlier Moscow metro suicide bombing of March 2010; 
between October and December 2013, shakhidki were heavily implicated in sev-
eral bombings on Volgograd’s transport system). At this point, although the state 
media re-invoked the strategy of inscribing Russia into the global ‘war on terror’ 
that has been deployed at intervals since the 9/11 attacks of 2001, it co-existed in 
tension with the reverse strategy of occluding the role of jihadist ideology and por-
traying a region undergoing a protracted but successful process of normalization.73
Toward the end of our recording period, the balance of references to Islamist 
extremism in the North Caucasus slowly increased. This preceded a veritable del-
uge of scaremongering stories broadcast on Rossiia and NTV in 2012 and 2013 
and linking the problem of illegal migrants in Moscow and St. Petersburg to jihad-
ist groupings from the North Caucasus and Azerbaidjan planning terrorist acts 
in Russian cities.74 The ever-cautious Channel 1 succumbed to the appeal of the 
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anti-Islamist line less unambiguously than its two rivals, Rossiia and NTV. Thus, 
it accompanied its coverage of a series of arrests in St Petersburg in March 2013 
with the carefully worded reminders of an Islamic scholar that the danger repre-
sented by those arrested ‘lies in the fact that they are destroying the foundations 
of traditional Islam, dissolving it, and enticing our Muslims into their incompre-
hensible extremist organizations’.75
In addition to the renewed critical focus on North Caucasian (and other) ‘migra-
tion’ that occurred during the first 18 months of Putin’s new presidency, the greater 
prominence of largely negative treatments of Islam in the North Caucasian context 
was also reflected in a spate of stories relating to the building of a large mosque in 
Moscow and to the wearing of the Islamic hidjab in the North Caucasian region of 
Stavropol, which is predominantly populated by ethnic Russians. The Stavropol 
story attracted particular attention because it centred on the pressure brought to 
bear on beleaguered Russian head teachers bravely fighting against the tide of 
local Islamism in insisting that girls at their schools remove their hidjabs, since 
they breached school dress code.76 Between December 2012 and March 2013 
alone, we counted a total of ten substantive reports on the topic from Vremia and 
Vesti. Our NVivo analysis of the texts of those reports generated 40 results for 
combinations involving the word ‘hidjab’.
The hidjab controversy acquired significant media resonance; the main evening 
bulletin of the populist NTV devoted as many reports to it as Vremia and Vesti 
put together during the same period (10), generating almost the same number of 
references to hidjabs as the two other channels combined (38). This is partly attrib-
utable to the controversy’s links with a related issue which we touched on in the 
context of our earlier project on European television coverage of Islam, where we 
drew attention to a spate of Channel 1 reports in 2007 telling of a concerted attempt 
by elements within the local Muslim population in Ingushetiia to intimidate eth-
nic Russian residents, particularly school teachers, into leaving the region.77 The 
hidjab issue added new potency to the fears generated by this development and 
seemed to chime with a growing sense that the North Caucasus was on the point 
of being lost to Russia – a sentiment, however, which the vast media event of the 
2014 Sochi Winter Olympics, held close to the region, was intended to help dispel.
***
The aim of this chapter was to identify broad patterns of coverage in 
 ethnicity-related news reporting and to provide some empirically based con-
text for further discussion throughout the book. Above all, our analysis revealed 
that the Russian state’s nation-building policy was replete with contradictions 
which manifested themselves in the approach taken to ethnicity-related ques-
tions. On the one hand, these reports presented ethnic and cultural diversity as 
one of Russia’s uniquely positive qualities; on the other, with multi-ethnicity 
and migration proving to be a powder keg within the population at large and 
with xenophobic hatred growing, state broadcasters were caught between two 
options: (i) attempting to preserve ethnic cohesion by underreporting sensitive 
68 Managing difference
or inflammatory topics, and (ii) acceding to popular sentiments by echoing, and 
even fomenting, the prejudicial fears to which those topics gave rise.
Against the background of the Kremlin’s concerns, Channel 1 and Rossiia are 
well aware of their responsibility to support state policy on diversity management. 
This was particularly visible in relation to migration issues, where state broad-
casters initially differentiated themselves from other media outlets by exercised 
restraint rather than joining those outlets’ anti-migrant bandwagons in order to 
achieve higher ratings. This approach changed in 2012, as we will discuss later.
Throughout the chapter, we noted certain discrepancies between the two chan-
nels. Rossiia, though state-owned, tends to be more provocative and swifter in 
responding to the public mood. Taking account of its more international audi-
ence, the part-privately owned Channel 1 tacks closer to the Kremlin’s line and 
is more cautious about ethnicizing news stories. These differences manifested 
themselves in each channel’s responses to the 2012 Pussy Riot scandal, whose 
indirect links to ethnic relations will become apparent. While even Rossiia was 
slow in reacting to the incident, Channel 1’s Vremia did not take up the topic for 
over six weeks.
Notwithstanding the constitutional commitment to multi-confessionality, both 
channels consistently promoted Russian Orthodoxy as an unchallenged pillar of 
Russianness which transcends national and religious identities. Judaism, Bud-
dhism and non-Orthodox Christian denominations and ‘sects’, by contrast, were 
all marginalized. Benefiting in part from the Eurasianist thinking underpinning 
elements within official rhetoric, Islam received more attention, though nothing 
to rival that accorded to Orthodoxy. The hysteria about ‘radical Islam’ promi-
nent since our recording period finished had yet to develop in earnest, but it was 
foreshadowed in reactions to the terrorist attacks on the Moscow metro and at 
Domodedovo airport in 2010 and 2011 respectively.78 Major incidents such as the 
Vladikavkaz bombing and Special Forces operations in Ingushetia were rarely 
reported in terms of ethnic or religious conflict, despite the importance attributed 
to such factors by actors in the region and by the Russian public.
One of several paradoxes that we noted was the dual function played by the 
emphasis placed on western Europe’s reportedly catastrophic failure to handle 
migration flows and ethnic tensions and the perceived crisis within European 
multiculturalism. For while, against this backdrop, Russia’s approach to diversity 
management could be presented in a much more positive light, the deadlock in 
Europe also provided a convenient alibi for the strong measures that Russia itself 
has been occasionally forced to take with respect to its own problems in the area 
of inter-ethnic relations.
The contradictions we have identified and the often unpredictable terrain we 
have mapped in this chapter are indeed cast into sharp relief when seen in the con-
text of television news coverage of inter-ethnic relations in present-day western 
Europe as well as that of the preceding Soviet period, albeit not as Russia’s state 
broadcasters would wish. In each case we can speak of strong continuities and sig-
nificant differences. Thus, while the baton of Soviet state television’s obligations 
as an instrument of Kremlin policy has been passed to its post-Soviet successor, 
Mapping an uncertain terrain 69
the relationship between policy and broadcast output is now considerably more 
complex and less ‘transitive’ than in Soviet times; there is greater heterogeneity, 
more editorial autonomy and journalistic room for manoeuvre, more inconsis-
tency and shifting in response to changing circumstances and a stronger sense of 
the need to account for popular opinion.
Equally, west European PSBs are undoubtedly grappling with similar issues to 
their Russian counterparts (increased migration flows, growing inter-community 
tensions, the breakdown of diversity management policies, the inexorable rise of 
right-wing populism). They too fulfil a powerful nation-building function within 
their respective establishments. But the post-Enlightenment principles and lan-
guage of tolerance are far more deeply entrenched within their collective psyches 
than in their Eastern neighbours’. Moreover, their public service ethos, sheltered 
by mature democratic systems within which they represent the outer limit of a 
powerful ‘fourth estate’, is distinctly lacking in Russia. For that very reason, 
they tend to exhibit more consistency in their approach to diversity management 
issues. Their adherence to a relatively narrow band of consensual opinion on the 
subject is, ironically, stronger than that of either Channel 1 or Rossiia, though 
it is significant that the BBC has itself recently been pressured into acknowl-
edging and redressing a certain perceived ‘liberal bias’ in its own coverage of 
immigration.79
The full significance of the broad-brush spatiotemporal juxtapositions will 
emerge in the analysis we undertake in later chapters. We begin that analysis, 
however, by focusing on Russian television coverage of the ill-fated Day of 
National Unity: an example of nation-building whose brief and curious history is 
very much of post-Soviet time and space.
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3 Re-inventing Russia in television 
news commemorations of the 
‘Day of National Unity’
Mediation as fracture
A new day is born
Like religious belief, the sharing of foundation myths contributes to the coherence 
of national communities, binding them through their shared stake in the symbolic 
birth of the nation.1 When the nation was becoming an international norm in the 
nineteenth century, states began setting aside a specific day for public commem-
oration of the birth of the nation as a single ‘imagined community’. The urgency 
with which post-1991 Russia required a convincing myth of origin appropriate 
for the new realities it faced relates to the fact that, until the late twentieth cen-
tury, the states with which today’s Russian state claims direct historical lineage 
were supra-national, multi-ethnic communities, wherein the Russians occupied 
an ambiguous position. When the Russian Federation emerged as an independent 
state, its political leadership proclaimed it to be a post-imperial national state, 
though it remained a vast, ethnically diverse entity, the boundaries of which have 
proven difficult to agree.2
However, when, under Putin, Russia began to implement a co-ordinated 
nation-building strategy to counter the centrifugal tendencies, it was able to draw 
on two distinct advantages: first, the preceding centuries of Russian (and, lat-
terly, Soviet) historical achievements; second, a compliant media system inured 
to serving as the propaganda tool of a powerful, centralizing state. One of the 
Kremlin’s key motivations for imposing its grip on television broadcasting was 
to promote its own vision of a powerful Russian state with a unity of patriotic 
purpose and an enviable cultural history spanning the imperial and the Soviet 
periods. As early as 1999, Pushkin’s bi-centenary year, the main state television 
channel mounted a campaign to re-install the poet at the heart of the nation’s cul-
tural history. In 2003, it used the St Petersburg tercentenary to celebrate the old 
imperial capital’s re-established status as Russia’s ‘showcase’ to the west.3 Putin 
has overseen a steady ratcheting up of patriotic rhetoric surrounding the annual 
9 May ‘Day of Victory’ celebrations, culminating in a year of saturation coverage 
of Soviet wartime achievements in 2005, the 60th anniversary of the end of the 
Second World War.4
2005 also saw the introduction of a ‘Day of National Unity’, celebrated with 
hesitant media fanfare on 4 November and repeated annually. The new holiday had 
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an implicit ideological purpose pitting it against three competing dates: first, 12 
December, which El’tsin had introduced as the ‘Day of the Constitution’ in 1993 
to mark Russia’s newfound commitment to democracy; second, 7 November, the 
Day of the October Revolution, re-named by El’tsin in 1996 as the ‘Day of Accord 
and Reconciliation’ to counter the divisive associations attached to the old Soviet 
ideology but still celebrated by the Communist Party; third, Russia Day, marked 
on 12 June, introduced in 1992 following the Russian Federation’s declaration of 
sovereignty within the Soviet Union on 12 June 1990 but rejected by many for 
its implicit endorsement of the collapse of the Soviet Union. In inaugurating the 
Day of National Unity (henceforth DNU), Putin simultaneously called for the 
elimination of Constitution Day, a rallying point for liberals, as ‘compensation’ 
for Communists by removing what they saw as an illegitimate rival to the Day of 
the October Revolution.
Apart from the need to assert primacy in the nation-building calendar, DNU 
reflected concern over the deterioration of the North Caucasus situation. This, in 
turn, was mirrored by the growth of nationalist forces (encouraged by the ‘main-
streaming’ of figures like Zhirinovskii and the legitimization of concerns about 
the fate of ethnic Russians in light of demographic changes within the Russian 
Federation, as well as the legacy of Soviet policies toward nationalities which 
were perceived by many as anti-Russian). The latter development coincided with 
a steady increase in hate crimes against minority communities.
Unsurprisingly, therefore, despite the mass mobilization of youth movements 
in support of DNU, it soon threatened to become a site not of togetherness but of 
discord. Indeed, even before the establishment of DNU, 4 November had been 
marked by the notorious ‘Russian March’, a demonstration initiated by Russian 
nationalists involving the participation of the extremist Movement Against Illegal 
Immigration and even the Ku Klux Klan. DNU has witnessed a three-way split 
into ‘those who celebrated (ultra-nationalist youth and the “United Russia” Young 
Guards political movement) and those who did not celebrate it (an older gener-
ation for whom 7 November remained the date and the holiday to celebrate)’.5 
Contrary to Durkheim’s view of national rituals as promoting social integration, 
DNU provided ‘crucial elements in the mobilization of bias’.6
The two linked historical events around which DNU’s official symbolism is based 
are themselves problematic in terms of their capacity to instil unity. The ending of 
the Time of Troubles (Smuta) in 1612 when, led by the legendary Kozma Minin 
and Dmitrii Pozharskii, a popular army of volunteers (or  opolchentsy) marched 
from Nizhnii Novgorod to Moscow to expel the Polish–Lithuanian occupiers and 
revitalize Russia is a rousing story (it is no coincidence that during the Ukraine 
crisis of 2014, Russian media sources referred consistently to East Ukrainian reb-
els as opolchentsy). However, its capacity for acceptance as marking the birth of 
modern Russian nation is limited. Moreover, the fact that the Russian Orthodox 
Church – which, before 1917, had celebrated the ‘Day of the Kazan Mother of 
God Icon’ on this date for 270 years – soon intertwined its own celebrations with 
those of the state by emphasizing that Minin and Pozharskii gained inspiration 
from the icon, strengthening DNU’s claim to continuity with the pre-revolutionary 
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era. But the Orthodox narrative clashed with the theme of Russia’s multi-faith, 
multicultural make-up and its adopted mantra of ‘Unity in Diversity’. This tension 
is reflected each year in the conflicting images of the Russian nation which char-
acterize television coverage of DNU.
The significance of the holiday is evidenced by the fact that all three main 
national television channels (Channel 1, Rossiia and NTV) produced historical 
films for the occasion.7 Since 2005, it has gathered pace in terms of the level of cap-
ital, actual and symbolic, that the government has invested in its success; there are 
now co-ordinated demonstrations across the Russian Federation on 4 November, 
tailored to the regions in which they take place. Since 2009, a concerted effort 
has been mounted to reclaim the Russian March from the nationalists; nonethe-
less, polling indicates that ordinary people have not adopted DNU. By 2010, 
the percentage of those polled who considered the holiday ‘necessary’ had 
dropped from 46 per cent to 38 per cent. The same poll revealed that those with 
no plans to celebrate the occasion numbered 71 per cent; in 2005 the figure was 
73 per cent.8
National broadcasters must mediate between the values of the establishment and 
the perspectives of the viewing public. DNU presents a particular set of challenges 
to Russian television (the top-down, artificial ‘imposition’ of the celebration; the 
lack of viewer ‘buy-in’; tensions surrounding the event’s meaning; the poten-
tially divisive symbolism it deploys). The present chapter explores how Channel 
1 and Rossiia have addressed these challenges, focusing on their approach toward 
DNU’s modulating emphasis on ethnic cohesion, its interpretation of the ‘Unity in 
Diversity’ mantra and the broader meaning of Russian nationhood. We trace shifts 
that have occurred over a seven-year period, dwelling at some length on 2010–12 
since this period marked a key turning point in the coverage, and making reference 
to Russia’s two other main national channels and to foreign broadcasters.
Our analysis is informed by Hobsbawm’s notion of ‘invented tradition’ and 
we examine how television news contributes to the construction of DNU as 
an organic tradition with popular support rooted in spontaneous local rituals. 
Hobsbawm’s recognition of television’s importance to this process aligns with 
the first category of ‘media event’ outlined in our Introduction (the pre-planned 
collaboration of state television and its political masters in celebrating rituals of 
national communion which recur in the official calendar). It corresponds, too, to 
Dayan and Katz’s concept of the ‘media event’, defined as those ‘high holidays of 
mass communication’ when ‘broadcaster and state “resonate together” in common 
cause to celebrate historical events of national significance’.9 We argue, however 
that DNU both conforms and fails to conform to this definition, attributing the 
failure to, first, the broadcasters’ lack of participatory commitment to the ‘spirit’ 
of the occasion; second, the absence of a ‘media metalanguage’ enabling them to 
ground the DNU rituals in everyday practices ‘beneath’ official state discourse 
and simultaneously transpose those rituals to a transcendent level of universal 
values ‘above’ the level of the state; third, narrative discontinuities affecting the 
inter-ethnic cohesion aspect’s integration with other components. In this sense, we 
suggest, DNU benefits from interpretation within the framework of later critiques 
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by Dayan and Katz, which take into account the inherent capacity of all media 
events to expose discontinuity and conflict.
We link the discontinuities to perceptions of Russian identity fiercely contested 
by rival elites, and to the contradictions affecting the treatment of ethnicity within 
the Kremlin’s official nation-building programme. This, we argue, constitutes a 
barrier to the performative role required of media event broadcasters. That role 
dissipates altogether from 2012, when the subtle and at times productive dynamic 
of the contradictions gives way to open polemic on one hand and a ‘congealed’, 
manufactured harmony on the other. By way of examples from the UK, we caution 
against overstating the contrasts with parallel media events in mature, multicul-
tural democracies – concluding, however, that the potential for complete fracture 
is particularly great in Russia.
A media event like any other?
In many senses, post-communist Russia offers a textbook model of the 
nation-building prerogatives and media strategies of other states. It is difficult 
to pinpoint precisely how ritualized national days unify societies according to 
Durkheimian theory. Much clearer is the way that, whether successful or not, they 
all expose social cleavages and the unequal structuring of political and symbolic 
power.10 Indeed, every media event reveals ‘truths’ about contemporary mediated 
societies which are otherwise invisible.11
Nor is Russia the only country whose turbulent history makes it difficult to 
agree which events should constitute its foundation myth. Germany has a simi lar 
problem.12 The urgency with which the opolchenie narrative was imposed upon 
the official version of Russia’s historical roots to cement the unification of its 
post-Soviet political community confirms Hobsbawm’s assertion that invented 
traditions arise ‘when a rapid transformation of society weakens or destroys the 
social patterns for which “old” traditions had been designed … or when such old 
traditions are eliminated’.13
The oxymoron at the heart of ‘invented traditions’ points to the requirement that, 
in order for such phenomena to endure, ‘tradition’ must ultimately suppress ‘inven-
tion’. Russia’s DNU is new, and it may be premature to dismiss its capacity for ever 
generating popular engagement – for ‘ritual can come first in formulating expe-
rience’, as the USSR’s cross-societal celebration of 7 November demonstrates.14
The onus on the mass media to subordinate public experience to an elite- 
sponsored ritual finds expression in Dayan and Katz’s argument that national cel-
ebrations of historical traditions are inseparable from their media representations. 
It is also implicit in their identification of the three criteria that media events must 
satisfy: semantic (they deal reverentially with sacred matters); syntactic (they 
interrupt the flow of daily life); pragmatic (they invite the response of a commit-
ted audience).15 All three criteria aim to ‘naturalize’ the traditions as inherently 
worthy of respect, and as embedded in the national consciousness.
DNU meets the ‘semantic criterion’ in both its literal and its figurative senses. 
Russian television has long accorded ‘reverential’ treatment to ‘sacred matters’, 
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ever since the Soviet period when deference to official rituals was central to its rai-
son d’être. Unsurprisingly, the words of Medvedev and Putin feature prominently 
in coverage of the occasion from its inception. In 2010, one of two Vremia reports 
on DNU focused on a ceremony marking the occasion at which Medvedev made 
special awards to foreign guests to thank them for their contribution to strength-
ening Russia’s international ties. The newsreader’s opening reference to ‘interna-
tional friendship’ was part of the sacred lexicon of Soviet official discourse and 
provides DNU with a historical lineage, strengthened by the re-sanctification of 
the beloved Russian language.16 The re-appropriation of Orthodoxy within offi-
cial patriotic discourse provides an opportunity for the sanctification of DNU in 
a more direct sense. The intentional foregrounding of the intersection of religious 
and secular commemorations is common for national days in other countries, par-
ticularly where Orthodox Christianity remains important.17
The media account of DNU’s historical grounding grafted the opolchenie narra-
tive onto the 270-year old celebration of the Day of the Kazan Icon of the Mother 
of God, a gesture which intensifies both the historification and the sanctification 
of the event. The intensity of the sacralization procedures acquires legitimization 
in the hallowed historical events to which they are directed, for, as in many ‘media 
events’, it is the foundational status of the myths at their heart which underpins 
the reverence paid to them: these are no run-of-the-mill narratives, but the sto-
ries which define nationhood. In 2010, reviving the nineteenth-century interpre-
tation of the end of the Smuta as marking the birth of modern Russia,18 a Vremia 
newsreader concluded: ‘This event marked the beginning of the emergence of the 
 Russian (rossiiskogo) state’.19
For countries that do not ground themselves in a royal lineage whose mystique 
rests in its indeterminate origins, foundation mythologies are essential. From the 
story of the founding of Rome by Romulus and Remus, to the forging of modern 
France in the fire of revolution, to America’s Declaration of Independence, such 
myths have abounded in the history of nations and empires. Characteristic of a 
certain category of foundation myth is the story of a nation’s coming to selfhood 
through the expulsion of an alien other. The opolchentsy myth belongs to this 
familiar category. A comparison can be made with the USA’s Independence Day; 
just as the act of expulsion marked on the Day of National Unity has been (mis)
appropriated by extreme Russian nationalists, so America’s Republican right 
has reinterpreted Boston Tea Party mythology as a conservative ‘call to arms’ 
against the ‘liberal establishment’. To consolidate their ‘sacred status’ and render 
them eligible for entry into the media event canon, successful foundation myths 
must reflect positive value systems that transcend the original act of expulsion. 
 Latter-day Tea Partiers target not British imperialists but ‘tax and spend liberals’ 
who threaten America’s true, Christian, way of life. Here the blending of the 
Minin and Pozharskii story with the Kazan Mother of God icon gains signifi-
cance for, as Patriarch Aleksei’s pronouncements on the eve of the very first DNU 
indicate, it links transitory history with the eternal spirit of the nation: ‘It is no 
secret that the flags had icons sewn into them. And this was the standard which, 
with faith and hope, led the Russian people to the salvation of the motherland.’20 
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 The ‘eternal’ dimension to the opolchenie establishes it as one link in a chain of 
sacred feats traversing Russian history. Thus, the most sacred victory of all – the 
defeat of fascism – has been invoked annually by both Vesti and Vremia.
If such historical linkages achieve unity through time, then the spiritual dimen-
sion ‘draws out’ and universalizes the ‘unity of the peoples’ principle posited 
as inherent in Minin and Pozharskii’s feat. Every year, attention is drawn to the 
multi-faith, multi-ethnic make-up of the original opolchentsy in what is an anach-
ronistic projection onto the original historical event of contemporary political and 
ideological concerns (cf. annual efforts in BBC coverage of war commemorations 
to associate the sacrifices of veterans of the two World War campaigns with more 
recent British military heroism). It demonstrates how media events celebrating 
specific historical moments ground themselves in an organically linked ‘canon’ of 
celebrations, projecting the transitory present into the ‘Great Time’ of the History 
of the Nation.
By associating the ‘Unity in Diversity’ principle with historical events, the orga-
nizers play an active role in consolidating the principle. For it is a defining feature 
of the mass media that they unite in one ‘space’ diverse individuals dispersed 
across a vast land mass. This is a generic practice shared by all media events, 
but particularly apposite in the case of DNU, where unity in diversity is both the 
‘means’ and the ‘object’ of the celebration. Vremia’s report on the 2010 celebra-
tion centres on a collage of images from across the Federation, bound together by 
the newsreader’s authoritative voice.
The inscription of the Orthodox Church into the DNU myth accounts for another 
dimension to the event: the attempt to connect it with the inherent ‘generosity’ of 
the Russian people. The original proposal that DNU should be marked by ‘good 
deeds’ is attributed by state television to the Inter-Religious Council of Russia, 
which represents Russia’s four officially recognized ‘traditional religions’: Chris-
tianity, Islam, Judaism and Buddhism.21 Yet from the start the main commentator 
on the proposal is Kirill, in 2005 still the Metropolitan of Smolensk and Kalin-
ingrad, who on the eve of the first DNU celebration was interviewed at length 
on Rossiia about the meaning of the new holiday.22 Following the Metropolitan’s 
endorsement, Vesti claimed that ‘Day of Good Deeds’ (Den’ dobrykh del) has 
emerged as an ‘unofficial name’ for the occasion and tells stories of a blood donor 
who was to save the life of a boy with leukaemia, a sports benefactor who was 
to finance the treatment of sick veterans and a woman who was to give money to 
support the Siberian tiger. The report included a comment from the benefactor that 
he would mark the occasion by ‘drinking a little vodka, telling a few jokes, and 
having a little singsong’, demonstrating the extent to which the new holiday has 
taken root in the popular rituals by which Soviet holidays were celebrated. It con-
cluded by projecting this wave of spontaneous generosity across the entire nation.
In subsequent years, blood donation programmes were installed as one of the 
‘traditions’ of the holiday until, in 2007, blood donation became the centrepiece of 
Channel 1’s coverage, as youth leaders declared to the camera their commitment 
to its dual political and symbolic significance. ‘“We are all of one blood” was 
the name of the joint initiative taken by the youth movements Nashi and Rossiia 
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Molodaia. “Today will be International Donor Day, because blood has no nation-
ality”.’23 In the ‘one blood’ motif the spiritualization of the opolchenie unifies the 
original act of ‘sacrifice’ in driving the Poles from Moscow, the ‘unity in diversity’ 
represented by the opolchentsy and Orthodox exhortations to give to charity, thus 
embodying Russians’ inherent self-sacrificial generosity. The Great Time of the 
Russian Nation converges with the Great Spirit of the Russian People.
But the attention paid to the blood donation theme aligns DNU with media 
events elsewhere: for semi-spontaneous blood donation is an index of a coming 
together of official and non-official, people and state, ceremonial ritual and heart-
felt, spontaneous tradition. The integration of state and people provides the ‘ver-
tical’ subplot in its narrative structure to which the ‘horizontal’ equivalent is the 
unification of peoples, races and ethnic groups. Again, with its ability to speak 
in the ‘popular idiom’ and its close ties to the state’s official agendas, the public 
broadcaster is uniquely placed to play the mediating role.
In later years, the two state broadcasters have cultivated the impression that 
ordinary people are committed to the official and not the extremist version of the 
celebration, conjoining the unifying ceremonials carried out by elites with enthu-
siastic popular endorsements. This function requires a second mediator located 
within the events themselves. In many western nations, that role is assigned to 
public figures shown participating alongside the ordinary masses, or to a pre-
senter who thus succeeds in merging the two mediations. In DNU, the ranks of 
the semi-official youth organization are allotted the role, in a deliberately man-
aged throwback to the Komsomol marches which many Russians recall with nos-
talgia. Nashi and Molodaia gvardiia dominate Vremia’s and Vesti’s coverage. In 
2009, Vremia enacted vertical integration in the very structure of its report on 
a DNU initiative, as the account proceeded from the official realm, to that of 
the  ‘spontaneous’ – but suitably compliant – Molodaia gvardiia, to the demotic 
voices (and informal text messages) of the people who, in closing the circle, ‘write 
back to the centre’: ‘Text messages were posted on the giant screen … answers 
to the question “What future do you want for the country?” Of several thousand 
 messages, the most popular was “Happy”.’24
Such gestures embrace the same principle of circularity as that of the crowds 
of British mourners queuing to write in books of condolence on the occasion of 
dignitaries’ deaths, whose surviving relatives thank them in formal messages of 
gratitude addressed back to the nation.
The vertical and horizontal subplots of nationhood are required to work in uni-
son. In 2009, Vesti described the gatherings of Nashi supporters in Moscow, focus-
ing simultaneously on the role of Russia’s ‘youth’ in securing the country’s future 
and the unity of the diverse ethnic groups making up Nashi: ‘Twenty thousand 
people in multi-coloured costumes symbolising tolerant and diverse Russia.’25
As elsewhere, the gesture inserts the transitory present, with its fissures, into an 
‘eternal time’ oriented both backward to a glorious past and forward to a bright 
future, when Russia will realize the unity in diversity that is integral to its national 
spirit. This is not only a Russian phenomenon: in 1998, when France hosted and 
won the World Cup, French television was awash with images uniting France’s 
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revolutionary history and larger-than-life photos of its multiracial football heroes 
gazing to a future in which France will erase the inter-ethnic tensions of the pres-
ent and the colonial misdeeds of the past, to realize the spirit of unity embodied 
in its founders.
Day of National Unity: A media event apart
Although certain aspects of DNU set it apart from media events elsewhere, few 
national days can claim mass popular participation and popular consensus. Those 
of France, Norway and the United States are rare exceptions. What distinguishes 
these successful national days from their peers? Above all, Bastille Day in France, 
Constitution Day in Norway and US Independence Day all began in the nine-
teenth century, during the high days of nation-building. Even though the construc-
tion of nineteenth-century national narratives was not conflict-free, the number 
of groups actively competing to offer their interpretations of the commemorated 
events was smaller than today. This, alongside a greater concentration of power in 
fewer centres, made it easier for a narrow circle of national elites to formulate the 
nation’s foundational myths.26
Successful national days are what Pierre Nora has called ‘sites of memory’, 
which ‘by dint of human will or the work of time [have] become a symbolic ele-
ment of the memorial heritage of any community’.27 A particular entity can only 
embody national memory if ‘a sense of historical continuity persists’.28 DNU’s 
main problem is that the nineteenth-century attempt to date modern Russia’s birth 
to the end of the Smuta had been largely forgotten during the twentieth century.29
A second important element in successful national days is either the decen-
tralized nature of the nation-state – where regions with strong identities enjoy 
long-established traditions of local celebrations, as in France and the United 
States – or relative homogeneity, as in Norway.30 While adopting a top-down 
approach, the Russian authorities appreciated the importance of feeding local cel-
ebrations into the overall vision projected by its foundation myth. Yet, far from 
emerging spontaneously from the grassroots, local DNU celebrations were mostly 
organized by United Russia, pro-Kremlin youth groups and local governmental 
bodies. The narratives of Russian nationhood disseminated by the state media 
organizers of DNU leave little room for Russia’s ethnic autonomies to establish 
genuinely local celebrations. Tellingly, Vesti’s and Vremia’s reports on DNU cel-
ebrations in Kazan, the capital of Tatarstan, focus on the commemoration of the 
Kazan icon of the Mother of God, although the Tatars, who make up the plurality 
of the population, are Muslim.
Let us now focus more closely on other distinct features of DNU, grouping 
them into three categories.
Apartness as non-participation
DNU scores poorly against the ‘syntactic’ or ‘pragmatic’ criteria for a media event. 
Arguably, its inability to address those criteria disqualifies it altogether from the 
TV commemorations of the ‘Day of National Unity’ 81
status of ‘media event’. DNU even falls down on the semantic criterion if we move 
beyond Channel 1 and Rossiia. In 2010, REN TV’s round-up of the news at the 
end of the first week of November featured DNU as its third item, following a 
story of the shocking beating of a Kommersant journalist known for criticizing the 
Nashi movement. Its report began with a sarcastic description of Russia’s ‘newest 
and least comprehensible holiday’. Its focus was on the continued presence of 
extreme nationalists in the Russian March, whose slogans were difficult to tell 
apart from those of the Nashi supporters.31
REN TV’s ‘desacralizing’ approach leads to DNU’s failure to meet the ‘syn-
tactic’ criterion, for even the ‘supportive’ channels fall short of interrupting their 
daily schedules, or the standard structure of their news bulletins, to embrace the 
festive spirit. DNU lacks the ‘live coverage’ dimension associated with ‘media 
events’. However, DNU challenges the very distinction that media event the-
ory makes, between the unpredictability, negativity and tension associated with 
‘reported news’ and the spontaneous pleasure that comes from shared participa-
tion in a universally familiar ‘celebratory ritual’.
For Vremia and Vesti, DNU must be accommodated within its regular bulletin 
format. While on 4 November they usually lead with the celebration, the reports 
form part of a typical sequence of domestic and international news items. The 
inclusion of multiple reports – the saturation coverage characteristic of media 
events – applies only sporadically, and is absent altogether from the popularizing 
NTV, which tends to feature just one perfunctory DNU report each year.
Failure against the syntactic criterion is the corollary of a failure to meet the 
‘pragmatic criterion’. The fact that schedules are not interrupted is a function of 
the absence of a committed audience likely to ‘accept’ an ‘invitation’ to suspend 
their regular viewing habits. In an apparent regression from the first year of cele-
bration, when we witnessed ordinary people ‘helping imperilled cats’ in the spirit 
of the ‘Day of Good Deeds’,32 by 2010 the ‘spontaneity of joyous participation’ 
was reduced to senior bureaucrats announcing charitable initiatives.
The lack of demotic support means that there are no vernacular rituals and 
practices grounded in an organic relationship linking popular culture and official 
discourse. Nor is there evidence of the temporary ‘suspension of rules’ permitting 
an erasure of distance between journalists and public and the participatory enact-
ment of a holiday spirit: the newsreader wearing a Remembrance Day poppy 
(in 2010 Britain’s Jon Snow generated controversy by refusing to perform this 
gesture when presenting Channel 4 News); the deviation from normal editorial 
style as the sounds of a military band marching along the Champs-Élysées on 
Bastille Day form the soundtrack for a montage of images from across France.33 
These points, at which the nation becomes both ‘subject’ and ‘object’ of dis-
course, at which the ‘we’ of shared nationhood is co-articulated by media and 
public, help solidify the ties that bind citizens together; they explain the central 
role of ‘media events’ in modern nation-building strategies. There are copious 
examples of such procedures in Channel 1 coverage of the Victory Day celebra-
tions, reminding us of the dangers of ‘essentializing’ the Kremlin’s difference 
from other nation-builders.
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Also rare are instances of media traditions echoing the traditions they 
celebrate – those ‘strategies that repeat themselves from media event to media 
event’, compensating for the destruction of pre-modern ‘aura’ by re-injecting 
it into the intimacy of the living room:34 the BBC’s allocation of commentary 
on state occasions to David Dimbleby, whose father fulfilled the same duty in 
the 1950s and 1960s; its comical wheeling out of Peter Snow’s old-fashioned 
‘swingometer’ on every election night. Seven years of DNU coverage has deliv-
ered no such deviations from the generic norm of news reporting. Nor – unlike 
 Victory Day, which in 2006 featured cameras attached to the cars of the political 
 leaders as they saluted the troops – has it promoted any technological innovations, 
 demonstrating that ‘the power of media events lies in the rare realization of the full 
potential of electronic media technology’.35
Apartness as the fractured narrative of nationhood
A significant indication of the difficulties faced by DNU is the discontinuities in 
the narrative of Russian nationhood fostered by the event’s media cheerleaders. 
The inclusion of multiple interpretations within an overall narrative is not nec-
essarily a sign of failure; they can be co-opted into, be reconciled with, and thus 
reinvigorate the dominant narrative. At the heart of the current official vision of 
the rossiiskaia nation is a major tension relating to the ambiguous position of 
ethnic Russians within Russia’s multi-ethnic, state-framed community. The ambi-
guity was already a focus of debates among Russian and non-Russian nation-
alist movements in the late imperial period and was exacerbated by the Soviet 
approach to managing multi-ethnicity.36 In post-1991 Russia, it is revealed in the 
conflicting perceptions of Russia as either a nation-state of and for the ethnic Rus-
sian majority or a multi-ethnic homeland of multiple nationalities. Both percep-
tions are complicated by the difficulties that many members of the Russian elites 
still experience in distancing themselves from their state’s imperial legacy and the 
perception that the larger the space a nation occupies, the greater is its internal 
strength.37 This complex legacy profoundly shapes the interpretation of Russian 
nationhood in television coverage of DNU.
The tensions are traceable to the two power centres dominating the articula-
tion of Russian nationhood.38 The first is represented by the president, United 
 Russia and Nashi; the second is the Orthodox Church, for which Patriarch Kirill 
is the main spokesman. DNU coverage demonstrates that both centres engage 
with a range of visions, yet until recently each had its own preferred vision which 
dominated the narratives of its key actors. Contradictions, now diminished, were 
previously only too apparent. On the one hand, DNU celebrates a nation which 
derives its strength from Russia’s multi-ethnicity and multi-confessionalism, yet 
this is periodically contradicted by a mono-ethnic, populist vision promoting 
the Orthodox Church’s ‘unifying’ role. In another conflicting set of represen-
tations, alongside a nation bound together by its members’ affiliation with the 
Russian state, there also exists a vision which unites all Russian speakers across 
the world, irrespective of their citizenship. Finally, Russia is imagined as both 
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a European nation and as a ‘special world’ (‘osobyi rossiiskii mir’), bridging 
Europe and Asia.
The stress on multi-ethnicity was closely associated with the first locus of power 
and is central to presidential speeches and local celebrations organized by United 
Russia and Nashi. In 2005, Putin argued in a speech which dominated Vesti’s and 
Vremia’s headlines that it was ‘particularly symbolic’ that the opolchenie troops 
first gathered in Povolzh’e, the centre of multi-ethnicity in seventeenth-century 
Rus. Although the Orthodox dimension was prominent from the start, the impor-
tance to the DNU narrative of Russia’s diversity is accepted by all parties. Thus, 
the proposal to introduce a Red Square parade of representatives of the different 
peoples of Russia as a key feature of DNU was articulated at a United Russia 
meeting in November 2010 by the Head of the Patriarchate’s Department of the 
Relationship between the Church and Society, Father Vsevolod Chaplin.39
Russia’s multi-ethnicity has complex origins, which lie in the country’s impe-
rial and Soviet past, but this controversial historical legacy is represented as 
unproblematic by DNU’s key actors. For Patriarch Kirill, Russian imperialism is a 
source of pride and the means by which the Russian people carried out an import-
ant cultural mission. In an interview with Vremia on 6 November 2005, Kirill 
notes that as a result of the Time of Troubles ‘Russia ceased to be a mono-national 
country’. While Putin comments on the contribution of non-Russian and non- 
Orthodox people to the opolchenie efforts, Kirill supports his argument by saying 
that the end of the Smuta engendered Russia’s ‘territorial expansion eastwards’, 
bringing Russian culture to the shores of the Pacific Ocean. The expression used 
(‘postupatel’noe dvizhenie na Vostok’) is a standard euphemistic description of 
Russian imperial expansion dating to the nineteenth century, and references to a 
civilizing mission in the East were a common justification of European colonial-
ism in that bygone era.
Television coverage of celebrations organized by United Russia regularly 
stresses the presence within the rossiiskaia nation of representatives of the nation-
alities of the former Soviet Union. The 2010 DNU celebrations opened with an 
event called ‘Peoples of Russia are Moscow’s Treasure’ which, as depicted by 
Vesti and Vremia, celebrated the activities of Moscow’s ‘largest diasporas’ from 
the now independent states of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Ukraine.40
DNU coverage helps clarify which aspects of multi-ethnicity Russia’s cur-
rent ruling elites perceive as making the most positive contributions to society. 
In depicting modern Russian diversity, Vremia and Vesti emphasize the impor-
tance of what are now officially termed ‘the four traditional religions’ of Russia 
in binding local communities through a set of shared moral values, such as the 
commitment to ‘charitable deeds’. At annual Kremlin ceremonies, Russia’s diver-
sity is symbolized by the presence of the official leaders of these four religious 
communities.
Other ethnic distinctions are portrayed through the lens of dress, song and 
dance. Since 2006, one region has been selected in which local people are filmed 
performing folk songs and dances, dressed in the many national costumes of the 
Russian Federation and the former Soviet Union. This reduction of identity to 
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 ethnographic performance characterized the Soviet interpretation of nationality.41 
Yet many members of the Russian political elites, including Putin, have warned 
that the policy of ethnicizing identities hastened the collapse of the Soviet Union.42 
In attempting to counter the danger of such fragmentation, DNU organizers have 
modified the Soviet approach. In the regions, a carnivalesque changing of roles 
now takes place. In 2008 on Vesti, in the Astrakhan region a Tatar dance was per-
formed by an ethnic Russian, while a Russian folk song was sung by a Kazakh 
woman wearing traditional Russian headgear. In 2010, the capital of the Khanty- 
Mansi autonomous region was the focus of celebration. However, the main com-
mentator on both Vremia and Vesti is not a representative of the Khanty or Mansi 
communities, but an Azeri. In 2009, in the selected region of Ekaterinburg, ethnic 
Russians performed the lezginka, a traditional Caucasian dance.43 Ironically, fol-
lowing the Manezhnaia riots, unauthorized public performances of the lezginka 
emerged as a symbol of the minority communities’ refusal to subscribe to Russian 
norms.
DNU coverage reveals cracks in the narrative of Russia’s multi-ethnic nation-
hood. Since 2009, Nashi has been entrusted with enacting societal support for the 
Kremlin vision of multi-ethnicity and with representing the people’s rejection of 
nationalist xenophobes. In 2009, Nashi staged an alternative ‘Russian March’, 
subtitled ‘Everyone Is Ours’ (Vse svoi) and aiming to promote inter-ethnic toler-
ance. Yet, at the point at which the Vremia voiceover on the piece refers to ‘young 
people of different nationalities’, the camera alights incongruously on the faces 
of black African students carrying Nashi banners – hardly the ‘unity in diversity’ 
intended by the official slogan.
As early as 2005, another vision in which Orthodoxy constitutes the basis for 
Russian national identity was articulated. The commemoration of the Kazan icon 
of the Mother of God has become directly linked to DNU, as both Vremia and 
Vesti consistently remind their views that the leaders of the opolchenie prayed 
before the icon for victory. Orthodoxy’s centrality to Russian identity is further 
elaborated through the narrative of the Kazan icon as a protector of Russia over 
the centuries.
In 2005 Kirill’s status as a key DNU actor emerged in a televised interview in 
which he highlighted the Orthodox Church’s role in the events of 1612.44 Along-
side the secular rituals in Red Square, every year an Orthodox Christian site pro-
vides the locus from which the DNU celebrations commence – most notably the 
Spaso-Evfimiev monastery in Suzdal’, near whose walls Pozharskii is buried, and 
the Kazanskii Cathedral on Red Square, where the Patriarch conducts a Church 
service. Local celebrations are also dominated by Orthodox rituals.
In addition to contradictory interpretations of the rossiiskaia nation’s distinctive 
features, there is ambivalence about its membership. The contradiction is intro-
duced by the key actor representing the first power centre, the president. The DNU 
narrative which Putin and Medvedev project in their annual speeches, excerpts 
from which dominate the first evening bulletins on both channels on 4 November, 
stresses state patriotism as the force which engendered the modern Russian nation 
and brought together the different ethnic groups of Rus. Yet from 2006 onward, 
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the nation is also represented as extending beyond the Russian Federation. That 
year witnessed the introduction of a now standard Kremlin ritual – a ceremony in 
the Kremlin at which the president bestows awards to ‘compatriots’ (sootechest-
venniki) active in promoting Russian language and culture outside the state bor-
ders. They are part of what is now called, in the dominant political discourse, ‘the 
Russian world’ (rossiiskii/russkii mir) – helping to unite members of the nation 
not only across space but also through time, as among those ‘compatriots’ who 
receive the greatest publicity are figures connected with the imperial past.45 The 
intentionally vague categories of ‘compatriots’ and ‘the Russian world’, and their 
origins in Russia’s imperial past, have played a major role in shaping Russian 
domestic and international policy. Dramatic consequences ensued in the 2014 
Ukraine crisis, when Russia’s widely condemned intervention was justified by 
reference to the interests of its ‘compatriots’ in Crimea and elsewhere in eastern 
and southern Ukraine.
Kirill’s emphasis on the uniqueness of ‘rossiiskii mir’ co-exists with represen-
tations of Russia as a European nation. In an interview on the eve of the first 
DNU celebrations reported on both Vesti and Vremia on 2 November 2005, Kirill 
concluded his description of Russia’s imperial expansion after the Smuta by say-
ing that ‘from a small European country... we created our own, great Russian 
(rossiiskii) world’. In contrast, the Sunday edition of Vremia on 6 November 2005 
depicted Russia as a European nation, noting that with DNU Russia now meets 
the European average for the number of state holidays; he also draws parallels 
with other nation-binding events in Europe, such as England’s Guy Fawkes Day.
DNU actors all posit the harmonious co-existence of the two conflicting 
 ‘horizontal’ narratives of national unity, and of these ‘horizontal’ narratives with 
the ‘vertical one’ (the people united in loyalty to the state). On 4 November, the 
president attends Orthodox commemorations. Conversely, Kirill explicitly utilizes 
Kremlin discourse in his pronouncements when explaining the meaning of the 
new holiday. In 2005, he referred to the restoration of ‘the vertical of power’ and 
the emergence of a diverse ‘civil society’.46
The illusion of harmony is undermined by a further narrative discontinuity 
along not only ethnonational but also political lines. A prime task for broadcasters 
is managing the relationship between the ritual and cyclical (those aspects of the 
occasion that are continuous with the past) and the novel and unexpected (those 
aspects which deviate from the norm, but only inasmuch as they refresh the view-
ing experience). For Victory Day in 2005, a focus on previously unknown facts 
about the original 1945 celebration was both entertainingly new and reassuringly 
familiar in terms of its war mythology. In the 2010 DNU, the ‘news’ about Nashi 
members leading a ‘city clean up’ of social undesirables fulfilled a similar func-
tion, albeit more artificially.
However, there are key points at which the hierarchy subordinating norm to 
deviation is disrupted. Prime among these flashpoints is the fraught relationship 
between the Russkii marsh and the official DNU events. The problem is exacer-
bated by the fact that Russkii marsh had appropriated 4 November long before 
DNU was mooted. In 2006 the tensions were particularly apparent. That year, 
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Vesti deployed a dual strategy. On one hand it assimilated marginal elements into 
an inclusive DNU spirit in which parties of all shades unite. Here, the ‘deviation’ 
represented by the right-wing and liberal-progressive counter-demonstration was 
subordinated to the norm represented by the mainstream within a single narrative.
On the other hand, it detached from that mainstream any deviant events, dis-
carding them as representing a minor rupture (‘hooligan elements’) which it 
made no effort to re-assimilate: ‘The initiators of the unsanctioned marches were 
detained, along with straightforward “hooligan elements”’.47
2009 proved to be a milestone in the DNU meta-narrative, as it witnessed a 
re-appropriation of the Russian March for official ‘Unity in Diversity’. The very 
act of supplementing the title of the march to lay the stress on ethnic cohesion 
(‘vse svoi’) is an index of discord to be overcome. Little wonder, then, that the 
remainder of the Vremia report focuses on the articulation of a more manage-
able dialectic of division and unity in which deviant occurrences (a demonstration 
called by the LDPR) can be readily swept up into the normative account.
By 2010, a full cycle was completed. Nashi and the ROC are firmly established 
as lead actors in the narrative, the norm is reinstalled and ‘new’, deviant events are 
re-subordinated as manufactured ‘demonstrations’ by other groupings, diverse in 
their orientations and ethnic origins but ‘united’ in their commitment to building 
a cohesive Russia. But the conflictual process by which the re-subordination has 
been achieved points to the ‘short circuiting’ of deviation and norm in 2010; there 
is little that is ‘deviant’ about the annual mushrooming of ever more, conveniently 
compliant youth groupings. It also indicates the battle for control over the mean-
ing of DNU, and the centrality of power to the whole media event.
The structure of DNU coverage had, by 2010, developed a consistent template. 
Rather than an organic narrative in which norms are breached then renewed, and 
where ‘sacred’ ritual and ‘secular’ news are integrated, each year the ceremonial 
and the vernacular, the ritual and the ‘new’, are separated in a tri-partite progres-
sion: from first, a report on a carefully managed series of demonstrations led by 
Nashi and United Russia, to second, a ceremony involving the Orthodox Church, 
to third, a ritual event or announcement filmed from the Kremlin.
Apartness and the absent metalanguage
There is a parallel, and related, problem: that of the absence of an effective broad-
casting metalanguage capable of transcending official rhetoric in order to authen-
ticate ‘truths’. Such transcendence requires two separations: that of media from 
official discourse (hence the importance of media traditions distinct from those 
being celebrated) and that of official discourse from a set of banal practices in 
which that discourse can be grounded.48 This dual separation allows the media to 
posit themselves as the site at which ‘Russian-ness’ (British-ness, French-ness, 
etc.) emerges as both ‘less than’ and ‘more than’ the state’s version of what it is, at 
which official national identity is both grounded in the vernacular and subnational 
and realized in the transcendent and supra-national. The power of American-
ness lies in its claim to incarnate the everyday truths of individual liberty and the 
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aspiration to succeed, and to root them in the multiple biographies of extraordi-
nary Americans such as the tennis-dominating Williams sisters who accord tele-
vision the power to ‘mediate’ between the everyday values they represent and 
the ‘eternal truths’ of the American spirit which transcend their embodiment in 
transient governmental form.
The BBC’s measured coverage of London’s reaction to 7/7 was attributable to 
its grasp of the ‘stoicism and common sense’ underlying the ‘British spirit’. This 
enabled it to embed that reaction in long-standing institutional practices like the 
precedence-based legal system and pragmatic suspicions of patriotic fervour and 
to distinguish it implicitly from both post-9/11 US hysteria, and the Blair govern-
ment’s protestations that the attack was unconnected with Britain’s involvement in 
Iraq. Shots of Londoners, unbowed, continuing with their daily business, indicate 
a subtle mastery of the nation-building ‘metalanguage’.
Because Russia’s nationhood is so intensely contested and its nationalism is 
anything but banal, DNU lacks an effective metalanguage. Examples of vernacular 
endorsements of the ‘essentially Russian’ value of ‘kindness’ range from the com-
ical (the woman who saved a cat) to the portentous (the Nashi campaign against 
drug dealers). Russia’s authoritarian regime and supine broadcasting media, and 
the novelty of both the Russian state and DNU, help account for the weakened 
metalanguage. But what is also significant is the Russian state’s meagre stock of 
‘banal’ practices on which to draw.
The consequence is a laxity of control over, and thus instability within, that 
metalanguage, permitting tension to infiltrate the ‘Unity in Diversity’ formula. 
We referred earlier to the way in which Channel 1 foregrounds the blood donation 
metaphor (the basis for the ‘Day of the Donor’ appellation belatedly accorded 
to DNU in 2008) as a way of symbolizing unity in diversity and simultaneously 
focusing it on the Orthodox value of charity. The power of the image of young 
people ‘giving their blood’ has to do with its capacity for literally em-bodying and 
‘ethnicizing’ the civic, multicultural ideal. But blood connotes racial purity and 
ethnic exclusivism, as recognized by Zhirinovskii, who seized upon the blood 
imagery for his own, ‘othering’, purposes: ‘Europe is living and thriving. Because 
for 300 years the Russian army spilled its blood so that they could live in peace.’49 
Any contradiction with the previous item is lost on the newsreader who introduces 
Zhirinovskii’s tirade in approving mode (though he substitutes the ‘civic’ term 
‘rossiiskii’ for Zhirinovskii’s ‘ethnic’ term ‘russkii’).
Also prominent is the tendency to expand the metaphorical value of the opol-
chentsy narrative itself – a gesture which de-historicizes rather than sanctifies the 
original events. To equate the assault on the Poles with Nashi’s twenty-first cen-
tury campaign against social undesirables is both dubious and dangerous and the 
need to avoid DNU’s exploitation for xenophobic purposes was recognized in 
2005, when a Vesti report on a State History Museum exhibition commemorating 
the opolchenie highlighted reassurances given by the museum to a Polish televi-
sion team.50
Despite the fact that current Russian–Polish relations are far from smooth, those 
who – according to the state-media DNU narrative – should be expelled from the 
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nation are not the Poles but figures who symbolize Russia’s most recent Time of 
Trouble, the 1990s, with which Putin’s period has been contrasted. In a histori-
cal film shown by Channel 1 to mark the first celebration of DNU in 2005, the 
commentator, Mikhail Leont’ev, compares the treacherous Vasilii Shuiskii of the 
seventeenth-century Smuta with contemporary Russia’s ‘traitors’, the oligarchs 
Berezovskii and Khodarkovskii.51
National symbols and narratives are always open to multiple appropriations, 
often by diametrically opposed political movements. St George’s Day, like DNU, 
fell into disuse in recent centuries, only to be subjected to a campaign for revival 
in the present decade as a means of strengthening English national identity. One 
reason why the campaign failed is that the celebration has also been adopted by 
the extreme British National Party as a symbol of English racial purity. Nonethe-
less, as the co-ordinated unmasking suffered by the BNP leader, Nick Griffin, on 
the BBC’s Question Time in 2009 demonstrated, misappropriations of national 
symbols by extreme politicians in the UK are subject to a far greater degree of 
media ‘gatekeeping’ than similar actions by the likes of Zhirinovskii in Russia 
(ironically, in such cases control is more rigid in the British media environment).
The BBC exuded confidence in this case due to its knowledge that the apparent 
deviation from its own codes of impartiality was, in the BNP case, endorsed by 
the overwhelming majority of its viewers. This indicated its capacity to occupy the 
transcendent, meta-lingual position from which the essence of ‘British moderation 
and decency’ is spoken. It contrasts with the anxiously dialogical stances adopted 
by Vremia and Vesti in relation to the extremists with whom the state battled in 2009 
and 2010 for proprietary rights over the meaning of the Russian March. Unlike the 
BBC, which has little need to spell out the ‘transcendent meanings’ of the media 
events it leads, both Vesti and Vremia speak a meta-lingual idiom whose posi-
tion of externality to DNU is pedagogical and polemical rather than transcendent 
and inclusive: ‘In the mass celebrations everyone displayed remarkable unity … 
Twenty thousand people in multi-coloured costumed symbolized a tolerant, 
 multicultural Russia.’52
Rather than embodying national cohesion, Channel 1 and Rossiia direct their 
attention toward combating competing perceptions of disharmony which find 
expression at the peripheries of the Russian media: that of a nation riven by ethnic 
tension and corruption (REN TV); that of a weak state in thrall to migrant cultures 
(various nationalist websites).
DNU in a comparative context
Given the relative novelty of DNU, it is not surprising that, to return to Hobsbawm’s 
classic formulation, ‘invention’ prevails over ‘tradition’. However, novelty cannot 
fully explain the difficulties which DNU encountered in establishing itself as a 
‘media event’. Part of the problem lies with the broadcasters’ inability to ‘mediate’ 
between the predispositions and practices of ordinary Russian people and the pre-
occupations and policies of the Russian state. But the problem also reflects the fact 
that the perceptions of Russian nationhood are so overtly contested at the levels 
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of societal and political elites. DNU coverage constantly exposes tensions at the 
heart of the nation-building project, between the rossiiskaia nation as a civic union 
of cultural and religious communities and an ethnocentric interpretation in which 
the Orthodox Church, the Russian language and culture and ethnic Russians are 
binding forces. It strives simultaneously to appease those groups which feel that 
ethnic Russians are not properly recognized and those who see in the growing 
power of ethnic Russian nationalism a major threat to the country. Another unre-
solved tension is that between the ‘horizontal’ visions of the nation as united in its 
ethnic diversity or through Orthodoxy and the Russian language on one hand, and 
the ‘vertical’ vision in which people and state are one on the other. Overall, the 
distribution of symbolic power favours institutions and groups which promote an 
ethnic Russian interpretation of nationhood, while ethnic minorities merely enact 
the script written for them by the Moscow elites.
Russia’s difficulties in managing ethnic diversity in the face of globally induced 
mass population movements are shared across Europe. Controversies over the 
expulsion of gypsies and the wearing of religious attire in public places point 
to a common crisis in European values of tolerance from which Russia is not 
immune. David Cameron’s recent pronouncement of the death of what he ten-
dentiously calls ‘state multiculturalism’ could have been targeted at the Kremlin’s 
increasingly hollow Unity in Diversity formula. But Cameron’s loaded expression 
correctly identifies the passing of a brief (and mythical) moment coinciding with 
the attainment of the Kantian categorical imperative (the fact that Britain is a 
multicultural state becomes inseparable from the universal moral ‘truth’ of multi-
culturalism as a state policy). The denigratory term ‘state multiculturalism’ signals 
the irrevocable separation of ‘is’ from ‘ought’, as multiculturalism reverts to the 
status of an official mantra imposed against the grain of reality and of popular 
consensus (the desire for ‘the ethnic other’ to assimilate or disappear). This is the 
context upon which DNU was artificially grafted.
The struggle faced by Russia’s state broadcasters in disentangling the ritualistic 
and predictable elements of DNU from the new and ‘surprising’ components (par-
ticularly in relation to the proprietary battle over the Russian March) resembles 
annual controversies embroiling the BBC over the extent to which it focuses on 
the spates of ‘ethnic crime’ that afflict the annual Notting Hill Carnival, rather than 
on its ritualized celebrations of diversity. Even the impression of a BBC position-
ing itself comfortably at the heart of a stable societal consensus is misleading. One 
should not forget the liberal outcry against the BBC’s original decision to invite 
Nick Griffin onto Question Time in the interests of ‘free speech’, a decision seen 
by many as ‘providing a platform for extremism at taxpayers’ expense’. Discur-
sive struggle is not confined to the Russian context.
DNU differs from similar occasions in mature democracies, but only inas-
much as it expresses in acute form the discursive conflict lurking beneath them 
all, thereby adding empirical weight to critiques of Dayan and Katz’s theory. 
Referring to public disputes over the significance of Princess Diana’s death, Nick 
Couldry attacks Dayan and Katz for ‘automatically excluding from the defini-
tion of media events highly mediated situations that are contested’.53 Questioning 
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their division between ‘true’ media events based around pre-planned rituals and 
second-order phenomena centring on saturation news reporting of unanticipated 
disasters, he argues that ‘the fact that societies are stable … does not necessarily 
mean that they have a set of shared values or… that it is these values … that holds 
them together’.54 Rather than disqualifying it from media event status, the Russian 
state’s aversion to live coverage renders DNU the ideal tool with which to expose 
the contradictions underlying media events per se.
In John Fiske’s and John Hartley’s estimation: ‘A media event is a point of 
maximum … turbulence … It … invites intervention and motivates people to 
struggle to redirect some of the currents flowing through it to serve their inter-
ests.’55 In Russia’s case, the currents in question threaten the nation’s cohesion as 
a multi-ethnic, multi-faith state.
At the day’s end (the 2012 celebration and beyond)
On the face of it, 4 November 2012 offered little to differentiate it from previous 
years. Many of the same media rituals recurred for the seventh time: the obligatory 
reminders to viewers of the reason for the celebration; the ceremonial laying of 
flowers on the monument to Minin and Pozharskii; the reaffirmations of Russia’s 
commitment to multi-ethnic harmony and of its greatness as a nation; the Kremlin 
awards to those who had advanced the international cause of Russian language 
and culture; the city parades and patriotic, slogan-carrying young enthusiasts; the 
complementary role of the Orthodox Church and the sonorous pronouncements 
of Patriarch Kirill.
The process of accreting historical facts, myths and events capable of incor-
poration into DNU mythology continued unabated in 2012. A Vesti report on 4 
November made reference to a city-wide Crucession, or Religious Procession 
(Krestnyi khod), taking place for the first time in St Petersburg in honour of 
DNU.56 A new figure was welcomed into the DNU canon by Patriarch Kirill: his 
distant predecessor, Patriarch Germogen, who headed the Orthodox Church at the 
time of the opolchenie and who, according to Kirill, was a pillar of strength during 
the troubled times – despite his imprisonment by the hostile forces occupying 
Moscow, Germogen refused to order the opolchentsy to retreat.57
Yet something unmistakable had changed, making 2012 a turning point in 
the brief history of the initiative. In fact, 2012 marks the end of any claim that 
the occasion might have had to constitute a ‘media event’ in the performative, 
actively nation-binding sense. For example, in 2012 Vesti’s coverage was notice-
ably  Moscow-centric, with Nizhnii Novgorod (whose historical importance as the 
starting point for the opolchenie assures its place at the heart of the canon) the only 
city featured other than Moscow. Of 32 of Rossiia’s news reports dealing with 
aspects of the occasion in total, two focused on Nizhnii Novgorod; there was also 
one on Ekaterinburg, but this was in the context of trouble at a nationalist march. 
Vremia featured nine DNU-related reports, of which two were Moscow-specific; 
the other seven treated Russia as a whole, with most of the emphasis on events 
in Moscow. The apparent switch of the nation-binding function from Rossiia to 
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Channel 1 is part of a wider blurring of missions observable over the course of the 
last decade. More noteworthy, perhaps, was the dearth on either Vesti or Vremia 
of vox pop interviews with ‘ordinary people’ in the streets. Absent, too, were the 
‘heart-warming’ special reports on young patriots giving blood. And gone was the 
pretence that DNU is anything other than a carefully managed exercise in reaf-
firming the national narrative.
One of the most important shifts was the effort to separate DNU coverage from 
reporting on the Russian March. Vesti treated them largely as unrelated events 
and spread them apart within the bulletin running orders. This was a tacit admis-
sion of defeat over the struggle to absorb the March within DNU, or to exploit 
selected elements of the nationalist cause for official patriotism. Reports on the 
Russian March were consistently negative, focusing on breaches of the law, on 
the provocative slogans and on extremist calls to have Article 282 of the Crimi-
nal Code annulled (the article is directed against actions which arouse hatred or 
diminish human dignity).58 All of them reminded viewers that the authorities had 
for the first time allowed the march to take place in the centre of Moscow, with 
the implicit suggestion that the marchers had not repaid that trust. One of the few 
reports in which the march is specifically linked to DNU quotes an ‘expert’ who 
accuses the participants of ‘casting a shadow’ over the March organizers and on 
a great national celebration, and of reviving memories of the Manezhnaia Square 
violence.59 Again, the fact that tensions and contradictions in the approach to the 
Russian March and its relationship to DNU have receded and the lines of distinc-
tion are now more clearly drawn points to a loss of dynamic performativity; the 
contradictions were the corollary of the active hegemonic struggle to give voice 
to, assimilate and moderate currents of extreme opinion at the peripheries of the 
nationalist movement.
The second important shift was that Channel 1 and Rossiia appeared to have 
resolved any residual rivalry between competing state and ecclesiastical centres of 
power. Reflecting the broader convergence which had been occurring since 2012, 
DNU reports were crafted to emphasize the complementarity of church and state. 
Even the visual choreography of the reports detailing the now ‘traditional’ ritual 
of the laying of flowers at the monument to Minin and Pozharskii emphasized the 
two leaders’ unprecedented affinity in their solemn approach to the monument.60 
Indeed, in one of the few examples of a residual performativity to the celebration, 
albeit one safely concealed within a historical narrative, an NTV Novosti report 
on Patriarch Kirill’s prayer for the well-being of the Russian nation offered in the 
Kremlin’s Uspenskii Cathedral quotes only one passage from Kirill’s address – 
the one in which he refers to the Church’s role in the Time of Troubles.61
The implication is that it was lack of faith which plunged Russia into the Trou-
bles, just as faith (and by extension the Orthodox Church) saved it from ruin at the 
hands of its occupants. The symbolism of the setting – Uspenskii Cathedral: the 
very locus of church–state unity – is unmistakable; it was the Church which res-
cued the state from disaster during the Time of Troubles, and religious faith which 
continues to maintain the stability of the church–state concordat responsible for 
Russia’s continuing status. However, the act by which the Church and the state 
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acquired the power of unity remains safely encased in the historical narrative of 
the opolchenie; the context for Kirill’s address merely symbolizes the unification, 
rather than enacts it.
The 2012 version of DNU strives precisely to ‘stabilize’ rather than to ‘enact’ 
national values and meanings. Acts of generosity epitomizing the spirit of national 
unity are perfunctorily described rather than displayed. One of the few reports 
which did feature extensive vox pop contributions in 2012 was broadcast on the 
Vesti evening edition of 4 November and was entitled ‘Where are the nationalists 
marching to?’ The contributors were no ‘ordinary’ people; they were leaders of 
various nationalist factions. When the National Democratic Party leader, Vladi-
mir Tor, was allowed to promulgate to camera his call for a stricter migrant visa 
regime to ensure that Russian workers are not undercut, the reporter interceded, 
clarifying that the crowds were motivated not by these policies (which resemble 
the position of the Moscow mayor Sobianin), but by the extremist actions and 
criminality with which the Russian March is now associated.62
In 2012, the strenuous media efforts to incorporate the Russian March into 
the mainstream of DNU which characterized previous years were replaced by 
an equally concerted attempt to expel it to the peripheries by engaging with, and 
actively undermining, its credibility.
True to its populist leanings, NTV paid significantly more attention to the 
Russian March than the two official state channels. Its longest report began by 
underscoring the large number of towns and cities across Russia in which the 
March took place. It proceeded to list the wide variety of slogans under which 
the demonstrators marched, noting that they included ‘We are not extremists – we 
are Russians’, ‘Russian power for Russia’ and ‘No to drugs and migration’, and 
that marchers included campaigners against paedophilia as well as nationalists.63 
While not free of a critical tone, the reporters are far less condemnatory than their 
state channel counterparts. Mindful of the onus placed upon it to engage the inter-
ests of ordinary viewers alienated by the official ceremonials by privileging real, 
unpredictable news over pre-prepared ritual, NTV devoted several reports to an 
incident barely mentioned by Rossiia and Channel 1: the violent skirmish which 
was supposed to have taken place between nationalist and anti-fascist demonstra-
tors at Dostoevskaia Metro Station in Moscow.
Even the strictly ritualized stabilization strategy pursued by Rossiia and 
Channel 1 retains a residual dynamism, indicating that the erasure of distinction 
between the two power centres is incomplete. This is evident in the unusual pre-
cedence given by Vesti to Kirill’s pronouncements. Here it takes the form of an 
implied polemic with the opponents of ‘traditional Orthodox values’ which had 
been severely challenged in the aftermath of the Presidential election. Kirill’s 
familiar address in the parallel celebration of the ‘Day of the Kazan Icon of the 
Mother of God’ recapitulates the sentiments he expressed when anathematiz-
ing Pussy Riot for their act of sacrilege in the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour. 
They are now re-inserted into the heart of the DNU celebration: ‘We must ensure 
that never again and in no circumstances should the confusion (smuta) in peo-
ple’s minds, which today, too, is conditioned by a loss of religious faith, lead to 
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civil unrest, revolution and the loss of national independence.’64 By equating the 
Smuta with the atmosphere of protest succeeding Putin’s re-election in 2012, 
Kirill almost supplants Putin as the state’s key figurehead, simultaneously tar-
geting: (i) the atheistic sentiments which supposedly motivated the ‘punk prayer’ 
performance; (ii) related calls for a change of regime; (iii) the decoupling of 
church and state; and (iv) the foreign forces purportedly behind the seditious 
activities.
The importance attributed to Kirill’s exploitation of the ceremonial occasion to 
renew his anti-atheistic diatribe is signalled in the carving out from Kirill’s address 
of a discrete report in which he extrapolates from his earlier defence of the reli-
gious ‘right’ to speak out against the blasphemers of Pussy Riot from the Ortho-
dox view of sin: ‘The Patriarch is convinced that the Church is called upon … 
to affirm traditional-moral values … “The Church will never be silent when it 
identifies sin and vice, especially if it is being disseminated … on a mass scale”.’65 
But Kirill’s barely disguised slight on Russia’s present opposition occurs in the 
context of his paean of praise for Patriarch Germogen, which enables him to 
ground his diatribe in Russia’s heroic past. The values acquire both the renewed 
dynamism and authenticity which comes through them having to be re-forged on 
the anvil of the latter-day struggle against sedition and the enhanced authority and 
stability accorded to them by being reconfirmed within the historical canon. The 
past is also deployed as a premonition of the appalling future that awaits Russia 
if Kirill’s dire warnings about its present are not heeded.66 The rhetorical similar-
ity between Kirill’s address and the conclusion to Putin’s speech at the laying of 
flowers ceremony quoted in the preceding report points to a single script jointly 
co-authored by Patriarch and president.67
DNU 2012 can thus be delineated from earlier years through the increased link-
age it posits between, first, the negative consequences of atheism; second, the 
seductive danger represented by ‘revolutionaries’ and ‘false pretenders’ in thrall 
to alien forces; and third, Russia’s potential loss of independence. A Channel 1 
documentary film made for the 2012 celebration by Aleksei Denisov and nar-
rated by Fedor Bondarchuk, son of the famous Soviet director Sergei Bondarchuk, 
acquires new significance against this background. Its title, ‘The Russian Time of 
Troubles: History of a Disease’, gained further political significance against the 
backdrop of events immediately preceding 4 November 2012. The politicization 
and polarization of the contemporary point of reference is evident even when such 
politicization is being explicitly denied: ‘Today on Bolotnaiia Square there were 
no politics at all; just a student festival … Young people came to Bolotnaia not just 
for entertainment; here one could also give blood.’68
The implied contrast is with the anti-Putin protests on Bolotnaiia Square of a 
year earlier. This example is emblematic of DNU 2012 coverage, especially that 
concerning the Orthodox Church’s pronouncements: for its significance is to be 
found not in its highly predictable surface text – by 2012, DNU and its official 
media representations had reached an unprecedented level of redundancy – but 
within the hyper-polemical subtext that the new political situation accords to it, 
and at which it is consistently directed. Polemic (oriented to the denigration of 
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detractors and oppositionists) had effectively replaced performance (designed to 
reassure supporters and attract new ones).
By 2013 the process was complete and any pretence that DNU was capable 
of fostering either popular support or uniformity of sentiment had evaporated. 
In abandoning the performative, nation-binding function of DNU, Russia’s state 
broadcasters are merely reflecting the stubborn refusal of ordinary citizens to 
incorporate DNU into the rhythms of their own annual calendar. Given the sym-
bolic capital invested in DNU, it is unlikely that it will be discarded. What is clear, 
however, is that, even as (productive) tensions between the elites who crafted the 
initiative dissipate, at the operational level the mediation of inter-ethnic harmony 
tends increasingly toward polarization and polemic. Ultimately, it portends the 
kind of deep fracture that we explore in our next chapter.
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4 Ethnic conflict and television 
news coverage of the December 
2010 Moscow riots
Managing the unexpected
The previous chapter demonstrated that state-endorsed media projects to pro-
mote inter-ethnic harmony via elaborately planned celebrations like the Day of 
National Unity are highly fallible tools. Broadcasters need above all to respond 
appropriately to sudden outbreaks of conflict and to handle media events of the 
unexpected kind, making sense of them within accepted policy frameworks. The 
Day of National Unity’s failure to attain the full status of media event in the first 
sense is, in part, attributable to the fractured narrative of nation that the project has 
been attempting to articulate; the contradictions in official media accounts of the 
shocking events considered in this chapter owe more to the state’s fading capacity 
to assert its dominance over the strictly managed pluralism it had permitted within 
the national broadcasting sphere. Just as performance is eventually replaced by 
polemic in coverage of the Day of National Unity, so here we will see managed 
pluralism ceding place to a managed populism, betraying the limits of the Krem-
lin’s grip on events and foreshadowing the altogether more ominous atmosphere 
that was to prevail in 2012 – our focus in Part III.
Even if, as Chapter 2 illustrated, the two main state-controlled channels tended 
to underreport conflicts perceived by the public as inter-ethnic and to avoid dis-
cussions of societal xenophobia, major incidents which provoked wide public 
resonance and required the authorities’ intervention could not be ignored. Fur-
thermore, in the current information-rich environment, no media organ can com-
pletely disregard popular expectations regarding coverage of much discussed 
events, particularly if they involve ethno-racial violence. Such events have the 
power to challenge the Kremlin’s discourse about Russia as a state-framed civic 
nation which derives its strength from the historical experiences of multicultur-
alism. They tend to highlight particularly strongly a tension at the heart of the 
state-sponsored nation-building agenda, between a discursive promotion of the 
concept of the civic Russian multi-ethnic nation and a simultaneous systematic 
utilization of ethnic Russian nationalism as a tool of political self-legitimation 
and popular mobilization.1 In short, such events test both the Kremlin’s policies 
and the state media’s ability to endorse them. A situation in which a fast reaction 
to unanticipated developments is required can lead journalists to fall back onto 
preconceived ideas and stereotypical perceptions, which might have been modi-
fied had more time for reflection been available. Therefore, from the coverage of 
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dramatic, quickly unfolding events which raise sensitive issues we are likely to 
learn a lot about the fragile nature of state television’s balancing act: its need to 
negotiate the contradictory rhetorical discourses of political leaders on the one 
hand, and wider public (and diverse media) perceptions and representations of 
inter-ethnic relations on the other. Television’s ability to perform this balancing 
act was tested severely during the ethno-racially motivated riots in Moscow in 
December 2010, whose coverage will be the focus of this chapter. The riots were 
to become a milestone in the troubled history of inter-ethnic relations in post- 
Soviet Russia, and a select member of the canon of such major disturbances now 
invoked by the media whenever ethnic tensions spill over into violence.
The riots were sparked by the 6 December murder in the capital of Spartak foot-
ball fan Egor Sviridov, during a late-night altercation between Sviridov and his 
friends and a group of men from the North Caucasus. Subsequent mass demon-
strations, culminating in a violent riot which began next to the Kremlin walls on 
Manezhnaia Square on 11 December, seemed to have been provoked by the fact 
that the police quickly released the detained North Caucasians, including Aslan 
Cherkesov, who had allegedly killed Sviridov. The release was widely perceived 
as a manifestation of police corruption. The fact that Cherkesov was from the 
North Caucasian republic of Dagestan allowed some people to view what origi-
nally seemed to be an ordinary, if violent, street fight through a lens of ethnic 
conflict. The rioters therefore targeted their anger not only at the police, but also 
at people whom Russian media typically refer to as being of ‘non-Slavic appear-
ance’. Numerous shocking beatings occurred.
It took the re-arrest of the original suspects, interventions by Medvedev and 
Putin on 12 and 13 December respectively and Putin’s appearance at a Sviridov 
memorial meeting, all broadcast on prime-time television, before calm was fully 
restored in the capital and other cities where protests in solidarity with Moscow 
rioters took place.2 The riots forced the two main state-controlled channels to 
confront the growing xenophobia among the country’s Slavic majority, to which, 
other than in their hesitant and minimal coverage of the 2006 Kondopoga distur-
bances, they had hitherto turned a blind eye, but which the Manezhnaia events 
underscored. Since the late 1990s this xenophobia has been reflected in opinion 
polls.3 In its ugliest and most destabilizing form, it has – as the SOVA statistics 
quoted in Chapter 2 indicate – been manifested in an alarming rise of neo-Nazi 
hate crimes targeting ethnic minorities across the country.4
The growth in neo-Nazi extremism and inter-ethnic tension is not unique to 
Russia and its coverage presents challenges to broadcasters elsewhere. Many 
European countries have experienced such problems, often in the context of a 
reaction to the ‘threat’ posed by Islamic fundamentalism. Most North Caucasian 
republics are predominantly Muslim, but in 2010 the religious dimension of the 
tension in the central Russian cities was less pronounced than in other European 
locations. This is one of the reasons why the Manezhnaia case study gains signifi-
cance in the comparative context, which will never be far from the discussion of 
this chapter.5 Far-right forces in the UK, France, Scandinavia and elsewhere now 
target what they term the ‘Islamicization’ of European societies.6 As we will see 
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later in the book, federal broadcasters began systematically exploiting the theme 
of the ‘Islamic threat’ almost two years after Manezhnaia.7 In contrast, their cov-
erage of the 2010 riots made no reference to Islam.
Prior to Manezhnaia, state television had tended to contrast Russia’s reportedly 
positive historical legacy of ethnic diversity with European multiculturalism, to 
which solely negative outcomes were attributed.8 But in the immediate aftermath 
of the riots, talk shows on the Rossiia channel proposed that the Russian situa-
tion now be viewed within the international context, acknowledging that Russia 
shared with Europe and the rest of the world difficulties in managing ethnic diver-
sity in the face of global mass population movements. In particular, on Rossiia’s 
Poedinok talk show broadcast on 20 January 2011, which was dedicated to the 
Manezhnaia riots, Vladimir Zhirinovskii argued that Russia’s multi-ethnic ideal 
supported by the Kremlin did not exist. Those who had destroyed it, Zhirinovskii 
claimed, were exclusively North Caucasians, particularly those from Dagestan, 
Chechnia and Ingushetia.9 Zhirinovskii further argued that most other countries in 
which one ethnic group constituted 80 per cent of the population would be seen by 
their leaders as mono-ethnic. In Russia, however, where ethnic Russians enjoyed 
such a majority, leading politicians insisted on representing the state as multi- 
ethnic, thus benefitting minorities at the expense of the majority. The show’s 
 moderator did not challenge Zhirinovskii’s radical claims and at times even agreed 
with them. While permitting the elaboration of such extreme views at such length 
was at the time unusual for Rossiia, other media had long been cultivating similar 
sentiments, both shaping and reflecting public opinion. (As we will see later in the 
book, such arguments resurfaced on Rossiia in 2012.)
There is a patent mismatch between the realities of the societal xenophobia 
represented by Zhirinovskii and the official rhetoric of multicultural harmony. The 
challenges that this disjunction poses to the media’s ability to promote cohesion 
agendas both in Russia and in Europe10 constitute the backdrop against which 
television news coverage of the Manezhnaia riots is analysed here.
Inevitably, actors interpret complex issues with the help of the conceptual appa-
ratuses available to them. When journalists have to cover swiftly unfolding events, 
they tend to use these apparatuses particularly crudely, inadvertently exposing 
their contradictory and problematic aspects. In the Russian context, where factual 
and opinionated reporting are poorly differentiated, dramatic events encourage 
even relatively careful state-controlled broadcasters to advance radical arguments, 
which would otherwise be articulated in a more nuanced form.
We aim to identify and analyse the conceptual apparatus used by national tele-
vision broadcasters in handling the media event that was Manezhnaia, suggesting 
that this apparatus to a large extent determined the ways in which they repre-
sented ethnicity and nationality-related issues. Many Russian observers highlight 
similarities between the discourses of Putin’s era and those of their Soviet prede-
cessors. In relation to discourses of nation and ethnicity specifically, we empha-
size the impact of Soviet policies on nationality, demonstrating, however, that 
the conceptual apparatus utilized systematically by state broadcasters during the 
riots is not bound by its Soviet origins. It now reflects a new, post-Soviet take 
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on the concepts of nation, ethnicity and race, in which Soviet interpretations are 
modified through the influences of late imperial Russian intellectual traditions 
and western approaches to societal diversity. This apparatus bears the impact of 
interpretative lenses (or prisms) which possess a mythic resonance. Its operation 
simultaneously at the official, (pseudo-)academic and unofficial, demotic levels of 
the public sphere accounts for its power and durability.
In addition to Channel 1 and Rossiia, we analyse relevant news reports by NTV 
and REN TV. The reasons for this comparison are three-fold. First, when covering 
dramatic events, the main state-aligned channels now have to take account of what 
they are each reporting, as they are competing for audience share and advertising 
revenue. The comparison will thus allow us to explore the dialogical nature of 
the two main channels’ coverage of controversial issues. Second, in contrast to 
Channel 1 and Rossiia, NTV and REN TV had acknowledged rising inter-ethnic 
tensions as a serious problem for Russia prior to Manezhnaia, offering detailed 
coverage of the issue.11 We need therefore to assess whether these differences in 
the pre-Manezhanaia approaches to covering ethnic tensions led to divergent out-
comes during the riots. Finally, REN TV’s Nedelia news programme was overtly 
critical of the Kremlin and strove to subject official positions and interpretations 
to critical scrutiny. Comparing its coverage with that of Channel 1 and Rossiia 
could therefore shed light on those aspects of the coverage which reflected the two 
main channels’ subordinate position.
The hour-long weekend news bulletins of each channel provide the main 
sources for this chapter, but it also draws on the complete range of coverage across 
the channels viewed throughout the two weeks in which Manezhnaia dominated 
the headlines. We focus particularly on the weekend editions for two reasons. 
First, our comparative approach required careful selection of bulletins for in-depth 
scrutiny to ensure that the basis for comparison was consistent. As stipulated by 
the qualitative paradigm we follow,12 we derived that selection from an inductive 
reading of the entire corpus, which revealed in the weekend editions the ‘charac-
teristic rhythms and patterns’ that, for Martin Harrison, differentiate weekend bul-
letins from weekday news and which, as Espen Ytreburg argues, distil into more 
‘assertive’ and more ‘dramaturgically’ defined trajectories the disparate narrative 
fragments to emerge from weekday broadcasts.13 Second, the fact that, in con-
forming to Ytreburg’s thesis, the Russian weekly overviews indicated the ‘settled’ 
view adopted by each channel in relation to the breaking events to which they 
spontaneously reacted over the preceding days meant that they were pertinent 
to our central concern with narrative coherence (the degree to which the various 
accounts of the disturbances which the channels provide are consistent within and 
between one another).
Proceeding by channel, we show how the transformative process (more or 
less ‘linear’ in nature, according to each channel’s relative need to cleave to 
shifts in the governmental and/or popular accounts) leads to partial convergence 
around a common line, while the contradictions within and between broadcast-
ers remain unresolved and a coherent narrative fails to emerge. We adopt the 
principle that consensus, and the power relations that it reflects, is never more 
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than the provisional fixing of dominant meanings within a complex system of 
antagonisms liable to disrupt and reconfigure those meanings at any point.14 
Post-Soviet Russian public discourse, we contend, offers a specific, and partic-
ularly vivid, demonstration of that principle.
Our core argument, which has three interlinked components, can be briefly 
summarized as follows: first, rather than adhering to the edicts of a univocal state 
machine, post-Manezhnaia broadcasting reveals multiple fault-lines, and their 
partial convergence around a single narrative which congeals the emergent media 
event into a settled form reflects less an imposed Kremlin version of events than 
the restricted logic of the available conceptual apparatus and a perceived need to 
reflect the public mood; second, the emphasis within that apparatus on the per-
ceived clarity and fixity of ethnic boundaries – a legacy of multiple sources which 
influence the post-Soviet discourse of nation, ethnicity and race – leads both to 
over-interpretation of the inter-ethnic dimension to the crisis and to its occlusion; 
third, other European broadcasters are not immune to this paradox, which relates 
also to the contingent nature of ethnicity as a category.
The four interpretative lenses
Conflicting information about the Manezhnaia disturbances was refracted by the 
four channels through a set of consistently utilized interpretative lenses reflecting 
official myths, (semi-) academic theories and popular interpretations of events: 
first, ‘the friendship of the peoples’; second, ‘ethnic criminality’; third, ‘cul-
ture conflict’ or ‘inter-ethnic strife’; and fourth, ‘conspiracy of power’ theories. 
Possessing distinct genealogies, these interpretative devices have, as we show, 
acquired new life in the contemporary discursive environment. The second and 
third lenses, in particular, reflect distinct racializing worldviews which, while 
avoiding the articulation of crude biologically determined hierarchies, naturalize 
ethno-cultural differences and transpose to culture some of the prejudices com-
monly associated with biologically defined race. Such perceptions are typical of 
what scholars call the ‘new racism’.15 In fact, in most situations, public discourses 
poorly differentiate the ethno-cultural and racial aspects of identity, and attempts 
to disentangle them founder. In Russia, demotic, media and semi-official pro-
nouncements (such as those of Duma deputies and regional and local politicians) 
often describe the cultural specificities of minority groups as being ‘in their blood’ 
or ‘in their genes’.16
Coined by Stalin in 1935 and used until the late Soviet period, the ‘friendship 
of the peoples’ notion emphasized pan-Soviet unity, highlighting the central role 
attributed to Russians in achieving it. It signalled a major shift in the USSR’s 
nationalities policies, away from the earlier approach of fostering the national 
self-expression of non-Russian minorities while stigmatizing ethnic Russians as 
members of an ‘oppressor-nation’. Yet, despite the fact that Stalin’s new slogan 
reversed the Russians’ role in sustaining the unity of the state-framed multi-ethnic 
community, it did not presuppose the transformation of the Soviet Union into a 
Russified nation-state, stressing instead the multi-ethnicity and multiculturalism 
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of the Soviet community of peoples.17 In view of the formula’s original meaning, 
it sits awkwardly with the current Russian government’s attempts to  construct 
a more unified national identity among citizens of the Russian Federation than 
the Soviet approach had allowed. Simultaneously criticized as Russification in 
disguise by nationalist activists in the non-Russian Union republics and as a 
licence to exploit the RSFSR for the benefit of the non-Russian nationalities by 
Russian nationalists, Stalin’s formula was discredited by the end of the Soviet 
period. Significantly, it was only within the context of the December 2010 riots 
that the ‘friendship of the peoples’ metaphor suddenly resurfaced in the coverage 
of the two main state-controlled channels.18 The resurrection of this slogan, which 
lost its power under Gorbachev, seems to indicate a lack of a clear vision among 
broadcasters and political leaders regarding the causes of and solutions to the 
Manezhnaia violence.
The genealogy of the ‘ethnic criminality’ concept connects it with late 
 nineteenth-century racial theories, particularly those of Italian scientist Lombro-
so’s school of criminology, which linked particular anthropological types to crim-
inality. Lombroso’s ideas acquired their own life in Russia as, in the late imperial 
period, a debate took place among Russian anthropologists about whether those 
ideas could be applied to entire ethnic groups, particularly the peoples of the 
 Caucasus.19 Significantly, the works of the pre-revolutionary experts occupying 
the most extreme position on the issue are currently being republished in  Russia. 
Particularly often repeated today is the hypothesis – first articulated at the turn of 
the twentieth century, and since the 1970s revived in the ideology of the  European 
New Right – that social norms and social deviance were determined by the indig-
enous people (korennoe naselenie) of a given territory, whereas migrants (prishloe 
naselenie), deprived of links to their native soil, more readily displayed an incli-
nation towards criminality.20
Despite the fact that the official Soviet approach stressed the social origins 
of crime, the shift in the 1930s to an essentialist view of the nation permitted 
the assigning of immutable characteristics to every member of a national group 
subjected to repressions.21 Furthermore, in the Soviet Union of the 1970s, in the 
context of the diminishing power of Marxist–Leninist ideology, leading Soviet 
ethnographers and certain historians were already claiming that an ‘ethnos’ pos-
sessed ‘psychological specificities’ (psikhologicheskii sklad) which determined 
‘certain typical features of behaviour’ of its members. In this context, some legal 
scholars also began to concur that individuals’ psycho-physiological features 
could, at times, influence behaviour more than social circumstances.22 The post-
1991 period has witnessed a proliferation of publications claiming a deterministic 
link between ethnicity and/or migrant communities on the one hand and criminal-
ity on the other, often on the basis of tendentious statistical data. In the media, as 
in various official state documents and academic texts, even seemingly neutral ref-
erences to ‘ethnic criminality’ in terms of the occasional stratification of criminal 
groups along ethnic lines are frequently marred by racial undertones.23
The ‘culture conflict’ notion was likewise first alluded to by European theorists 
of race in the late nineteenth century, and then reformulated in more politically 
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neutral terms in North American sociology of the 1930s. This approach suggests 
that in complex, multicultural societies, the practices followed by some groups 
(particularly immigrants) are liable to antagonize the dominant culture. Under 
such circumstances, migrant behaviour may be viewed as offensive and even 
criminal by wider society.24 In turn, the ideologists of the New Right in Europe 
have re-appropriated the ‘culture conflict’ notion in order to argue that the dom-
inant European culture, which they represent as homogenous and static, is under 
threat from the incompatible cultural norms of migrant communities.25 In today’s 
Russia, the notion is in wide circulation, along with references to its multiple 
interpretations in the west.26
In current public discourses, ‘culture conflict’ theory also overlaps with the 
Soviet-era idea of ‘inter-ethnic strife’ (mezhnatsional’naia vrazhda or rozn’).27 
The latter defines a type of activity forbidden in Soviet and post-communist Rus-
sian legislation.28 As we will see, the two main state channels reflected the Soviet 
tendency to, spatially and temporally, externalize ‘inter-ethnic strife’ (as occurring 
elsewhere and/or to be resolutely avoided in the future). As deployed in today’s 
Russia, ‘culture conflict’ theory and the ‘inter-ethnic strife’ concept are based 
on an essentializing understanding of ethnic boundaries as clearly definable and 
fixed. Recent research into the origins of ethnic conflict has shown that narratives 
about ‘ethnic criminality’ have powerful potential to act as a catalyst for violence 
against ‘the ethnic other’, as they project onto ‘the future victims of violence the 
very impulses entertained by those who will victimize them’.29 The ‘culture con-
flict’ argument, with its dehumanizing tendency, has its own conflict-generating 
power, albeit in a less pronounced form.30
Finally, events which represent a sea-change tend to stimulate the appearance 
of conspiracy theories, suggesting that the events are not at all that they seem.31 
In Russia, conspiracy theories have historically performed important functions.32 
Thus, in Stalin’s period the notion of conspiracy was systematically used by the 
government to delegitimize political opponents and justify repression. This legacy 
is still alive in contemporary Russia, and its impact has been increasing lately. 
The Manezhnaia disturbances were at times refracted in news coverage through 
a conspiratorial lens. Let us now examine how this, and the other lenses, shaped 
that coverage.
Channel 1 and Rossiia
Channel 1 and Rossiia were hesitant in responding to the Sviridov affair, as they 
attempted to closely follow the interpretations set out by representatives of law 
enforcement organs and political leaders. At the same time, owing to its more 
explicitly domestic remit, Rossiia’s Vesti nedeli differed from Channel 1’s Sunday 
Vremia in the complexity of the angles it adopted and in the wider range of voices 
heard. The first reports on Sunday editions of Vremia and Vesti of 12 December 
attempted to downplay the racist nature of the violence. The reporting was dom-
inated by comments from representatives of the Moscow police and the Minister 
of the Interior, who used euphemisms such as ‘non-football slogans’ (nefutbol’nye 
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lozungi) in describing the crowds’ overtly racist chants and described ‘left-radical 
youth’ and unspecified ‘extremists’ in reference to members of extreme Russian 
nationalist groups participating in the disturbances. Any possibility that racist 
views could be shared by members of football clubs (that is, members of ‘our’ 
‘ingroup’) was categorically denied. It was only towards the end of the 12 Decem-
ber coverage that, after showing footage of crowds of people outstretching their 
arms in Nazi salutes, the reporters on both channels began to use the expres-
sion ‘radical nationalist groups’ and mention attacks on ‘passers-by who did not 
look Slavic’. To some extent, Vesti went beyond what Vremia acknowledged at 
the time, concluding its first Sunday report with an interview with Rossiia jour-
nalist Nikolai Svanidze, who admitted that on Manezhnaia, ‘Nazi slogans were 
everywhere’.33
The most detailed coverage occurred in the Vremia broadcast of Sunday 19 
December which followed Medvedev’s and Putin’s speeches, both of which sug-
gested that what had happened in Moscow on 11 December should be treated 
with the utmost seriousness. The leaders condemned manifestations of extreme 
ethnonationalism, yet balanced this criticism – which was implicitly aimed at the 
Slavic majority – with reference to problems arising from violations of societal 
norms on the part of unintegrated minorities and migrants. At the same time they 
framed their general analysis of the riots with criticism of local authorities’ fre-
quent failure to adequately address conflict situations.34
For the media, a week after the riots, it was difficult to deny the racist frenzy 
that had gripped the Manezhnaia crowds and to avoid acknowledgement of the 
extent of the violence directed against non-Russians. Even though the speeches by 
the country’s two main leaders seemed to have indicated the emergence of a more 
‘settled’ official narrative about the events, the Vremia bulletin of 19 December 
continued to frame its coverage in a highly contradictory way. Apparently follow-
ing the official line, it started with the insistence that ‘the catalyst for the mass 
outrage… was a story not about nationalism, but corruption’ of law enforcement 
organs. The lack of detail about what exactly constituted corruption in this partic-
ular case lent the discussion a populist-conspiratorial colouring.
However, the report then changed tack and began showing YouTube clips fea-
turing shaven-headed youths attacking, without any visible provocation, people 
with darker skin; the attackers were referred to by Vremia as ‘fascists’ or ‘skin-
heads’. It next juxtaposed this footage with an equal number of clips depicting 
young Caucasians behaving aggressively and in a highly asocial manner on Mos-
cow streets. The shifting of the blame to Caucasians was reinforced by the Ortho-
dox Patriarch Kirill, who, unlike the political leadership, openly invoked ‘ethnic 
criminality’. For Kirill, rather than Caucasians reacting to racist attacks, Russians 
had been ‘provoked’ by the criminal ‘radicalism’ of the minorities. He willingly 
acknowledged that there was indeed a ‘majority’ crowd acting upon ‘understand-
able’, even if prejudicial, sentiments. Such differences between Kremlin politi-
cians, church leaders and state journalists indicate tensions within a post-Soviet 
establishment lacking firm ideological underpinnings.35 In conclusion, the reporter 
argued that ‘the number of crimes caused by extreme nationalism’ (prestupleniia 
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na national’noi pochve) ‘was growing and growing’. So, in contradiction to its 
opening statement, halfway through the Vremia report the disturbances began to 
be interpreted in the context of ethnic relations in Russia. In the depiction of these 
relations, the label of ‘extreme nationalism’ was applied to activities of a very 
different nature and the main victims of the violence were assigned a large part of 
the blame for what happened in Moscow on 11 December.
Within this contradictory framework, Vremia attempted to explain the origins 
of the racially motivated violence. Despite strong criticism of the manifestations 
of such violence, the terminology used indicated how pervasive the power of a 
racializing worldview had become in Russia, to the extent that certain words and 
concepts which, in their original meaning, had nothing to do with ethnicity and 
race were now ethnicized and racialized. At the beginning of the 19 December bul-
letin, in the initial context of Manezhnaia as a spontaneous, popular response to an 
incident of corruption in the law enforcement organs, the moderator claimed that it 
was quite common for frustrated youths to start directing their anger at ‘strangers’ 
(chuzhie). According to the Vremia reporter, ‘it is easy to provoke hatred of strang-
ers’, and so in Moscow ‘visitors (priezzhie) were beaten up’. The original mean-
ings of the words chuzhie and priezzhie have nothing to do with ethnicity or race: 
they refer respectively to those who are not family members or friends and those 
who have recently moved to a particular area. Vremia unreflectively adopted the 
currently popular trend of using such terms to label non-Slavs, particularly peo-
ple from the Caucasus and Central Asia, without giving any consideration to the 
appropriateness of applying words with a strong distancing and ‘othering’ effect to 
fellow citizens of the Russian Federation, such as North Caucasians.
After eventually acknowledging that the Manezhnaia riots revealed serious 
problems with ethnic relations, the programme-makers evidently felt compelled 
to give a positive example of Russia’s traditional ‘friendship of the peoples’ in 
a story about an Armenian boy, Gagik, who was set upon by adult males during 
the riots and was defended by two Russians, Lesha and Sasha. In a performative 
evocation of the ‘friendship of the peoples’ myth, the reporter commented that 
Lesha and Sasha did not care ‘what physical appearance their friend had’. In its 
original meaning, the Soviet myth was supposed to mark the happy coexistence 
of different ethno-cultural traditions; in the Vremia coverage, however, this was 
reduced to a mere reference to ethno-racial distinctions.
In the context of Vesti’s more dialogical approach to reporting (its tendency 
to pitch its reporting as an implicit response to views which it feels the need 
to rebut), a reference to the North Caucasians’ – albeit partial – responsibility 
for the Manezhnaia disturbances appeared earlier than was the case on Vremia, 
being alluded to as early as the 12 December broadcast. Evoking the ‘conflict of 
cultures’ theory, Svanidze, whose normally liberal inclinations appeared to have 
been set aside, spoke of ‘people of alien religion and alien culture’ who needed to 
be ‘taught the local norms of behaviour’ if exacerbation of ethnic tensions was to 
be avoided.36
Both channels included the Manezhnaia riots in their surveys of the main 
events of the year, shown on 26 December.37 In these final annual broadcasts, both 
106 Managing difference
channels, in different ways, returned to their original tactic of downplaying the 
overall significance of the events and their implications for the state of ethnic rela-
tions in the country. Vremia distilled its Manezhnaia narrative down to the simple 
story of an ‘everyday street fight’, purging any references to ethno-racial unrest. 
Vesti, in turn, claimed that – the riots notwithstanding – the ‘friendship of the 
peoples’ was still flourishing in Russia, whose citizens were proud of their legacy 
of fighting against fascism.
The approach taken in the final annual broadcast of Vesti nedeli could be seen 
as a polemical rebuttal of the line taken by alternative media (for example REN 
TV), that ethno-cultural pluralism in Russia had acquired destructive forms, and 
of the nationalist opposition’s argument that Soviet ‘friendship of the peoples’ 
was based on the exploitation of Russians by non-Russians.38 Appropriately, it 
fell to Putin to perform the final act in the ‘friendship of the peoples’ drama. 
Providing no context, the Vesti nedeli report depicted Putin’s meeting with the 
Russian national martial arts team – whose members, viewers were reminded, 
came from throughout the former USSR.39 In this officially sanctioned perception 
of sport as a mirror of Russia’s multi-ethnicity there was no place for ethnically 
motivated violence. But the broadcast suddenly featured a challenge to the rhet-
oric of harmony. Following a report on Putin’s post-Manezhnaia actions, details 
were given of the arrest of a retired GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate) colonel, 
Anatolii Kvachkov, whose son participated in the riots. The report revealed that 
Kvachkov senior was accused of ‘wide-ranging nationalist subversive’ activities. 
His arrest was widely reported in the print media and on the Internet,40 leaving 
Vesti nedeli little choice but to cover it. Significantly, Rossiia acknowledged that 
Kvachkov aligned himself with the seventeenth-century opolchentsy movement, 
whose march on Moscow to drive out the Polish occupiers dominated the symbol-
ism of the officially instigated Day of National Unity celebration marked a month 
earlier.41 There could be no more vivid illustration of the difference between the 
two kinds of media event, nor of the path leading from official ‘unity in difference’ 
to the ‘unity via the expulsion of difference’ principle which has come to dominate 
the coverage since 2012, and which we will analyse at the end of the book.
Overall, the two main government-backed channels failed to articulate an 
‘authoritative discourse’ about the Manezhnaia riots. Their coverage was unable 
to resolve the contradictions between the representation of Russia as a place where 
a historically rooted ‘friendship of the peoples’ was still flourishing and narratives 
of ‘ethnic criminality’ and ‘conflict of cultures’ reflecting popular prejudices that 
were clearly shared by the reporters and representatives of Russia’s elites whom 
we interviewed.
NTV
Of all the four channels, NTV most consistently reproduced ethnic and racial 
prejudices, as it relentlessly stereotyped minority communities according to the 
‘ethnic criminality’ lens. In NTV’s Sunday news programme, Segodnia, ‘eth-
nic criminality’ emerged as the main cause of the disturbances in particular, and 
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ethnic tensions in Russia in general; the coherence of the channel’s narrative was 
bolstered by selective quoting of authoritative figures and biased visual repre-
sentational techniques. NTV’s preferred ‘investigative’ mode (a legacy of its ear-
lier enthrallment with western news formats) accorded its reporters the leeway to 
exceed the bounds of the approved sources to which Channel 1 and Rossiia were 
tied, and to indulge in free-ranging, populist interpretations.
The first Manezhnaia report on Segodnia, of 12 December, unashamedly 
adopted a viewpoint close to that of the Spartak crowds, righteously incensed by 
the release of Sviridov’s assailants, whose North Caucasian origin was stressed 
by the reporter.42 Similar to the first reports on Channel 1 and Rossiia, NTV’s 
only mention of racist slogans referred to an ‘unfair accusation’ from unknown 
sources; the violence in the centre of Moscow was attributed to unspecified ‘left 
radical and nationalist organisations’, that is, marginal actors on the fringes of the 
dominant ‘ingroup’. This downplaying and externalization of ethno-racially moti-
vated violence continued during the subsequent weeks, with the programme of 26 
December describing the behaviour of Manezhnaia rioters as a mere ‘emotional 
outburst’.43
The reports of 19 and 26 December were unambiguously framed by a narra-
tive about ‘problems with unintegrated diaspora communities’, whose deviant 
behaviour and criminal actions, described as rooted in the specificity of their 
cultures, were presented as the main cause of social tensions across Russia. In 
the course of these reports, the question of ‘who is guilty’ for the riots was raised 
on several occasions, with the answer always starting with discussion of ‘visitors’ 
(priezzhie) – ‘including those from the Caucasus’, who tended ‘to behave outra-
geously and criminally’ (naglo i kriminal’no).44 Moreover, the North Caucasian 
republics of Russia, from where these ‘guests’ came to Moscow, were depicted 
as areas where ‘criminal gangs have merged with law enforcement organs’ and 
where even members of the political elites behaved so offensively that neigh-
bouring Russian regions had to set up special police units to deal with North 
Caucasian political leaders when they visited.45 With the apparent intention of 
bolstering the credibility of its coverage, NTV interviewed members of law 
enforcement organs in Moscow so that they could provide statistical ‘evidence’ 
of ‘ethnic criminality’. It was furthermore the criminality of ethnic minorities, 
the coverage suggested, that was largely responsible for incidents of corrup-
tion in local administrations and law enforcement organs across Russia. As the 
reporter on the 19 December programme put it, adopting the kind of conspirato-
rial tone set to saturate post-Manezhnaia public discourse: ‘National diasporas in 
large cities have become criminalized; they are in cahoots with local authorities, 
the police…’
The selection of quotes from Medvedev’s and Putin’s speeches was also tenden-
tious, as the greatest gloss was given to their remarks about problems with uninte-
grated ‘migrants’. The coverage of instances of ethnic tensions involving Russians 
and North Caucasians other than Manezhnaia always adopted the viewpoint of the 
Russian majority, as confirmed in the use of the parenthetic phrase, ‘As the local 
people say…’ On the rare occasions when members of minorities were given a 
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voice, they were quoted as reaffirming the majority viewpoint, arguing that their 
fellow North Caucasians ‘bring shame on the country in which we live’.46
Visual techniques further reinforced the representation of North Caucasians as 
the guilty party. The 19 December report on the aftermath of Manezhnaia, sensa-
tionally and conspiratorially entitled ‘Battle with the Forces of Darkness’, opened 
with images of people in Moscow being checked for the possession of weap-
ons. The hitherto unspecified voiceover was accompanied by footage depicting 
young Caucasians denying that they held weapons. But the film cut to a weapons 
haul. The reporter then ‘rebutted’ the young man’s verbal denial (complimenting 
the ‘rebuttal’ of the visual edit): ‘And yet they (weapons) do exist. These knives, 
hatchets, pistols – this entire arsenal – have been confiscated from Russian citi-
zens marching towards each other on Moscow streets.’47
The reporter’s initial even-handed phrasing of a ‘general’ problem was under-
mined by visual examples weighted against Caucasians. Similarly, on 26 Decem-
ber, in the coverage of Putin’s meeting with football fans at which the Prime 
Minister gave his warning that ‘inter-ethnic strife’ posed a real threat to Russia, 
the camera dwelt on the darker-skinned participants, as if hinting that Putin’s 
admonitions were directed at them.48 This was certainly the reporter’s own view, 
as he concluded that, despite Russia’s history of peaceful coexistence of different 
nationalities, in the North Caucasus as well as in the capital ‘a new generation has 
grown up, who apparently needs to be taught anew what Russia is and what norms 
of behaviour its people have’. In a further indication that this ‘new generation’ 
consisted of people from the Caucasus and migrants from elsewhere, the report 
ended by criticizing the St Petersburg educational authorities for producing a Rus-
sian-language textbook for children of minorities that was based on folk stories 
from the Caucasus. The reporter suggested that instead it would have been better 
to teach them – as everyone else – Pushkin’s fairy tales.
NTV’s position at the boundaries of approved discourse renders the interpre-
tative substratum from which state media outlets constructed their narrative par-
ticularly susceptible to re-inflection by populist voices that cannot, post-1991, 
be ignored. Its former status as a repository of ‘progressive’ infotainment-style 
television formats only aids that cause (‘commercialism’ and ‘liberal democracy’ 
are no longer synonymous in Russia). NTV’s threshold position also allowed it to 
offer coverage with much greater coherence than Channel 1 and Rossiia, conflat-
ing – to potentially devastating effect – the ‘ethnic criminality’ narrative with criti-
cism of the corruption of Russia’s law enforcement organs – which are themselves 
also, it was implied, a victim of such criminality. As we shall see in later chapters, 
this explosive theme was to resurface with a vengeance.
REN TV
REN TV’s weekly news programme Nedelia made the clearest attempt to interpret 
the riots as part of a broader inter-ethnic problem, and was the most explicit in its 
criticism of extreme Russian nationalism and manifestations of racism. The same 
interpretative prisms used by Channel 1 and Rossiia were often put to opposite 
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uses. Nedelia projected the view that ‘friendship of the peoples’ was dead in Rus-
sia, as the country was gripped by an intense ‘conflict of cultures’. Nedelia also 
made clear that the Manezhnaia riots were not just a one-off event, as Vremia 
and, to some extent, Vesti attempted to claim. Instead Nedelia spoke about ‘the 
epidemics of inter-ethnic conflicts’ afflicting Russia, for which multiple failures 
of the government and law enforcement organs were responsible. Paradoxically, 
the channel’s attempt to offer an open discussion of the causes and consequences 
of the riots, using western-style semi-documentary and ‘investigative’ modes of 
reporting, seemed to exacerbate its reliance on concepts and theories replete with 
ethno-racial prejudice.
Nedelia’s first broadcast on 11 December made no attempt to conceal the racist 
nature of the riots, treating them as a major challenge to the Kremlin.49 The report 
on Manezhnaia was placed first in the running order, in contrast to Vremia and 
Vesti on that day, which covered the riots towards the end of their news bulletins.50 
Nedelia’s report was dramatically entitled ‘The Spartacus Uprising’, evoking the 
fan club to which Sviridov belonged and the largest Roman slave uprising of the 
first century bce.51 The historical semantics of the Spartacus myth convey the idea 
of a mass protest against authority. Risks are posed by awakening these associa-
tions while populist anger at alleged collusion between the authorities and minori-
ties and migrant communities rages. That it is the self-styled ‘liberal’ Nedelia 
programme which courts such danger, misappropriating the rhetoric of civic pro-
test, is as indicative of the fluid uncertainties of Russia’s media environment as is 
Rossiia’s focus on the appropriation of the opolchentsy narrative by the anti-gov-
ernment opposition.
In this report, Nedelia seemingly endeavoured to avoid concessions to the right, 
curtailing references to the possibility that the behaviour of the so-called diaspora 
communities could also be regarded as problematic. The issue of uncontrolled 
‘migration from the periphery to large cities’ was briefly noted as causing tension, 
but was accompanied by a reporter’s observation that ‘visitors (priezzhie) acquire 
weapons in order to defend themselves from aggressive aboriginals (aborig-
eny)’.52 The ironic, and deeply dialogic, use of the word ‘aboriginals’ in relation to 
permanent residents of cities in European Russia at this stage seemed to indicate 
the channel’s understanding of the problematic nature of the term priezzhie.
In the subsequent broadcast of 18 December, however, the Nedelia coverage 
began to reflect a shared perception of Caucasian responsibility for social tensions 
in Russia’s big cities. Dwelling on the causes of the riots, Nedelia attributed a 
dominant explanatory power to the ‘conflict of cultures’ lens. Within this context, 
Nedelia suddenly began to ‘balance’ its opposition to ethnic Russian nationalism 
with a concern about the asocial behaviour of North Caucasians.53
As with Vremia and Vesti, Nedelia’s hybrid of sources and ideas failed to gel. 
The over-reliance on the ‘conflict of cultures’ lens, which lacked a firm ideological 
mooring, produced particularly striking contradictions in REN TV’s coverage. 
While strongly condemning the racist tone of the demonstrations, the programme 
itself promoted a racializing worldview invisible to the moderator and reporters, 
who subscribed to a narrow definition of racism, limiting it to explicit instances 
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of the employment of Nazi symbolism.54 (Indeed, the problematic nature of ‘new 
racism’, which claims a deterministic link between ethno-cultural distinctions and 
social issues, is recognized only by a small number of liberal commentators in 
Russia.55)
In the Nedelia broadcasts, Slavs and Caucasians were depicted as two neatly 
demarcated groups with immutable behavioural norms. Like Vremia and Vesti, 
Nedelia suddenly began to racialize the words priezzhie and gosti (‘visitor’ and 
‘guest’), using them as a collective definition of anyone non-Slavic, irrespective 
of their citizenship or length of residence in Moscow. Likewise, the expression 
korennoi moskvich (indigenous Moscovite) was applied by Nedelia’s moderator, 
Marianna Maksimovskaia, solely to ethnic Russians/Slavs, though strictly speak-
ing the word korennoi (indigenous) applies merely to a long-term resident of a 
particular location.56
Contrary to the Kremlin-sponsored discourse of a pan-Russian civic nation, 
whose multi-ethnic population is bound together by common efforts to build a 
strong state, REN TV’s coverage of the December riots represented Russia’s dif-
ferent ethnic groups as separate nations (natsii), among whom only Russians were 
identified with the country as a whole. Post-Soviet discourses of Russian nation-
hood have failed to overcome conflations of ethnicity and nationality and the 
linking of ethnically defined nationality to discrete territorial space that was char-
acteristic of the Soviet era. It was this that caused REN TV, like other broadcast-
ers, implicitly to place Dagestanis, Chechens and Ingush permanently residing in 
Moscow under the umbrella term of priezzhie. North Caucasians invited to speak 
on the programme seemed to have internalized their own ‘othering’. This was 
reflected in the arguments of a Chechen student activist living in Moscow: despite 
the fact that he had moved to the Russian capital as a child, the student accepted 
the external definition of himself as an outsider whose personal behaviour was 
responsible for shaping a collective image of his nation (Chechnia) in the eyes of 
the host (ethnic Russian) society: ‘Those who take out knives put their nation into 
shame ... In other cities... we should demonstrate [the best sides] of our culture, 
of our nation.’57
REN TV eschewed the other channels’ tendency to quote liberally from Medve-
dev’s and Putin’s speeches. But extreme nationalists and communists on one hand, 
and spokesmen for North Caucasian communities on the other, were interviewed 
extensively. Also notable by their absence were members of the liberal opposi-
tion.58 Nedelia’s west-leaning credentials were, by 18 December, outweighed by 
the emerging cross-channel consensus, with its grounding in domestic strains of 
anti-liberal, popular and pseudo-academic discourses.
Nonetheless, the liberal critique never faded entirely. On 18 December, an 
attempt by Vladislav Surkov, First Deputy Head of the Presidential Administra-
tion, to blame the liberal opposition for teaching nationalists to stage unauthorized 
demonstrations was dismissed. In an interview with Maksimovskaia in the same 
bulletin, Ingush President Iunus-Bek Evkurov blamed the media for the state of 
inter-ethnic relations, arguing that they regularly highlighted the ethnicity of Cau-
casian criminals while ignoring that of neo-Nazi skinheads.59
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On 18 December, Maksimovskaia claimed that one of the most active partici-
pants in shaping Putin’s youth policy, Vasilii Iakimenko, carried direct responsibil-
ity for the rise of xenophobia because, as leader of the Nashi movement, he helped 
divide the country into ‘ours and theirs’, further implying that such outcomes were 
not necessarily an oversight;60 meanwhile Ruslan Aushev, the former president of 
Ingushetia, described the authorities’ toleration of neo-Nazism in central Moscow 
as suspicious.61 No attempt was made to reconcile hints at the possibility that the 
authorities stood behind the riots with the suggestion that they were genuinely 
terrified by them. Indeed, conspiracy theories, including suggestions that Putin or 
the exiled oligarch Berezovskii were involved in organizing the riots, ran rampant 
within the oppositional media, penetrating the peripheral space within official dis-
course which REN TV occupies.62 The absence of robust political meta-narratives 
permitted such fantasies to coexist side by side.
***
In now recapitulating the key elements in our argument and linking them to one 
another, and to the European comparative dimension, we must consider what the 
weak or non-existent meta-narratives and the multiple divergences and conver-
gences between national broadcasters meant for the state-aligned media’s man-
agement of inter-ethnic flare-ups such as Manezhnaia. We have shown that the 
transformations of the four interpretative lenses through which they all viewed 
the riots can be traced through contradictions expressed diachronically, via shifts in 
the Manezhnaia narrative over two weeks, and synchronically, via ideological and ter-
minological conflicts present throughout. For Rossiia and Channel 1 the diachronic 
axis is foregrounded, as these official outlets struggle to recalibrate their narratives 
in line with the shifting perspectives of their political masters and with popular opin-
ion. On NTV’s Segodnia and REN TV’s Nedelia, the respective populist and liberal 
orientations are pre-set and, despite concessions to the official line or the perceived 
popular consensus, the synchronic axis prevails. This difference points to a further, 
‘meta-discursive’, dimension to the contradictions and one of this book’s recur-
ring themes: that of a ‘mediasphere’ structured as a spectrum running from centre 
(Channel 1), through Rossiia, which leavens its official line with a strictly managed 
pluralism, to a periphery serving as a two-way filter to extra-official realms: demotic- 
nationalist (NTV) and liberal-progressive (REN TV’s Nedelia).
The transformative process results in an apparent convergence around a com-
mon line related to a widely perceived problem with unintegrated minorities and 
migrants. Rather than the imposition of an unambiguous Kremlin view, it reflects 
the point at which state pronouncements intersect with ‘popular consensus’. The 
convergence is partial and tensions between and within the different narratives, 
including that of the state itself, remain unresolved. All of the accounts are frac-
tured from within and retain a strongly dialogic aspect. Thus, particularly when 
tested by events such as the Manezhnaia riots, the official discourse is incapable of 
re-integrating the different layers of its mythological substratum and struggles to 
‘mainstream’ the multiple voices (nationalist, liberal, populist–conspiratorial, etc.) 
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that it confronts. Its power to assert its dominance over a Russian public sphere 
characterized by relative discursive plurality is further undermined by the range of 
contradictory ideological frameworks that it utilizes in confronting major political 
and social issues. Indeed, in their final broadcasts of 2010, the two main state-con-
trolled channels ultimately resorted to denying the full scale of the conflict which 
they had earlier acknowledged. NTV’s consistently populist approach enabled it 
to maintain a more coherent line – which, however, came dangerously close to 
inciting ethno-racial prejudices, even if paying lip service to the ‘friendship of the 
peoples’ narrative its subordinated position compelled it to adopt. Notwithstand-
ing its explicit condemnation of ethnic Russian nationalism and of the authori-
ties for encouraging it, REN TV’s Nedelia paradoxically reinforced perceptions 
of impenetrable ethnic boundaries and irreconcilable inter-ethnic differences to 
a still greater extent than the two main state channels, thus highlighting particu-
larly clearly the power of the pre-existing interpretative apparatus, which is used 
unreflectively when journalists are faced with quickly unfolding dramatic events.
The main point of consensus shared across all the channels remained the unre-
flective equation of ethnic Russians alone with the Russian Federation as a whole – 
a view that contradicted the Kremlin’s ideal of a multi-ethnic civic Russian nation 
(rossiiskaia grazhdanskaia natsiia) and the Russian constitution. The perception 
that ethnic Russians have (or should have) a special status within the Russian 
 Federation is, however, widely shared, and so Zhirinovskii’s reiteration in the 
Poedinok talk show of 20 January 2011 of the demand that the constitution be 
revised to acknowledge this special status was predictable. The ultranationalist 
Zhirinovskii used bold, even radical language to express his demand. In contrast, 
by using a particular unreflective terminology, Nedelia’s liberal moderator merely 
implied that Russians were different from (and superior to) other national groups 
in the Russian Federation.
In their reproduction of ethno-racial stereotypes, Russian television practices 
are not dissimilar to those of west European media. The tendency to emphasize 
negative characteristics of ethnic ‘outgroups’ and downplay or deny those of the 
dominant ‘ingroup’, the selective application of ethnic labels in coverage of crime 
and inter-ethnic conflict construed from the perspective of the Slavic majority 
and the equation of cultural and biological differences find parallels in reporting 
in Europe as a whole.63 There are significant differences between the media of 
different European countries and between individual media outlets within these 
countries regarding the degree of terminological laxity and the levels of crude 
stereotyping in coverage of issues related to ethnicity and race. Some outlets 
are much more effective than others in masking ‘ingroup’ bias.64 Television cover-
age of the Manezhnaia riots demonstrated a very high degree of laxity and a strong 
inclination towards stereotyping with little attempt to conceal any biases. Thus, the 
label of ‘visitor’ was systematically applied to citizens of the Russian Federation 
whose difference from the ethnic Russian majority is solely ethno-cultural. North 
Caucasians are not first or second-generation ‘migrants’ from another country; the 
region of North Caucasus was incorporated into the Russian state in the course of 
the nineteenth century. In that sense, Russian citizens from the North Caucasus 
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are different from North African migrants in west European countries. Yet in both 
the Russian and western European cases, the stereotyping and racializing media 
coverage betrays attitudes rooted in Europe’s colonial past. North Caucasus was 
Russia’s colonial domain, subjected to discrimination and ‘othering’. The Soviet 
integrationist project did not overcome this legacy.
The terminological laxity seen here reflects deep uncertainties about how the 
Russian national community should be defined, which we also noted in the cov-
erage of the Day of National Unity. In the broadcasters’ treatment of the Mane-
zhnaia riots, the uncertainties which came to the fore are connected with the 
legacy of Soviet policies on nationality. They are based on a highly ambiguous 
approach to the relationship between Soviet (civic) identity and peoples’ ethnona-
tional identities, as well as to squaring the dominance of the Soviet Union’s most 
powerful contingent (the russkie) with recognition of the ethnonational separate-
ness of non-Russian minorities of differing statuses. Thus, the prejudicial appli-
cation of terms like ‘visitors’, ‘guests’ and ‘diasporas’ to people who are bona 
fide citizens of the Russian (Rossiiskaiia) Federation is the direct consequence 
of the division of first Soviet, then Russian, federal space into multiple territories 
inhabited by ‘titular nationalities’. This terminology also reflects Russia’s impe-
rial legacy, which the Soviet experience uniquely reshaped, but did not overcome. 
So the identification of the Slavic population alone as the ‘indigenous population’ 
of Russia as a whole and of its capital city, which was common in the late imperial 
period, has been revived post-1991.
Key to our interpretation of the discursive crisis to which the lexical confu-
sion points is the notion that the interpretative prisms we identified operate at, 
yet cut across, different levels of the public sphere: vernacular (‘conspiracy of 
power’); intermediate/academic (‘ethnic criminality’); official (the ‘friendship 
of the peoples’). Meanwhile, the notion of inter-ethnic disharmony straddles the 
official/intermediate divide. It can manifest itself in ‘virtual’ form: inter-ethnic 
strife portrayed as a potential, but avoidable, consequence of the disturbances, 
and realizable only ‘elsewhere’; but it also exists in a realized version (the ‘con-
flict of cultures’ represented by REN TV’s Nedelia as the actual cause of the 
disturbances).
The differential location of the four prisms generates multiple interpretations 
of the official discourse within which they interact. For instance, Channel 1 and 
Rossiia draw at times on the vitality of conspiratorial sentiment to minimize 
 ethno-nationalist and racist undertones and portray the disturbances as a singular 
act of resentment at an aberration resulting from nothing more than endemic legal 
inertia. Yet the linkage elsewhere of conspiratorial thinking to ‘ethnic criminality’, 
which receives its most lurid expression in NTV’s invocation of ‘dark forces’, 
inevitably fosters over-interpretations of those same undertones.
The dangers represented by ambiguities and contradictions in the discourses 
of national unity and ethnic conflict are symbolized in the ambivalent seman-
tics of the Spartacus revolt evoked by REN TV – for in its contemporary set-
ting, the revolt is at once a justifiable populist march on corrupt officials in 
conspiratorial collusion with ‘ethnic criminal groupings’; a terrifying outburst of 
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anti-migrant rage; and a profound threat to the integrity of the Russian state. 
Equally ambiguous is the opolchentsy narrative. Central to the artifice by which, 
since the introduction of an official Day of National Unity in 2005, Russia cel-
ebrates its multi-faith, multicultural society, the story of the victorious uprising 
against a ‘foreign invader’ galvanizes popular opposition to that very unifying 
project, as reflected in the story about the arrest of Colonel Kvachkov which Ros-
siia linked to its coverage of Manezhnaia.
The fact that, in the coverage we analysed, the ‘foreign invader’ remained a 
culturally hybrid mass gathered under the ethno-geographical umbrella of Kavkaz 
(the Caucasus) demonstrates the explanatory power of Rogers Brubaker’s insis-
tence on ‘performative ethnicity’, according to which ‘by invoking groups, [eth-
no-political entrepreneurs] seek to evoke them’, and on groupness as an ‘event’ 
rather than a phenomenon or a mere ‘construction’.65
Brubaker argues that, because of the performativity of ethnic groupings, what 
is reported as ethnic conflict ‘may have more to do with thuggery, opportunis-
tic looting and black-market profiteering’.66 An instructive contrast therefore 
emerges between Manezhnaia and the rioting that shook London in August 2011 
before spreading throughout the UK. The latter commenced as a protest against 
the police’s shooting of a young black man and refusal to deliver justice to his 
family but degenerated into what was presented in all public representations and 
in popular perceptions as a looting spree devoid of inter-ethnic content.67 The for-
mer began as a football fans’ protest against police ineffectiveness which mutated 
into ethnically saturated violence. The radical contingency of ethnicity as a cat-
egory (its emergence as a determining force in one situation but not another, 
ostensibly similar, one) is but one explanation for the difference, but if it is a 
factor at all, then the Manezhnaia disturbances might tell us something important 
about how the ‘crisis of multiculturalism’ is playing out in post-communist space.
One legacy of the Manezhnaia events has been a noticeable increase in attention 
to inter-ethnic relations within official discourse. In January 2012, as we shall see 
in Chapter 7, Putin chose to dedicate one of his ‘election manifesto’ articles to 
the ‘national question’. Here, he made extended reference to collusion between 
corrupt law enforcement organs and migrants, linking it to the ‘radicalization of 
the host society’. But he also depicted in alarming words the ‘crisis of multicul-
turalism’ afflicting west European societies, which he presented as being unable 
to cope with large migration flows – comparing ‘the west’ unfavourably to Russia, 
where ‘culture conflicts’ are easier to manage given the fact that ‘for centuries Rus-
sia has existed as a multi-national state.’68 The narrative struggles that Manezhnaia 
revealed as a ‘crisis management’ type of media event contradicted Putin’s opti-
mistic assessment. As we will later demonstrate, in the first year of Putin’s third 
presidency, Rossiia in particular began to reject the earlier interpretation of the riots 
as a one-off episode, instead aligning itself with REN TV’s Nedelia in linking them 
to the nation’s crisis in inter-ethnic relations and frequently resorting to the popu-
list approach adopted by NTV in December 2010. Nonetheless, when, in October 
2013, mass inter-ethnic violence flared at the Biriulevo market in Moscow follow-
ing the murder of an ethnic Russian by an Azeri migrant, even Vesti, which was by 
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now leading the broadcast news agenda (Vremia was noticeably reticent), refrained 
from earlier anti-migrant excesses, fearful of provoking still worse violence.69 By 
this point, however, as we shall see in Part III, state-aligned television news had 
effectively abandoned its favoured diversity management tool – the complex, and 
often contradictory, hybrid of interpretative lenses at work in coverage of Mane-
zhnaia – in favour of a co-ordinated, univocal campaign of ‘othering’ in which the 
fears and prejudices prevalent at the margins of approved discourse drown out the 
dying echoes of the ‘friendship of the peoples’ myth. Curiously, those very margins 
are also the site of a range of alternatives to the ominous drumbeat of xenophobic 
alarm. It is these alternatives that Part II will now explore.
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Part II
Difference at the margins

5 Re-working Russian diversity
The ‘marginal’ role of 
television fiction
As our discussion of talk shows in the wake of Manezhnaia revealed, television’s 
role in the (mis)management of diversity policy is far from restricted to news bul-
letins. The assumed separation between ‘real news’ and non-news programming 
is, anyway, something of a fallacy.1 In fact, news and non-news broadcasting 
have always existed in a symbiotic relationship. Current events, first reported in 
news bulletins whose language and discourse place them close to the centre of 
the official sphere, are therapeutically ‘worked through’, or re-worked, in non-
news genres at the margins of that sphere.2 Meanwhile, news bulletins themselves 
import from the margins those styles, editorial practices, narrative structures and 
myths which will enliven their reports (the term ‘news story’ is revealing).3
The interconnectivity between news and non-news broadcasting has partic-
ular significance for the media’s representation of inter-ethnic relations in the 
context of televised drama. News broadcasters strive to give vivid and dramatic 
expression to the problems that issues of inter-ethnic tension generate, but also 
to distance themselves from the inflammatory stereotypes that circulate in the 
discourses inflecting popular television fiction. Equally, television dramatists are 
drawn to the raw emotion and controversy of topical inter-ethnic conflicts, yet 
seek to avoid becoming news stories in their own right by overstepping the bound-
aries of permissibility in this sensitive area.
A compelling example of a case in which the boundaries were breached is pro-
vided by the controversy over the Russian reality television serial, Shkola, which 
we analyse below as a media event in which ‘the media’ themselves become the 
source of the ‘event’. The serial featured nationalist extremism among teachers 
and skinhead violence against North Caucasian pupils – themes whose long-stand-
ing threat to burst from the peripheries to the centre of the news agenda was real-
ized at the end of the year in which Shkola was released via the Manezhnaia riots.
By dint of its capacity to tap into popular mythologies, fictional television 
like Shkola serves as a gateway at the periphery of the spaces of official cul-
ture, through which subcultural prejudices and counter-discriminatory discourses 
rarely expressed even on talk shows might enter, and via which those prejudices 
and discourses are, in turn, processed, managed and responded to by mainstream 
media practitioners. It is the site of a permanent circulation and contestation of 
ethnicity-related meanings.
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The above principles have particular relevance for the post-Soviet media envi-
ronment, with its continuing legacy of government control on one hand, and with 
its manifest failure to articulate societal consensus and increased sensitivity to 
inter-ethnic tension on the other. As we have seen, official discourses offer their 
own contradictory perspectives on inter-ethnic tension and the need for toler-
ance. Our purpose here is to re-examine the circulation of official and demotic 
approaches to ethnicity on the territory of televised fiction. We seek to evaluate 
whether the seemingly marginal status of that territory exacerbates the capacity 
for ethnic prejudices to thrive, or whether it furnishes new tools with which to 
manage them (whether deliberately or as the subliminal effect of an impersonal 
process) or rebut them.
We rely on the overarching approach to media cultures developed by Jesus 
Martin-Barbero, whose account of cultural hegemony draws on the same 
neo-Gramscian principles as Laclau’s, positing power as control over the defini-
tion of what passes for ‘consensus’ and emphasising ‘cultural circulation’.4 While 
it cannot be applied wholescale to post-communist societies lacking societal con-
sensus, such a conception of hegemony helps us address the encounter of official 
Russian approaches to the management of inter-ethnic relations with popular and 
subcultural strands of opinion. It avoids the twin dangers of first, assessing the 
Russian political class’s grip on power solely on the basis of the force (juridical, 
political, economic) at its disposal, and second, dismissing subcultural forms as 
peripheral to the exercise and questioning of that power.
We identify three strategies, each tied to a particular fictional format. First, we 
describe a mediation process in which current issues informing constructions of 
ethnic difference are explored within a variant on the drama series popular in Rus-
sia: the gypsy romance. This facilitates the filtering of ‘otherness’ through idealized 
imaginings of an inclusive selfhood in which that ‘otherness’ is appropriated and 
emptied of threat. Through the principle of narrative transgression, it also allows 
characters to renegotiate the boundaries of ‘self’ and ‘other’. Via our reading of 
Shkola and the controversies it raised we then explore the longer, serial format as 
a locus within which xenophobic extremism can be moderated (or alleviated) by 
competing discourses of official multiculturalism and universal tolerance. We turn 
finally to the comedy series Nasha Russia, investigating whether humorous por-
trayals of ethnic minorities (the main cause of the scandal evoked by the series) 
re-confirm popular prejudices, or whether the format in which those prejudices are 
expressed modalizes (or ‘de-literalizes’) them. We locate the programmes in their 
broader contexts, addressing popular mythologies in the case of the gypsy serials 
and societal reactions and cultural references in that of Shkola and Nasha Russia.
The programmes treat issues drawn from the news bulletins analysed in other 
chapters, positioning themselves at varying distances from the official discourses 
represented in those bulletins. The gypsy serials were broadcast on Rossiia, with 
its government-imposed remit to give positive expression to Russia’s ethnic 
diversity. Shkola aired on Channel 1, which adheres closely to the Kremlin line 
but, since the government is technically a minority shareholder, is more attentive 
to advertising income and viewing figures, and part of whose remit is to address 
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Russian speakers abroad who are inured to non-Russian, critical representations 
of their nation of origin. Shkola was, significantly, made by a director whose prior 
work dealt with problems affecting Russia’s alienated youth. Nasha Russia is a 
product of TNT, a commercial channel aimed at the 16–30 market.
The spectrum of approaches (from Rossiia, through Channel 1, to TNT) indi-
cates that, far from serving merely as a locus of vernacular racism, popular 
cultural forms also contribute to a tentative recasting of inter-ethnic relations. 
Channels and programme genres susceptible to the influences of peripheral cul-
tural forms and discourses are likely to contribute most to this process; even a 
gypsy romance is further from the approved line than a Rossiia news broadcast. 
Thus, the strategies we identify serve not solely to attenuate extreme positions 
or to legitimize approved responses to them, but also as a means of interrogating 
these responses. It is no coincidence that two of the programmes we examine 
were the subject of scandal.
We supplement the overarching theoretical emphasis on popular culture’s work 
in negotiating societal consensus with tools geared to each genre. In the case of 
the gypsy series, we apply narrative theory to explore how fictional characters can 
challenge established boundaries of national self and ethnic other. Our approach 
to Shkola relies on Martin-Barbero’s own identification of the telenovela’s capac-
ity to embrace a controlled dialectic of audience and producer and to provoke, 
but ultimately evade, official censure. For Nasha Russia, we adapt Todorov’s and 
Ducrot’s definition of modality as the distinction between the ‘content’ of lan-
guage and the speaker’s attitude to that content to describe the sources of the 
humour the series generates.5
We demonstrate that the peripheral space occupied by fictional and comedic 
genres proves to be fertile territory for the renegotiation of national and ethnic 
identities, official and subcultural discourses. Taken as a whole, our spectrum of 
genres and channels refutes any assumptions that the renegotiation process offers 
either univocal support for the Kremlin approach to ‘the national question’ or 
enthusiastic endorsement of the populist attitudes to ethnic minorities which that 
approach ambivalently targets.
The gypsy as vanishing mediator
From tabor to screen (and back)
When illustrating the symbiosis of news and non-news genres, one might turn 
to portrayals of North Caucasians who, as we have seen, have been a focal point 
in the recent rise of inter-ethnic tensions in Russia. Given the low official size 
of Russia’s Roma population and their relative absence from the domestic news 
agenda, it is seemingly odd, then, that it is the image of the gypsy which provides 
the more compelling manifestation.6 The paradox deepens when one considers 
discontinuities between that image’s ‘news’ and ‘non-news’ manifestations. On 
one hand, gypsies cede little to North Caucasians in terms of the negativity that 
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accompanies their presence in the news (both are tarred with the brush of ‘ethnic 
criminality’). On the other, the romanticized image of the Russian gypsy as exotic 
outsider has a long pedigree stretching to Pushkin’s Tsygane.7 In this variant, we 
encounter a gypsy whose innate creativity, restless spirit and mysterious affinity 
with nature offer a counterpoint to the dry rationality of modern, urban civili-
zation. There is, of course, an orientalist version of the North Caucasian whose 
lineage can also be traced to Pushkin,8 but it was never as readily adaptable to 
mainstream customs as that of the gypsy. Moreover, the mystique of the Caucasus 
has declined precipitously since the Chechen wars.
Like many stereotypes, that of the gypsy is internally contradictory and includes 
notions of dishonesty and a sinister association with the supernatural (popular 
fears of the ‘gypsy curse’ and ‘the evil eye’ – the negative corollary to the cele-
brated affinity with the mystical).9 So endemic is the myth in its complete form 
that news reports must erase those tensions if they are to benefit from the powerful 
resonance of the prejudicial attributes. Equally, if popular drama drawing on rural 
gypsy mystique is to renew itself with the vitality of the socially authentic, it must 
square the romantic idyll with the harsh realities of narcotics, poverty and sexual 
exploitation blighting the contemporary tabor.
Precisely because the figure of the gypsy confronts in stark form the chal-
lenges of the news/non-news dynamic, it also epitomizes the potentials which that 
dynamic holds. A key factor facilitating this role is that intra-television media-
tions (from news to non-news and back) are themselves the function of broader 
mediations linking official and vernacular discourses, state policy and popular 
sentiment, transnational form and local variant.10 The gypsy community’s status 
as a pan-European symbol of the excluded outsider is important here.11 Few of the 
features of gypsy mythology discussed so far would not apply throughout Europe. 
Yet in each nation, the myth acquires local attributes. The Roma’s historical sta-
tus as an itinerant people with a transnational identity is a linear enactment of its 
semantic quality as mediator of the global and the national, a quality it shares with 
the Jews.
One peculiarity of the Russian variant of the myth is the extent of its assimi-
lation into mainstream tradition.12 For this reason, it is ideally placed to explore 
relationships with alterity, particularly in fictional forms which accommodate such 
experimentation: the tsygan is not of the self, yet nor does s/he belong unambig-
uously to the other. The tabor’s associations with a traditional lifestyle featuring 
a strong, authoritarian figurehead (the baron) and antiquated attitudes to women 
mean that it can serve, too, as the locus for an exploration of changing gender rela-
tions. Thus, the Russian myth of the gypsy lifestyle highlights the arranged mar-
riage. In its extreme version, this evokes fascinated revulsion (girls of 11 undergo 
weddings to men twice their age); in its moderate form, it offers comfort to males 
yearning for traditional femininity.
Latter-day images of the gypsy as beggar and thief, combined with the squa-
lor of camps beset with social problems, mean that ethnicity and class are con-
flated. Alternations between ‘Roma’ and ‘gypsy’ (tsygan) as appellations reflect 
this confusion of the cultural (tradition, way of life) and the ethno-racial (blood 
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lineage, language, physical appearance). The alternation of cultural and ethno- 
racial characteristics is linked to a final mediatory function, for the tsygan’s exot-
icism and nostalgic appeal can be deployed to articulate an impossible, and thus 
disembodied, desire for the absolute difference of the ethnically ‘other’. By elid-
ing the image with characteristics relating to mundane lifestyle practices, that 
other becomes attainable, and so embodied. Many drama plots revolve around 
romances between Russians and gypsies in which the alien and the different are 
gradually familiarized. We relate the gypsy’s multi-level mediatory function to 
the circulatory dynamic linking these plots, and thus the ‘real’ to the ‘imaginary’ 
in Martin-Barbero’s understanding of mediation.13 As fictional genres situated in 
the realm of desire, the dramas invariably bear the influence of the exotic imagery 
of ‘wild’ gypsy dancing, of the gypsy’s fortune-telling powers and of the various 
cinematic realizations of gypsy mythology which punctuated the Soviet period.14 
The latter are important not least because they also broach the fraught issues of 
Russian national identity with which the gypsy theme is intertwined.
The new generation of gypsy dramas to flood Russian television can also be 
traced to the early 1990s arrival on post-Soviet screens of the Latin American ‘soap 
opera’ form, with its melodramatic narratives of provincial girls finding love and 
social advancement in new, urban environments. Post-Soviet social upheavals 
offered a fertile environment for the serial genre and Russian television generated 
its own variants, including those centred on gypsy themes. That the three Rossiia 
dramas we treat reflect similar thematics is evident from their titles: The Enigmatic 
Tomorrow of Fate (Sud’by zagadochnoe zavtra), The Gypsy Girl with the Way Out 
(Tsyganochka s vykhodom), Love and Separation (Liubov’ i razluka). Of these, the 
most recently made was Love and Separation (2011, directed by Aleksei Kozlov). 
The previous year saw the broadcast of The Enigmatic Tomorrow (directed by Vasi-
lii Moskalenko). The Gypsy Girl is the earliest of the serials (2008, directed by 
Aleksei Rudakov) but, like the others, it was showing in 2010–11 when the Roma 
were prominent in the news. We treat them in reverse order.
Love and miscegenation
The plot of Love and Separation, which ran over eight episodes, treads familiar 
ground. A young provincial teacher, Anna, marries a middle-aged police chief, 
Trekhin, but falls in love with a dashing gypsy, Lacho. Lacho’s community expel 
him from the tabor for refusing to marry the gypsy girl chosen for him by the 
baron, but he persists in pursuing Anna, getting her pregnant. She refuses an 
abortion and gives birth to a son whom Trekhin removes, driving Lacho away 
and attempting to have him murdered. Meanwhile, Trekhin’s own wayward son 
accumulates debts and kills his father for refusing to help him, but blames Lacho. 
Finally, Anna proves Lacho’s innocence and the couple are reunited.
Lacho’s orientalized exoticism (his swarthy features, passionate nature and 
love of horses) renders him the archetypal forbidden object of desire. The dan-
gers which such desire holds are attenuated by the fact that the desiring subject 
is a provincial girl, herself objectified from the male viewpoint, and by Lacho’s 
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de-ethnicizing ejection from his own community. The narrative pattern of union, 
separation and reunion dramatizes in linear form an alternation between identifi-
cation with and distanciation from ‘otherness’. As Anna’s relationship with Lacho 
deepens, she ‘overcomes her feeling of alienation’ (to quote the serial’s web-
site),15 echoing the process by which viewers accommodate themselves to him. 
The identificatory viewpoint which ‘sutures’ the audience into the fictional reality 
is suspended between Lacho as the desiring male and Anna as the representative 
of Russian selfhood.16
But the narrative also permits an unfolding of the prejudicial fears of consti-
tutive ‘otherness’. Lacho is criminalized during the story. His initial pursuit of 
a married woman sets the tone. In his campaign to rescue Anna from Trekhin, 
he sets fire to a hotel owned by Trekhin’s unscrupulous business associate, who 
also has designs on Anna. Finally he is wrongly accused of Trekhin’s murder 
and endures intense suspicion from Anna’s confidante, Anfis’ka, who serves as a 
cipher for anti-gypsy prejudice.
However, just as Anna’s illicit desire for ‘the ethnic other’ is attenuated by the 
state of transition into which he has been thrust, and because, extra-diegetically, 
the romance is fictional, so Anfis’ka’s fear of gypsy criminality is ameliorated 
by the fact that, intra-diegetically, Lacho’s purported crime is a fabrication. It is 
further alleviated by the negative portrayal of Trekhin as a vindictive police chief 
immersed in shady business deals. In the intricate game of alternation between 
romantic ideal and social reality, identification and counter-identification, police 
corruption and collusion with the world of crime are balanced with the Roma 
community’s arranged marriages and underage sex.
Central to the dénouement is the birth of Anna’s illegitimate son. It is he who 
cements their love, precipitating Trekhin’s descent into self-destructive ven-
geance. He is the embodiment of the miscegenation which is the semantic equiv-
alent to the oscillation process. Moreover, he is a vehicle for exposing the social 
reality of ethnic prejudice. When he begins school, he is taunted with the racist 
nickname ‘tsyganionok’ (little gypsy boy) as the serial directs its critical lens at 
anti-Roma sentiment. The serial exploits within its narrative the very structuring 
contrast between idealized image and grim reality of which it is itself a manifes-
tation. When on the way to his trial, Lacho asks the guards if he should read their 
fortune, subjecting their racial stereotyping to ridicule. Yet the drama propagates 
those same stereotypes. Anna is herself subjected to the unnerving stare of the 
gypsy girl over whom she was preferred by Lacho, and is fearful that she has been 
given ‘the evil eye’.
Ultimately, Love and Separation abandons the principles it adopts in its surface 
narrative (that of a love story targeting anti-Roma prejudice). Lacho’s expulsion 
from his tabor, his love for Anna and his gradual de-ethnicization confirm his 
status as the ‘exception that proves the rule’ about gypsy criminality, for excep-
tionality is the driver of narrative (stories engage us to the extent that they tran-
scend the predictable). Unsurprisingly in light of these tensions, the story fails to 
tie up some of its loose ends: the consequences of Lacho’s expulsion; the subplot 
involving Trekhin’s corrupt business associate.
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The Enigma of Origin
The Enigmatic Tomorrow shares with Love and Separation a concern with iden-
tity, explored through the relationship between gypsy and Russian ethnicities. That 
concern relates to the contradictory way in which Russian television co-articulates 
culture, race and ethnicity. Here, though, gypsies play a secondary role. Even their 
tabor is located at the peripheries of the village in which the action occurs. Their 
very marginality means that the desires and fears they represent emerge with 
greater clarity. Set in a Cossack village, the 15 episodes revolve around a soldier, 
Ivan, who returns from the front to find that his fiancée, Nastia, is to marry Kostia, 
whom she does not love. The jealous Kostia has Ivan beaten: an act witnessed by 
a gypsy boy, Sanakai, and his betrothed, Rita. Their marriage is in turn imperilled 
by the gypsy baron, who has promised Rita to a man from another tabor. When 
they rescue Ivan, he reciprocates by reassuring the police that the gypsies are not 
to blame (suspicion has been aroused by the rival tabor’s criminal activities). 
Nastia’s refusal to marry Kostia enrages him, yet he ignores a warning from the 
gypsy fortune-teller, Lachi, that he has ‘chosen his fate’. Meanwhile his associate, 
Kurchavyi, tries to endear himself to Kostia by incriminating Ivan in the burning 
of a stable. When Kostia finds out, Kurchavyi kills him with a weapon stolen from 
Ivan, who is arrested – a deception witnessed by the gypsy couple, who expose 
Kurchavyi’s crime, reuniting Ivan with Nastia. A joint wedding (Nastia and Ivan, 
Rita and Sanakai) is organized at the tabor, which is celebrating the discovery of 
the remains of a previous generation, executed by Nazi occupiers. However, Nas-
tia had earlier given birth to a stillborn baby, surreptitiously replaced by another 
woman’s child. The woman returns for her son, to Nastia’s horror. This twist was 
intended as a link to a non-existent sequel.
Cossack tradition has its own place in the repository of archetypes on which 
Russian national identity draws.17 The serial is replete with scenes of bareback 
riding and an ataman (who, in Cossack regalia, takes a delegation to the tabor to 
complain about its purported criminal activities). Cossacks are closer than gypsies 
to the mythological core of Russian-ness in the many redefinitions to which it has 
been subject since 1991, but not coincident with it, enabling them simultaneously 
to distance viewers from the gypsy ‘other’ (now a further stage removed from 
Russian-ness) and to bring them into alignment with it (Cossack and gypsy life-
styles are equated through their shared exoticism).
This process is reinforced by the bifurcation of the gypsy characters into pos-
itive and negative manifestations (Sanakai and Rita; the rival tabor). Within the 
Cossack subject position, the viewer is thus encouraged to incorporate gypsy ‘oth-
erness’ within the boundaries of the self, then to expel it, in a process pointing 
towards a resolution of differences and a revitalization of Russian selfhood. The 
fact that the positive variant is itself subject to accusations of criminality (until 
Ivan intervenes, Sanakai is held responsible for the beating he receives) facili-
tates a partial viewer identification with the gypsies, for our position as voyeur 
matches that of Sanakai and Rita. Conversely, when Ivan is wrongfully detained, 
the prior arrest of the innocent gypsies casts him as a victim of discrimination, 
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and viewer identification with ‘one of our own’ is retrospectively conferred on 
the gypsies.
The Enigmatic Tomorrow facilitates a complex interplay between self and 
other, halted by the denouement. The joint betrothal is enacted within the space 
on which the gypsies have located their ancestral origin. The presence of the Cos-
sacks on that land points to a figurative resolution of the biological subtext under-
lying inter-ethnic tensions. In Love and Separation the gypsy male’s passion for 
a Russian woman enables him to mediate between the two ethnic groups, offering 
a ‘metonymic’ solution to the mediation problematic in which the contiguity of 
gypsy and non-gypsy spheres leads to their mutual ‘contamination’. In The Enig-
matic Tomorrow, the two spheres remain separate. However, the echoes between 
them point to a ‘metaphoric’ resolution. In order to cement the two halves, a fur-
ther plot mechanism is deployed. From the beginning, when Lachi foresees Ivan’s 
danger-strewn future path, through her prediction of Kostia’s demise, to her warn-
ing about Nastia’s tragic fate as a mother, the fortune-teller shapes the plot. Since 
viewers are privy to the authenticity of her powers from the point at which Lachi’s 
first premonition about Ivan’s fate proves true, their position of epistemological 
authority (by identifying the pattern of prediction and enactment, they ‘foresee’ 
the narrative future) is ‘focalized’ through Lachi’s viewpoint.18
Yet The Enigmatic Tomorrow, too, fails to resolve its tensions. The discordant 
child-swapping line collapses, meaning that while the collective ‘paternity’ of the 
gypsies is settled, that of Nastia’s child is not. The integration of gypsy and non-
gypsy identities proves illusory.
No Way Out?
The Gypsy Girl with the Way Out appears free of such anomalies. A gypsy girl, 
Ligita, who lives with her stepmother, father and half-sister, is courted by a Rus-
sian boy, Lesha. But her hand is promised to Misha, son of the baron, Latso. 
Lesha, already receiving unwanted attention from Ligita’s jealous half-sister, 
Sandra, is beaten by Latso’s henchmen, but Ligita cannot stomach the repulsive 
Misha. Her dancing talent offers her a ‘way out’ and, while participating in a 
dancing contest in Moscow, she falls for Ivan Golovin, a wealthy ballet master 
who perceives her as a potential star, if he can tame her wild gypsy talent. The 
remainder of the series recounts their love affair and Ligita’s burgeoning career, 
hampered by the jealous Sandra who becomes involved in a drugs operation run 
by her baron in collaboration with Shandor, shady owner of a gypsy dance troupe. 
Shandor himself desires Ligita, and she can only bring her love for Ivan to a happy 
conclusion when Shandor dies in a car chase. The series concludes with a mar-
riage and a reunion between Ligita and her blood mother, for whom she searches 
in a series of ‘interludes’.
Laura Keosaian, who plays Ligita, features in numerous gypsy serials. Her 
Armenian nationality and appearance conform to the romantic stereotype of the 
gypsy beauty. They also reinforce that stereotype’s capacity to negotiate Russia’s 
relationship with its ‘black’ (in the vernacular Russian usage) Central Asian and 
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Caucasian others. Ligita’s relationship with Ivan mirrors that between Anna and 
Lacho in Love and Separation. In the later series the gypsy male (Lacho) occupies 
the liminal position between the tabor and the non-gypsy realm; Ligita, by con-
trast, is the gypsy female, driven from her tabor for an illicit act of miscegenation. 
The trope of desire for the forbidden other is another recurrent feature, as is the 
splitting of the gypsy realm into positive and negative hypostases.
Gypsy Girl foregrounds a structural phenomenon recurring in all the dramas. 
If stories are constructed around the breaches of normality necessary to generate 
significance, there are profound ideological implications for a narrative which 
traces the fate of a gypsy assimilated into the non-gypsy realm.19 This becomes the 
exception which proves the ‘rule’ of non-assimilability. Nor is it accidental that 
access is granted via desire. The universalism of romantic love, uniquely capable 
of conquering difference, operates against a background in which such love is 
‘out of the ordinary’. Accordingly, the depictions of gypsy ‘difference’ (the crim-
inality, the alien practices) are represented as the ‘everyday’ backdrop to the main 
action. Within fictional narrative’s paradoxical logic, it is by not highlighting such 
phenomena, and by supplanting them with the exceptionalism of universal love, 
that they acquire truth value.
Gypsy Girl furnishes two riders to the logic of narrative exceptionalism. The 
first relates to the drama’s focus on performance. Since Ligita is an aspiring 
dancer, and since the plot centres on her rehearsals, her exoticism (her intuitive 
feel for sensuous bodily rhythm) is recast as mundane ‘normality’, while her 
exceptionality is naturalized as authentic. The second rider derives from the sub-
plot depicting the mutual mistrust between the two communities. When Lesha’s 
mother discovers his passion for Ligita, she tells him: ‘These people have their 
own laws and their own traditions. We don’t belong with them’. His brutal beating 
confirms the wisdom of this warning. Here, gypsy barbarism and anti-Russian 
prejudice is cast as normal, in opposition to Ligita’s atypical success in escaping 
from the tabor’s oppressive regime. Thus, the narrative structure reconciles the 
two opposing components of gypsy mythology.
The narrative rhythms of Ligita’s expulsion from and reconciliation with the 
gypsy world point to the familiar process of de-ethnicization and re-ethnicization. 
Her accession to the realm of non-discriminatory ‘true love’ represents the victory 
of universal sameness over ethnic difference. But in the discordant finale, Ligita’s 
reunification with her blood origins reconfirms the difference and the lack of nar-
rative integration between the two plot lines.
Loose ends
All three dramas indicate that the markers of difference which gypsies bear must, 
paradoxically, be highlighted, yet concealed. Equally, ethno-racial features (the 
irreducibility of ancestral ties; the sensuousness of the body) and culture are at 
once elided and separated. This is as true within the Russian self (of which the 
gypsy is one hypostasis) as it is between that self and the irreducibly other (of 
which the gypsy represents an ameliorated version). It renders gypsies particularly 
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suitable for their mediatory role in negotiating the treacherous waters surrounding 
post-Soviet articulations of the race/ethnicity/national community relationship, 
according them privileged value in the nation-building struggle and demonstrat-
ing that fictional romance offers distinct advantages over grandiose state–media 
collaborations such as the Day of National Unity as part of this struggle.
Serializing national cohesion
The telenovela dialectic
By contrast, such was the controversy surrounding Valeriia Gai-Germanika’s 69-part 
Shkola (School), shown on Russia’s Channel 1 in 2010, that it was nearly banned. In 
a post-totalitarian society beset by intergenerational ‘culture clash’, along with the 
rise of ethnic and other societal tensions, promoting cohesion is paramount. Shkola 
appeared to do the cause no favours. Filmed in a real school using hand-held cameras, 
it laid bare the problems afflicting Russian education: racism, casual sex, depression, 
drug-taking, bribery and unremitting disorder exacerbated by dismal teaching.
However, unlike the gypsy dramas, Shkola adopted the telenovela format, 
whose dialectical logic was crucial to its ability to moderate the subcultural 
excesses it appropriated from the cultural periphery by bringing them into contact 
with both official discourses of the centre and the global rhetoric of universal 
rights. Its prolixity created space for extended discursive encounters, enabling it 
to ‘get close’ to its audience and to modify its course in light of reader responses.20 
The dialectical ‘to-ing and fro-ing’ mirrored what Martin-Barbero terms the seri-
al’s ‘provocation–pacification’ dynamics, enabling it to ‘sti[r] people up and 
denounce[e] the atrocious contradictions of society, but in the same process … 
to resolve these problems without moving people to action’.21 This process was 
linked with tensions in the serial’s structure. Its open-ended immersion in ongoing 
‘eventness’ was identified with its tendency to incorporate social conflict. Its need 
to conclude its elongated narratives provided the ‘pacification’ dimension, aiding 
it in ‘resolving’ the issues it raised and moderating the anxiety they generated.
A peculiarly Russian controversy
Gai-Germanika’s own provocative reputation was sealed by her feature film 
Everyone Dies but Me (2008), an uncompromising exposé of the lives of Rus-
sian teenage girls which dismayed the Russian cultural establishment. How-
ever, Channel 1 felt she promised a boost to its flagging performance in the 
ratings war. Iurii Gevorkian noted that ‘Channel 1 understood that it needed to 
change something … It took the first illogical step towards the new viewer by 
releasing Shkola … It wanted to attract a new, young audience.’22
Shkola began showing in 25-minute episodes on 11 January 2010. Initially 
broadcast in the prime-time 18.30 slot and at 23.30, it was discontinued during 
the Winter Olympics – causing many to assume that it would never reappear – but 
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then restored at the later time. The serial attracted vociferous criticism from Duma 
deputies, who demanded that Channel 1’s director explain himself.23 The Krem-
lin-backed party United Russia split into two over the matter.
Channel 1 remained undeterred, issuing a robust online statement rebutting its 
detractors.24 On 12 April, Putin intervened:
I haven’t seen this serial … and if you haven’t watched it then you don’t want 
to say, as in Soviet times, ‘I condemn Solzhenitsyn, although … I haven’t 
read him’. … We know of the problems and we are trying to react to them.25
In an exemplary illustration of Shkola’s conformity to Couldry’s emphasis on 
the ‘thickened’, multi-platform nature of media events, many bloggers saw 
Shkola as part of a deliberate plan to provoke indignant support for the teaching 
profession – view that was inadvertently endorsed in a Channel 1 discussion of 
the serial by Aleksandr Isaev, president of the Duma Committee on Social Policy, 
who described the programme as a ‘present’ to the Year of the Teacher.26
Ratings confirm the interest elicited by the show. Viewers in the 18–30 age range 
accounted for 22–23 per cent of the entire television audience during the early 
evening showing, but Shkola attracted significant viewer shares among people up 
to 55 years old.27 Numerous online forums show viewers divided into three cate-
gories: those who welcomed the serial’s honesty; those who found it insulting to 
Russia’s young people; and those who felt that it understated realities.28 A smaller 
number adopted Gai-Germanika’s line: that the serial was an artistic film dealing 
with universal issues, not an attempt to represent Russian schools.29 On 21 June 
2010, Channel 1 announced that, contrary to demand, there would be no series 2.
A lesson in provocation
Viewers had never seen anything like Shkola before. The script was heavily 
improvised, adding to the air of authenticity. The dialogue was riddled with foul-
mouthed youth jargon. Pupil misbehaviour was uncannily convincing, as were 
the extra-curricular cannabis-smoking sessions. The serial features an extended 
gay kiss, gratuitous sex and close-ups of drunken pupils vomiting in each other’s 
faces.
The action portrays the parallel lives of the pupils of 9A, which only the physics 
teacher, Natalia Nikolaevna, can control (she has persuaded pupils to rehearse 
Romeo and Juliet at an after-school drama club). Its central character is Ania 
Nosova, the disturbed granddaughter of the history teacher. She is rejected by 
other pupils, one of whom disseminates erotic photographs of her. Ania seeks 
solace in a group of ‘emos’ (a darkly pessimistic youth subculture she encoun-
ters outside of school), and later discovers an incipient attraction to Orthodox 
mysticism. Her pursuer harries her with anonymous text messages, then begins 
voyeuristically filming her. She steals the camcorder, but sinks into depression, 
before being sent to a psychiatric hospital where she commits suicide, videoing 
her last, desperate words.
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Also prominent is Vadim Isaev, who is beaten by his drunken father and is a 
racist bully at school. His xenophobic comments about immigrants torment Timur, 
a quiet Muslim boy from Dagestan. Isaev frequents local skinhead gatherings but 
falls foul of inter-gang rivalry and mends his ways. However, he is encouraged 
by the geography teacher, Arsenii Ivanovich, a nationalist who establishes an 
extra-curricular group to promote his anti-migrant beliefs and is eventually sacked 
by the acting head teacher. Timur, meanwhile – a paragon of virtue – dissuades 
his cousin from kidnapping Isaev’s brother in revenge for his abuse and begins a 
relationship with Sonia, a modest pupil whom he invites to his brother’s Muslim 
wedding celebrations, but who is spurned by the other guests.
The finale focuses on the aftermath of Ania’s death, which shocks the commu-
nity into placing its worldly concerns into perspective. The penultimate episode 
features a Soviet-style appeal by Kharitonova, the acting head teacher, calling for 
parents and teachers to ‘listen to children, to try to understand them, and to be 
their “friends”’ (episode 68).30
(De)construcing the nation
The much-quoted 1934 Pravda headline, ‘The Whole Country is Watch-
ing Chapaev’, might have applied to Shkola. Like that socialist realist classic, 
Gai-Germanika’s social realist shocker gripped Russia. Despite its grim aesthetic, 
Shkola too belongs to a vast project aimed at unifying a fragmented nation by 
provoking shared outrage at misplaced patriotic optimism, but was also an, albeit 
controversial, contribution to Russia’s Year of the Teacher. In its very reversal of 
the logic of Day of National Unity or Manezhnaia (here television itself catalyses 
broader societal fractures and convergences), Shkola was every bit as much a 
media event as those phenomena.
The serial addresses issues of social cohesion and national (dis)unity. The cen-
tral trope is that of intergenerational alienation: the inability of adults to ‘manage’ 
their teenage charges. The theme operates not only on the level of plot (parent–
child; teacher–pupil), but also ‘performatively’: the dominant reaction among 
older viewers was ‘We don’t recognize our children in these monsters’; a preva-
lent response from youngsters was ‘At last, something which tells the truth!’ Sev-
eral plot lines revolve around boys treating girls as objects of sexual gratification. 
Class animosities are aroused through the image of a BMW-owning New Russian. 
Finally, the serial explores inter-ethnic tension, and the relationship between pop-
ular xenophobia and official patriotism.
Like the Shakespearean tragedy of inter-tribal conflict contained within it, 
Shkola aims to overcome a litany of ‘othernesses’. Its trajectory enacts metatex-
tually what is narrated at the textual level: just as the multiple conflicts are ame-
liorated, so the impression of alienation created by the initial negativity cedes 
place to a rhetoric of mutual empathy. The (partial) triumph of this ‘adult’ rhetoric 
of reconciliation signalled in Kharitonova’s emotional address to parents is con-
firmed in the excruciating scene at Ania’s graveside which further develops the 
girl’s stirrings of Orthodox sentiment.
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The closing episodes evoke a Soviet past still relevant to the serial’s older view-
ers, but bolstered by the post-Soviet supplement of Orthodox virtuosity. Ironi-
cally, given its initial press, Shkola concludes by re-establishing the Soviet cults 
of the Child and of School which it had seemingly dismantled, but has eventually 
‘purged’ of sentimental falsehood. Thus, Shkola both challenges official opti-
mism about national harmony and builds support for the symbolic importance of 
the pedagogue, revitalizing the officially endorsed values of tolerance and social 
cohesion.
(Mis)managing inter-ethnic conflict
The struggle to overcome adolescent recalcitrance is central to the chain of con-
flicts which Shkola enacts, for these are the challenges that the state must meet to 
ensure intra-societal cohesion. Paradoxically, this enables the school to function 
metonymically as a displaced peripheral effect of the state’s confrontation with 
alterity, and simultaneously as that confrontation’s central, metaphorical model.
The attention devoted to Timur indicates the ‘national question’s’ privileged 
position in the chain. Until the closing stages (when he is befriended by Sonia), 
Timur remains at the margins of the collective. He sits on his own, suffering 
the same ostracism endured by Ania. The two fates unfold in parallel: Timur 
proceeds from loneliness to friendship, a touching romance with Sonia (a blond 
girl of archetypally Slavic demeanour) and ‘reconciliation’. Ania’s journey 
ends, via the alterity of the emo subculture, in alienation and death. The inter-
section of ethnic exclusion (a ‘peripheral’ theme) and teenage angst born of 
social exclusion (the ‘central’ narrative line) guarantees the penetration of centre 
by periphery.
The modelling function is evident in the school’s approach to managing 
inter-ethnic tension. History lessons follow a familiar sequence: from the revolu-
tion, through Stalin’s purges, to Perestroika. The pupils’ ignorance of historical 
landmarks highlights the challenges faced by the state in its efforts to instil national 
pride. During the lesson on the Second World War, Vadim mutters objections to 
criticism of the Nazis (episode 15). In the literature lesson pupils guffaw when one 
of them recalls that, as a ‘part negro’, Pushkin was famed for his gigantic penis 
(episode 7), revealing why adolescent subculture proves fertile territory for the 
xenophobic right. Geography is taught by Arsenii Ivanovich, whose account of 
regional structures characterizes Moscow as overrun with migrants, echoing the 
bending of official nation-building to extremist ends (as will be shown in Part III, 
since 2010 Arsenii’s position has moved much closer to the mainstream).
When the conflict between Vadim and Timur flares up (episode 13), the perma-
nent head announces the need to deal with ‘national disharmony’ (natsional’naia 
rozn’) – a term of Soviet origin still used in the state media. The intuitive Khari-
tonova inflects state harmonization policy with a less formalistic idiom; when she 
sacks Arsenii Ivanovich, her voice quivers with anger as she declares that she will 
not endure fascism (episode 62). Her spontaneous liberal tolerance provides a 
welcome fillip to institutional rhetoric.
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Kharitonova’s initial position outside the school hierarchy enables her to import 
the unsullied peripheral values of liberal tolerance to the heart of the authority 
structure; this, too, is why her peroration calling for mutual understanding tran-
scends dry officialese. But that same extra-institutional position to which she must 
return undermines the school’s modelling function, reasserting its role as a periph-
ery at which normal rules do not apply.
In the classroom, centre–periphery contamination works to opposite effect. 
Vadim’s clash with Timur simmers throughout. On one hand, it is depicted in 
detail drawn from the broader social context: frequent use of the insults cher-
nozhopye (black arses) and churki (literally, wooden stubs); Vadim’s chanting 
of the slogan ‘Russia for the Russians’ at a group of Tajik workers (episode 51). 
Less authentic is the manner in which the conflict is confined to two individu-
als, which sits uneasily with Gai-Germanika’s efforts to convey the ‘drip-drip 
effect’ of racism in its recurring, everyday banality. Vadim’s constant racist 
posturing is credible, but the fact that it is isolated threatens to turn the character 
into a mere cipher.
Universal empathy
Social contexts are, nonetheless, carefully observed. Vadim’s obsession with 
Tajiks reflects popular perceptions, emphasizing the illogicality of his hostility 
to Timur who, as a Dagestani, is a Russian citizen. Timur’s characterization, too, 
is grounded in his cultural background. His Muslim greeting to his relatives, and 
the use by his family of an incomprehensible Dagestani language, authenticate an 
‘otherness’ that threatens to alienate viewers alongside Vadim.
But universal goodwill trumps social circumstance. Vadim and Timur begin the 
serial as friends and end with an implied reconciliation, as Shkola’s embrace of a 
universalist rhetoric of good and evil accounts for the submersion of the ‘national 
question’ within a network of surrounding issues. Vadim’s everyday racism 
merges with the rest of Class 9A’s insubordination; Arsenii Ivanovich’s resent-
ment of Kharitonova’s challenges to his fascist sympathies reflect his jealousy 
over her appointment as acting head. The integration of socio-political antago-
nism with teenage alienation sees ‘mutual understanding’ alleviating both the 
conflict threatening to tear the Russian state apart and those private hells afflicting 
individuals’ young lives. The prominence acquired by the universalist rhetoric is 
facilitated by the serial format. The visceral horror of the early episodes captured 
an audience, but the tone was subsequently recalibrated following the intensity of 
their reaction.
Whose tolerance, whose patriotism?
The ambivalence of the humanist triumph points to a mutual contamination of 
discourses. Vadim’s skinhead prejudices enter the orbit of Arsenii Ivanovich’s 
nationalism, which in turn appropriates the vigour of the former. Meanwhile, 
Ania’s death prompts the replacement of the official agenda of opposition to 
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‘national disharmony’ with Kharitonova’s spontaneous humanism, whose prox-
imity to the wellsprings of adolescent rebellion authenticates her liberal empathy. 
Ania’s incipient Christian mysticism, and the school’s embrace of funeral ritual, 
reveal the ‘reverse contamination’ of liberal humanism with the Orthodox piety of 
formal nation-building. And in Kharitonova’s empathy for ‘nashi deti’, the Soviet 
idealized myth of the Child resurfaces.31
But does the fact that Kharitonova’s Soviet-style sermon to parents after Ania’s 
death has no subsequent impact on the pupils suggest that official discourse has 
failed to ‘hegemonize’ the humanist message? Does the continuing resistance of 
adolescent subculture to assimilation by the formal pieties of the centre leave 
space for Arsenii Ivanovich’s nationalist extremism, now expunged from the 
institution, to realign itself with populist xenophobia?
The centre–periphery dialectic permits multiple voices to circulate, testing out 
their respective capacities for imposing unity (whether that of the adolescent sub-
culture, the cohesive state institution, the multicultural federation or the ethnically 
cleansed nation). It also enables conflicting discourses (official patriotic/liberal 
oppositional) to compete for ownership of the director’s universalism.
(Mis)placing race
We have emphasized Shkola’s focus on the transcendence of multiple ‘other-
nesses’, identifying inter-ethnic cohesion as the privileged link in a chain which 
includes gender, classroom and family issues. The emphasis on Vadim’s ‘every-
day racism’ as part of generalized class rebelliousness and the attribution of 
Arsenii Ivanovich’s nationalism to professional rivalry reinforce the ‘normaliza-
tion’ strategy.
But the fact that Vadim’s racism lacks peer support opens up a gap between 
strategy and realization. The gap is a corollary of the metonymy/metaphor ten-
sion. Do events represent the displacement to the subcultural periphery of phe-
nomena occurring at the centre (social tensions pitting migrant cultures against 
indigenous Russians)? Or is the Timur–Vadim conflict an individualized model of 
a larger Manichean duel? The invocation of Shakespeare’s universalist discourse 
of tolerance cannot resolve this tension and is at odds with the visceral shock cre-
ated by Shkola’s naturalistic detail.
Ultimately, the serial struggles to ‘place’ the national question. Its deliberately 
engineered web presence (it was released in full by Channel 1 online, free of 
charge) merely projects the problem into unpatrollable virtual space, where the 
intergenerational divide replicates itself in paratextual form – a phenomenon fully 
consistent with the ‘thickening’ process Couldry associates with media events. On 
one hand, adolescent bloggers debate issues relating to their age group, emulating 
the language and mindsets of their fictitious heroes in a symbiosis facilitated by a 
shared subcultural idiom and treating the characters as real acquaintances:
Frigging hell! (Blin!) Why do we have to wait so long for the next episode? 
What a nightmaaare! (Kaaashmaaar!)32
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Friiiging hell! (Bliiiin!) She’s really driven me crazy (zabesila), your Budi-
lova. She gets pregnant and runs straight away to Pif [a male character in the 
serial] and straight away she needs him. What’s all that about? … And that 
geography teacher – he’s a rat.33
On the other hand, a much smaller number of adult commentators recognize the 
inter-ethnic problem as ‘the most dangerous’.34 Thus, an anonymous online inter-
viewer asks Gai-Germanika whether the inclusion of words such as ‘black-arsed’ 
was really necessary and suggests that ‘The nationalist theme in this film will 
shock society much more powerfully than what the youngsters are on about now: 
sex and so on’.35
Channel 1’s answer to the question of where to ‘place’ the national question is to 
‘displace’ it into a blogosphere of communities (liberal–oppositional; adolescent–
subcultural; traditional–Soviet leaning) whose mutual disjunction mirrors the 
communicational malfunction targeted by the serial. The reason for the displace-
ment is partly the political constraints placed upon the broadcaster, and partly 
the lack of a framework within which controversies might be aired. These issues 
came together in an exchange between Aleksei Venediktov, chief editor of the 
Moscow Echo radio station, and Irina Iarovaia, a United Russia deputy, which 
took place during an edition of Channel 1’s Sudite sami discussion programme:
Iarovaia: There should be no censorship. Today it is important to talk about 
the social contract (obschestvennom dogovore). If we speak of unified value 
orientations (edinykh tsennostnykh orientirakh), then they must be uniform 
for the mass media, too, and for schools. Whereas we have this strange situa-
tion in which the mass media can be immoral.
Venediktov: So you are suggesting introducing uniform opinion (edinomys-
lie) in Russia?
Iarovaia. No, a uniform culture.
Venediktov: We have a very diverse culture in our country, a multi-faith soci-
ety. There is no uniform culture.
Iarovaia: Russian culture – we have that in common. If you’ve got pro-American 
values, then you’d better tell us.36
Despite this chasm and the sharp disagreements that it reflects, Shkola represents 
a gesture towards a centre–periphery dialectic through which a more stable con-
sensus might be negotiated. The chastening dénouement and the attenuation of 
socio-political conflict as ‘universal (mis)understanding’ contribute to the wider 
mission of managing the infiltration of extremist rhetoric into the mainstream. 
That this comes at the expense of permitting a powerful liberal critique of extrem-
ism’s presence within both youth subculture and official patriotism is part of the 
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‘hegemonic bargain’. Shkola epitomizes the potential, but also the considerable 
dangers, that the serial harbours for Russian television’s nation-builders – the 
reason why, under the conditions we describe in the next part of our book, the 
prospects for a second series faded so rapidly.
Modalizing prejudice
Three contexts
What, however, of the outer limits of our broadcasting spectrum: those channels, and 
genres, whose relative distance from the centre of power appears to minimize the 
nation-building prerogative? Let us turn to our final fictional format – the comedy 
sketch series – and to a broadcaster at the peripheries of the mainstream. Nasha Rus-
sia began showing on TNT in 2006. Five series have been made (all available at 
TNT’s website).37 The show was placed 36th (repeat series) and 48th (current series) 
in Russian television’s top 100 rankings for 2010–11, according to rating data from 
late November 2013.38 In 2010 a feature-length film, directed by Gleb Orlov and sug-
gestively entitled Nasha Russia: Balls of Fate (Iaitsa sud’by), was released; it briefly 
became Russia’s biggest box office hit for 2010.39 Nasha Russia (henceforth NR) is 
made by TNT (Tvoe novoe televidenie). Although one of Russia’s top five networks 
and owned by Gazprom-Media (part of the Putin establishment), it is aimed at a youth 
market.40 In contrast to Channel 1 which, in turning to Gai-Germanika, was self-con-
sciously mining the cultural peripheries for fresh material, TNT must perpetually 
accommodate subcultural discourses at odds with official rhetoric. And unlike Shkola, 
which filters profanity-laden, carnivalesque youth humour through the ‘adult’ vision 
of an art-house director, NR aligns itself more closely with its source.
Also important is the fact that NR was adapted from the BBC1 series Little 
Britain (2003–6), whose provocative portrayal of issues of class, gender, sexu-
ality and race generated debate as to whether it had spurned the ‘achievements’ 
of political correctness or whether its ‘knowing’ attitude exonerated it from this 
heresy.41 The adoption of Little Britain catchphrases like Vicky Pollard’s ‘Yeah 
but no but yeah but …’ in media assaults on illiterate ‘chav’ culture certainly 
indicates a reinforcement rather than a subversion of popular prejudice. ‘Political 
correctness’ has yet to establish a firm foothold in Russia, of course, and indeed, 
judging by the homophobic hysteria and Orthodox-led campaign for ‘traditional 
values’ currently sweeping the country, seems as distant as ever.42
However, a third factor to consider is that NR’s creators originate from the post-
1991 version of the Soviet-era show KVN (Klub veselykh i nakhodchivykh), which 
achieved cult status among students (the show spawned a nationwide competition 
in which teams from every Soviet republic participated in ‘leagues’, outdoing one 
another in socio-politically biting skits judged by panels of ‘experts’). Dating back 
as far as 1961, KVN was banned under Brezhnev but revived in 1986. It continues to 
enjoy success among students throughout the former USSR and an annual ‘final’ is 
shown on Channel 1, though its satire has recently been diluted.43 NR is scripted by 
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former KVN player Semion Slepakov and Armenian producer Garik Martirosian, 
both actors in the series, along with Mikhail Galustian (also Armenian). Although 
closer to the cultural mainstream than Gai-Germanika, KVN’s lingering dissident 
ambiances and pan-Soviet reach pervade NR.
Cultural (mis)translation
NR begins with a narrated introduction highlighting the quirks of the nation it 
lampoons. While the equivalent Little Britain narration is read by Tom Baker, 
famous for his appearances in the cult science fiction series Dr Who, and drifts 
into surreal flights of hyperbolic nonsense, NR’s anonymous narration hones in 
on the stupidities of Russian everyday life. It begins with the statement ‘We live in 
the most wonderful country in the world and all other countries envy us’, followed 
by a series of facts contravening that statement, for example:
It is in our country that women drink beer through straws in order to look like 
ladies; only our girls put cosmetics on before going swimming; it is we who 
have so much oil that nobody can possibly steal it all – even us!
The narration always ends with the sentence: ‘We call our country ‘Rossiia’, 
whilst foreigners enviously refer to us as ‘Russia’, but still it is ours – nasha 
Russia.’
Like Little Britain, NR consists of unrelated sketches featuring recurring 
comic heroes, each exposing different aspects of Russian reality. The use of men 
in drag is also borrowed from the British series, as is the grotesque style and 
the (locally adapted) focus on class, gender, ethnicity and sexuality. The homo-
sexual character is a foreman in a Cheliabinsk factory rather than an effeminate 
frequenter of a Welsh village pub. Class surfaces in the depiction of two bomzhi 
(tramps) bedecked with designer suits, smartphones and laptops acquired from 
the refuse bins at Rublevka, favoured residence of Russia’s new bourgeoisie. 
Gender relations are satirized in the interactions between an uncouth male from 
Taganrog and his television screen and overweight wife. Certain themes are 
absent from Little Britain: corruption (a Voronezh teacher constantly tricks her 
students into giving her money; two Duma deputies use their privileged posi-
tions to plot their own advancement) and the iniquities of private healthcare (a 
state-funded patient is repeatedly insulted by her consultant, who fawns upon 
her private counterpart).
The ‘stars’, however, are Ravshan and Djumshud, two Gastarbeiter workers 
whose widespread notoriety has, as Roland Oliphant suggests, established them 
in the Russian cultural imagination as ‘archetypes of the guest worker’.44 They 
were assumed to be Tajik – the nationality which, because its members consti-
tute the overwhelming majority of migrant workers, many Russians associate 
with a generically conceived Central Asia – but, in response to Tajik protests 
that NR represented the ‘cultural genocide of the Tajik people’, TNT argued that 
the gastarbeiters’ ethnicity is never specified; in the feature film, they are from 
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the fictitious ‘Chuchukistan’.45 The sketches portray them carrying out building 
work in, alternatively, a Moscow novostroika, the mansion of media celebrity 
Kseniia Sobchak and the site of the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics. One of them 
speaks broken Russian and the other has no Russian at all. Their stupidity and 
their disastrous inability to follow instructions frustrate their Russian supervisor.
Later series introduce Zhorik Vartanov, the presenter of Sev-Kav TV, a ficti-
tious television channel based in Piatigorsk. He forever harangues his interfer-
ing cameraman in a heavy North Caucasus accent for restricting his freedom to 
promote his own concerns. In one sketch (episode 85), Zhorik’s interview with 
a local police chief about a cannabis haul descends into a self-interested effort 
to discover how cannabis crops can be hidden from the authorities. Elsewhere 
(episode 98), he reports on a local beauty competition, pressuring the organizer 
to favour his sister in the event, and uses a feature on local food to advertise his 
family restaurant (episode 86). An interview with a plastic surgeon (episode 96) 
ends with Vartanov enquiring about a penis enlargement ‘for a friend’. Vartanov 
epitomizes images of the North Caucasian as hot-tempered, venal and over-sexed. 
His ethnicity is never specified, enhancing his stereotyping function.
Ravshan and Djumshud, however, have the monopoly on criticism from migrant 
communities. Russians, too, lamented the depressingly negative picture of their 
nation conveyed by NR.46 The associated feature film aggravated the controversy. As 
well as depicting the gastarbeiters as incompetent, it adds a crude sexual dimension: 
the plot centres on the disappearance of two golden balls (the testicles of Genghis 
Khan) from their current owner – a scheming oligarch who owes his fortune to their 
magic properties. The dénouement turns on the revelation that there exists a third 
golden ball which Ravshan, a descendant of the Khan (a fact he proves by display-
ing his anatomical affinity with his ancestor), wears around his neck. Ravshan is 
eventually reunited with all three balls and the entire population of Moscow gastar-
beiters gather around him, celebrating the fortune the balls will bring them.
NR’s British progenitor was no stranger to scandal. However, it featured only two 
non-white characters – Desiree DeVere (David Walliams), a black, obese former 
Miss Botswana prone to displaying herself naked, and Ting-Tong Macadangdang 
(Matt Lucas), a scheming mail-order Thai bride. The humour is hyper-grotesque 
and there is little connection between the surreal excesses displayed by the charac-
ters and the behavioural stereotypes associated with their ethnic groups. By contrast, 
ethnicity defines NR’s place in Russian cultural discourse, and shapes our discus-
sion of the programme’s complex relationship with prejudice.
Frames as modalizers
The title Little Britain conflates the imperialistic ‘Great Britain’ with the anti-na-
tionalist taunt ‘Little Englanders’ (it is also the name of a street in the City of 
London). NR refers not to Russia, but to (mis)perceptions of Russia common to 
the English-speaking ‘other’. Yet the title is ‘nasha’ Russia. In Russian, the con-
cept of ‘our guys’ (nashi) connotes a strong sense of national self-identification, 
as reflected in the name of the pro-Putin youth movement. In Nasha Russia, 
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the perspective of the anti-western patriot is combined with that of the naïve west-
ern admirer. Yet the ‘Russia’ which foreigners ‘enviously’ imagine is not that 
depicted in the succeeding sketches, but one inflected with the mordant voice of 
the KVN player. National pride is mischievously deflated rather than triumphantly 
reconfirmed. The title and the multi-voiced introductory sequence infiltrate the 
sketches, distorting their surface meanings. Each edition is likewise framed at the 
end with a patriotic rap song peppered, incongruously, with anglicisms and with 
a chiastic refrain whose grandiose claims have been punctured by the preceding 
skits: Strashnaia sila – Nasha Rossiia; Nasha Rossiia – strashnaia sila’ (‘An 
awesome power is our Russia; Our Russia is an awesome power’).
Anti-migrant sentiments pervade Russian nationalism, as slogans such as ‘Rus-
sia for the Russians’ confirm. Thus, recalling Todorov’s and Ducrot’s distinc-
tion between ‘literal content’ and ‘attitudinal stance’, NR’s frames modalize the 
anti-migrant prejudice projected within the comic sketches. If Russian patriotism 
is open to ridicule, then so is the xenophobia central to its construction.
Intratextual modalizers
The framing effect is reinforced by the narrative dynamics of the sketches them-
selves, and by the intertextual linkages traversing them. Ravshan and Djumshud 
form part of a trio which also includes Leonid, their foreman, whom Ravshan 
addresses as ‘nasial’nika’ (a corrupted version of ‘nachal’nik’). Leonid, a bigot 
who despises his subordinates, persists in exploiting them. The three settings 
between which the sketches alternate underscore societal hypocrisy on a larger 
scale: the exploitative use of illegal immigrant labour by the privileged, and by 
the state itself, undermines the anti-migrant discourse to which both are prone.
In one sketch (episode 62), Leonid arrives back at the luxury flat whose repair 
he is overseeing drunk, following Russia’s ‘Day of the Airborne Troops’, a key 
date in the Russian patriot’s calendar. He creates havoc, inflicting damage on 
the flat, uttering profanities and shouting at the gastarbeitery that they do not 
belong in his country. When he emerges from his drunken stupor he blames his 
hapless workers for the damage. An earlier sketch (episode 51) revolves around 
a Commission of Human Rights visit to a building site. Leonid feigns that he is 
looking after his migrant workers, but beats them once the inspectors have left. 
In one scene, the inspectors make a surprise return, catching Leonid in the act of 
manhandling Ravshan. Thinking on his feet, he tells the inspection team that he is 
merely administering a massage.
The migrants’ incompetence is so grossly overstated as to represent a 
double-voiced commentary on the inevitable hyperbole at the heart of stereotyping 
itself. Examples include constructing three toilets on Olympics-style podia in the 
Sochi complex then defecating in one before the flush system has been installed 
(episode 49), and accidentally setting fire to an intricate model of the Olympic vil-
lage (episode 46). The gastarbeitery gabble to one another using made-up words; 
the absurdity of rhymed pairings like ‘Schengel’m-Bengel’m’ would not be lost on 
a Russian ear. When speaking Russian, Ravshan merely repeats in a high-pitched 
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voice what Leonid asks him, likewise conforming to a classical stereotype of the 
ignorant foreigner so obvious as to be immediately identifiable.
The migrant is constructed from Leonid’s openly bigoted point of view, a posi-
tion which audiences are encouraged both to identify with (the ‘canned laughter’ 
is inserted when the gastarbeitery are at are their most inept) and distance them-
selves from (Leonid is frequently himself ridiculed), and so to experience their 
own susceptibility to ethnic stereotyping. The migrants’ perceived stupidity is fur-
ther undercut by learned philosophical conversations between them (in the ‘Air-
borne Troops’ sketch they quote Cicero to one another in their own ‘language’ 
as the inebriated Leonid is temporarily unable to focalize viewer perceptions). 
Confirmation of their dual construction comes in the film, which ends with the 
revelation that the action has been simply a Hollywood-style blockbuster viewed 
on a provincial Russian television screen.
The intertextual persona
NR’s self-reflexivity extends to the roles of its key actors: the Armenian Mikhail 
Galustian (Ravshan) and the Russian Sergei Svetlakov (Leonid). Both have 
strong KVN connections (Galustian was a KVN ‘champion’ in 2003) and both 
contributed to the politically controversial Channel 1 television comedy talk 
show ProzhektorPerisHilton, a KVN offshoot.47 Galustian’s Armenian identity 
is a strong component of his stage persona and Galustian is responsible for the 
Armenian ambiance of much of the show’s humour, which can be traced to the 
absurdist ‘Radio Erevan’ jokes.
The intertextual linkages are reinforced by the shared audience profile of 
ProzhektorPerisHilton, KVN and NR, and by the NR fanclub’s website.48 In the 
Gastarbeiter sketches, Galustian’s biographical background is important. The 
introductory voiceover describes the two ‘heroes’ as ‘our guests from Central 
Asia’. Combined with his self-evidently generic language, Galustian’s prominent 
Armenian (non-Tajik) persona exposes the reductionist tendencies informing 
anti-migrant prejudice.
References to the broader cultural environment are complemented by intertex-
tual effects reliant on ironic juxtapositions within the series. Galustian embodies 
overblown North Caucasian machismo as well as the child-like naiveté of the 
Central Asian migrant. But he also adopts the rough-edged proletarian persona of 
Mikhalich, the unsuspecting ‘victim’ of the homosexual advances of Dulin (Svet-
lakov). Svetlakov plays the corrupt Voronezh schoolteacher Snezhana Denisovna, 
as well as the Taganrog couch potato Sergei Beliakov and the discriminatory hos-
pital consultant Vadim Rol’fovich. The prejudicial stereotypes cancel one another 
out; Svetlakov’s camp Ivan undermines his migrant-taunting Leonid. Galustian’s 
comical North Caucasian bravado contradicts the deference of the simpering 
migrant. Both are negated by Galustian’s quintessentially Russian homophobe. 
His Armenian-ness, meanwhile, places all three ethnic types in quotation marks.
The criss-crossing meanings shape the overarching image of Russian identity 
projected by NR. In one of the Cheliabinsk sketches (episode 56), Mikhalich 
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dreams that he is a Tolstoyan hero, scything in a mythical Russian field and flirt-
ing with a peasant girl in national costume; as the girl (Svetlakov) gently caresses 
him, he wakes with horror to find that she has mutated into an all-too-real Dulin, 
whose homosexual advances besmirch the patriotic idyll.
Performative community-building
Galustian’s and Svetlakov’s performances are a theatrical tour de force: as they 
slide in and out of their various skins, they underscore less the attitudes of their 
different personae than their own comic bravura. The irreconcilable differences 
between a homophobic muzhik, an impassioned North Caucasian television pre-
senter and a diminutive migrant are transcended by the virtuoso talents of a single 
Armenian comedian. This ‘equalization’ effect contradicts both the misappropria-
tions of the Gastarbeiter sketches by Russian xenophobes and the knee-jerk reac-
tion of the Tajik authorities.
The annulment of difference and the consequent undermining of stereotypes 
at the level of ‘character’ are motivated by the KVN-inspired collaboration at 
the level of ‘performance’. Despite its ‘dissident’ heritage, KVN now fulfils a 
nation-binding function (Putin occasionally attends performances). Karin Sarse-
nov argues: ‘The show creates a communicative space in which people share the 
same jokes in spite of national and ethnic differences. Those very differences are 
subjected to kind-hearted ridicule, taking the edge of existing conflicts.’49 NR’s 
inter-ethnic inspiration subverts current nationalist mythologies by re-invoking 
KVN’s Soviet-era community-building.
Installed at the heart of the UK’s flagship broadcaster, Little Britain also ulti-
mately projects a positive image of the nation it mocks, revitalizing the offbeat 
excesses of British comic tradition, performing the epiphany which occurs when 
some conclude that, with inter-ethnic relations in post-PC Britain now purport-
edly ‘harmonized’, a scabrous sketch about a Thai bride is as ‘inoffensive’ as a 
good-humoured Irish joke. From the peripheries of the Russian mediascape, NR, 
by contrast, fails to close off the ambivalent spaces for nationalist bigotry and for 
anti-xenophobic indignation that its double-voiced sketches open up. Thrust into 
pre-PC conditions, NR’s imported, post-PC format cannot claim the transcen-
dent position to which both Little Britain and Gai-Germanika’s liberal universal-
ism aspire. KVN’s community-binding legacy subsists not at a level above the 
discourses and counterdiscourses targeted by NR, but alongside and in compe-
tition with them. More subversively liberal in intent than Little Britain or Shkola, 
NR runs a greater risk than either of them of mobilizing rather than modalizing 
prejudice.
The programmes we have analysed are, in their different ways, all party to 
the nation-building mission that state-aligned television plays in Russia as else-
where (the Rossiia dramas by re-grounding Russian identity in popular images of 
‘gypsiness’; Shkola by attempting to dissolve inter-ethnic difference in a transcen-
dent universalism; NR by ‘re-enacting’ the pan-Soviet community). They each, 
too, complicate stereotypical representations of ethnic minorities; the Rossiia 
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romances deploy the ‘threshold’ figure of the gypsy to mediate and thus attenuate 
ethnic ‘otherness’; Shkola accommodates the North Caucasian object of national-
ist bigotry within an all-embracing humanism; NR self-consciously hyperbolizes, 
and thus modalizes, stereotypes.
The programmes share an impulse to subject ethnonational and racist preju- 
dice to critique. Both Shkola and the gypsy dramas expose bigotry by align-
ing the viewing subject with its target. Conversely, NR places the viewer in the 
bigot’s position but frames it from without. Shkola moderates the xenophobic 
viewpoint by locating its roots in an alienation endemic to youth subculture, 
and in a resultant susceptibility to deleterious ‘adult’ influence. All the genres 
exploit their fictional status as a licence to explore and exceed the limits of issues 
as treated in the mainstream news media. As part of that process they situate 
themselves at the nexus of a circulation of discourses emanating from various 
points on the official–unofficial spectrum. Their genre specificities account 
for the different ways in which they negotiate that position. The gypsy drama 
makes available narrative devices which facilitate the transgression of estab-
lished boundaries between romantic ideals and familiar news representations of 
the Roma community. The protracted form of the telenovela brings hybrid dis-
courses into conflict but, via its ‘provocation–pacification’ dynamic, also man-
ages audience resentments arising from the encounter. NR’s comic sketch format 
reframes common prejudices and patriotic truisms from the grotesque viewpoint 
of subversive student subculture.
Subcultural space demonstrably provides tools of renewal as well as sources 
of threat. Moreover, it is emerging as the site of an as yet inchoate renegotiation 
of the relationship between majority and minority ethnic communities. That pro-
cess is uncertain. As the controversies surrounding NR and Shkola demonstrate, 
discursive strategies are open to misappropriation (by nationalist extremists; by 
hardline anti-westerners) and to misreading (the Tajik response to Ravshan and 
Djumshud). Nowhere is this truer than in Russia’s heterogeneous social reality, 
which lacks a stable, consensual source of authority.
Indeed, the deeply unconventional Gai-Germanika’s plea for a consensual 
acceptance of radical difference in all its forms, though contaminated by nos-
talgia for an imagined version of Soviet brotherhood, represents the mirror 
image of the exclusionary version of unity we will find later in our analysis 
of coverage of the Pussy Riot scandal. This exclusionary approach and the 
earlier latitude shown by Channel 1 (and Putin) to Gai-Germanika highlight 
state television’s (and an increasingly desperate ruling elite’s) fractured and 
contradictory response to its acute awareness that it has failed to speak to and 
for a growing segment of Russia’s younger generation: it ‘indulges’ that seg-
ment through risky ventures such as Shkola, while at the same time giving the 
likes of Irina Iarovaia a platform from which to demonize it as treacherous and 
degenerate.
One might surmise that, by the time of Putin’s third presidency, the latter 
strategy had prevailed. Nonetheless, the very same period saw the habitually 
populist NTV broadcast a bold example of ‘reality TV’ in a genre different 
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from but complementary to that of Shkola: a spoof documentary mocking 
NTV’s shock-revelatory style and making the patently absurd claim that sci-
entists have discovered a ‘fascist gene’ accounting for Russia’s nationalist 
movement.50 Meanwhile, at the peripheries of the Russian media sphere, TNT 
continued to host the equally subversive comedy Nasha Russia. Still more 
striking is TNT’s launch in 2014, at the height of the Ukraine crisis, of a new 
sitcom mocking xenophobic prejudice and featuring a stable, happy family 
consisting of a Russian woman, a North Caucasian man and their two chil-
dren. With its ironic, provocative title Druzhba narodov, the sitcom defiantly 
contradicted the Russocentric, anti-migrant sentiment which, as we will see in 
Part III, was to sweep across the federal channels after Putin’s re-election as 
president in 2012.51
The fact that, as these phenomena indicate – and despite the developments 
broached at the end of Part I and in Part III – all is still to play for in Russia’s 
internal hegemonic struggle is part of the legacy of Shkola, Nasha Russia and, in 
a different sense, the gypsy dramas, with their complex mediations of identity and 
alterity. The controversies generated by some of these programmes, their muta-
tions into full-scale media events of the endogenous type, perhaps after all marked 
the birth pangs of a public sphere that is both tolerant and productive of diversity 
of all kinds, albeit one enduring a dispiritingly prolonged interruption of its devel-
opment. If the interruption is to be temporary, and given the abject failure of the 
DNU project, the role of fictional genres located at the margins of official media 
discourse in challenging and re-working that discourse’s worst excesses can only 
grow in importance.
Notes 
1 Dayan Thussu, News as Entertainment: The Rise of Global Infotainment, London: 
Sage, 2007.
2 John Ellis, ‘Television as Working-through’, in Jostein Gripsrud (ed.), Television and 
Common Knowledge, London: Routledge, 1999, pp. 55–71.
3 For the narrative dimension to news, see Karen S. Johnson-Cartee, News Narratives 
and News Framing: Constructing Political Reality, Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 
2005, pp. 155–61.
4 Jesus Martin-Barbero, Communication, Culture and Hegemony: From the Media to 
Mediations, London: Sage, 1993, p. 99.
5 See Oswald Ducrot and Tzvetan Todorov, Encyclopaedic Dictionary of the Science of 
Language, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1979, p. 313.
6 The 2002 Russian census showed that there were 180,000 gypsies in Russia. See 
‘Gypsy Culture in Russia’, 26 August 2005. Available online at http://en.rian.ru/analy-
sis/20050826/41232225.html (accessed 27 March 2008). Between July 2010 and Octo-
ber 2011 there were only two stories about gypsies on Vremia, even though this period 
coincided with the European Roma expulsion crisis and even though Channel 1 nor-
mally has a more international outlook than Rossiia, whose Vesti dedicated 30 reports 
to the crisis, but only one to domestic ramifications. For detailed analysis of Russian 
television news depictions of gypsies see Stephen Hutchings, ‘The Gypsy as Vanishing 
Re-working Russian diversity 145
Mediator in Russian Television Coverage of Interethnic Tension’, Nationalities Papers, 
41/5, 2013, 1–17.
7 The most comprehensive treatment of Russian gypsy mythology’s roots in Pushkin 
is Alaina Lemon, Between Two Fires: Gypsy Performance and Romani Memory from 
Pushkin to Post-Socialism, Durham: Duke University Press, 2000.
8 Susan Layton, Russian Literature and Empire: Conquest of the Caucasus from Pushkin 
to Tolstoy, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
9 Toby Sonneman, ‘Dark Mysterious Wanderers: The Migrating Metaphor of the 
Gypsy’, The Journal of Popular Culture, 32/4, 1999, 119–39.
10 For Martin-Barbero, mediation goes beyond the media themselves: ‘We are placing the 
media in the field of mediations, that is in a process of cultural transformation which 
does not start with or flow from the media but in which they play an important role’ 
(Communication, Culture and Hegemony, p. 139).
11 For the gypsy as outsider in European culture, see Angus Bancroft, Roma and Gypsy 
Travellers in Europe: Modernity, Race, Space and Exclusion, Aldershot: Ashgate Pub-
lishing, 2005.
12 Alaina Lemon argues that ‘the Russian romance with gypsies has no equivalent force 
in most other countries’ (Between Two Fires, pp. 31–2).
13 Martin-Barbero terms this ‘the real mediation, the function of a medium which mass 
culture fulfills day by day: the communication between the real and the imaginary’ 
(Communication, Culture and Hegemony, p. 56).
14 For the gypsy theme in Soviet cinema, see Stephen Hutchings, Screening Intercultural Dia-
logue: Russia and its Other(s) on Film, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, pp. 14–15.
15 Available online at www.kino-teatr.ru/kino/movie/ros/89276/content/ (accessed 5 
April 2012).
16 Susan Haywood defines ‘suture’ as ‘the effect of certain filmic codes that stitched the 
spectator into the film text’: Cinema Studies: The Key Concepts, London: Routledge, 
2000, p. 357.
17 Judith Kornblatt, The Cossack Hero in Russian Literature: A Study in Cultural Mythol-
ogy, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1992.
18 Gerard Genette defines ‘focalization’ as the way that third-person narrative orients 
itself towards the perspectives of its characters in order to reveal different levels of 
‘omniscience’ regarding plot outcomes. See Narrative Discourse: An Essay in Method, 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983.
19 Hayden White, ‘The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality’, in W. J. T. 
Mitchell (ed.), On Narrative, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1981, pp. 1–23.
20 Martin-Barbero, Communication, Culture and Hegemony, p. 130.
21 Ibid., p. 137.
22 ‘The Serial Shkola: Provocation or Truth to Life?’, 15 January 2010. Available online 
at www.aif.ru/culture/article/32072 (accessed 5 April 2012).
23 A. Belitskii, ‘The Serial Shkola Has Outraged a Duma Deputy’, 13 January 2010. 
Available online at http://vesti.kz/media/36867/ (accessed 5 April 2012).
24 Ibid.
25 ‘Putin o seriale “Shkola”: ne nado delat’ obobshchaiushchie vyvody’, 25 January 2010. 
Available online at www.rian.ru/culture/20100125/206194022.html (accessed 5 April 
2012).
26 The programme, entitled ‘School – Is it Life?’, was broadcast on 14 January 2010.
27 Arina Borodina, ‘Serial “Shkola”: ot massovogo zritelia do prezidenta strany’, Kommer-
sant, 8/4308, 2010. Available online at /www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=1306937 
(accessed 5 April 2012).
28 Available online at www.shkola-serial.ru/ (accessed 5 April 2012).
146 Difference at the margins
29 S. Grachev, ‘Valeriia Gai-Germanika: “Moi fil’m ne o shkole! Ia snimaiu kino o 
chelovecheskikh otnosheniiakh”’, 20 January 2010. Available online at www.aif.ru/
culture/article/32144 (accessed 5 April 2012).
30 Further references to the serial itself include the episode number in parentheses. The 
official online version of the programme is available at www.shkola-serial.ru/smo-
tret-serial-shkola-online.html (accessed 5 April 2012).
31 For the myth of the child in Soviet culture see Catriona Kelly, Children’s World: 
Growing Up in Russia, 1890–1891, London and New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2007.
32 Available online at www.shkola-serial.ru/smotret-serial-shkola-online/smotret-on-
line-serial-shkola-besplatno.-56-seriya.html (accessed 5 April 2012).
33 Available online at www.shkola-serial.ru/smotret-serial-shkola-online/smotret-on-
line-serial-shkola-besplatno.-47-seriya.html (accessed 5 April 2012).
34 Ibid.
35 Valeriia Gai-Germanika, ‘Moi fil’m lish’ zhalkoe otrazhenie togo, chto proiskhodit’, 23 
January 2010. Available online at http://yarportal.ru/topic58303s285.html (accessed 5 
April 2012).
36 Sudite sami (Channel 1), 14 January 2010. Available online at www.1tv.ru/prj/sudsami/
vypusk/2813 (accessed 5 April 2012).
37 Available online at http://nasha-russia.ru/ (accessed 5 April 2012).
38 Available online at http://allcharts.org/tv/russia/rating.htm (accessed 14 April 2014).
39 ‘“Nasha Russia: Iaitsa sud’by” stala liderom otechestvennogo prokata’, 26 January 2010. 
Available online at www.bfm.ru/news/2010/01/26/nasha-russia-jajtsa-sudby-stala-lid-
erom-otechestvennogo-prokata-v-minuvshij-uik-end.html (accessed 5 April 2012).
40 The Gazprom-Media website describes TNT as ‘the entertainment channel of the 
young generation’. Available online at www.gazprom-media.com/en/tv.xml?&com-
pany_id=49 (accessed 5 April 2012).
41 Barbara Ellen attacked the show for its condescending mockery of the working class: 
The Guardian, 12 December 2004. Peter Tatchell praised its ‘irreverence’ but added 
that its caricaturing of gay people reinforces old-fashioned clichés. Quoted in Sharon 
Lockyer (ed.), Reading Little Britain: Comedy Matters on British Television, London: 
I.B. Tauris, 2010, p. 12.
42 Nasha Russia has no licence from the BBC. For a full scholarly analysis of Little Brit-
ain, see Lockyer (ed.), Reading Little Britain.
43 For an analysis of KVN, see John Dunn, ‘Humour and Satire on Post-Soviet Russian 
Television’, in Lesley Milne (ed.), Reflective Laughter: Aspects of Humour in Russian 
Culture, London: Anthem Press, 2004, pp. 181–92.
44 Roland Oliphant, ‘Whose Russia’, 24 March 2010. Available online at http://russiapro-
file.org/international/a1269451394.html (accessed 5 April 2012).
45 For Tajikistan’s protest on behalf of its migrant workers in Russia, see ‘Etnicheskaia 
chistka: krizis zhanra’, in Kommersant, 14/868, 2010. Available online at www.kom-
mersant.ru/doc/1345030. For TNT’s rebuttal, see ‘“Tadzhikskie trudovye migranty” 
osudeli fil’m “Iaitsa sud’by”’, Kommersant Online. Available online at www.kommer-
sant.ru/doc/1341516 (both accessed 5 April 2012).
46 Boris Nevzorov, a local government official, complains: ‘It is offensive when they say 
nasty things about us abroad and we can’t respond. And we show ourselves to be such 
idiots in Nasha Russia.’ See ‘A vam za chto stydno?’, Kommersant Vlast’, 37/891, 
2010. Available online at www.kommersant.ru/doc/1506984 (accessed 4 April 2012).
47 The show premiered in 2008 and airs on a Saturday evening on Channel 1.
48 The website features biographies of both Svetlakov and Galustian, whose KVN past 
is extensively referenced. Available online at http://fanparty.ru/fanclubs/nasha-russia/
forum (accessed 5 April 2012).
Re-working Russian diversity 147
49 Karin Sarsenov, ‘Televising Soviet Tropes: Reforging a Supraethnic Cultural Identity’, 
Slavica Lundensia, 24, 2009, 257–77 (264).
50 The programme, Total Eclipse (Polnoe zatmenie), was the brainchild of controversial 
journalist Andrei Loshak.
51 The complete series is available online at http://drujba-narodov.tnt-online.ru/s01e01.
6 Transcending marginality
Ethnicity, identity and religion on 
Vesti-Buriatiia
We now switch our attention from the peripheries of the post-Soviet Russian 
‘mediasphere’ to the geo-political margins of the Russian Federation itself. We 
simultaneously make a second, related shift for, until now, we have focused on 
federal television channel coverage of ethnic minorities as objects of representa-
tion; even when, as in Chapters 4 and 5, characters from minority cultures speak 
in their own name within news reports, talk shows or television dramas, their 
subject positions are framed from an ethnically Russian perspective, and oriented 
towards a primarily Russian audience. Since Soviet times, however, the state has 
claimed to empower non-Russian minorities by giving them a voice and a space 
for self-expression. Ethnic republics of the USSR and of the Russian Federation 
have been viewed as national homelands of the ‘titular nationalities’ after which 
they were named. Within these ethnic autonomies local media have been among 
the prime outlets allowing minorities to act as subjects of representation. Oppor-
tunities for local self-expression were, of course, severally limited in the Soviet 
Union. After a period of unusual freedom in the 1990s, Putin’s government again 
strengthened ‘the vertical of power’, imposing restrictions on the ability of Rus-
sia’s ethnic autonomies to challenge the centre. However, the media in the repub-
lics and regions of the Russian Federation have their own distinct profiles, which 
are shaped not only by current local political realities, but also by the historical 
specificities of the areas and by their own relations with the outside world. This 
chapter analyses one such example from the Siberian republic of Buriatiia, on 
the shores of Lake Baikal. We argue that it furnishes a model for negotiating the 
relationships between unity and difference, and between centre and periphery, that 
is both surprising and enlightening for our appreciation of the broader issues of 
representation and nation-building with which the book engages.
Vesti-Buriatiia, our focus here, is the main news programme of the republic of 
Buriatiia’s state television and radio company, and the only local news provider 
whose potential audience is the entire population of this Siberian republic.1 The 
company broadcasts its programmes on the federal state channel Rossiia, and 
Vesti-Buriatiia technically has the status of a regional news programme, subor-
dinate to the federal Vesti.2 Yet Buriatiia state television, despite being a regional 
affiliate of the Pan-Russian State Television and Radio Company, seems to have 
considerable autonomy in selecting topics and has developed its own style of 
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coverage.3 Most programme reporters are ethnic Buriats and they consciously 
use television to shape a particular image of the Buriats as a national commu-
nity. Buddhism, which is virtually ignored by the federal channels, is identified 
in the dominant public discourse in the republic as the national religion of the 
Buriat people and receives much attention from Vesti-Buriatiia. Whereas the 
coverage of Orthodox Christianity and Islam on Russian television has attracted 
significant scholarly attention, little research outside academic circles in 
Buriatiia itself has been conducted on media representations of Buddhism, the 
issue which we address here.4
There are further reasons for our interest in Vesti-Buriatiia. These are connected 
with the fact that Buriatiia is both typical and exceptional. Its typicality lies in 
the fact that the titular nationality after which it is named constitutes a minority 
of the local population, as is the case in more than half of Russia’s 21 ethnic 
republics. This demographic profile complicates the task of local journalists who 
are required both to represent the republic as the national homeland of its titular 
nationality and to take into account their predominantly ethnic Russian audience. 
The way in which the tension is handled provides us with the distinctive perspec-
tive on the relationship between unity and difference that is one of the two guiding 
themes in this chapter.
Official pan-Russian discourse also represents Buriatiia as exceptional. The 
republic is seen by the federal centre as a model for the rest of the country in 
terms of the region’s achievement of societal, including ethnic, cohesion.5 Indeed, 
the level of conflict, whether between people of different ethnicity or among local 
elites, is relatively low. This renders the republican broadcasters’ task somewhat 
different from that of their federal counterparts, who regularly have to negotiate 
more complex situations. It also means that Moscow leaves the local leadership to 
manage its own affairs, including those of the media. As one of our interviewees 
explained: ‘[This distinctiveness is permitted] because no one [in Moscow] cares 
about Buriatiia.’6 The way in which Vesti-Buriatiia covers ethnicity-related issues 
will therefore furnish an instructive comparison with the approach of the federal 
channels. Finally, it is important to note that Buriat elites imagine their nation 
in relation not only to Russia, but also to Mongolian and Buddhist communi-
ties beyond Russia’s borders. Vesti-Buriatiia thus offers a crucial perspective on 
the local/global axis as well as the local/federal one. Together, these two angles 
generate the centre–periphery theme that is our second overarching concern in 
this chapter.
In our monitoring period (September 2010–August 2012), Vesti-Buriatiia fea-
tured numerous news reports on the start of the harvest season, the production of 
milk by local collective farms, the testing of heating systems before winter and 
even the local marking of anniversaries of the Komsomol and Young Pioneers 
communist youth organizations, which Vesti did not cover.7 Routine speeches and 
visits by republican political leaders open most daily bulletins, and are covered 
with even greater frequency and detail than that accorded by Vesti to similar events 
at the federal level. The tone of the news is overwhelmingly positive, with a pal-
pable feeling of local pride running through most stories and found also in the 
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general youthful and enthusiastic appearance of the reporters themselves. If social 
or economic problems in the republic are noted, it is claimed that they are being 
addressed by the authorities. What is perceived as news by Vesti-Buriatiia, and 
the very reporting format, at first glance seems therefore to have more in common 
with the Soviet period, in which predictable, ritualized coverage reaffirming the 
‘normal’ state of affairs predominated, than with what we find on Vesti, where 
this traditional approach is constantly challenged by the perceived necessity to 
conform to global media formats in reporting extraordinary, scandalous and other- 
wise sensationalized developments. Most of the Vesti-Buriatiia broadcasting is 
in Russian, which reflects the linguistic profile of the republic.8 Twice a week, in 
ten-minute slots, selected reports from Vesti-Buriatiia – mostly on cultural issues – are 
re-broadcast in the Buriat language.
In the monitoring period we found no reports of any criticism of the Kremlin. 
In contrast to its federal equivalent, Vesti-Buriatiia told its viewers nothing about 
public protests held in Moscow and across Russia between December 2011 and 
the summer of 2012.9 The first obvious explanations for this are to be found in the 
tight control exercised over Vesti-Buriatiia by the republic’s political leadership, 
whose position is shaped by Buriatiia’s dependency on subsidies from Moscow, 
and in elite and broadcaster perceptions of the channel’s audience, which clearly 
differs from that of the federal channels; in an economically poor republic with 
a harsh climate, where 40 per cent of the population still lives in the countryside 
(as opposed to the national average of 26 per cent), stories about harvests, milk 
production and preparation for winter which would not be deemed newsworthy by 
Muscovites are likely to be topical for many people. What the channel’s stance in 
relation to Moscow also points to is a paradox by which its very distance from the 
federal centre renders it a more reliable proponent of that centre’s official values. 
Similarly, the Soviet period, when centripetalism was at its height, is still viewed 
with nostalgia by many in the region.10 As one of our local interviewees put it: 
‘For Buriatiia the Soviet period was fortunate – industrialization, modernization, 
the formation of the Buriat nation...’11 Within this context, the Buriatiia Television 
and Radio Company’s virtually unmitigated glorification, on its website, of the 
establishment of television broadcasting on the republic’s territory in the Soviet 
period comes as no surprise.12
Post-Soviet trends are, of course, also prevalent. For instance, unlike in the 
Soviet period, the so-called traditional religions of Russia (Buddhism and Ortho-
dox Christianity) are depicted as constituting the core of people’s identities and 
as symbols of the historical continuity of national and ethnic communities. This 
coverage fits with the Kremlin’s view of the role of religion in contemporary 
 Russia and prioritizes a limited number of so-called traditional religions, each 
associated with one particular religious organization which closely co-operates 
with the government. Thus, despite the existence of various schools of Buddhism 
in today’s Buriatiia, on Vesti-Buriatiia only representatives of the Buddhist tradi-
tional Sangha of Russia speak in the name of all Buddhists of the republic.
Nevertheless, similarities with the Soviet approach to news reporting, instances 
when republican broadcasters follow the current Kremlin line and inversions of 
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the centre–periphery relationship cannot on their own adequately account for 
the nature of Vesti-Buriatiia’s coverage. We will demonstrate, also, that in their 
coverage of identity politics, Vesti-Buriatiia’s broadcasters are engaged in a com-
plex task of negotiating multiple ambiguities connected with Buriatiia’s position 
in relation to its main ‘external’ reference points (Russia, Tibet and Mongolia), as 
well as with internal boundaries criss-crossing society.
We attempt to make sense of the complex balancing act by analysing 
Vesti-Buriatiia’s broadcasts through the perspective of marginality theory, which 
explores strategies with which groups and individuals tend to address their real 
or perceived, symbolic or physical status of being on the border between two 
or more cultures. The Buriat elites, we suggest, have a long, historically formed 
tradition of negotiating what could be perceived as their community’s marginality. 
An appreciation of this tradition is necessary to our understanding of current pro-
cesses. State television broadcasting in Buriatiia combines this tradition with the 
ideology of Eurasianism. We suggest that, following the demise of the USSR, for 
the elites in Russia’s ethnic republics, Eurasianism has become an alternative to 
post-colonial interpretations of the relationship between the Russian/Soviet impe-
rial centre and ethnic minorities.13
We start with an overview of the broader historical and current political context 
of the region within which Vesti-Buriatiia’s coverage will be analysed. Buriatiia 
is a relatively little known region, yet local conditions to a large extent shape 
approaches to broadcasting – hence the need to discuss them in detail. We then 
outline the theoretical framework we deploy when analysing individual news 
reports. The remainder of the chapter explores the representational strategies with 
which Vesti-Buriatiia deals with the republic’s actual and symbolic borderland 
position and negotiates its cultural and religious diversity. We link those strategies 
to a recasting of centre–periphery relations and to the articulation of hybrid iden-
tities, whose potential to interrogate and subvert federal models of representation, 
we argue, is however undermined by the mythologized Eurasianism to which the 
strategies are ultimately subordinated.
A historical overview
The Buriats are a people of Mongolian language and cultural tradition, who have 
lived historically around Lake Baikal in southern Siberia and in northern Mon-
golia. The formation of the Buriats as an ethno-national community is, to a large 
extent, a result of Russian imperial and Soviet nationality policies. An organized 
penetration of Russian Cossacks into the region began in the seventeenth century 
and the establishment of the border between the Russian and Chinese empires 
in 1729 facilitated the separation of the Mongolian tribes on the Russian side 
from other Mongolian communities, thus allowing for the consolidation of the 
former as a separate Buriat people. The process of ethno-national consolidation 
was further facilitated when, in 1923, the Soviet government established the Buri-
at-Mongol (from 1958 Buriat) autonomous republic within the RSFSR, which 
was conceived as the national homeland of the Buriat people.14
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Religious affiliations among the Buriats have also been influenced by the 
policies of St Petersburg and Moscow. The systematic penetration of Tibetan 
Buddhism into the region, where the local population had previously been wor-
shipping shamanist deities, dates to the eighteenth century, and the process was 
again strongly influenced by the empire-building and foreign goals of the Russian 
tsars. Orthodox missionaries were active among western Buriats, particularly in 
the nineteenth century.
As is often the case with the imperial historiography of colonial conquests, 
the dominant Russian narrative about the peaceful establishment of Tsarist rule 
among the Mongolian tribes of the Baikal region glosses over instances of active 
and passive resistance to the Russian imperial expansion. During Soviet times, 
the local population resisted the brutality of Stalin’s collectivization and the 
1930s campaign against Buddhism. Yet these events attracted significant media 
attention only in the first years after the collapse of the communist regime: 
already by the mid-1990s, as Caroline Humphrey argues, these complex histori-
cal issues had been pushed into the background, partly to avoid any complica-
tions in relations with Moscow and the republic’s Russian majority and partly 
because of the positive view of the Soviet period among the republican popula-
tion at large.15 Significantly, these issues were not explored in Vesti-Buriatiia’s 
coverage in 2011 of celebrations of the 350th anniversary of ‘the unification of 
Buriatiia with Russia’.
At the same time, as Humphrey notes, we cannot reduce the relationship between 
Russians and Buriats to a conqueror–conquered dichotomy; instead, hierarchical 
relations have historically often been challenged and subverted in the region.16 
Russian Cossacks and peasants who moved into the areas around Lake Baikal 
at times also regarded the Russian imperial administration as an enemy, joining 
the indigenous population in acts of resistance. In turn, some Buriats joined Cos-
sack troops and fought alongside Russians against Khalkha Mongols.17 Levels of 
cohabitation and inter-marriage between members of different ethnic groups were 
high. In the religious sphere syncretic practices were also widespread, and people 
did not see contradictions between them.18 Thus, hybrid identities – which, as we 
will see, Vesti-Buriatiia portrays so positively – emerged historically as a common 
feature of the region.
The contemporary political and media environment
Buriatiia is a relatively calm and stable region, with no major ethnic conflicts, 
extreme nationalist movements or aggressive commercialization.19 It is a multi-eth-
nic and multi-confessional republic in which the titular nationality, the Buriats, 
constitutes only 24 per cent of the population. The Russians form a majority of 
over 70 per cent.20 Political power mainly resides with the head of the republi-
can government: at the time of writing the position is occupied by Viacheslav 
Nagovitsyn, an ethnic Russian from the Siberian region of Tomsk. Yet despite 
the authoritarian nature of the regime, political pluralism is not completely absent 
in Buriatiia, where leaders who come from outside the republic have to take 
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into account the local ways of conducting politics. Opinion polls suggested that 
Nagovitsyn enjoyed strong popular support; the relationship between key players 
among the elites demonstrated a relatively high degree of consensus.21
The Buriatiia government website reveals the nature of government-sponsored 
discourse on the history of the Buriat–Russian encounter, as well as the role of 
religion and inter-ethnic relations in today’s Buriatiia. As we will see below, the 
influence of this governmental discourse is reflected in Vesti-Buriatiia’s output. 
Here, there is no place for considering local resistance to Russian imperial rule 
and repressions of the Soviet period. The multi-ethnicity of the region is cele-
brated as a major strength. Orthodoxy and Buddhism appear as the two main reli-
gions today, with shamanism described historically as the first dominant ‘religious 
worldview’ of the indigenous population.22
The website pays a great deal of attention to inter-ethnic relations. The text of 
the 2007 ‘Concept of the State Nationalities Policy’ of the Republic of Buriatiia is 
included in full, alongside annual reports on the implementation of the policy. The 
document proudly states that ‘currently, the ethno-political situation in Buriatiia is 
marked by a well-grounded stability (stabil’nost’iu i ustoichivost’iu) and is char-
acterized by a climate which fosters [ethnic harmony] and ensures the absence of 
serious conflicts and expressions of extremism’. This is attributed to a long-term 
tradition in the region of solving controversial issues through ‘negotiations and a 
search for compromise’.23 Yet potential problems are not altogether denied, as the 
document warns that the situation could easily deteriorate.
The republican nationalities policy ascribes particular importance to the media 
in the management of inter-ethnic relations. Contrasting inter-ethnic harmony in 
Buriatiia with the rise of ethnic conflict in Russia as a whole in the past ten years, 
the ‘concept of state nationalities policy’ blames the media above all for inflaming 
ethnic conflict:
The Republic of Buriatiia is part of a unified information space in the country 
and is subjected to the destructive influence of this negative information... 
We have to admit that in terms of its impact, negative information, broad-
cast on television and disseminated through the print media and Internet, can 
sometimes be greater than the enlightened and prophylactic work which pub-
lic and educational institutions of the republic are conducting.24
From the context, it seems that the media subjected to criticism here are particu-
larly those based outside the republic of Buriatiia. Even though this is not spelled 
out, the statement might be read as a criticism of the coverage of ethnic relations 
on the federal channels, which report instances of conflict more frequently than 
the state media in Buriatiia, at times interpreting them through the prism of racial-
ized concepts such as ‘conflict of cultures’ or ‘ethnic criminality’ (see Chapter 
4). There is no place for such terminology in government-sponsored discourse in 
Buriatiia. In line with this local policy, Vesti-Buriatiia also avoids racializing its 
conceptual apparatus, preferring instead to evoke the Soviet ideal of the ‘friend-
ship of the peoples’ which appeared – and disappeared – so suddenly in federal 
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coverage of Manezhnaia.25 In this sense, it is providing from the peripheries a 
Soviet corrective to the erroneous, de-Sovietized practices of the centre.
Indeed, in our statistical analysis of Vesti-Buriatiia reports, and unlike the sit-
uation on the federal channels, we coded the majority of relevant  Vesti-Buriatiia 
news stories as belonging to the ‘ethnic cohesion’ category. These included 
reports celebrating displays of cultural diversity during local holidays and fes-
tivals, as well as the artistic and sporting successes of republican representa-
tives in Moscow. Also assigned to this category were reports on the celebrations 
of the 350th anniversary of the ‘unification of Buriatiia with Russia’, because 
they portrayed the republic as a community of citizens who, regardless of their 
ethnicity, viewed ‘the unification’ as wholly beneficial. At the same time, in 
contrast to the federal channels, reports falling into categories capturing chal-
lenges to the picture of inter-ethnic harmony (‘separatist violence’, ‘migration’ 
and ‘violent conflict’) were minimal or completely absent in Vesti-Buriatiia’s 
coverage26 (see Figure 6.1).
The republican government has the means to exercise tight control over the 
media, which, in this economically poor region with underdeveloped market 
relations, rely heavily on government subsidies for their existence.27 Yet, as is 
the case with the functioning of the broader public sphere in the republic, this 
does not contradict the presence of a degree of pluralism within the republic’s 
media output.28 Overall, the model of media production followed by state tele-
vision corresponds to what Olessia Koltsova has called ‘pact configuration’. 
This model emerges when one player dominates the situation, yet for various 
reasons decides to compromise with others.29 In Buriatiia the adoption of the 
‘pact configuration’ model can be attributed above all to a local style of con-
ducting politics in which the possibilities for the emergence of an organized, 
outspoken opposition are minimized.30 Within this context, the most powerful 
leader is willing to show a degree of tolerance towards alternative voices, as 












Figure 6.1  Frequency of category-coded news for Vesti-Buriatiia over the total recording 
period (September 2010-May 2012).
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long as they do not offer too vigorous a challenge to his position. Buriatiia has 
six television companies, four of which are commercial. One of these commer-
cial companies, called ‘Arig Us’, offers viewers alternative, critical perspectives 
on political issues.31
Vesti-Buriatiia’s tasks in covering ethnicity and religion-related issues are in 
some respect straightforward, in others complicated. The programme closely fol-
lows the expectations of the republican government, which seems to believe that 
the best way of ensuring good inter-ethnic tensions is to avoid discussing contro-
versial issues. At first glance, this should simplify the work of Vesti-Buriatiia’s 
team. The fact that the level of inter-ethnic tension is low in Buriatiia compared 
to many other parts of the Russian Federation allows the broadcaster to follow 
government recommendations without losing its overall credibility.32 At the same 
time, as is the case for all television broadcasting in Russia, more specific regu-
lations about how to handle particular situations in the media are non-existent; 
journalists are expected to exercise ‘their professional judgement’, which makes 
them potentially vulnerable if the decisions they take on this basis fail to coincide 
with the judgement of their superiors.33
While broadly advising the state media to focus on positive examples in the 
sphere of ethnic relations, the republican government displays ambivalence 
regarding the very nature of Buriat nationhood. The official position, as outlined 
on the government website, reflects an unresolved tension between a more inclu-
sive perception of the republic as the homeland of all its residents and an exclusive 
vision of the region as the national homeland of ethnic Buriats. This situation 
replays at a local level the pan-Russian dilemma of reconciling civic and ethnic 
approaches to nation-building.
The confusion created by the tension between the two approaches is evident 
in the site’s definition of the ‘indigenous’ (korennoe) population of the repub-
lic. At one point Russians, Buriats and the third main ethnic group, the Evenks 
(Tungus), are classified as ‘the indigenous inhabitants (korennye zhiteli) of the 
republic of Buriatiia’; elsewhere only Buriats are described as the ‘indigenous 
population’ (korennoe naselenie) of the republic.34 This inconsistency simulta-
neously points to the special status of ethnic Buriats and to the fact that the 
republic is part of a state in which ethnic Russians dominate the political sphere. 
The duality is reflected in the ethnic composition of the Buriatiia Television and 
Radio Company staff. The company, like Vesti-Buriatiia itself, is led by ethnic 
Russians, with two Buriats acting as the deputy heads. At the same time, the 
majority of members of staff are ethnic Buriats (five out of nine members of the 
leadership team and 12 out of 18 people involved in the production of television 
programmes).35 This suggests that, even if Vesti-Buriatiia refrains from talking 
about overt conflicts, the broadcasters cannot avoid making complex choices 
when covering inter-ethnic relations.
Before looking in detail at how Vesti-Buriatiia attempts to influence the ways in 
which residents of the republic perceive inter-ethnic and inter-confessional rela-
tions, we must present the theoretical framework within which we will illuminate 
the specificity of the programme’s approach.
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Marginality theory and identity politics in Buriatiia
Buriatiia is quintessentially a borderland zone; it is located on Russia’s border with 
Mongolia, and a flight from Moscow to the Buriat capital of Ulan-Ude lasts six 
hours. Internally Buriatiia is also divided by numerous – even if normally fluid – 
religious and ethno-cultural boundaries (particularly between ethnic Russians and 
Buriats). Scholars have long considered boundary spaces as particularly good loci 
to study relationships between culture and power and the complexities of identity 
formation. Especially interesting processes tend to occur when boundaries are 
(semi-)permeable and can be crossed in both directions without being eradicated. 
Power relations among people around such boundaries are invariably hierarchical; 
yet the hierarchies can be unstable. The situation of people positioned, at least 
implicitly, subordinately around such boundaries has been analysed by scholars 
since the 1920s through the concept of ‘marginality’. Robert E. Park, who first 
suggested the term, conceived of marginality as ‘a state of limbo between at least 
two cultural life-worlds’.36
Since the revival of interest in marginality theory in the 1960s, scholars have 
offered further insights into how the concept of marginality could be understood 
and utilized as a tool for analysing particular social and political conditions. In 
our analysis the ‘in-between state’ of marginality is crucial, as is the rejection of a 
simplified perception of power relations in respect to groups whose situation could 
be described as marginal. Marginality, of course, is predicated on inequalities in 
access to power and resources between groups separated by different boundaries.37 
At the same time, one should remember that the balance of power between indi-
viduals and groups is rarely fixed. Its reduction to a simple dichotomy between a 
powerful centre, represented by a dominant group, and a weak periphery, repre-
sented by minority groups, would gloss over the complexities of local processes.38
A form of marginality, at the core of which lies the ‘double ambivalence’ of 
a group or individual towards their own and foreign cultures, inevitably pro-
vokes differing responses.39 Each specific case needs to be examined, taking into 
account the political and social conditions under which different cultures meet. 
Adam Weisberger has offered a productive general typology of responses to mar-
ginality that is helpful to our understanding of the specificity of Buriatiia’s case. 
Weisberger argues that individual and group strategies for dealing with margin-
ality often go beyond remaining in a state of limbo or poise, which Park saw as 
the only position associated with his definition of marginality. Whereas Park’s 
‘marginal man’ did not attempt to resolve ambivalences associated with his status, 
historically people have developed various strategies to achieve such a resolution. 
Weisberger suggests three other ways of addressing the condition of marginality. 
The first is transcendence, entailing attempts to overcome ‘the opposition of the 
two cultures through creating a third way which is supposed to surpass them or 
reconcile them’.40 Two further methods are assimilation, when those in the posi-
tion of marginality strive to integrate into the dominant culture as far as possible, 
and what Weisberger calls ‘return’, which entails an overzealous identification 
with one’s own culture and community.41
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It can, of course, be argued that the term ‘borderland zone’ can describe not just 
physical spaces around state borders, but any sites where different cultures interact 
with each other.42 In that sense many urban metropolises are borderlands. Yet areas 
around state borders do have specificities, if only because intensive cross-cultural 
interactions and actual and symbolic border crossings in such regions tend to have 
longer histories, dating to a time when most people rarely ventured outside their 
own communities. Moreover, power relations and hierarchies between different 
groups, even under conditions of colonialism, are paradoxically likely to be more 
ambiguous within areas around state borders than around symbolic boundaries in 
the national centre.
Buriatiia’s position as a borderland zone since the seventeenth century has 
been shaped by the existence of the state border between Russia and China and 
later Mongolia. Here, too, local people and Russian colonizers interacted closely, 
meaning that group identities, and not only those among non-Russian minorities, 
have been historically shaped by conditions of marginality. As our brief historical 
survey indicates, power relations in the region never neatly mapped onto ethnic 
divisions. Ordinary Russians have not always enjoyed the dominant position and 
could find themselves in the condition of not only cultural and social but also 
political marginality, although the overall balance of power has invariably tilted in 
favour of the Russian/Soviet centre.
Nonetheless, when, at the turn of the twentieth century, a small number of 
members of the intelligentsia began to speak in the name of the imagined Buriat 
nation, they were acutely conscious of their in-between position. Their very desire 
to speak the language of nationalism reflected their encounter with European cul-
ture, which at the time was widely perceived as the yardstick according to which 
all traditions were to be measured.43 This perspective inevitably placed Buriats in 
the position of marginality which these intellectuals attempted to address in the 
course of their travels between St Petersburg and their homeland in the eastern 
regions of Baikal, Mongolia and Tibet.
The fact that this period as a whole has sometimes been described as Europe’s 
‘second oriental Renaissance’, marked by a fascination among the European 
elites with non-European cultural traditions and criticism of Eurocentric preju-
dices, seems to have encouraged these Buriats to develop the strategy of tran-
scendence with which to negotiate their marginal position. In fact, Buddhism, 
which they claimed to be their community’s national religion, provoked particular 
fascination in Europe and Russia at the time.44 The Buriats’ first-hand knowledge 
of Buddhist traditions facilitated their creative interaction with Russian imperial 
scholars, in the course of which, at least occasionally, established power relations 
and hierarchies were subject to challenge. The Buriat intellectuals developed par-
ticular frames through which they interpreted their experiences. These included 
the centring of Buriat culture and forms of religiosity vis-à-vis other Mongolian 
and Tibetan communities; partaking in representations of Russia as a space where 
various cultural traditions mixed and created third-way fusions, of which the Bud-
dhist reform movement (obnovlencheskoe dvizhenie) was claimed to be a striking 
example; and contributing to the development of a view that a strong adherence to 
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the local ethno-cultural tradition, even if distinct from that of the Russians, could 
facilitate rather than hinder the formation of a strong sense of belonging to the 
Russian state as a whole. In this vision, a provincial locality within Russia, termed 
a ‘small homeland’ (malaia rodina), was perceived as a building block, fitting 
organically within the large construction of the Russian fatherland (otechestvo).45
In the years immediately following the creation in 1923 of the Buriat ASSR, 
the politics of culture were firmly in the hands of those Buriats who cultivated 
transcendence as the way of negotiating between local cultural and religious tra-
ditions and Russian/Soviet influences.46 Although the Buriats who occupied lead-
ing positions in the Buriat ASSR in the 1920s fell victim to Stalin’s purges, their 
legacy again began to attract significant attention in Buriatiia from the late 1980s 
onwards, because the 1920s are seen as a key stage in the Buriat nation-building 
process. Today elites in Buriatiia draw parallels between current developments 
and the early twentieth century, arguing that conceptions of the Buriats as a nation 
and of the relationship of this nation to powerful surrounding cultures, though 
articulated almost one hundred years ago, remain directly relevant.47
Vesti-Buriatiia’s representational strategies
Within this context, it comes as no surprise that the strategy of transcendence is 
consistently at work in Vesti-Buriatiia news. As a result, a more creative and var-
ied set of representations of ethnicity-related issues is offered than in the republi-
can government’s documentation on the nationalities question.
In Vesti-Buriatiia’s output the boundaries around which identities are formed in 
contemporary Buriatiia are often similar to those highlighted one hundred years 
earlier. The boundaries and meeting points between Russian culture and Orthodox 
Christianity on the one hand, and the Buriat ethno-cultural traditions – in which 
Buddhism occupies a particularly important place – on the other continue to pro-
duce the main zones of marginality. At the same time, the importance of Mongolia 
and Tibet as other reference points for the formation of local identities has only 
increased since 1991.
Many conceptual frames for addressing the ambiguities arising from Buriatiia’s 
position as a multi-faceted borderland zone are also similar to the ones which have 
been employed historically: these include the celebration of hybrid identities and 
the highlighting of instances of successful multi-directional border crossings; the 
revival of the small homeland (malaia rodina) ideology; and the centring of the 
Buriats’ historical, cultural and religious experiences within Russia, as well as 
within global Mongolian and Buddhist communities. At the same time, the ideol-
ogy of Eurasianism is also often used to highlight the Buriats’ experiences within 
the pan-Russian context.
Buriatiia – a region of hybrid identities
The governmental ‘Concept of the State Nationalities Policies’ only briefly 
addresses the convergence of different cultures on Buriatiia’s territory. It argues 
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that one of the aims of ‘the preservation of ethnic cultures and traditions of 
ethnoses’ in Buriatiia is ‘to create a unified rossiiskaia civic (obshchegrazh-
danskaia) identity’.48 This statement reflects the current Kremlin line, as well as 
the legacy of Soviet policies on nationality which, in theory, were supposed to 
achieve the eventual transcendence of national specificities by means of the ini-
tial cultivation and even, in some cases, temporary strengthening of the ethno- 
cultural identities of the Soviet Union’s subject nationalities. As the events of 1991 
demonstrated, this utopian project of identity formation failed. Putin’s leadership 
has not been able to develop a practical means of creating a unified ‘rossiiskaia 
civic identity’ while preserving the legacy of Soviet ethno-cultural particularism. 
The Buriatiia government’s outline of its vision of policies on nationality likewise 
fails to explain how such a goal can be achieved.
Vesti-Buriatiia, however, adopts a consistent discursive strategy in support of 
the convergence goal by constructing an image of the republic as a place where 
the successful crossing of boundaries is easily achieved on a daily basis and where 
people feel entirely comfortable with their hybrid or ambiguous identities. The 
transcendence of ethnic boundaries and the appearance of creative fusions as a 
result of multi-directional border crossings are claimed in relation to the three most 
important points around which, according to Buriatiia’s and Russia’s elites, iden-
tities are formed today – native language (rodnoi iazyk), religious affiliation and 
common historical memory, in which the Second World War is the main episode.
Typically, reports on various government-sponsored activities promoting the 
Buriat language and culture highlight the fact that they are aimed at non-ethnic 
Buriat residents of the republic for whom the Buriat language is not expected to 
be native. Thus, a report of 6 April 2012 on a Buriat-language competition among 
non-Buriat residents featured a local university student, an ethnic Russian, who 
successfully negotiated her potential position of marginality vis-à-vis the Buriat 
culture. Commenting on winning the competition, the student stated:
For me the Buriat language is a second native language. Sometimes I per-
ceive it as more native (rodnee) than Russian. It is easy for me. I grew up in 
a Buriat village among the Buriats, I am an ethnic Russian, but in my soul I 
am a Buriat.49
The reporter noted that knowledge of the Buriat language could also improve this 
student’s employment opportunities. The student is thus presented as a symbol of 
the multiple benefits derived from the ability to cross cultural boundaries.
Similarly, the celebration of boundary-crossing is a prominent feature in cov-
erage of religion-related events. Orthodox Christianity and Buddhism (in that 
order) are officially proclaimed to be the two ‘national religions’ in Buriatiia, 
and most coverage is devoted to them. It is not, in fact, immediately obvious 
what the appropriate balance in the coverage of the religions important to the 
region should be. From the early twentieth century, the dominant Buriat intellec-
tual tradition represented Tibetan Buddhism of the Gelug school as the bona fide 
national religion of the Buriats, branding shamanism – which was widespread 
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particularly among Western Buriats – as backward, and describing Buriat conver-
sions to Orthodox Christianity as ‘artificial’.50 Yet shamanic beliefs and practices 
which do not require the existence of an organized religious institution survived 
better during the Soviet period than Buddhism, whose clergy fell victim to Sta-
lin’s repressions and whose institutional base was all but destroyed.51 Post-1991 
shamanism emerged as an important spiritual phenomenon, often described as 
an element of Buriatiia’s ‘national tradition’, and attracts a following not only of 
Buriats, but also of local Russians and representatives of other nationalities.52 At 
the same time, because ethnic Russians constitute 70 per cent of the republic’s 
population and 70 per cent of the officially registered religious communities (reli-
gioznye ob’edineniia) are Orthodox, significant attention to Orthodox Christian 
events on state television is to be expected.53 Vesti-Buriatiia deals with this com-
plex situation by according virtually equal space to Orthodoxy and Buddhism, 
with shamanism receiving less attention.54
Again, the coverage is aimed at facilitating the transcendence of religious bound-
aries. It underscores the similarities between the two ‘main national religions’ by 
identically structuring reports about them and by drawing direct parallels between 
Orthodox and Buddhist religious holidays and divine figures. The prevalence of 
syncretic religious rituals in Buriatiia is also highlighted. Finally, the fact that the 
concept of reincarnation in the Buddhist tradition is based on the perception of 
crossing temporal, spatial and corporal boundaries also seems to encourage a view 
of border crossings as an acceptable and even highly desirable condition.
Numerous reports on Orthodox and Buddhist religious festivals and tradi-
tions start with a description of their origins in the distant past and a brief over-
view of a tradition’s survival up to the present (a history usually depicted as an 
unbroken line); interviews with Orthodox priests and Buddhist lamas, as well 
as believers among lay people, are always included. Considerable attention is 
paid to various ‘miracles’ occurring in the context of particular traditions, which 
both interviewees and reporters invariably take at face value.55 Indeed, in these 
reports the voices of the reporters and those of the priests, lamas and believers 
are indistinguishable.56
Reports also tend to draw parallels between Orthodox and Buddhist rituals and 
belief systems. Thus the Virgin Mary is compared to Green Tara, a female Bodhi-
sattva (enlightened being) in Mahayana Buddhism, with the reporter commenting 
on how both offer protection to believers in similar ways.57 Religious syncretism 
is also presented as a common feature. A report on Shrovetide in 2011 describes 
it as a holiday marking the end of winter and the beginning of spring and cele-
brated by most ethnic groups in the region. It then features an event organized by 
the Ulan-Ude ethnographic museum, during which different nationalities were 
encouraged to demonstrate their modes of celebrating the occasion.58 Meanwhile, 
the coming together of different religious traditions is noted in coverage of rituals 
featuring both shamans and lamas, such as the Lusuud takhilga ritual dedicated 
to a water spirit.
Last but not least, coverage of the Buddhist traditional belief in the possibility 
of crossing existing boundaries, even those which in most cultures are perceived 
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as impermeable (such as that between life and death), implicitly endorses that 
belief.59 The most prominent manifestation of the belief in contemporary Buri-
atiia is the phenomenon of the Pandito Khambo-Lama Itigelov. This well-known 
Buriat Buddhist priest died in 1927. His body was recovered, reportedly intact, 
in 2002; it is now preserved in the main Buddhist datsan of Buriatiia, and occa-
sionally exhibited to the public. In contrast to the perception of the ‘uncorrupted’ 
relics of saints in the Christian tradition, where these ‘saints’ are understood as 
being dead, in the Buddhist tradition the ‘uncorrupted bodies’ are perceived to be 
in a marginal state, in between life and death. Vesti-Buriatiia pays a great deal of 
attention to the story of Khambo-Lama Itigelov. The language used by Vesti-Buri-
atiia adheres closely to the statements on the issue made by the main governing 
body of Russia’s Buddhists, Buddhist Traditional Sangha, suggesting that Itigelov 
is more alive than dead and constantly defying one of the most crucial boundaries. 
As one Vesti-Buriatiia report put it:
The teacher returned on the fourth day of the lunar calendar on 10 September 
2002... Retaining his body uncorrupted, Dosha-Dorji Itigelov has reached the 
highest level of spiritual realization. Living next to us (zhivia riadom s nami), 
he gives advice, helps out, acting out of compassion towards all the living 
beings (vsem zhivym).60
Significantly, the federal version of Vesti initiated this merging of the voices of 
religious authorities and reporters as late as the start of the presidential elec-
tion campaign in January 2012. On Vesti-Buriatiia, by contrast, it was a feature 
throughout our entire monitoring period, reconfirming Buriatiia as a republic 
whose very peripheral status enables it to provide an ‘exemplary’ handling of the 
‘national question’, pre-empting that of broadcasters located at the federal centre.
Finally, in television representations of the collective historical memory of the 
people of Buriatiia, those individuals who have shown the ability to negotiate 
cultural boundaries successfully, building new ties across them and encourag-
ing fusion between communities, are particularly celebrated. This, for instance, 
applies to the selection and representation of Second World War veterans who are 
interviewed on television. Every year, several days before the Soviet Victory Day 
of 9 May, Vesti-Buriatiia news coverage is dominated by reports about the war, 
which is perceived as a formative event for the people of Buriatiia, underscoring 
their membership in the Soviet and now pan-Russian national community. Most 
interviewed veterans have multiple identities, which they always manage to rec-
oncile. Thus, a veteran interviewed at length on the occasion of Victory Day in 
2012 was a ‘hereditary’ (potomstvennyi) Cossack, who was born and raised in 
Mongolia, outside the Soviet borders, yet reportedly felt equally at home within 
the Cossack, Buriat-Mongol and Soviet cultures.61
In a similar example, in 2011 Vesti-Buriatiia reported on a reception in the 
Buriat Republican Mission in Moscow of war veterans from ‘Buriatiia’s dias-
pora community’ in Moscow. Whereas in federal television coverage members 
of Moscow’s so-called diaspora communities are invariably identified by their 
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non-Russian ethnicity rather than by their affiliation with an ethnic repub-
lic within Russia or a foreign state (for example, they are represented as ethnic 
Chechens, Dagestanis, Tajiks, etc.), on Vesti-Buriatiia the veterans representing 
the republic at its ‘Mission in Moscow’ were of multiple nationalities, including 
Russians. What united them, according to the broadcast, was that when the Second 
World War started they were living in Buriatiia; only later in their lives did they 
move to Moscow. The report emphasized these people’s ability to transcend eth-
no-cultural differences by sharing a strong feeling of pan-Russian patriotism, as 
well as through a shared perception of Buriatiia as their ‘small homeland’ (malaia 
rodina).62
There are other instances of evocation of the notion of ‘malaia rodina’, which 
dates to the late nineteenth century and which contributed significantly to shaping 
the worldview of the first generation of the Buriat intelligentsia. Even though 
the notion acquired a second life in the Soviet Union in the 1960s and 1970s 
and is occasionally used today by elites in the centre, ‘malaia rodina’ is not part 
of the conceptual apparatus with which federal television news reporters attempt 
to make sense of Russia’s diversity. The term foregrounds the ease with which 
cultural boundaries can be crossed – indicating, however, that the total erosion of 
these boundaries is unnecessary and could even harm the process by which people 
achieve a productive membership within the pan-Russian community. It is clearly 
well matched to Vesti-Buriatiia’s representational strategies.
The Eurasian identity
In Russia, Eurasianism is currently championed by many politicians and intellec-
tuals, who interpret it in different ways. Eurasianism’s representation of Russia 
as a special world where different cultures interact, thereby creating a distinct 
supranational community different from both ‘west’ and ‘east’, is very popular 
among the elites in Russia’s ethnic republics.63 They adapt Eurasianism to local 
conditions, regarding it as an effective tool with which to overcome the position 
of marginality through the strategy of transcendence.
The evocation of Eurasianist theory by elites in Russia’s ethnic republics in 
order to emphasize the importance of their local cultural traditions within the 
 pan-Russian (rossiiskii) framework can be seen as a specific response by  Russia’s 
non-European minorities to the post-imperial situation. Indeed, the original Eur-
asian movement of the 1920s offered what was arguably at the time the most 
systematic attack on Europe’s cultural and political imperialism. In the context 
of Russia’s ethnic republics, Eurasianism in effect acts as a substitute for the 
 post-colonial perspective. It has a distinct anti-colonial message and it entails 
the challenging of cultural hierarchies which prevail in Russian intellectual dis-
courses treating Russia as part of Europe. So it offers a framework in which 
leaders of non-Russian autonomies within the Russian Federation can draw atten-
tion to the importance of their local experiences and traditions, which otherwise 
remain marginalized. Yet Eurasianism treats Russia not as a colonial power, but 
as a community which is itself under threat of being colonized by the west. In its 
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juxtaposition of Russia’s supposedly positive experience of managing multi-eth-
nicity and the destructive nature of west European colonialism, Eurasianism was 
and remains an attempt to articulate a new ideology for the Russian empire and 
does not encourage the questioning of Russia’s political practices and cultural 
attitudes.64 Today, as in the past, Eurasianism promotes the mythologization of, 
rather than a critical reflection on, the cultural and political interactions of the 
peoples of ‘Russia-Eurasia’.
The main criticism of the centre which Eurasianism encourages among local 
elites is in relation to the claims of their federal equivalents regarding the European 
nature of Russian statehood. This is the case in Buriatiia, where the political pro-
gramme of the republican branch of the United Russia party represents the republic 
as ‘the cradle of the Eurasian culture’.65 On important public occasions covered 
by Vesti-Buriatiia, the Eurasian nature of the republic is claimed by Buriatiia’s 
leadership with reference to current times as well as to the distant past. Thus, in 
 September 2010, coverage of celebrations of the 15th anniversary of the establish-
ment of Buriatiia’s state university in Ulan-Ude emphasized that various luminaries 
who spoke on the occasion explored the ‘Eurasian nature of Russian (rossiiskaia) 
statehood’ and Buriatiia’s role in the development of the syncretic Eurasian cul-
ture.66 This role, it was contended, was central and dated back to the period when 
the great Mongol leader, Genghis Khan, was establishing his vast empire.
The figure of Genghis Khan occupies an important place in the historical 
mythology of Buriatiia today, since the Khan’s birthplace is said to be located on 
‘Buriat national territory’, in the Aginsk Buriat autonomous district (okrug).67 The 
Buriat perception of Genghis Khan stands in sharp contrast to the Russian his-
torical tradition dominant since the nineteenth century, in which Genghis Khan’s 
image is negative and the Mongol invasion of Rus is portrayed as an event which 
failed to divert Russia from its necessary development as part of Europe. In Buri-
atiia, however, the Khan is a ‘national’ hero, represented as a model leader of a 
multi-ethnic community, and this is indeed how he is depicted on Vesti-Buriatiia. 
In 2012 the parliament of Mongolia made 14 November, the day on which Geng-
his Khan is reputed to have been born, a national holiday. The Vesti-Buriatiia 
report covering the occasion depicted the Mongol empire founded by the Khan as 
a place of unusual ethnic and religious tolerance and ‘international cooperation’. 
A member of the Buriat parliament was quoted as arguing that if the Russians 
acknowledged fully the ‘Eurasian nature’ of their statehood, they would have been 
able to change their assessment ‘of this Mongolian military leader from negative 
to positive’.68 Buriatiia is thus depicted as being instrumental in revealing to the 
Russians their true identity. Here, then, the centre–periphery inversion involves not 
the ideal embodiment by the periphery of the centre’s values, but the projection of 
the values of the periphery onto the centre in order to reveal its ‘authentic’ core.
Centring Buriatiia’s experience
Vesti-Buriatiia regularly attempts to centre the Buriat people’s historical experi-
ences not only within Russia, but also within the global Mongolian and Buddhist 
164 Difference at the margins
communities. Yet the challenging of established hierarchies and power relations 
prevailing in this context never presupposes the perception of Russian and Soviet 
policies as colonial. Thus, in a report on the 50th anniversary of the Academy of 
Culture and Arts in Ulan-Ude in September 2010, it was argued that the institu-
tion, with its multicultural teaching staff and student body and its location at ‘the 
crossroads of East, West and North’, should be seen as ‘the centre of a dialogue 
between the culture of Russia and that of the world’.69 What this argument chal-
lenges is Russia’s self-representation vis-à-vis Europe/the west, not the nature of 
the relationship between ethnic Russians and minority cultures.
Not only Russia but also Tibet and Mongolia constitute important reference 
points for the Buriats. The proto-Buriat tribes in the regions to the east and south of 
Lake Baikal received Buddhism from Tibet. The transmission of this religious tra-
dition began relatively late and was further challenged by the activities of Orthodox 
missionaries in the late imperial period and the anti-religious campaigns of Soviet 
times. Against this background, members of the Tibetan exile community often 
see Buriats as in need of assistance through the missionary activities of Tibetan 
monks.70 The activities of these monks have become a political issue in Buriatiia, 
generating public debates.71 Vesti-Buriatiia seems to adopt a particular position 
in this debate. Based on a rejection of the perception of Buddhism in Buriatiia 
as a peripheral phenomenon, it challenges the dominant hierarchy in which Tibet 
emerges as the religious centre in relation to which Buriatiia has an inferior status.
Such coverage reflects the current position of the republican leadership as well as 
that of Moscow, according to which Russia’s Buddhists can revive their traditions 
and rebuild their monasteries without any help from abroad.72 This position has a 
long history, dating back to the Russian imperial policies of offering instrumental 
support for the development of Buddhism among eastern and southern Buriats at 
the same time as ensuring their separateness from their co-religionists in Tibet and 
Mongolia. Within this political context, in collaboration with  Russian imperial 
specialists on Buddhism in St Petersburg, early  twentieth-century Buriat intellec-
tuals such as the famous Buriat lama Agvan Dorzhiev and Tsyben Zhamtsarano, a 
leader of the Buriat nationalist movement during the 1905 revolution, developed 
a powerful narrative about Buddhism practised among the Buriats. The dominant 
view of it as an inferior version of the Buddha’s teaching was rejected and it was 
argued instead that it was a form of Buddhism in its own right, which should 
not be measured against any external yardstick.73 These developments reveal the 
complexity of the relationship between the colonial context and the agency of the 
subalterns who attempt to use this context to achieve their own goals, a relation-
ship that continues to play itself out today.
Dorzhiev’s role as advisor to the Dalai Lama helped him develop a discourse 
about the centrality of the Buriats in the transnational community of Buddhists 
and among the Mongolian people.74 Today, Dorzhiev’s ideas are popular among 
Buriat elites. The Agvan Dorzhiev Foundation, set up in 1993, has as its pro-
claimed aim a ‘further development of his [Dorzhiev’s] spiritual heritage within 
the contemporary context’. While noting that this would include the strengthen-
ing of ties between Buddhists in Buriatiia and their co-religionists abroad, the 
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 foundation argues that in the main Buddhist monasteries outside Russia, ‘the 
memory lives of the great lamas’ from Buriatiia. In these foreign places, disciples 
of the Buriat lamas ‘now occupy important positions’.75 This is in line with the 
view of the Buddhist Sangha of Russia, which proudly asserts the autocephality 
of Russia’s Buddhist tradition, offering a highly idealized picture of the formation 
of this tradition as an outcome of the positive benefits of Russian imperial rule.76
In our period of analysis, Vesti-Buriatiia ran few reports featuring Tibet. Sig-
nificantly, most of them challenge the perception of Tibet’s cultural superior-
ity over Buriatiia and reject the perception of Buriatiia’s Buddhist tradition as 
peripheral. In January 2012, the programme focused on activities organized in 
the republic by the Buddhist Sangha of Russia to celebrate the lives of two twen-
tieth-century monks who were born in Buriatiia and were eventually to become 
leaders of important monasteries in Tibet and India.77 In this coverage, it is not 
Tibetan Buddhists who offer support for the development of Buddhism among 
the Buriats, but Buriat Buddhists who exercise leadership in the world centres 
of Buddhism. Similarly, when the activities of Tibetan monks inside Buriatiia 
are covered, reports note that participating Buriat Buddhists use the occasion to 
collect money to support their co-religionists abroad.78 Again, a reversal of power 
relations is implied.
The view that the Buriats could become cultural and political leaders in a 
pan-Mongolian community was first expressed by figures such as Dorzhiev and 
Zhamtsarano. In the early 1920s, Zhmatsarano’s, and other prominent Buriats’, 
roles in the establishment of the People’s Party in Mongolia was seen by them 
as fulfilment of the national destiny of their own community to be leaders among 
the Mongols.79 Here again local agency and the imperial context were closely 
intertwined, as the Buriat leaders attempted to pursue their own vision of their 
‘national mission’ while working for the new Bolshevik regime.
In its coverage of Buriatiia’s relationship with Mongolia, Vesti-Buriatiia adopts 
a similar template that simultaneously reflects the Buriats’ own historically formed 
strategy of self-representation, yet also fits with the Kremlin-sponsored line. Buri-
atiia and Mongolia appear as two separate, competing entities, for instance in 
the sphere of preserving and publicizing the historical heritage of the Mongo-
lian people and ‘the civilization of Central Asia’ (tsivilizatsiia Tsentral’noi Asii) 
as a whole.80 Buriats are expected to take a lead in this competition. The theme 
emerges in reports regarding the government policy of promoting ethnographic 
tourism as an important source of revenue for the republic, which suggest that by 
maintaining various historical sites in good condition and advertising them well 
to potential tourists, Buriatiia, rather than Mongolia, will emerge as the interna-
tionally recognized ‘centre of the historical heritage of the Mongolian tribes’.81
Russian imperial and broader Eurocentric perspectives seem to have been 
deeply internalized in Buriatiia, all the criticism of Eurocentrism and attempts to 
challenge established hierarchies notwithstanding. This introduces further ambi-
guities in the official discourse about Buriatiia’s position within Russia and the 
wider world. For instance, in Vesti-Buriatiia’s reports about ethnographic tourism 
the main point of reference remains ‘the west’, whose centrality in world affairs is 
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implied and whose approbation is implicitly sought. The publicity given to travel 
opportunities in Buriatiia is supposed to attract the particular attention of tourists 
from Europe, who, according to Vesti-Buriatiia, should be encouraged to recog-
nize the vast sight-seeing potentials of the Buriat lands.82
In a context where interrogations of Buriat–Russian encounters take place 
within the ideological framework of Eurasianism rather than post-colonialism, it 
comes as no surprise that some programmes on republican state-controlled tele-
vision occasionally lapse into promotion of an unmitigated imperial perspective. 
The most striking example of this approach was the local television programme 
Buriatiia: The Chronicle of the Centuries, whose launch in March 2011 was adver-
tised by Vesti-Buriatiia as a major cultural event.83 In it, Orientalizing stereotypes 
are reproduced without being subjected to any scrutiny. From the producers’ point 
of view the history of the region starts with the arrival of Russian Cossacks in the 
northern areas of today’s Buriatiia. Even though the programme acknowledges 
that the region was populated by various ethnic communities, the Cossacks are 
described as ‘the first comers’ ( pervoprokhodtsy). The presenter’s narrative about 
subsequent developments pieces together lengthy quotes from reports by Cossacks 
and Russian imperial administrators informing the government in St Petersburg 
about the distant and exotic peripheries. Again, fully in line with the Orientaliz-
ing perspective, the indigenous population of the region – Buriatiia’s main ‘small 
minority group’ (malyi narod), the Evenks – are not given a voice, instead being 
depicted through an exhibition of their exotic craftsmanship at a local ethnographic 
museum.84
***
Like the output emerging from the peripheries of the post-Soviet Russian medi-
asphere examined in the previous chapter, but for rather different reasons, Ves-
ti-Buriatiia, located at post-Soviet Russia’s geographical margins, is no mere 
‘re-transmitter of a Moscow-produced context’. In fact, local elites view the lat-
ter critically. The discursive strategies of Vesti-Buriatiia reflect not only the local 
elites’ interpretation of the Kremlin line on ethnic diversity as Russia’s major 
strength, but also a long-term indigenous tradition of negotiating the perceived 
marginal status of Buriatiia and Buriats within Russia and in relation to other 
important local points of reference, such as Mongolia and Tibet. The republic’s 
experiences are drawn upon in a double inversion of the established  centre– 
periphery axis. Buriatiia emerges as a region which can both epitomize the 
nation-building strategy emanating from the centre and project its own values 
and traditions onto that centre, enabling Russia to find its true Eurasian self and 
realize the ideal of multi-ethnic harmony to which it aspires. These experiences 
are also depicted as being of crucial importance for the wider communities 
of the Mongolian people and Buddhists, a strategy facilitated by a globalized 
environment in which local peripheries can bypass mediation through national 
centres and operate directly within a transnational context.
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Furthermore, by promoting hybrid identities and by cultivating individual and 
group experiences of multiple forms of boundary-crossing, Vesti-Buriatiia draws 
upon key tactics which the scholarship theorizing the relationship between the 
media and inter-ethnic relations identifies as conducive to strengthening  ethnic 
cohesion. Its preferred model of ‘unity via hybridity’ offers an alternative both 
to the failed ‘unity in diversity’ model analysed in Part II and the ominous ‘unity 
through division’ model that will dominate Part III. In contrast to federal television, 
Vesti-Buriatiia shuns sensationalism and refrains from dramatizing the events it 
covers. Unusually for a contemporary media outlet, Vesti-Buriatiia emphasizes the 
absence of crisis and conflict and dwells on instances of  co-operation and oppor-
tunities for consensus-building.85 It also positions itself as a ‘shared medium’, 
equally appealing to Buriats, Russians and other nationalities of the region.86 In 
thereby invoking the ‘friendship of the peoples’ mantra promoted by the former 
Soviet centre, but in a religious context alien to the latter’s atheistic values, it rep-
resents a particular kind of post-Soviet experience.
Ultimately, however, the programme lacks the necessary tools to fully interrogate 
power relations between ethnic minorities and the Russian centre. Its representa-
tions of the Buriats’ relationship with Mongolia and Tibet likewise fall in line with 
positions which find Moscow’s approval. The reason for this is that the Buriats’ own 
intellectual tradition of transcending marginality originated in the Russian imperial 
and Soviet contexts, with their limited opportunities for criticism or challenge; more-
over, it is now supplemented by the ideology of Eurasianism. While critically assess-
ing west European colonialism, Eurasianism mythologizes Russia’s own tradition of 
managing ethnic diversity. This intellectual framework only increases Vesti-Buriati-
ia’s reluctance to discuss serious challenges to societal cohesion. As a result it lacks 
both a strategy and a conceptual framework for addressing future internal conflicts 
which may prove impossible to ignore. In light of the dramatic confrontations that 
were to sweep the political and media environment at the federal level in 2012, and 
which we must now address, its intriguing and at times paradoxical mode of negoti-
ating its position on the centre–periphery axis looks all the more anomalous.
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Television, the 2012 presidential 
elections and the ethnic underside of 
Russian political discourse
A powerful new impulse for reform appeared to take Russia by storm in 2012. 
The explosion of protest following Putin’s victory in Russia’s latest presiden-
tial elections was, in fact, the culmination of a process stretching from the ini-
tial outrage at Putin’s announcement in September 2011 that he would run for 
a third term, through protests at the Duma election results later that year, to the 
remarkable scenes which greeted Putin’s re-election and the vigorous campaigns 
for and against the punk group Pussy Riot, who were imprisoned for ‘desecrating’ 
an Orthodox cathedral with an anti-Putin ‘prayer’ (the focus of our next chap-
ter). During critical historical periods the ‘political unconscious’ of a society’s 
prevailing discursive regime is revealed. Federal television broadcasts during the 
period prematurely hailed as the ‘Russian Spring’ are an ideal source to analyse 
the key subtexts of the ‘authoritative discourse’ which dominated state television 
during the new millennium. In this chapter we examine the initially subdued role 
of ethnicity in television’s approach to consensus management as it struggled to 
negotiate the competing demands of the democratic and nationalist oppositions. 
We argue that ethnicity’s virtual absence from the surfaces of mediated official 
discourse during the presidential election campaign belied its presence as a deep 
underside poised at any moment to disrupt and overturn that discourse’s very 
foundations.
Critical historical periods tend to highlight the tensions underlying a soci-
ety’s prevailing discursive regime. It is consistent with this phenomenon that the 
journalists whom we interviewed in early 2013 confirmed that federal television 
coverage had altered in the preceding 18 months, while building on pre-existing 
framing techniques and analytical templates.1 Television broadcasts during the 
first half of 2012 are therefore an ideal source from which to gauge the speci-
ficities and assess the effectiveness of the ‘authoritative discourse’ on political 
matters which Putin’s government has been attempting to articulate in the course 
of the new millennium. Our approach here is to explore these phenomena by 
attempting to identify the illocutionary strategies that they reveal: what coverage 
of the issues at stake is ‘doing’, or not doing, rather than what it is ‘saying’, or not 
saying (we dwell on the latter in more detail in our final chapter). We shift our 
attention from how federal broadcasts ‘stage’ a particular ‘content’ in relation to 
the management of diversity in the new political environment to how that staging 
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itself ‘performs’ certain moves, overt and inadvertent, in respect of the ways in 
which politics and ethnicity articulate with one another.
Recent Kremlin discourse dates to the middle of the first decade of the new 
millennium, when there was a major turn in the Putin government’s policies in 
response to the colour revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine and the Beslan school 
hostage crisis. This discourse, emerging during a heightened sense of insecurity, 
has included representations of the ‘west’ as Russia’s primary ‘other’, perpetually 
conspiring to destroy the country,2 as well as a particular account of Russia’s 
inter-ethnic relations according to which the country’s ethnic and confessional 
diversity, whose origins in Russia’s imperial and colonial past remain uninter-
rogated, have been presented as Russia’s main strength. Any challenges to this 
rhetorical celebration of Russia’s multi-ethnicity have been condemned as actions 
of the country’s external and internal enemies. The greatest of these challenges 
was the Manezhnaia race riots of December 2010. As Chapter 4 demonstrated, 
the Russian media struggled to explain their significance and the Kremlin was 
concerned enough to initiate policies designed to deal with them.3 In their imme-
diate aftermath, President Medvedev singled out the maintenance of ‘civic peace 
and interethnic and inter-faith harmony’ as Russia’s ‘biggest national priority’ 
and announced plans for a new federal programme on ‘Strengthening the Unity 
of the Russian (rossiiskaia) Nation and the Ethnic and Cultural Development of 
the Peoples of Russia’.4
Though Manezhnaia remains a milestone in the troubled recent history of Rus-
sian inter-ethnic relations, by the time of the 2012 elections it had receded in the 
public consciousness and did not feature prominently in coverage of the political 
clashes themselves. Indeed, at first glance, state-aligned news coverage of the 
presidential election campaign significantly downplayed the importance of the 
‘national question’ as an issue in need of urgent attention. This chapter will argue 
that it was far more central to the discourses employed by the presidential candi-
dates, as well as by the opposition, than was acknowledged by the Russian media. 
Western reporting, too, concentrated on suspected irregularities favouring the dis-
credited election winner, and on Putin’s prospects for survival in light of popular 
revulsion at his underhand, anti-democratic practices, his links to corruption, a 
weakening economy and the increasing confidence that the democratic opposition 
movement could inflict real damage on his reputation.5 Yet in the aftermath of 
Putin’s re-election, the importance of inter-ethnic relations to Russia’s political 
and social life was restated with a greater emphasis than ever before, by political 
leaders of all shades, and was highlighted by state broadcasters.
We begin with the point at which ethnicity and the (pseudo-)democratic pro-
cess seemed openly to coincide. Prior to the election, Putin wrote seven campaign 
articles, each tied to a particular theme in his political agenda. One of these arti-
cles, published in Nezavisimaia gazeta (in theory if not in practice an independent 
rather than government-controlled outlet), dealt with ‘the national question’ and 
provided Putin with a platform for his post-Manezhnaia thinking. The article was 
Putin’s first ever attempt to articulate an authoritative discourse on an issue that 
hitherto had been mostly debated by journalists and public intellectuals. We first 
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provide a brief account of the article itself, noting (i) explicit connections made 
between ethnicity and politics within the article and (ii) the article’s relationship 
to the set to which it belongs, and thus to the wider campaign.
We focus primarily on Channel 1’s coverage of the article, as it was the most 
extensive, highlighting six key rhetorical strategies for co-articulating seem-
ingly disparate issues: (i) discursive ‘contamination’; (ii) the declaration of 
false ‘equidistance’ from issues of different value; (iii) the use of ‘code’ terms 
in order to establish relations of equivalence, or of synecdoche, across disparate 
topics; (iv) the conducting of polemics ‘by proxy’ (deploying the voice of one’s 
opponents in support of one’s own position); (v) the ‘performative’ enactment of 
inter-ethnic harmony/disharmony; (vi) the inversion of the logic of the ‘univer-
sal’ and the ‘particular’ as a means of promoting the specific and ethnic over the 
abstract and political.
Our analysis enables us to posit the media’s central role in a hegemonic process 
of ‘manufacturing consent’6 in which questions of ethnicity (a priority of Putin’s 
conservative antagonists) are injected into the discourse of democratic debate (the 
rallying cry of the opposition), but then filtered from it through a focus on the 
‘struggle against corruption’ (an example of our emphasis on illocutionary act 
over locutionary statement). Drawing on Laclau’s theory of populism as the artic-
ulation of fragmented demands around a new hegemonic core, we then discuss 
the figure of Aleksei Naval’nyi, a prominent leader of the opposition movement 
and the target of a media campaign of vilification and exclusion.7 We examine 
the role of Naval’nyi’s own populist campaign in constituting such a core and in 
accounting for federal television’s neurotic reaction to Naval’nyi’s claim to the 
anti-corruption territory, pointing, however, to that territory’s ethnic substratum, 
and demonstrating that it is liable to rise to the surface at any point.
Putin’s ‘national dilemma’
Putin’s pre-election campaign articles dealt with the ‘national question’, eco-
nomic tasks, democracy and effective government, social policy, military affairs 
and foreign policy. The national question was the subject of the second of the arti-
cles, released in January 2012 in Nezavisimaia gazeta, whose associations with 
free speech gesture toward the insertion of the national question into the realm 
of democratic debate.8 From the outset, inter-ethnic cohesion and democracy are 
linked in the official symbolism of the Kremlin campaign. Indeed, the gesture 
is largely staged, since despite its title, the newspaper has been frequently used 
to promote the Kremlin line. Recognizing the dangers posed by a failure to deal 
with the ‘national question’, Putin divided his article into five sections, treating: 
(i) the inadequacy of international models; (ii) Russia’s historical experience of 
multi-ethnic statehood; (iii) ethnic Russian cultural heritage as a ‘cultural code’ 
for unifying the nation’s diverse ethnic communities; (iv) national politics and the 
role of strong institutions; (v) the problem of migration.
Rejecting both the American ‘melting pot’ approach and the separatism fos-
tered by European multiculturalism, Putin is equally forceful in his objections 
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to ethnic purism and nationalist extremism. He emphasizes Russia’s multi- 
ethnic, multi-faith history, invoking Dostoevskii’s claims that Russia’s very des-
tiny lies in its unique ability to unify disparate peoples. Treading an awkward 
line between proposing a ‘polycultural’, civic model and insisting on the primacy 
of one community over others, he eventually accords ethnic Russians a special 
position within the national community by referring to them as a ‘state-forming’ 
people – the glue which binds the plurality of peoples together.9 This leads him to 
advocate adherence to a ‘cultural code’ based on the Russian language, Russian 
literature and culture and Russian history, but respectful of the rights of minori-
ties to maintain their own traditions and cultures. The instillation of such a code 
relies on powerful institutions of state and Putin singles out education as key. 
He concludes with a proposal to tighten laws to ensure that immigration works 
in favour of Russia’s ‘indigenous’ (korennoe) population. This term introduces 
further ambiguity, as it can be used either in specific reference to ethnic Russians 
or Slavs (the dominant definition) or to mean representatives of minorities, in 
theory including North Caucasians, whose ‘ethno-national homelands’ are located 
within the Russian Federation. In his concluding remarks about migration, Putin 
distinguishes between ‘external’ and ‘internal’ migration, acknowledging the 
rights of non-Russian citizens to move freely around their country without fear of 
discrimination but, in an echo of the post-Manezhnaia line eventually settled on 
by the Kremlin, calling on them to respect the behavioural norms of the cities and 
regions in which they now reside. Given that the dominant flow of migration is 
from the ‘ethnic periphery’ to ‘Russia proper’, the call to migrants to respect the 
behavioural norms of their new places of residence is one-sided.
State-forming news?
Unsurprisingly, the article received largely reverent coverage on Russia’s fed-
eral channels. Channel 1 is normally the most reliable guide to Kremlin think-
ing. The fact that, as we shall see, it unusually included trenchant criticism of 
Putin’s arguments deserves explanation and accounts for the particular attention 
we devote to it. Two Vremia reports in the bulletin of 23 January dealt with the 
article itself and with Putin’s address to a forum held in Kislovodsk, in the North 
Caucasus. The Sunday edition included a lengthy summary on 29 January. In 
addition, the weekly discussion programme ‘In Context’ (‘V kontekste’), broad-
cast on 26 January, centred on a debate on the article involving the controversial 
Eurasianist Aleksandr Dugin, film director Stanislav Govorukhin, the editor of 
the liberal-leaning Moscow Echo radio station, Aleksei Venediktov, and liberal 
historian and television journalist Nikolai Svanidze.
Both Vremia reports utilized the familiar rhetorical device of eliding direct and 
free indirect speech in such a way as to blur the boundaries between the authorita-
tive voice of Putin and that adopted by the reports themselves:
Putin warns against the idea of a mono-national state in our country which has 
historically gathered together the most varied of peoples around the Russian 
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people as its core. Russia is not some kind of immature calque on Western 
countries which it needs to catch up with. It is a unique civilization … The 
article provoked many arguments.10
The first report addressed the issues raised in the order in which Putin presented 
them. However, it illustrated the first section on the failure of European multicul-
turalism with footage juxtaposing an illegal Central Asian migrant worker and 
a North African French citizen going about his daily business.11 The conflation 
of illegal immigration with minority communities was indicative of the lack of 
rigour characterizing Russian public debate on inter-ethnic cohesion issues, and 
of the tendency for state broadcasters to stray from protocol. Likewise, commen-
tary on Putin’s rejection of all extremisms (mono-ethnic nationalism; separatism) 
is accompanied by images of the Manezhnaia, Kondopoga and Sagra conflicts. 
While the influence of Russian nationalist impulses can be considered as part of 
the context to these conflicts, ‘separatist nationalism’ is not an ideological factor. 
The potential dangers of this elision are reinforced by the fact that one of the 
points from the article omitted by Vremia is Putin’s warning about the dangers of 
political parties established on a regional basis, and conversely by the extent of 
the attention paid to the section on the ‘behaviour’ of ‘visitors’. Overall, the issue 
of migration was not central to Vremia’s coverage. In contrast, Vesti’s 23 January 
report on the article paid considerably more attention to problems associated with 
migrants than did the article itself.12
Given that the article was presented as part of Putin’s electoral manifesto, the 
inclusion of critical commentaries is noteworthy. Vremia’s main report of 23 Jan-
uary incorporates an interview with Geidar Dzhemal (President of the Islamic 
Committee of Russia), who criticizes Putin for failing to distinguish sufficiently 
clearly internal and external migration, and for implying that it is always ‘visitors’ 
whose norms are at fault:
The assumption is made that local populations are always more cultured and 
civilized than migrants, regardless of whether these are internal or external 
migrants … And the Soviet experience is completely ignored because Soviet 
policy was founded precisely on extensive internal migration.
This is followed by an observation from Vitalii Tret’iakov, a well-known journal-
ist, dean of the Faculty of Television Broadcasting at Moscow State University, 
editor of the journal Political Class and a vocal critic of the government’s nation-
alities policies for their alleged failure to accommodate ethnic Russian interests. 
He claims that Putin overestimates the capacity of education to change ethnic 
identity. Dissent is also featured in the Sunday report.13 Oleg Orlov, president 
of the human rights organization Memorial, argues that tightening registration 
rules will only increase corruption. Boris Makarenko, president of the Centre for 
Political Technology, warns that Central Asians forced to study Russian literature 
may shun Russia altogether. The incorporation of dissenting voices is a reflection 
of genuine disagreements over inter-ethnic relations, but, above all it performs the 
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‘democratic process’ by permitting a dialogue within tightly controlled param-
eters. Before critics are given a voice on the Sunday Vremia, the reporter notes 
that on ‘matters of principle’ (glavnoe) ‘everyone agrees; disagreements relate 
only to specific points’ (raznoglasiia po chastnostiam). Critics are in the minority 
and their remarks are preceded and followed by those of Putin’s unequivocal 
supporters.
The range of voices serves other discursive purposes. A question 
addressed to Putin at the Kislovodsk forum and aired within the second Vre-
mia report consists of an attack on ‘liberal forces’ which ‘reject and hate 
Russia’. The questioner identifies such forces with ‘some of those who aspire 
to be our leaders’ – an indirect reference to the opposition.14 Putin, naturally, 
agrees. Yet Orlov’s doubts about migration rules are accompanied by an attack 
on Russian nationalists whose presence at the anti-Kremlin demonstrations 
Orlov considers ‘a mistake’.15 Following Orlov’s intervention, the report cites 
Putin’s own implicit critique of Aleksei Naval’nyi, the popular opposition figure 
who is not averse to deploying nationalist rhetoric: ‘Slogans like “Stop Feeding 
the Caucasus” appear. If that logic is pursued, Putin writes, … you bring about 
the collapse of the entire country.’16
Orlov’s status as a member of that same opposition authenticates first, the 
aspersions cast upon Putin’s democratic opponents, second, his own rejection of 
the nationalist right and third, the sense that critiques of the absence of democratic 
debate in Russia are unjustified. Orlov is used as a proxy weapon, targeting two 
opponents at once (nationalists and pro-western liberals) and guaranteeing their 
mutual contamination.17
The Sunday Vremia report also accommodates the voices of Aleksandr Prokha-
nov, editor of the nationalist newspaper Zavtra, and Aleksandr Belov, ex-leader 
of the far-right anti-immigration movement DPNI, who reinforces Putin’s argu-
ment in favour of ‘visitors’ adhering to the behavioural norms of their places of 
residence by invoking the familiar stereotype of the Muslim slaughtering a sheep 
on the streets of Moscow. The pluralizing strategy establishes Putin’s position as 
equidistant from both extremes. Through it, Channel 1 enacts ‘democratic plural-
ism’, and constructs the official line as occupying the locus of consensus.
The same strategy is aimed at enacting the ‘unity in diversity’ which Putin 
claims to be central to Russian national identity, for the appearance of ideologi-
cal pluralism is matched by an inter-ethnic equivalent. The voices of a Russian, 
the Chechen Kadyrov and a Tatar (Dzhemal) are joined by that of Alla Gerber, 
selected to represent the liberal position within Russia’s Jewish community, who 
endorses Putin’s rejection of Naval’nyi’s ‘separatist’ logic. The Sunday Vremia 
report is structured as a collation of different views on Putin’s account drawn from 
across the political spectrum, and from a multitude of nationalities.18 The purpose 
of the overblown rhetorical performance of unity can thus be seen as providing 
a polemical rebuttal to perceptions of disunity. When presenting the report on 
Putin’s contribution to the Kislovodsk forum (an event whose North Caucasian 
location was itself significant), the newsreader includes in his introductory gloss 
the claim:
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Old and young, Orthodox and Muslims, people of different experience and con-
victions, are united in their love for their common motherland. In terms of its 
national, religious and social make-up, this is perhaps the most complex region 
in our country and it has survived more than one historical drama. But in spite 
of these problems, when we are united we are undefeatable, Putin recalled.19
But the unanimity expressed in the Kislovodsk forum barely confounds the image 
of a region torn by conflict. In this sense, the assertion of harmony uncovers the 
disharmony against which it is directed. Putin’s own attempt to set the tone for the 
forum illustrates the perils of the polemical strategy: ‘One of the most impressive 
examples of our strength of spirit and capacity for self-sacrifice was the legendary 
defence of the Brest Fortress. Its immortal defenders consisted of people from 
different nationalities.’20
Not only is the Brest Fortress not in Russia, but the state which defended it (the 
USSR) fragmented in 1991, precipitating the very conflict that brought Putin to 
Kislovodsk at that time. Moreover, there is more to the hegemonizing strategy 
than the mere achievement of ideological equidistance. It must be accompanied 
by an effort to articulate the common values underpinning that unity. Gerber’s 
endorsement of Putin in the Sunday report is followed by the reporter’s suggestion 
that ‘Supporters and critics of Putin’s proposals agreed on one thing: that we all 
need to begin with ourselves – to behave with respect toward visitors, no matter 
where they are from.’
Implicit here is one of the main themes to emerge from Putin’s article: the call 
for adherence to behavioural norms. The Sunday report deploys the voice of the 
Russian writer, Zakhar Prilepin, to convey the message that the call is a general 
one, reflecting a universal value:
We give each other bribes, steal from one another, scratch one another’s 
backs and the Caucasians who come here and do the same irritate us. But 
let’s resolve our own problems and the Caucasians and other people living in 
Russia will come on board.
Prilepin’s comments undermine the objectivity claimed for the appeal for adher-
ence to common norms. His superficially ‘balanced’ summary is preceded by the 
rather more partial commentary of a politologist, Leonid Davidov, who confirms 
that Putin’s call for a universal commitment to cultural norms on all sides is a 
euphemistic mask for an assault on the specificities of migrant behaviour:
In the article the accent was placed on the fact that migrants must not break 
local customs and traditions. This applies to everyone and the most vulgar 
crude and flagrant behaviour ought to be harshly, though legally, dealt with. 
It is an especially good signal for the peoples of Russia’s South.21
In effect, Davidov highlights the suspicion of all sub-cultural diversity inherent in 
Putin’s ‘traditionalist’ model of multiculturalism, which is based not on a shared 
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liberal adherence to individual rights but on the recognition of historical and cul-
tural commonalities of citizens of Russia. Channel 1’s use of proxy voices enables 
the different sub-textual currents in Putin’s ideological hybrid to be recalibrated 
so that the universal terms are coded with strong ethnic undertones. Analogously, 
the use of neutral terms such as ‘welfare recipient’ serves as a right-wing code for 
America’s black underclass.22
Closely tied to the ‘behavioural norms’ theme is that of corruption and ‘the 
equality of all before the law’. The rhetorical strategy is identical; an issue is 
extracted from the Manezhnaia ‘archive’, detached from its North Caucasian con-
text, then transformed via quasi-direct discourse into a universal principle authen-
ticated by Putin, and finally adopted as a code term:
The disturbances on Manezhnaia Square, the shoot-out in Sagra and the ear-
lier riots in Kondopoga: these events are … unified by one thing – corruption 
and the incompetence of the law enforcement organs. ‘We need to raise the 
level of competence of our law enforcement organs … So that the local pop-
ulation feels protected … When all are equal before the law – then there will 
be no problems’.
These gestures short-circuit the universal/particular relationship. Rather than the 
universal (‘the equality of all before the law’) subordinating to it all particularities 
(Russian, Caucasian, Tajik, etc.), the meaning of that universal is covertly altered 
to apply to one term (Caucasians) exclusively. This is the reverse of what happens 
with what Putin terms the ‘cultural code’. Here, a singularity (‘Russian language, 
culture and tradition’) is overtly accorded universal value.
In the V kontekste edition of 26 January dedicated to ‘the national question’ 
and focused on the discussion of Putin’s article, Svanidze acknowledges the dan-
ger posed by the insidious ethnic coding of terms such as ‘corruption’,23 offer-
ing his own socio-economic account of the phenomenon. Yet, despite the fact 
that Svanidze’s view has support from Putin’s own statements, the host, Maksim 
Shevchenko, is sceptical of the idea that corruption arises solely from a gener-
alized inequality, and he challenges Svanidze twice on the point. Shortly after 
Svanidze’s intervention, Shevchenko attempts a third time to ‘bring the discus-
sion back to concrete issues’: ‘Can we talk about concrete things? … What about 
the specifics of when a person from a Tajik village arrives? …’
Venediktov supports Svanidze’s liberal position on the implications of Putin’s 
article. They are opposed by Dugin and Govorukhin. The selection of participants in 
this talk show is an attempt to give voice to ‘extremes’ – Svanidze and Venediktov 
on the left, versus Dugin and Govorukhin on the right. Putin’s hybrid position thus 
appears as consensus-building and stability-endorsing. Indeed, every main point of 
his article is enthusiastically supported by one or another speaker. The programme 
ends with Shevchenko’s own description of Putin’s article as a clear guide for how 
to manage inter-ethnic relations in Russia by ensuring everyone’s ‘equality before 
the law’ and by accepting and respecting cultural differences, yet maintaining the 
primacy of the Russian language and of Russians as the ‘state-forming people’.
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Compared with post-election talk show coverage of the ‘national question’, 
the participants and the moderator of the 26 January edition of V kontekste are 
careful not to present the situation in Russia as alarming and out of control, nor 
to disagree openly with any of Putin’s statements. When an edition of the same 
programme broadcast just three days before the election discussed the key issues 
that the new president would need to address, the ‘national question’ did not fea-
ture at all.24 This downplaying of problems in the sphere of inter-ethnic relations 
other than in connection with the debate around Putin’s article reveals an acute 
awareness of the potentially explosive nature of the issue, and of the fact that it 
tends to polarize rather than unite society. It also points to broadcasters’ uncer-
tainty concerning their ability to maintain the superiority of Kremlin-sponsored 
discourse on the ‘national question’ over competing discourses.
Rather than offering more opportunities for disagreements, other Vremia reports 
during the presidential election campaign further narrowed down coverage of the 
‘national question’ to construct an image of Putin as the supreme guarantor of 
inter-ethnic harmony. In a highly staged representation of Putin’s meeting with 
his supporters at Moscow’s Luzhniki stadium on 23 February 2012, the Sunday 
Vremia report foregrounded Putin’s capacity in this regard in its account of how 
his supporters viewed him. (Putin’s own address to the crowd did not feature any 
discussion of inter-ethnic relations.) The first pro-Putin voter to be given a voice 
was from Dagestan. Referring to the Russian army’s repulsion of the invasion of 
Dagestan by the Chechen separatist leader Shamil Basaev’s forces in 1999, he 
hailed Putin for bringing peace to the region at a time of crisis.25 The choice is 
unlikely to be accidental. The 1999 invasion of Dagestan has acquired a symbolic 
meaning in anti-western conspiracy theories, which have flourished in Putin’s 
Russia and were frequently evoked on state-controlled television during the elec-
tion season. The Basaev-led invasion is claimed to be precisely the point at which 
unspecified enemies of Russia, acting in consort with western intelligence ser-
vices, attempted to trigger the country’s disintegration. These accounts represent 
Putin as the politician who saved Russia from being partitioned and put under the 
direct control of western powers.26
State television coverage of the presidential election campaign made no refer-
ence to how the candidates dealt in their public speeches with the so-called ‘Russian 
question’ or of whether the ethnic Russian majority should enjoy special status or 
rights, despite the fact that the issue is of significant public interest. Opinion polls 
indicate that the constitutionally acknowledged equality of all the nationalities of 
the Russian Federation is viewed critically by large segments of the population. 
Of particular concern are the attitudes of young ethnic Russians (aged between 18 
and 25). A 2011 Levada Centre poll on the state of inter-ethnic relations found that 
only 37 per cent of respondents from that group supported the equality of all the 
nationalities of the country, whereas 55 per cent were either in favour of the notion 
‘Russia for the Russians’ or favoured greater rights for ethnic Russians.27
To one degree or another, every candidate exploited such sentiments in their 
public statements. Putin’s evocation of the notion of the ‘state-forming’ people 
was among the more cautious responses.28 Zhirinovskii was, predictably, rather 
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more vocal in addressing the ‘Russian question’. The broadcasters’ decision not 
to dwell on this aspect of the electoral debate represents an acknowledgement 
of its divisive nature and of the Kremlin’s inability to articulate a convincing 
consensual position on it. Similarly, the presence in opposition rallies of Russian 
ethno-nationalists, including those at the extreme pole of the spectrum, tended to 
be mentioned only in passing. Neo-Nazi groups’ participation in anti-Putin rallies 
was ignored. In order to discredit the opposition, by contrast, state broadcasters 
continually underscored its heterogeneity and lack of effective leadership.
Yet it is clear that Putin’s electoral team was aware that inter-ethnic relations 
were perceived in the popular imagination as being in acute crisis, and that vio-
lent incidents interpreted by those affected as having an ethnic basis provoked 
widespread fear. New media were used by the Putin campaign’s organizers to 
exploit this fear. It was reportedly Putin’s electoral headquarters (vybornyi shtab) 
that placed on the Internet a pro-Putin advert warning that unless he was elected, 
Russia would disintegrate along ethnic lines amid a bloody civil war. Alternative 
media, such as REN TV’s Nedelia, discussed the clip, but its appearance and the 
public controversy around it were ignored by the state-controlled channels.
The agenda ‘beyond’ ethnicity
The performative strategy adopted by the state-aligned media during the presiden-
tial election campaign relied, then, on managing consent by both manipulating and 
suppressing the national question. In a parliamentary democracy, the consensual 
centre ground is the point from which hegemony operates. In Gramsci’s theory, 
consensus and hegemony are mutually dependent.29 The question of the extent 
to which the hegemonic process is at work in Russia is contested. According to 
Andrew Wilson, the restricted pluralism accorded to Russian state-controlled tele-
vision is far from hegemonic in the Gramscian sense and amounts to no more than 
a cynically manufactured, superficial, ‘imitative’ democracy imposed by a fully 
subservient media.30 While not rejecting Wilson’s linear account, the position we 
adopt throughout this book is one for which that account oversimplifies a relation-
ship between Kremlin, media and populace which is more dynamic, ‘hegemonic’ 
and complex than the ‘imitative democracy’ model allows. Why, for example, 
should an all-powerful Kremlin need to create such an elaborate artifice if not to 
respond to a popular demand for pluralistic dialogue? The question also arises of 
how well this enacted pluralism fulfils its main function in ensuring that Krem-
lin-sponsored discourse enjoys authoritative status.
Channel 1’s reporting strategies are more consistent with a reading of Russia’s 
wider political environment in which the media are ideologically aligned with, 
but do not merely regurgitate, a Kremlin position that is itself fragmented and 
sufficiently vague to generate multiple interpretations. For example, the deploy-
ment of proxy voices to articulate different emphases within the official stance 
on the national question facilitates the recalibration of the stance from within 
that of opposing forces, enhancing its pre-eminence within the hegemonic pro-
cess. Inversions of the relationship of particular to universal indicate a struggle to 
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inflect definitions of values such as ‘equality before the law’ and ‘the rejection of 
corruption’ with meaning favourable to one political or social force. Yet the man-
ner in which the polemical subtext to the performance of inter-ethnic harmony 
exposes the disharmony against which that performance is directed confirms the 
fragility of any position of hegemonic dominance.31
In exploring how ethnicity informs the hegemonic process beyond the topic’s 
seemingly limited presence in Putin’s overt election campaign agenda, we might 
first touch upon the broader fate of axiological principles emerging from dis-
course specific to the ‘national question’ article. On 6 February 2012, Putin pub-
lished in Kommersant (another newspaper with a reputation for independence) his 
fourth campaign article, dealing with ‘Democracy and the Quality of Our State’. 
It includes one whole section on ‘corruption’ and another on ‘Russian federalism’. 
In the latter, Putin refers to ‘countering blatant separatism as well as its latent, 
subtle varieties, along with breaking up the convergence between certain regional 
authorities and organized crime or nationalist groups.’ He grounds his defence of 
‘a strong federal centre’ in the claim that
People’s lifestyles are determined by their specific traditions, customs and 
models of behaviour. Therefore, we have certain assets of unquestionable 
value, namely the powerful consolidating factors such as the Russian lan-
guage, Russian culture, the Russian Orthodox Church as well as Russia’s 
other traditional religions.
Here Putin is clearly developing the ‘cultural code’ concept from his earlier arti-
cle. The Vremia and Vesti reports on this article broadcast the same evening single 
out the passages on corruption, ensuring that the longest direct quote from the 
‘Democracy’ article is drawn from them.32
The initial ‘overview’ article, published in Izvestiia on 16 January 2012, like-
wise references corruption and the ‘fight against separatism’. Vremia’s coverage 
of the third article (published in Vedomosti on 30 January 2012), on the econ-
omy, highlights Putin’s identification of the key issue facing Russia’s domes-
tic economy, connecting it with the legal context familiar from his approach to 
the ‘national question’: ‘The main problem is a lack of transparency … in the 
workings of state representatives, from customs and tax services to the courts 
and law enforcement system. To call a spade a spade, we are talking about sys-
temic corruption.’33 In the reports broadcast by Vremia and Vesti on Putin’s fifth 
article, published in Komsomol’skaia pravda on 13 February 2012, the theme of 
corruption surfaces again, this time in relation to housing issues: ‘The recipe is 
familiar: fighting corruption and monopolism; greater transparency and private 
investment.’34
Naval’nyi and the populist ‘chain’
Ethnicity’s centrality to the hegemonic process is indicated by the sublimi-
nal manner in which it colours the corruption theme so ubiquitous in Russian 
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political discourse. The corruption theme is most closely associated with Aleksei 
Naval’nyi, who first rose to fame in the western media following the 2011 Duma 
elections, when he brazenly dubbed the Kremlin-backed United Russia ‘the Party 
of Swindlers and Thieves’. In July 2013 the charismatic blogger was sentenced to 
five years in prison, having been convicted of a specious embezzlement charge. 
Released in a surprise move before he had served any of his term, he went on 
to provide an unexpectedly robust challenge to Sergei Sobianin in the Moscow 
mayoral election of September 2013, and remains a popular force. In February 
2014 he was again placed under house arrest for participating in an opposition 
demonstration against the sentencing of the Bolotnaia protesters.
Naval’nyi has used his specialist legal knowledge to conduct a relentless cam-
paign against corruption at the heart of the Russian body politic, a phenomenon he 
links directly to Putin. Revulsion at corruption is widespread and the authorities 
attempt to use it as their own tool for political mobilization. Putin and his most 
serious opponent are engaged in a battle to inscribe themselves into this popular 
sentiment, and to externalize one another as its objects. The official counter-strike 
against Naval’nyi is based on a strategy of tarring the campaigner with his own 
brush and undermining his popular reputation by associating him with the crimi-
nality that he, in turn, attributes to his pursuers. Here, all pretence at pluralism 
is abandoned. Channel 1 turned to Mikhail Leont’ev, presenter of the virulently 
pro-Kremlin opinion piece, Odnako (However):
That our ‘Bolotnaia’ opposition is so painfully concerned about corruption 
… and that Comrade-Mister Naval’nyi is at the forefront of these concerns, 
every child knows. Yet the fact that Mister Naval’nyi is himself a highly paid, 
hired entrepreneur in the services of that very same corruption is known to a 
much narrower circle.35
Though Leont’ev’s accusation lacks credibility, Naval’nyi is a more complex fig-
ure than is suggested by the western media’s image of him.36 His anti-corruption 
fight aligns him with the movement for political change in Russia and has enabled 
him to form allegiances with other leading liberal opponents of the Putin regime.
Naval’nyi was a prime mover in the protest against electoral fraud on Bolotnaia 
Square between December 2011 and February 2012, and in demonstrations on Push-
kin Square that followed the March 2012 presidential elections. He has, along with the 
likes of Grigorii Iavlinskii of the liberal Iabloko Party, called vociferously for ‘honest’ 
elections and democratic reforms. Yet Naval’nyi often underscores his Orthodox faith. 
He was initially ambivalent in his support for Pussy Riot, rejecting their ‘desecration’ 
of the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour but vocally opposing their incarceration and 
trial.37 Furthermore, he played a leading role in the Russian nationalists’ ‘Stop Feed-
ing the Caucasus’ campaign. In his LiveJournal blog he rebutted those accusing him 
of fomenting extremism, suggesting that they had ‘fallen into the traditional trap of 
the liberal and are describing chimeras and prejudices’ when they claimed dramati-
cally that ‘the virus of nationalism is very dangerous’ and that ‘a packet of yeast and 
we all die. Pogroms will begin’. He went on to contend:
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I don’t see in the discussion of questions of budgetary equality, fairness and 
the rationale for government grants any threats of universal catastrophe … 
The Kremlin swindlers are paying for the 120% vote extracted for the Party 
of Swindlers and Thieves by ploughing unheard of amounts of money into the 
North Caucasus, not forgetting to take their 30% cut.38
Naval’nyi grounds his participation in the campaign through references to finan-
cial transparency, electoral propriety and equality. Like Putin, though from a dif-
ferent angle, he frames his position from a universalist stance.
Still more controversial is Naval’nyi’s participation in the ‘Russian March’, 
whose slogan ‘Russia for the Russians’ has become a nationalist battle cry. Inter-
rogated about his political allegiances during a Moscow Echo radio interview, he 
described himself as a ‘national democrat’: ‘I am in favour of a democratic form 
of government but I consider that Russia has particular national qualities. We 
differ significantly from European countries, but must definitely seek a European 
path of development. Nonetheless, Russia is no Holland.’39
When pressed on his apparent support for the ‘Russia for Russians’ slogan, and 
on his participation in the ‘Russian March’, Naval’nyi negotiated the tension by 
attempting to combine a commitment to a civic notion of Russian identity with an 
antagonism toward illegal migration:
I mean Russia for Russian citizens, of course … It is complicated to explain 
the meanings that people put into the concept of ‘Russia for Russians’, but 
I think that it is definitely not Nazism. We know that Russia has the highest 
number of illegal migrants in Europe and … those [who support the slogan] 
are really saying ‘Kick migrants out of our country’… When I attend events 
like ‘Russian March’, I see that the overwhelming majority of people are 
quite normal, and they consider themselves nationalists or national demo-
crats … If you ask them what they mean by ‘nationalism’ they will … say 
that they are against corruption, against migration, and against our oligarchic 
economy. According to that terminology, you and I are both straightforward 
nationalists.40
Naval’nyi is a signatory to the manifesto of a small political grouping known as 
‘Narod’ (The People), which confirms that ‘corruption’ is the biggest problem 
facing the Russian state and which envisages its first task as:
to stop the process of the degradation of Russian civilization and the creation 
of the conditions for the development of the Russian people, their culture and 
language and their historical territory. The indigenous (korennye) peoples 
of Russia are firmly inscribed into Russian civilization and have long since 
tied their fate to that of the Russian people. National minorities have all the 
opportunities for successful assimilation, and for the preservation of their 
national specificity.41
188 Difference in question
Acknowledging its nationalist orientation, the manifesto attacks not nationalism 
itself but extremist xenophobia, for giving nationalism a ‘bad name’: ‘National 
provocateurs foist xenophobia on the state with their calls for violence toward 
‘aliens’ (inorodtsam), thus creating a negative image for nationalists.’42
Naval’nyi’s meteoric rise to fame, combined with first his tortured efforts 
to steer a path between the liberal democratic wing of the anti-Putin protest 
movement and its nationalist right; second the Kremlin’s desperate efforts, via 
the media, to marginalize and discredit him; and third the vicious competition 
between the opposing forces to achieve ‘ownership’ of the corruption issue, are all 
indicative of a set of conditions favouring the rise of a populist movement.43 When 
Naval’nyi’s accusations of corruption became intolerable, and in an example of 
an old media ‘reframing’ of a new media subversion, Vesti broadcast a report 
on the discovery of Naval’nyi blogs containing on one hand falsified charges of 
vote-rigging against United Russia, and on the other ‘extremist statements incit-
ing hatred toward Dagestan, Mordovia and Ingushetiia’.44 Unsurprisingly, no 
space was found for Naval’nyi’s rebuttal. The report disrupts what Laclau calls 
the ‘chain of equivalent demands’ on which populism relies, and which threatened 
to coalesce around Naval’nyi.45
For Laclau, populism is not a fixed ideological constellation ‘but a series of dis-
cursive resources which can be put to very different uses’, and which ‘proceeds by 
articulating fragmented and dislocated demands around a new core’.46 He stresses 
the need for heterogeneity as a precondition for populism, but argues that ‘het-
erogeneity … has as a defining feature a dimension of deficient being or failed 
unicity’. The plurality of demands must remain discrete, yet contain the shared, 
unfulfilled urge toward unity which constitutes them as a ‘chain’. 47 When one 
demand becomes core, it acquires the capacity to occupy the position of ‘unity’, 
ensuring that the chain is precisely one of equivalences, without erasing either 
its own distinctiveness or the antagonism of competing demands: the particular 
‘can also have a non-partitive meaning: not a part of a whole, but a part that is the 
whole’. It ‘transforms its very partiality’ in the name of a ‘transcendent universal-
ity’ whose impermanence guarantees the continuation of the hegemonic struggle.48
We have already observed the instability of relations between universal and 
particular in our analysis of Vremia’s coverage of Putin’s election campaign. 
Moreover, the ‘transcendent universality’ can, as Laclau insists, never be per-
manent, for ‘this moment of fusion between partial object and totality represents, 
at one point in time, the ultimate [and unattainable] historical horizon’. Driven 
by the persistent encounter of mutual antagonisms, history is in truth ‘a discon-
tinuous succession of hegemonic formations that cannot be ordered by a script 
transcending their contingent historicity’.49
It is in keeping with Laclau’s account that anti-corruption protests, calls for 
free speech, pleas for economic reform and campaigns around slogans such as 
‘Stop Feeding the Caucasus’ and ‘Russia for the Russians’ should remain dis-
crete, even mutually ‘antagonistic’, demands. The antagonism of representatives 
of Central Asian migrant workers toward the liberally inclined makers of the sub-
tly anti-xenophobic television comedy Nasha Russia (see Chapter 5) illustrates 
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how difficult it is for chains of equivalent demand to form in political environ-
ments lacking the basis for hegemony, such as Russia’s. In the populist process, 
one demand is required to constitute the whole as an equivalence chain and fill 
the ‘empty signifier’ that is the claim to universality with its particular meanings. 
Despite the anti-hegemonic environment, several such impulses converged in 
the Manezhnaia crisis. Naval’nyi, meanwhile, as absent from Russia’s state-con-
trolled mediasphere as he is omnipresent in its blogosphere, juggles them with 
consummate skill. State-controlled television provides a plane on which the state 
enacts its part in the process.
Rather than colouring the entire political landscape, ethnicity features within 
the chain of demands from which a universalist claim to populist ‘transcen-
dence’ might emerge. In themselves, anti-corruption protests may or may not 
carry hidden xenophobic motivations. But the effectiveness of the anti-corrup-
tion protest as a mobilization tool depends on whether it can establish itself as a 
core demand capable of investing universality with its meanings by establishing 
equivalence between disparate demands, several of which have ethnic undertones. 
Little surprise, then, that Naval’nyi, who seems best placed to accomplish the 
elusive feat of transcendence, is persona non grata on Russian state television, 
nor that Vladimir Pozner, who has survived as one of the few relatively inde-
pendent voices left on Channel 1 – at the expense of numerous compromises 
with his principles – issued a threat to cancel his own show after a discussion of 
Naval’nyi, which took place on one edition, was cut (Pozner has prided himself 
on the fact that his show is never censored).50
Naval’nyi’s intuitive ability to re-contextualize popular prejudices promul-
gated by his state media opponents, including those relating to the ill-mannered, 
unintegrated migrant worker, adds a further tool to his armoury.51 He was, for 
example, closely associated not only with drafting the anti-migrant statement 
issued by Russia’s Opposition Coordination Council, formed in 2012 following 
the 2013 murder of a half-Russian, half-Tatar soldier by a Chechen youth in 
Pugachev, but also of persuading the usually liberal journalist Oleg Kashin, 
to sign it (most liberal oppositionists did not follow suit, though the statement 
attracted some support from Moscow Echo listeners).52 During the Moscow 
mayoral campaign of September 2013, he became embroiled in a scandal relat-
ing to an inflammatory entry in his Live Journal blog – an open letter to Sergei 
Sobianin, his Kremlin-backed rival, calling on him to desist from ordering his 
illegal Uzbek migrant worker employees to tear down banners from the bal-
conies of Naval’nyi supporters, claiming that the migrants ‘would tell their 
compatriots how to break into Moscow apartments’, leading to ‘an increase in 
burglaries’.53
The image of the migrant in Russian culture, and the related mythology sur-
rounding the Gastarbeiter, is, as Naval’nyi well understood, redolent with signif-
icance, and in the fast-changing, febrile atmosphere following Putin’s re-election 
it was repeatedly, and often with deeply contradictory intent, deployed by those 
with rather more access to the broadcast waves than Naval’nyi. We will explore 
the full extent of the contradictions in our final chapter.
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Naval’nyi’s knack for reconciling his tactical endorsement of elements of the 
far-right, anti-migrant agenda with his status as a figurehead of the democratic 
opposition to Putin illuminates the suggestive but problematic distinction that 
Tomasz Zarycki makes between core (western) and periphery (eastern) national-
isms in Europe. Zarycki argues:
For the core-countries nationalism the key significant other is the migrant; for 
peripheral nationalism the other is the cosmopolitan liberal, who is betraying 
his country by assisting the core countries in imposition of their symbolic and 
material rule over peripheries.54
He concludes:
In such a context Russia seems to be a case of both a peripheral and a low-
er-level core country at the same time. As a regional centre for part of Eurasia 
it attracts migrants, mostly from the poorer countries of the former Soviet 
Union. At the same time it is increasingly peripheral in relation to the western 
core and resents its pressure in acute forms. These two forces may mutually 
reinforce themselves producing a specific kind of nationalism.55
Zarycki thus accounts for the co-presence within mainstream Russian nation-
alism of both a powerful anti-migrant tendency and the virulent anti-liberalism 
that emerged in television coverage of the Pussy Riot scandal (the subject of 
our next chapter). However, he understands nationalism in a narrow sense 
and solely as the domain of inward-looking, isolationist and xenophobic 
movements and ideologies. Nationalism of all shades has in fact from its 
inception engaged in a transnational trading of ideas and iconographies. It 
has invariably staked universalist claims (Dostoevskii’s Russia as the ‘Christ 
among nations’ representing just one example), and it has frequently sought 
out cross-border allegiances (hence the professed admiration of far-right US 
politicians such as Pat Buchanan for Putin’s social conservatism). Binarism 
of the sort embraced by Zarycki inevitably tends toward collapse. Naval’nyi 
highlights a further complication in that, as his demonization by Russia’s 
official media demonstrates, Russia’s internal ‘liberal other’ is as capable 
nowadays of presenting an anti-migrant nationalist front as it is of promot-
ing European multiculturalist tolerance. Ultimately, perhaps, the Laclauan 
approach to hegemonic ‘chains of equivalence’, not without blind spots and 
limitations of its own, provides the better apparatus with which to interpret 
the Naval’nyi phenomenon.
Federal television’s neurotically exclusionary approach to the figure of 
Naval’nyi went hand in hand with its pseudo-pluralistic coverage of Putin’s 
pre-election article. Each phenomenon pointed to the restricted hegemony char-
acterizing the environment in which it operated. In each case, ethnicity operates 
as a disturbing, intractable underside; it is rarely foregrounded as such. In the 
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maelstrom at the centre of the Russian media prior to and in the aftermath of 
Putin’s re-election, it is displaced onto the theme of corruption around which, as 
we began to see in our analysis of the Manezhnaia riots, the battle for populist 
hegemony raged.
In the Laclauan model, ethnicity remains beyond the limit of the chain of 
equivalences, restricting its scope for expansion and limiting its power. But it 
remains as a trace, tainting and disrupting the hegemonic process. The situation 
is fluid, unpredictable and with any number of conflicting outcomes possible. 
And lest we forget, Gramscian hegemony of the sort which prevails in mature 
democracies only reflects a deeper level of repression; as the 2011 summer riots 
in the UK revealed, mass disorder sparked by ethnic tension is liable at any 
moment to shatter the brittle edifices holding together those societies, too. The 
2010 Manezhnaia riots (when ethnicity leapt to the forefront of the movement 
for change in Russia) and the Pussy Riot scandal of 2012 (when, by contrast, 
the call for freedom of expression was pitted against the aggressive promotion 
of a virulently Church-state symbiosis directed against western liberalism in all 
its manifestations) appear to represent alternative scenarios. As we shall show 
in the next chapter, however, the spectre of the ethnicized ‘other’ remained a 
constant presence lurking beneath the shallow surface of that scandal, too.
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8 An unholy scandal
Profanity, abjection and the 
production of Russian-ness in the 
‘punk prayer’ affair
The making of an (un)orthodox scandal
On 21 February 2012, Aleksei Naval’nyi’s meteoric rise in the firmament of 
Russian opposition ‘stars’ was overshadowed by an event that was to become 
the lodestone of recent Russian cultural history. Four women from the Pussy 
Riot feminist collective entered Moscow’s Cathedral of Christ the Sav-
iour and began performing a ‘punk prayer’ in the sacred altar area (the musi-
cal accompaniment was added to the soundtrack later).1 After 40 seconds they 
were escorted from the church. The ‘prayer’ called upon the Mother of God 
(bogoroditsa) to ‘evict Putin’ (progoni Putina), and attacked the Church hier-
archy.2 Its chorus was a variant on the English phrase ‘holy shit’ (Sran’ gospod-
nia). After the YouTube clip went viral, days before the presidential election, 
three of the women – Nadezhda Tolokonnikova, Mariia Alekhina and Ekaterina 
Samutsevich (one evaded capture) – were charged with hooliganism, intruding 
on a sacred part of the cathedral, wearing clothing ‘manifestly contradicting com-
mon church rules’ and ‘openly expressing disrespect to the Christian world’.3 
The charges were pressed on the grounds that the performers acted out of ‘hatred 
towards Orthodox believers as a social group’. On 30 July their two-week trial 
began amid accusations that their performance was the devil’s work. On 18 
August the women were sentenced to two years’ imprisonment. On 10 October 
Samutsevich was released on probation after appeal. In December 2013, Tolokon-
nikova and Alekhina were also released three months short of their full term, 
thanks to an amnesty of political prisoners which also saw the dissident oligarch 
Mikhail Khodorkovskii freed. (The amnesty was widely believed to have been a 
publicity exercise prior to the Sochi Winter Olympics).
During the legal investigation into the case, law enforcement organs systemati-
cally used archaic lexicon referring to Christian dogmas and rules of conduct in 
church dating to the medieval period. The terms were echoed throughout state-
aligned media coverage of the scandal. ‘Experts’ supported their conclusion that 
the women were motivated by religious hatred by reference to a seventh-century 
Church Council. The preliminary investigation’s indictment stated that the women 
‘denigrated the Russian Orthodox Church’s centuries-old principles and basic 
guidelines in a blasphemous way’ and accused them of ‘opposing themselves to 
the Orthodox world’.4
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The scandal took place on the eve of the presidential elections, and in the con-
text of the liberal opposition’s criticism of the Moscow Patriarchate for offer-
ing its overt support to Putin. It is likely that political leaders were involved in 
the decision to mete out exemplary punishment to the performers. But as our 
interviewees stressed, in implementing the decision, the media had considerable 
agency5 in turning the incident into what Simone Gigliotti calls a ‘limit event’: 
‘an event or practice of such magnitude and profound violence that its effects 
rupture ... so-called civilising tendencies that underlie the constitution of politi-
cal and moral community’.6 According to self-appointed ‘moral entrepreneurs’ 
among Russian media personalities, the performance was part of a larger plot to 
destroy Russia’s key values and norms. In the words of one influential journalist, 
it forced the entire society to ask a fundamental question about national identity 
and values: ‘Who are we?’ In his view, society’s overwhelming response was ‘We 
are Orthodox (pravoslavnye)’.7 Liberal critics of the current regime responded 
by warning about the danger of Russia turning into a clerical state on a par with 
Khomeini’s Iran.8
In fomenting the furore surrounding the ‘punk prayer’, the discourse of federal 
broadcasters was systematically co-ordinated with that of the Orthodox Church 
hierarchy and of Russia’s political leadership, constituting the scandal as a ‘media 
event’ of the ‘collusive’ variety identified in our Introduction. The careful orches-
tration of the television coverage was evident from the fact that a particularly 
large number of talk shows and other feature programmes depicting Pussy Riot in 
a negative light were broadcast on the very days when the Moscow court contro-
versially decided to place the punk performers under arrest during the preliminary 
investigation, reconfirming this decision despite appeals from defence lawyers. 
Until it began to attract the opprobrium of prominent television personalities and 
to incite dispute throughout the Internet, the incident, no more shocking in essence 
than other less notorious acts of épatage performed by Pussy Riot and its affiliate 
group, Voina, was known and discussed only at the fringes of Russian society.9
The mediatization of the ‘punk prayer’ centred on representations of the perfor-
mance in the cathedral as a historical turning point which triggered ‘the madness 
of vandalism’ against the Orthodox Church and unexpectedly put the Church at 
the centre of ‘passionate battles’ between the opposition forces (depicted as an 
unrepresentative minority) and law-abiding, loyal Russian citizens. In the months 
to follow, news programmes and talk shows on the two main television channels, 
as well as on NTV, widely covered the Pussy Riot case. Before the presidential 
elections, there had been sharp differences between the more measured approach 
typical of news reports and the approach of talk shows, where extreme opinions 
were rife. The Pussy Riot coverage eroded this distinction. Now, apocalyptic 
visions of moral breakdown based on bizarre conspiracy theories and a strikingly 
Manichean representation of the world pervaded programmes of both genres. 
They invariably linked the incident to a recurring set of issues: a moral crisis in 
society stemming from the violation of boundaries between the permissible and 
the impermissible and the sacred and the profane; threats to Russia and the Ortho-
dox Church from opposition plots masterminded by internal and foreign enemies; 
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societal demands for tougher actions against transgressors of public morals and 
order; and Russian citizens’ overwhelming adherence to traditional values. These 
issues were directly linked to key elements in the emergent official discourse char-
acterizing Putin’s third presidency.
Once the media had performed its work, Russian society found itself sundered, 
with liberals expressing despair at the abandonment of secularism and Orthodox 
believers divided between those who called for Christian mercy and those inflamed 
with distorted rage at the ‘blasphemy’ of the acts. In a distortion of another kind, 
western media sources meanwhile depicted a supine court system enacting its 
masters’ wishes, glossing over the complex relations between the Kremlin and 
its intermediaries. On state television (itself an intermediary institution), these 
complexities are foregrounded and will form one of the issues we treat in this 
chapter. Our eventual goal is to show how, via the ‘space of opinion’10 provided 
by television coverage of the scandal, the ‘ethnic residue’ that we discussed in 
the context of Naval’nyi’s incipiently hegemonic anti-corruption campaign rose 
dramatically to the surface.
In addition to our usual analysis of news reports, we focus on eight shows 
devoted to Pussy Riot that aired between March and October 2012: Channel 1’s V 
kontekste and Pust’ govoriat (Let Them Speak), three special editions of Rossiia’s 
Spetsial’nyi korrespondent (Special Correspondent), Leont’ev’s Odnako opinion 
piece on Pussy Riot presented within the format of Channel 1’s Vremia and two 
editions of Rossiia’s Poedinok (Duel) debate show. Although not all these pro-
grammes are talk shows strictu sensu, they each feature discussion and rely on oral 
polemic for their effects. In media event mode, Pussy Riot function as a mecha-
nism for renegotiating the boundaries of consensus in a society divided between 
conservative forces loyal to Putin’s embattled regime and an opposition identified 
with the forces of ‘otherness’. Within the rapidly changing Russian media envi-
ronment, the precarious balancing act of the immediate post-Manezhnaia period 
is abandoned as the new boundaries provide a gateway through which sub-official 
and non-official voices of a distinctly uncompromising tone infiltrate the main-
stream. Moreover, official discourse fails to re-authenticate itself by internalizing 
those voices, and thus fails to occupy the locus of authority. We demonstrate how, 
by boldly erasing key temporo-spatial distinctions and by permitting associative 
displacements from the main narrative line, scandalized talk show participants 
further undermine the authority of that discourse.
Prime among the discursive displacements from the Pussy Riot scandal was 
the paranoid vitriol launched by the Orthodox Church and the hyperbolic pro-
fessions of piety. Viewed through the prism of Kristeva’s ‘theory of abjection’, 
these phenomena are linked to central issues of consensus, identity and inclusion/
exclusion,11 for both the visceral disgust and the religious indignation relate to the 
‘abject’ status of the three women as ‘of the national community’ yet ‘not of it’, an 
ambiguity Kristeva associates with religious rituals of defilement of the sacred. In 
re-making consensus through abjection, and in filtering populist voices from the 
peripheries into the mainstream, the Pussy Riot scandal produces a new, radically 
exclusionary form of Russian-ness, but it also exposes contradictions deep within 
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the consensus-making process that we examined in Chapter 7. The instability to 
which they point, and which penetrates the discussion show format, foreshadows 
an alarming transposition of the mark of ‘absolute difference’ from Pussy Riot to 
‘the ethnic other’ as embodied in the Gastarbeiter – the topic of our final chapter.
Context: ‘Orthodox nation’ to the fore
Before we trace the manufacturing of the Pussy Riot affair in detail, we should 
set it in the context of a change in television coverage of religious affairs during 
the preceding period. Until near the end of the Medvedev presidency, fed-
eral media approaches to religion were characterized by a managed pluralism 
of faiths; Orthodoxy retained a privileged position in a hierarchy of coverage, 
albeit that this gave limited space to Islam, and less still to Russia’s other faiths. 
Most notably, Rossiia has since 2004 broadcast a ten-minute weekly programme 
entitled Musul’mane (The Muslims). While presenting a positive image of Islam 
as it has been historically practised in Russia, in every edition the programme 
re-enacted Russia’s multi-confessional and multi-ethnic ideal, according to which 
the peaceful coexistence of the four traditional religions have made the Russian 
state powerful. It did so, however, with a consistent emphasis on the exceptional 
importance of Orthodox Christianity.12
The same carefully restricted pluralism was reflected in the representation of 
opinions. An instructive example is to be found in the reporting of the contro-
versial law of 19 November 2010 on the transfer of state property to religious 
organizations. Coverage of debates around the law was undoubtedly selective. 
For instance, unlike alternative broadcasters such as Dozhd’ and REN TV’s Ned-
elia, Rossiia and Channel 1 failed to report scandals around the Moscow Patri-
archate’s attempts to use the law in order to take possession of buildings which, 
prior to the region’s annexation by the Soviet Union, had belonged to the Cath-
olic or Lutheran Churches.13 The news reports there were on the subject did not 
overtly marginalize the law’s critics, even though the Patriarch branded this crit-
icism ‘blasphemy’ (koshchunstvo).14 Channel 1 journalist Maksim Shevchenko, 
who was to become the Moscow Patriarchate’s self-appointed campaigner on the 
Pussy Riot scandal, noted that society was split in its assessment of the law, point-
ing out that the Church was not the only institution which had suffered injustices 
under communist rule.15
On 7 January 2012, Orthodox Christmas, there was a subtle but significant 
change. In a seemingly innocuous news story, Vesti reported Patriarch Kirill’s 
comments on the display across Russia in October–November 2011 of the cinc-
ture of the Theotokos, a medieval relic whose story is described in a sixth-century 
Byzantine legend. The display of the relic in different Russian cities was widely 
covered by state-aligned broadcasters in late 2011. When recounting the story of 
the cincture in October–November 2011, news reporters introduced their accounts 
with the words ‘according to legend’ (po predaniiu). While noting a great interest 
in the relic among Orthodox believers, it was acknowledged that far from every-
one was happy about its arrival in their city. The complaints were recognized 
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by Vesti as a legitimate position for a Russian citizen to hold. Church leaders’ 
comments on the importance of the relic were distinguished from the newsread-
er’s reporting speech and did not dominate the coverage.16
The Vesti report of 7 January 2012 was very different, consisting entirely of 
Patriarch Kirill’s comments. According to the Patriarch, ‘not a single event, either 
political or sport-related, had ever mobilized so many people’. ‘This astonishing 
event’, he claimed, ‘has stirred the whole of society’. He concluded that such 
strength of religious feelings ‘shocked those who hate our faith’. In the report 
the Patriarch’s direct speech and the reported speech of the newsreader merged 
seamlessly.17 This story signalled a departure from hitherto dominant techniques 
of representing the role of Orthodoxy in society. Now the Church and the Ortho-
dox faith were Russia’s key binding force, the primary marker of Russian identity 
and the very foundation of Russian nationhood. Reflecting a Manichean and con-
spiratorial view of the world, those holding alternative views of the exhibition of 
the cincture were depicted as enemies of Russia, whose only possible motivation 
was hatred.
This shift must be understood within the context of the political situation. The 
widespread falsification of the results of the 4 December 2011 parliamentary elec-
tions provoked mass public protests across the country. On 10 December 2011, 
less than three months before the March 2012 presidential elections, tens of thou-
sands of people demonstrated in Moscow; the same day protests took place in 98 
other Russian cities and in 42 cities abroad.18 Oppositional media presented the 10 
December demonstration as the largest political protest in Russian history.
The developments could not but create major concerns for the Kremlin, as the 
official discourse drew parallels between protest demonstrations in Russia and 
the Arab Spring. As early as 8 December, Putin’s prominent ideological adviser, 
Vladislav Surkov – who would be officially entrusted with oversight of the mass 
media and of the relationship between the state and religious organizations in the 
course of the next few months – met with a group of journalists and intellectuals 
in the Presidential Administration headquarters to discuss how to react to growing 
public activism. For our understanding of the relationship between the media and 
the Kremlin, it is important to note that, according to Shevchenko and the well-
known writer and journalist Viktor Shenderovich, both of whom reported on the 
meeting in their blogs, this was not an occasion at which the Kremlin’s wishes 
were merely ‘handed down’. Instead, the two sides engaged in a collective brain-
storming.19 The participants reportedly included influential television journalists 
in addition to Shevchenko, as well as the political commentator Sergei Kurginian, 
who became a key figure organizing pro-Putin public events in 2012.
Following this meeting, representatives of the Church, commencing with the 
Patriarch’s confessor (dukhovnik), and later including the Patriarch himself, 
began to urge Russian citizens not to participate in opposition protests.20 This first 
intervention by the Patriarch’s confessor signalled a new turn in the relationship 
between the Russian Orthodox Church and the state. From this point the Church 
was to participate in politics to a far greater degree than had hitherto been the 
case, with the Patriarch playing a particularly important role. It would not be too 
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far-fetched to speculate that, in December 2011, the conclusion was reached that 
the Moscow Patriarchate and Orthodoxy more broadly could be a vital tool in 
mobilizing the population against the opposition.
Opinion poll data might help explain why the interpretation of Russian Ortho-
dox Christianity offered above all by Patriarch Kirill was now framing the official 
discourse so overtly, and why state-aligned media began adopting particular rep-
resentation techniques in their religious coverage. According to Levada Centre 
surveys, by the end of the first decade of the new millennium over 70 per cent 
of respondents identified themselves as Orthodox, even though 40 per cent of 
those said they did not believe in God. While the polls indicated poor Church 
attendance, they also pointed to high levels of superstition. A poll of August 2010 
reported that 61 per cent and 53 per cent of the respondents admitted their belief in 
the evil eye and miracles, respectively.21 In 2012 the Church and the media began 
exploiting the popular fascination with miracles. The state has a dual reputation, 
emphasizing corruption and aggression but also unity and protection; the latter is 
strengthened by the state’s association with the Church.22 With an understanding 
that the Church enjoys considerable ‘symbolic capital’, and amid concerns about 
the weakening of its position, the Kremlin appeared to have decided to draw more 
actively on this capital in order to authenticate its own enfeebled discourse.
Anathema, talk and consensus
From the outset, the Church’s symbolic capital was at the centre of the strategy 
to constitute the Pussy Riot scandal as a media event. For this reason, reporting 
on the incident amounted to more than mere demonization and had a ‘positive’ 
aspect to it, based on the opportunity for active consensus-building that the ‘punk 
prayer’ performance offered. The Channel 1 talk shows Pust’ govoriat and V 
kontekste provided complementary contributions to this process. The V kontekste 
edition of 15 March 2012 quoted in the opening pages of this book was hosted 
by Shevchenko, whose guests included Church representative Maksim Kozlov, 
human rights group leader Ol’ga Kostina, art critic Marat Gel’man and liberal 
campaigner Kseniia Sobchak.23
Shevchenko introduced the discussion by dismissing portrayals of ‘these maid-
ens (devits)’ as ‘tragic heroines’. Exploiting his position as moderator to expel 
them beyond the boundaries of accepted opinion, he intervened constantly in the 
debate, for example characterizing what they did as ‘spitting into the souls of 
believers’. The use of sarcastic lexicon (devits) and the deployment of hyperbole 
offer a vernacular embodiment of the act of expulsion, but with an anachronis-
tic religious colouring. The trajectory of the discussion served the dual roles of 
authenticating the expulsion as something accomplished by actors at odds with 
one another with regard to all other things, and tracing the progress of the expul-
sion across the timespan of the broadcast.
The discussion concluded with unanimity that the women must be punished. 
The fact that the preceding debate included sharp exchanges merely reinforced 
the authenticity of the eventual congruence. Indeed, amid a vigorous exchange 
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of views held by people from opposing ends of the political spectrum, the 
intervention from Kozlov quoted in our Introduction, in which he refers to ‘the 
slowly maturing consensus’ reached via ‘maximal disagreement’, simultaneously 
states the fact of the consensus, displays it ‘in action’, inserts itself within the 
‘maturing’ process and names it. This illustrates televised discussion’s centrality 
to the state-led consensus-building process advocated in Putin’s pre-election arti-
cle, exemplifying how its pseudo-Socratic format facilitates its ideological work. 
Consensus-building is always bi-aspectual and must exclude in order to include. 
As we shall see, the balance was later to shift toward exclusion, with a corre-
spondingly diminished performative effect.
The structure of a Pust’ govoriat edition dedicated to the scandal bears super-
ficial comparison with that of V kontekste. Like Shevchenko, the host, Andrei 
Malakhov, set the parameters for the debate, adopting Orthodox lexicon to frame 
it: ‘We are going to … get to the bottom of what … punishment those who … 
defaced holy Orthodox sacraments deserve, and how to exorcize the devils which 
have insinuated themselves into our souls’.24 Initially undercutting the consen-
sus-building mechanisms, such lexicon was soon to sweep across federal media 
discourse on the ‘punk prayer’, eventually establishing itself at the heart of a 
new, highly exclusionary and aggressively oriented consensus. The performance 
was regularly described as an example of ‘outrageous blasphemy’ (bezobraznoe 
koshchunstvo), ‘an act of demonic possession’ (besnovanie), ‘a witches’ Sabbath’ 
(shabash), ‘a satanic ritual’, ‘a demonic dance’ and ‘spitting in the soul of believ-
ers’. The performers were described as ‘Macbeth’s witches’ and ‘the possessed’ 
(oderzhimye and besy). A Rossiia journalist who interviewed Tolokonnikova in 
prison claimed that he saw ‘sparkles of devilry (nechistoi sily) in her eyes’.25
However, rather than lending this medieval lexicon popular authenticity, Mal-
akhov’s informal demeanour, the raucous atmosphere cultivated in his studio dis-
cussions and the show’s ‘permissive’ title, Let Them Talk, undermine it. Having 
seemingly resolved the tensions permeating the discourse of V kontekste’s com-
munity of ‘moderate’ intellectuals, official rhetoric fails to embed itself within 
the vernacular discourse dominating Pust’ govoriat. Like Shevchenko, Malakhov 
positions himself as a believer; in what became a leitmotif of television cover-
age of the scandal, his first question to the father of Tolokonnikova, the only 
Pussy Riot sympathizer present, was ‘Are you a believer?’ Tolokonnikov cut a 
despondent figure facing a hostile studio audience, his voice silenced by a chorus 
of condemnations from a panel of guests whose very selection consolidated the 
boundaries of national consensus,26 including representatives of the Church and 
Duma deputies, a Muslim hierarch, an actress and writer, a group of Cossacks 
and Maksim Shevchenko, present as a guest rather than a host, with Jewish activ-
ist Alla Gerber the only discordant voice. The range of guests thus models the 
‘multi-cultural, multi-faith Russia’ from which Pussy Riot excludes itself.
There was, however, robust argument over the Orthodox value of forgiveness. 
Again exploiting the informal setting to deploy non-standard lexicon, Shevchenko 
suggested that these ‘females’ (baby) be made to sweep the streets. The Cossacks 
went further, proposing a good whipping. Others in the Pust’ govoriat discussion, 
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however, argued for leniency, recalling Christ’s meek nature. A lively exchange 
also took place over the role of parental responsibility: Tolokonnikova had left a 
four-year old daughter behind after her arrest and Malakhov blamed Tolokonniko-
va’s own degeneracy on her upbringing. Her father’s silent isolation within the stu-
dio symbolized his position beyond the space within which ‘free speech’ can occur.
The Cossack call for physical retribution was not isolated. In Odnako, 
Leont’ev’s vitriolic diatribe concludes with the proposal that the women be 
spanked – a suggestion accompanied by Leont’ev’s claim that such a punishment 
would ‘re-establish a link with reality through tactile contact’.27 Odnako’s position 
at the heart of, yet separate from, the Vremia bulletin epitomizes vernacular talk’s 
problematic role in elaborating official policy by inflecting it with the colourful 
language in which popular discourse abounds. Vernacular speech is also more 
permissive than official news discourse with regard to the use of hyperbole and 
false equivalence. Thus, Leont’ev deploys a crude rhetorical ruse when presenting 
Pussy Riot’s protests as the metaphorical equivalent of abuse directed against the 
Patriarch, referring to his ‘persecution’ by a witches’ Sabbath’ and to ‘a bestial 
rage’ indicated by the ‘abundance of foul language’.28
False equivalences abound. In the V kontekste debate, Kostina lists Pussy Riot’s 
actions alongside a notorious, unrelated incident of a policeman in Tatarstan who 
sodomized a detainee with a champagne bottle.29 Its status as a subplot deriving 
from the peripheries of the news realm is what, in the logic of popular discourse, 
enables it to reinvigorate the mainstream account with the vitality of public scan-
dal, to be transmitted from person to person and eventually to insinuate itself at 
the core of the ‘approved’ Pussy Riot narrative.
The conflation of violent and non-violent law-breaking is not restricted to the 
popular sphere with its relative laxity with respect to linguistic and conceptual 
categories. It is also inherent in the hooliganism charge: as the defence lawyers 
pointed out, their clients caused no physical damage to person or property. In an 
instance of official–sub-official symbiosis, the outpouring of media vitriol, with 
its breaches of rhetorical convention, provides a discursive underpinning for the 
conflation. But it is also associated with a process by which the three women are 
progressively ‘othered’. Leont’ev’s use of the phrase ‘bestial rage’ is not coinci-
dental. It is reinforced visually by the main news bulletins covering the Pussy Riot 
trial, whose photographs of the women huddled together as objects of curiosity in 
the glass prison cage, known as the ‘aquarium’, in which they stood trial came to 
be iconic images. In a curious instance of discourse appearing to generate reality, 
subsequent reports of food and sleep deprivation barely raised an eyebrow outside 
the most opposition-minded circles.
The animal imagery was closely connected with Pussy Riot’s ‘bestial’ act of 
‘defilement’. This enabled the scandal to be drawn into the orbit of inter-eth-
nic relations, with commentators taunting liberal opponents with questions about 
how Muslims might have reacted if their own sacraments had been defiled. The 
singer Elena Vaenga generated a new media subplot around this theme in the 
verbal web of scandal when she misspelled the word ‘mosque’ (mechet’) in her 
Twitter diatribe, eliciting scorn from Sobchak. Retrieving this ‘meme’ from the 
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shadowy hinterlands of official Kremlin thinking, Putin himself proposed that, 
had the controversy occurred in the Caucasus, ‘the police even would not have 
had time to arrest the women’ (in other words, they would have been lynched), 
implying that their alterity exceeds that even of the less-than-civilized Muslim 
world. With Putin’s approval, this line gained momentum and was re-circulated 
throughout the state media, eventually eliciting a rebuttal from the Russian Coun-
cil of Muftis, which noted that the Quran cites an incident in which Moham-
med demanded forgiveness for a man who urinated in a mosque.30 The business 
channel, RBK, also included an acerbic rejoinder from imam Nail Mustafi, who 
branded the Pussy Riot controversy implicitly anti-Semitic for its propagation of 
conspiracy theories centring on a ‘Russophobic’ intelligentsia, as well as Islam-
ophobic in the assumptions made by the likes of Putin.31
Meanings circulated between the realms of the official (the Kremlin line), the 
sub-official (the state media; the Orthodox Church) and the unofficial (popular 
culture). Because the Putin regime’s legitimacy was draining away, and because 
its ideological framework had not rooted itself in popular consciousness, its pro-
nouncements were authoritarian rather than authoritative, and relied upon the 
credibility of spheres over which its power was less than absolute (primarily the 
Church). Putin’s own comments on the Pussy Riot episode in his 3 August 2012 
interview in London, his subsequent interview with Russia Today on 5 September 
and his October interview at a meeting of the Valdai club confirm this reliance.32 
His definition of the ‘punk prayer’ as a ‘witches’ Sabbath’ (an expression used 
earlier in Leont’ev’s Odnako and elsewhere33) and his lynching claim point to an 
unreflective dependency on lexicon and rhetoric developed by media personalities 
in the preceding months.
The Moscow Times singled out from among the prosecution’s far-fetched accusa-
tions the charge that the ‘punk prayer’ inspired a terrorist attack on Muslim leaders 
in Tatarstan.34 The Moscow Echo highlighted another interview in which the prose-
cutor at the Pussy Riot trial drew parallels between the ‘punk prayer’ performance 
and 9/11.35 The lexicon of ‘religious hatred’ became a leitmotif of conservative inter-
ventions into studio discussions of the trial, the talk show functioning as a filter for 
controlling the entry of sub-extreme rhetoric across the boundaries of official space 
whose construction it has, in a complementary gesture, modelled. In the V kontekste 
debate, a variant on the theme emerges in Kozlov’s invocation of Huntington’s ‘civi-
lizational clash’ rhetoric during the exchange between him and Sobchak quoted in our 
Introduction. By the end of the Pussy Riot controversy, the talk show’s dual mecha-
nisms had served their purpose and re-foregrounded that rhetoric within the official 
mainstream, a phenomenon whose earlier prominence in coverage of the Manezhnaia 
riots confirms the linkage between these two seminal events, and between issues of 
ethnicity and the related form of alterity represented by Pussy Riot.
The blasphemer as conspirator
In beginning to explicate the construction of that alterity, let us first recall Kozlov’s 
reference to the alluvial ‘dregs’ contaminating ‘traditional Russian culture’ from 
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the exchange quoted in our Introduction. Kozlov’s visceral image captures the dis-
gust Pussy Riot elicited in its opponents. While Putin was more restrained, Deputy 
Prime Minister Rogozin used Twitter to abuse the American pop star Madonna for 
offering her support to Pussy Riot, calling her a ‘clapped out, moralizing slut’ and 
advising her to ‘either take off your cross, or put on your knickers’.36 Nonetheless, 
Rogozin’s vulgar insult corresponded with the genuine revulsion felt by sections 
of Russian society.
The gendered aspect to the discourse of disgust emerges clearly in Arkadii 
Mamontov’s trilogy of programmes all bearing the title Provokatory (Provoca-
teurs), broadcast in Rossiia’s investigative Spetsial’nyi korrespondent series at the 
height of the scandal – on 24 April (Provokatory-1), 11 September (Provokatory-2) 
and 16 September (Provokatory-3). The first consisted of a documentary film 
purporting to uncover the ‘truth’ behind what the mainstream media referred to 
routinely as the ‘debauchery’ (debosh) in the cathedral. The film was framed by 
animations of black snakes writhing lasciviously, condensing sexual revulsion, 
animal imagery, religious obscurantism and the notion that the women serve a 
poisonous external force. It included a confrontation with an Amnesty Interna-
tional representative whom the Rossiia reporter presented with a photograph of a 
pregnant Tolokonnikova copulating in public, asking if these are truly ‘prisoners 
of conscience’.37 The camera cuts to the studio audience, wearing expressions of 
repulsion, as they model the disgust that the film provokes in viewers.
A reporter interviews the women in prison. Tolokonnikova receives most 
attention, with the camera lingering in extreme close-up on her striking fea-
tures, demonstrating the reverse mirroring of desire and revulsion. Samutsevich 
is asked why she has no children: her response – that she rejects conventional 
gender roles – meets with predictable scorn. The themes of motherhood and 
anti-motherhood infiltrate the discursive space around Pussy Riot. We con-
front the ‘revolting’ image of the pregnant, copulating Tolokonnikova and the 
anti-maternal views of the feminist Samutsevich. Later, in a further proliferation 
of the verbal promiscuity that scandal generates, Sobchak is attacked, via Vesti, by 
the husband of the singer whom she had ridiculed for criticizing Pussy Riot: ‘She 
is proposing that Valeriia, a mother of three, should take a rope and commit sui-
cide. It would be better if she got herself a husband and had even one child before 
telling people how to live.’38 The implied counter-images to the anti-mother are, 
of course, the Mother of God, defiled by the punk performance, and – beyond the 
epicentre of the ‘punk prayer’ controversy – the maternal image of the Buranovsk 
Grannies, Russia’s entry in the 2012 Eurovision Song Contest, which conve-
niently coincided with the scandal. The fact that the Grannies sang in both Udmurt 
and English enabled them to negotiate the links between Russian-ness, (ethnic) 
difference and modernity in a configuration which, as Putin revealed in a presi-
dential address, was altogether more reassuring for him and his media acolytes.39
Provokatory attempted to rationalize the visceral antagonism it incited against 
the anti-mothers of Pussy Riot by answering the question, ‘who lies behind the 
‘outrage?’. Predictably, the female blasphemers are for Mamontov and his guests 
merely the ‘puppets’ of a ‘global government’ in which Berezovskii, the exiled 
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Jewish oligarch, plays a prominent role. Footage of the 9/11 attack is replayed 
within the same sequence in which Berezovskii is shown writing to Naval’nyi, 
who is also drawn into the conspiracy. Conservative bloggers noted that the inter-
national campaign for Pussy Riot was led by Aleksandr Gol’dfarb, a New-York 
based Jewish publicist. Pro-Putin writer Eduard Bagirov suggested that Pussy 
Riot’s support was limited to ‘emigrants, kikes and queers’.40 In his tract on the 
clash between ‘universal liberal values’ and ‘national cultures’, Patriarch Kirill 
traced the source of these values to ‘protestant theologians and Jewish philoso-
phers’.41 Anti-Semitism, Islamophobia and fear of the democratic movement are 
synthesized in an irrational, paranoid narrative, Pussy Riot’s anonymous balacla-
vas and shapeless, unfeminine clothing confirming the conspiratorial logic.
The conspiracy was portrayed as having two sources: one historical and specif-
ically Russian; the other contemporary and purportedly emanating from beyond 
Russia. The historical origins of the crisis were found in the anti-Church activ-
ities of the pre-revolutionary liberal Russian intelligentsia, and in the Soviet 
regime’s anti-religious campaigns. A direct link was then made between these 
past events and the liberal opposition’s current criticism of the Moscow Patriarch-
ate and alleged hostility to Christianity. For instance, a member of the Provoka-
tory audience, well-known nationalist author Egor Kholmogorov, claimed that the 
liberal intelligentsia had been manifesting ‘its hatred of the country, the people 
(narod) and religion since the Crimean war [of 1853–6]’.42 For Kholmogorov 
and Mamontov, the Pussy Riot performance was a continuation of that historical 
trend. Similar comparisons between past and present were repeated in many other 
programmes, where the ‘punk prayer’ and acts of vandalism against churches 
and religious objects reportedly inspired by the performance were referred to 
as ‘a wave of crimes’ or even ‘a war’ against the Church on a par with Soviet 
anti-religious campaigns.43 Frequent references to Soviet repressions against the 
Church reflected a shift in the current official representation of Soviet history as 
compared to the previous decade, in which the official line often amounted to a 
whitewashing of Stalinism.44 In 2012, Stalin’s terror and other repressive Soviet 
policies were systematically condemned and the need to suppress the opposition 
was justified by references to the government’s determination not to allow a repe-
tition of the bloodshed which followed the Bolshevik revolution.
The second, contemporary source of Russia’s purported ‘moral crisis’ was 
located in the west. In 2012, federal broadcasters began placing developments 
in Russia within the broader context of a broader religious crisis in the world, 
enabling them to universalize the ‘moral transgressions’ identified in Russia. 
Echoing a claim made by Patriarch Kirill,45 Shevchenko maintained in the Rossiia 
talk show, Poedinok, that the west had initiated ‘a war’ against religion, excluding 
it from the public sphere. According to Shevchenko, the assault on religion was 
part of a larger campaign to destroy the traditional values of non-western societies 
in order better to control them. The Poedinok broadcast was devoted to the dis-
cussion of a controversial draft law which proposed introducing a punishment of 
up to five years in prison for ‘offending the religious feelings of believers’.46 A 
staunch supporter of the law, Shevchenko further argued that the new law would 
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act as a shield between Russia ‘and the godless, anti-Christian civilization of the 
west’ whence threats to ‘our religion and traditional values’ emanated.47
According to Shevchenko, Mamontov and other federal broadcasters, then, the 
Pussy Riot performance was an episode in an international war in which Russia 
was on the front line. It was a conspiracy or a provocation (provokatsiia) by inter-
nal and external forces who aimed to undermine the Church, which, according to 
the Patriarch, and now also leading television journalists, had historically been 
Russia’s ‘main binding force’ (skrepa).48 Sometimes plotters were vaguely hinted 
at; at other times their identities were revealed. Most prominent among them were 
members of the liberal opposition allegedly funded by western agents and by 
Berezovskii, who had been working for regime change in Russia. The Church was 
their prime target because, according to the Church hierarchy (in words echoed 
by state broadcasters), for centuries it had ‘constituted the foundation of Russian 
statehood’. When interviewed on Vesti nedeli on 9 September 2012, the Patriarch 
stated ‘I cannot help thinking that [the Pussy Riot performance] was an act of 
reconnaissance [razvedka boem]’, preceding a more sustained attack on Russian 
statehood.49
In keeping with the conspiracy narrative, every speaker in the ‘studio discus-
sion’ which dominated Provokatory began by declaring his religious faith and 
sympathy for the Patriarch’s wounded sensibilities. Mamontov concluded the dis-
cussion with a sentimental anecdote about how in Soviet times, when swimming 
in the pool built on the site of the pre-revolutionary Cathedral of Christ the Sav-
iour, he had dreamed of a time when cupolas would rise again from the spot, and 
how this dream had been sullied by the ‘demons’ of Pussy Riot.
Sacred boundaries and political apostasy
The Pussy Riot conspiracy narrative was frequently shaped by an obsession with 
delineating the boundaries separating the sacred from the profane, the lawful 
(dozvolennoe) from the lawless (bespredel) and, thus, the authentic Russian ‘self’ 
from its deviant, conspiring ‘others’. Widespread violations of these boundaries 
were persistently reported during the course of the ‘punk prayer’ scandal, foster-
ing a state of moral panic capable of delegitimizing attempts to defend the ‘trans-
gressors’ and geared toward soliciting public support for tougher state control 
over public order.
The sacred/profane boundary gradually became central to the media event, 
displacing the more inclusive boundary of the societal consensus articulated in 
the V kontekste discussion mentioned earlier. Unlike the latter, with its abstract, 
political connotations, the sacred/profane boundary goes to the heart of a commu-
nity’s sense of selfhood and has for this reason played a key role in the history 
of most cultures; even secular societies today retain a strong awareness of the 
taboos which violate what is ‘sacred’ to them and are liable to prove unacceptably 
provocative to large sections of the public. As Emil Durkheim puts it, ‘there is 
no other example of two categories of things as profoundly differentiated or as 
radically opposed to one another’ as the categories of the sacred and the profane. 
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‘The sacred thing is, par excellence, that which the profane must not and cannot 
touch with impunity.’50
In constructing the ‘punk prayer’ incident as a media event, state-aligned 
broadcasters went to great lengths to depict the Church of Christ the Saviour as 
a supremely sacred space, therefore rendering the Pussy Riot performance the 
ultimate act of desecration. The strategy proved effective. As we began to see 
even in the V kontekste discussion, members of the liberal opposition who had 
criticized the authorities tended nonetheless to accept the view that a religious 
space had been violated. Marat Gel’man framed his contributions to various 
television discussions of the Pussy Riot incident by invoking the sacred/profane 
boundary.51 Speaking on the Poedinok programme on 27 September 2012, the lib-
erally inclined Rossiia journalist Nikolai Svanidze argued that spaces and objects 
relating to the memory of the Second World War could also be regarded as sacred, 
and that their violations should not be left unpunished.52
The sacred/profane boundary is often called upon to construct a particular reli-
gious tradition and to bind it into the history and identity of a nation in such a way 
as to free it from the bureaucratic abstractions of the state.53 During the Pussy 
Riot campaign, broadcasters projected an image of the Russian Orthodox Church 
not as the state’s powerful ally, but as a vulnerable, long-suffering institution in 
need of protection from attacks by those whose aim was to weaken Russia. Coun-
tering representations of the Moscow Patriarchate as the dominant state-aligned 
religious institution in the country, the state-controlled channels claimed that in 
Russia and elsewhere, ‘Christianity and Orthodoxy are subjected to particular 
hostility’.54
From the period of witch hunts in late medieval and early modern Europe, the 
violation of the sacred/profane boundary has been associated with sexual trans-
gressions and the violation of gender roles.55 In line with this tradition, talk shows 
dedicated to the incident incorporated regular attacks on gays and lesbians as the 
people ‘who corrupt our youth’.56 A programme about Pussy Riot broadcast by the 
populist NTV channel on 6 April 2012 was a particularly striking example linking 
religious, sexual and gender transgressions.57
The overt political goals behind the emphasis on boundary-drawing via an 
assault on ‘deviance’ are revealed in the repeated claim that it is these ‘transgres-
sors’ who lead the criticism of the government. Alongside liberal critics of Putin’s 
regime, television viewers are told, the opposition included gay and lesbian activ-
ists and those who present acts of asocial behaviour as modern art. Despite their 
heterogeneity, these groups are purportedly united by their disdain for Russia and 
for the Orthodox Church. Strikingly, such reprehensible attitudes are also linked 
to the ethnically specific transgressors. Drawing a direct parallel between the 
current opposition and liberal parties in late imperial Russia, Arkadii Mamontov 
claimed in Provokatory-2 that ‘At the turn of the twentieth century... so-called 
progressive-liberal newspapers supported all religions apart from Christianity... 
Then the aim was to destroy Russian statehood.’ While he spoke, the screen dis-
played a caricature of a Jewish rabbi sacrificing a cock, along with the head of the 
last Russian emperor.
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As we saw with Manezhnaia, a stable Pussy Riot narrative took time to crys-
tallize. In March 2012, programmes like V kontekste acknowledged, even if hes-
itantly, that society was far from united in its position on Pussy Riot. In the 15 
March edition, Marat Gel’man was permitted to argue that the Russian Orthodox 
hierarchy provoked the Pussy Riot performance.58 By April 2012, society was 
being portrayed both in talk shows and in news coverage as homogenous, with 
the overwhelming majority of people belonging to ‘a social group of Orthodox 
believers’, ‘out of hatred’ for whom Pussy Riot had performed its act of hoo-
liganism. The possibility that there could be a variety of opinions even among 
Orthodox believers had rapidly diminished. Believers could now profess only one 
view. In the words of Kozlov, who regularly represented the Church in television 
debates on Pussy Riot, anyone with a ‘religious mentality’ would understand that 
the ‘punk prayer’ performance was ‘an act of blasphemy’.59
Official television accounts of the scandal reflected a clear order of voices, 
regardless of genre. The opinions of those perceiving the Pussy Riot performance 
as causing deliberate offence to religious feelings, a transgression which the 
authorities were obliged to prevent, invariably featured in the introductions and 
conclusions to talk shows and news reports, with those holding dissenting views 
given a brief slot in the middle. The dissenters themselves were located beyond 
the bounds of normal, mainstream, Orthodox society.
In 2012, two events were covered particularly intensively on state television 
as part of an effort to perform society’s unity through its adherence to ‘tradi-
tional Orthodox values’. One was the display across Russia of the cincture of the 
Theotokos. The Patriarch’s claim that it had solicited a level of public participa-
tion unprecedented in Russian history was aired repeatedly in television news 
reports and talk shows, as a means of countering the opposition’s claim that the 10 
December 2011 anti-government demonstration in Moscow had been the largest 
public gathering ever.60 Another such event was a series of communal prayers 
organized by the Patriarch across Russia on 22 April 2012 in response to what 
was claimed to be a wave of violence against the Church in the aftermath of the 
Pussy Riot performance. Vremia’s report on the event framed it in the context 
of a ‘mighty force’ loyal to the state and a scheming, apostate opposition which 
regarded the state as of questionable value.61
Also in common with Manezhnaia, the dominant narrative eventually infil-
trated alternative media accounts propagated by the very liberal groupings that it 
targeted. Dozhd’ and other non-official media were undoubtedly alert to disunity 
among prominent spokespeople for the Patriarchate, and also highlighted the facts 
that one of the Pussy Riot artists, Mariia Alekhina, was a member of an Orthodox 
youth movement and that some priests and lay people active within the Church 
has condemned the arrest of the performers and were generally critical of the 
Church hierarchy.62 At the same time, like their state-aligned rivals, alternative 
channels structured much of their reporting of the scandal around the sacred/pro-
fane boundary, though often in inverted form.63 By focusing on material rather 
than spiritual issues, they argued, the Church itself transgresses – for instance, 
by renting out space in the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour for secular events.64 
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They shared the official view of the scandal as an important turning point, but 
they defined the nature of the societal change differently and suggested that the 
case signalled a turn toward ‘growing aggression and intolerance’. They also 
resorted, albeit less consistently than the state channels, to conspiratorial specu-
lation. Speaking on Dozhd’ on 20 June 2012, biblical scholar Andrei Desnitskii 
suggested that the authorities deliberately manufactured the Pussy Riot incident to 
enable a split between the Church and the liberal intelligentsia.65
Furthermore, paradoxically, the alternative media at times endorsed state tele-
vision’s representation of society as Orthodox. REN TV’s Nedelia broadcast of 29 
September 2012 included a report on the impact of the Pussy Riot case on society 
at large, arguing that one could now talk about ‘two Russias’: one was represented 
by a young church warden prone to violent religious activism; another by a busi-
nessman who collected religious art.66 Significantly, the businessman also empha-
sized his Orthodox belief, placing both Russias on the same side of the sacred/
profane boundary as the Russia portrayed in the dominant narrative.
Abjection and the imaginary
How, though, do we link the media’s orchestrated narrative of sacred and profane 
with the flights of sheer conspiratorial fantasy and visceral disgust exemplified in 
Mamontov’s Provokatory? The question means we must return from the realm of 
apostasy and alterity to that of identity. In order to better understand the identifi-
cation process at work, we must revisit the authentic revulsion felt by sections of 
Russian society in reaction to the ‘punk prayer’.
Offering an account of identity formation inflected by, but not reducible to, 
psychoanalytical models, Julia Kristeva centres her ideas on the disgust evoked 
in us by bodily excretions, gaping wounds, the taste of certain foods and, above 
all, the smell of human corpses. The automatic gagging response produced by 
such experiences indicates the body’s impulse to reject what it finds alien (note 
Pussy Riot’s disgustingly Kristevan refrain ‘Sran’ gospodnia’, or ‘excrement of 
the Lord’, and the fact that the women made Medvedev ‘physically sick’).67 But 
the underlying aetiology of disgust is attributable to the fact that the phenomena 
evoking it are ‘of the body’, yet separate from it:
These body fluids, this defilement, this shit, are what life withstands … on 
the part of death. I am at the border of my condition as a living being … The 
corpse, the most sickening of wastes, is a border that has encroached upon 
everything … the utmost of abjection. It is death infecting life.68
While she writes in an uncompromising personal mode, for Kristeva the princi-
ple of abjection clearly operates also at the level of culture. Indeed, as Kristeva 
recognizes, to engage with issues of identity (whether national, community, 
group, personal or other) is unavoidably to deal with affinities in the relation-
ships between self and other, internal and external, individual and collective; 
with the liminal and with acts of transgression:
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It is thus not lack of cleanliness … that causes abjection but what disturbs 
identity, system, order. What does not respect borders, positions, rules. The 
in-between, the ambiguous, the composite. The traitor, the liar, the criminal 
with a good conscience, the shameless rapist, the killer who claims he is a 
saviour … By abjection, primitive societies have marked out a precise area 
of their culture in order to remove it from the threatening world of animals.69
Importantly, rather than a secondary process, abjection is the act by which the 
subject, collective or individual, is constituted:
I expel myself, I spit myself out, I abject myself within the same motion 
through which “I” claim to establish myself; it is thus that they see that “I” 
am in the process of becoming an other at the expense of my own death.70
Equally crucially, the ‘constitutive other’ common to identity theories in multiple 
disciplinary domains (political, anthropological, sociological, or cultural) dwells 
not beyond but within the borders of the subject: ‘I experience abjection only if an 
Other has settled in place and stead of what will be “me” … an Other who precedes 
and possesses me, and through such possession causes me to be.’71 Kristeva’s the-
ory can help us explicate the associations linking several features that we have 
identified in our analysis so far: the visceral disgust expressed toward the women 
of Pussy Riot by sections of Russian society, the persistent animal imagery accom-
panying their media representation and cultural perceptions of their ‘treacherous 
ambiguity’: they are ethnic Russians, but aligned with alien forces (the ‘global 
government’; Islamist extremism); they are women, yet somehow not ‘feminine’; 
they are child-bearing, but non-maternal. Also consistent with the Pussy Riot epi-
sode is Kristeva’s account of the links between abjection and the sacred, according 
to which ‘a whole facet of the sacred, true lining of the sacrificial, compulsive, and 
paranoid side of religions’ has to do with invoking ‘rituals of defilement’ in order 
to ‘ward off the danger’ that the emergent community might yet slide back into 
an earlier state in which its boundaries lack distinction.72 Paradoxically, the very 
aggressive certainties spouted by Mamontov and others betray a deep-seated fear 
of the loss of a community identity that has yet to acquire enduring authenticity.
In Kristeva’s account, moreover, phobia is merely the ‘opposite correlative’ of 
narcissism.73 Thus, the disturbing liminality of the abject underlies the mirror-like 
close-up of the desirable yet repulsive features of Tolokonnikova, the anti-mother, 
in Mamontov’s Provokatory, for ‘The more or less beautiful image in which I 
behold … myself rests upon an abjection that sunders it as soon as repression, 
the constant watchman, is relaxed … Abjection is therefore a kind of narcissistic 
crisis.’74 The phobic obsession with ‘global governments’ corresponds closely to 
the ambivalence which Kristeva locates in the image of the Jew, which she links 
in turn to the liminality of the woman:
He is … the one we do not differentiate … a conjunction of waste and object 
of desire …The Jew becomes the feminine exalted to the point of mastery … 
210 Difference in question
the border where exact limits between same and other, subject and object, 
inside and outside, disappear – hence an Object of fear and fascination. 
Abjection itself. He is abject: dirty, rotten.75
In a parallel reading, Slavoj Žižek associates Jewishness with Lacanian ‘excess’: 
‘that already within us which is more than us’, and which can stand for an infinite 
range of incompatible ‘others’:
Jews are … not another subject that I encounter in front of me but an alien, a 
foreign intruder within me …. The amorphous intruder of infinite plasticity 
and an un-dead ‘alien’ monster who cannot ever be pinned down to a deter-
minate form.76
In the Jew, capitalism and communism, Islamist and western liberal, can co-exist 
without contradiction. The overt anti-Semitism which peppered Russian nation-
alist discourse in earlier decades had been superseded by anti-Caucasian and 
anti-migrant sentiment as the dominant form of prejudice in Russia;77 however, 
it is now re-emerging in a covert form as the unspoken referent of liberalism, the 
west, homosexuality, non-conformism and terrorism.
What, though, of offended Orthodox sensibilities? Here, the temporal logic of 
the scandal is inverted. Rather than a pre-existent Orthodox community, repelling 
the incursion across its borders, that community is constituted by the very act of 
repulsion – for abjection, and the accompanying repression, coincides with the 
constitution of the ‘social dimension of man’.78 In Kristeva’s schema, full social-
ity is preceded logically by immersion in an imaginary phase, in which the emer-
gent community suddenly recognizes itself in the other, and as other, and is thus 
able to constitute itself as whole and integral. For Fredric Jameson, the imaginary, 
‘whose logic is essentially visual’, marks ‘a fundamental gap between the subject 
and its own self or imago which can never be bridged’.79 It is characterized by 
obsessive narcissism, and by a transitional phase in which, struggling to come to 
terms with the realm of alterity, the emergent subject misattributes its own actions 
to others. Jameson refers to this as the ‘indifferentiation of subject and object’, 
when ‘the child who hits says he has been hit, the child who sees another child 
fall begins to cry … slave [is] identified with despot, actor with spectator, victim 
with seducer’.80 This is precisely the logic of the Pussy Riot scandal, in which 
the extreme hostility displayed toward the ‘blasphemers’ is transferred back onto 
them, and a mythologized Russian people must ‘defend themselves’ from the con-
spiratorial forces of liberalism. ‘The state is not defending us’ was a recurring 
refrain in the Provokatory series. Provokatory-2, meanwhile, features an activist 
who, mimicking his nemesis, ‘defiles’ a t-shirt worn by a Pussy Riot supporter, an 
illegal act met with approval by the purportedly law-upholding audience.
The notion that Russian society remains in a pre-social, imaginary phase is 
strengthened by Dmitrii Kiselev’s startling claim in his interview with us that 
Russian television’s core audience is so primitive that it needs to be ‘colonized’;81 
in the imperial discourse which Kiselev consciously invokes, colonial subjects 
An unholy scandal 211
were regularly compared to (and viewed as) children. For Kristeva and Jameson, 
that pre-social phase is also characterized by category confusion and the childlike 
inability to distinguish subject from object, metaphor from reality. The accusation 
that Pussy Riot metaphorically ‘spat in the soul of believers’ is thus equated with 
the reality of violent aggression.
The category confusion was by no means restricted to a small number of televi-
sion talk shows, nor even to the ‘punk prayer’ scandal. It manifested itself too as a 
conflation of legend and fact in a co-ordinated campaign of exhibiting relics across 
Russia which began in early 2012. From that point, even news reports ceased to 
include explanations that the description of the relics’ nature derived from medi-
eval legends; instead they were now presented as real and miracle-performing 
objects, belonging unquestionably to Mary, Jesus and various saints. On 2 April 
2012, Vesti reported on the display in a church in Birobidzhan of a shroud, 
robe and belt supposedly belonging to the Virgin Mary. Without acknowledg-
ing that legends surrounding these objects date to the fifth century, the reporter 
commented: ‘Many people regard it as a miracle that things used by the Blessed 
Virgin Mary have survived until today’.82 From June to September 2012, in the 
wake of the ‘punk prayer’ scandal, a series of ‘miracle-performing’ relics, some 
brought from abroad, was displayed in churches across Russia. In highlighting 
these events, television effectively enacted a ‘collective psychosis’, in which the 
logical categories of the figurative and the referential, the imaginary and the real, 
broke down.83
As Jameson points out, within the realm of the imaginary, the confusion of sub-
ject and object often precipitates an inversion of roles. In the Provokatory trilogy, 
blasphemy’s rhetoric of inversion begins in part 1, where Mamontov defends his 
patronizing use of the term ‘girls’ in reference to Pussy Riot by citing his char-
acteristically Russian ‘over-generosity of spirit’ (transferring his own aggression 
to the threatening other). In part 3, he uses the term ‘blasphemers’ (koshchunitsy) 
as a fixed epithet (his aggression toward the other is now reassumed by the self). 
Rather than a weapon to repel the threat posed by an increasingly vocal oppo-
sition, Mamontov’s trilogy is, in Kristevan terms, a ritualistic enactment of the 
process by which the community of Orthodox Russians guards against the threat 
of a loss of distinctness and identity.
It is in accordance with the Kristevan account, too, that in the first and sec-
ond instalments speakers line up to agonize over how ‘we’ have allowed ‘our’ 
young people to descend into ungodliness. Throughout the third episode cen-
tring on the figure of Tolokonnikova’s partner, Petr Verzilov, who lived in 
Canada as a boy and has Canadian residency rights, part of the collective ‘we’ 
separates off to become ‘they’. The circles in which Verzilov moves belong to 
a virulent strain of an anti-Russian disease introduced into the collective body 
from abroad. Elena Vaenga, meanwhile, refers specifically to Pussy Riot as ‘trai-
tors’. In the first episode, the dominant appellation was ‘puppets’ (mannekeny). 
In Provokatory-1 and 2, as an expression of their outrage at the acts of blas-
phemy spreading across Russia, several speakers ask pointedly ‘Who are we?’ 
Their question is echoed in Pussy Riot’s masks of anonymity, indicating that the 
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processes of boundary (re)definition and (threatened) collapse cut across multiple 
communities.
The scandal chronotope as anti-media gesture
If televisual anathematizing is akin to religious rite, how do the media for-
mats in which the process takes place facilitate it? Let us return to V kontekste 
and Provokatory. Broadcast at either ‘end’ of the scandal, they represent two 
poles of a narrow spectrum. Shevchenko’s programme follows the outline of 
the democratic forum in which people holding different opinions challenge one 
another and the moderator, and genuinely compete for pre-eminence in the dis-
cussion. Despite his brazen efforts to impose his own views, the questions that 
Shevchenko poses are open-ended and the participants reflect the main strands 
of opinion about Pussy Riot.
By contrast, with the exception of a single, token ‘atheist’, Mamontov’s guests 
all express the same, conservative views. Representatives of the liberal wing 
are absent. The speakers reinforce rather than challenge one another, in a form 
of what Iurii Lotman calls ‘auto-communication’.84 Mamontov poses leading 
questions with pre-scripted answers. The very thematic question motivating the 
trilogy – ‘Who is behind them?’ – does not allow for competing responses. The 
only acceptable answer is provided by the ‘documentary’ films screened before 
each discussion, which leave little open to debate. While the trilogy is conceived 
as a sequence, memories are wiped clean between the films, and the argument 
they project requires constant recapitulation. At the beginning of Provokatory-3, 
Mamontov plays the role of a teacher dubious that his ‘class’ has assimilated pre-
viously taught material. Re-presenting the ‘facts’ of the case, he ‘speculates’ that 
there may be a plot behind them, before turning to his guests to ask ‘but what do 
you think?’ and receiving their dutiful response.
Rather than dismissing the Provokatory trilogy as mere paranoid propaganda, 
we must ask why, when state television is clearly capable of presenting its case 
more subtly, it should resort to the antics of the playground. The playground met-
aphor is apposite, not only in connoting a pseudo-infantile regression but also 
because Mamontov’s shows put one in mind of the rabble of the playground, in 
which a victim is subjected to conspiratorial gossip, ritual abuse and mockery, 
and where the purpose is not to debate but to re-confirm group identities through 
an act of exclusion. The inclusion of the token atheist enables the scapegoating 
hitherto reliant on an absent victim, to test the sentiment that it has generated in an 
‘encounter’ with the victim himself. In Provokatory-3, Mamontov intimidates this 
victim in the manner of the playground bully, infringing his personal space and 
addressing him with sarcastic menace as ‘my dear fellow’ (dorogoi moi).
The logic of Provokatory is that of Bakhtin’s carnivalized public scandal: 
the shock of the exposed, sexualized body (the women’s obscene dancing), 
the intrusion of the profane into sacred space and the inversion of hierarchies 
(the despicable punk displacing the high priest). Such breaches of propriety 
provoke hyperbolic outrage (‘this God-defiling action’) rabble-rousing abuse 
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(‘koshchunitsy’; ‘izvrashchentsy’), gossip concerning their origin (Berezovskii; 
the global government; Gol’dfarb), scapegoating and mockery. By showing the 
documentaries in a continual loop as the discussions proceed, the programmes 
re-enact both the original scandal and the shocked reaction of its witnesses.
The space of the studio is a model for scandalized society. The rabble-rouser-in-
chief occupies the central position in front of the ‘crowd’. A privileged front 
row is occupied by Orthodox dignitaries and intellectuals loyal to the state (the 
antithesis to the art collective, Voina), journalists and representatives of official 
youth movements (mediators between the centre of power and broader society). 
Behind them sit ‘the people’, whose role is limited to clapping and hissing their 
disapproval.
Scandal space is accompanied by a collapsed temporality in which events from 
different periods (the ‘punk prayer’, the 2006 Litvinenko scandal, 9/11, the 1917 
revolution, the pre-revolutionary period) can be edited into an undifferentiated, 
scandalized ‘present’. The waiving of the requirement for logical sequence affects 
the relationship between the three parts of the trilogy, and between different narra-
tive lines within each. The fact that the focus on Berezovskii in part 2 is replaced 
in part 3 by a new emphasis on Verzilov – the Canadian citizen and ‘new Lenin’, 
as he is described contemptuously – is contradictory only within conventional 
time–space. In the scandal chronotope, stories, rumours, gossip and conspiracies 
circulate in parallel, and in sequence, without any requirement for causal links.
Nonetheless, Mamontov’s trilogy is a radical departure from even Russian 
television’s distorted approach to balance. Dismissing accusations that he was 
skewing the discussion in his favour, Mamontov claimed in an interview with a 
popular Russian newspaper that he was countering the media sympathy that the 
‘blasphemers’ had elicited from liberals:
The presenters of current affairs programmes seemed to be reporting the infor-
mation neutrally, but with the subtext that these girls were in the right. I … 
decided that I would not take part in this devil’s choir … I invited people rep-
resenting that part of society which has no access to the media, which is not so 
eloquent.85
Mamontov’s trilogy was a counter-strike against a western-influenced media 
biased against the traditional values of those who felt the ‘punk prayer’ episode 
was an outrage.86 When pressed on the lack of evidence for his claims, Mamontov 
abandoned all pretence at reason:
So who is Berezovskii, the Pope or what? I was told he was involved once 
and that’s all I need. … And why have you decided that I must reveal every-
thing exactly when you want me to. I will explain when I want.87
Mamontov’s refusal to follow the conventions of televised discussion is itself 
a provocation against preferred liberal media formats. ‘Form’ and ‘content’ 
converge: the calculatedly ‘anti-liberal’ format of Provokatory coincides with 
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the assault on liberal sentiments expressed within them. We have turned full 
circle from Kozlov’s intervention in V kontekste signalling the correspondence 
between the ‘idea’ of a consensus in favour of traditional values and free-flow-
ing, ‘western-style’ discussion. In Provokatory, there is again a meta-level 
correspondence between format and ‘ideas’, but as an ‘anti-media’ gesture in 
which, by adopting the scandal chronotope, the very principle of open-ended 
discussion is rejected as an imposition from a media in hock to western powers.
When the media via which anti-western sentiments are expressed are them-
selves subjected to those sentiments, the very notion of ‘representing otherness’ 
becomes problematic, since the represented ‘other’ inhabits the tool of represen-
tation. Other areas of the Russian establishment experience similar meta-level 
transformations. The law itself was rejected as alien to Russian tradition even as 
it was being practised. When Mamontov is reminded in the interview that blas-
phemy is not illegal, he replies ominously: ‘Well, it will be from now on! Our 
criminal code was created by atheists, who in 1917 began to destroy our church.’88
From Provokator to Gastarbeiter
As Mamontov’s anathemas (and those of other leading television personalities) 
broadened to include multiple assortments of the marginalized and the excluded, 
the indirect implications for ethnic cohesion became apparent. However, the 
theme of ethnicity had already infiltrated Mamontov’s discourse in a more direct 
sense. In Provokatory-2, reference was made to a Voina performance in which 
three dummies (representing a Gastarbeiter, a Jew and a homosexual) were 
‘hanged’ in a Moscow supermarket. Mamontov criticizes the performance, point-
ing out that it soon became known in the Internet community as ‘The Execution 
of the Homo and the Gastarbeiter’.89 A member of Pussy Riot, claims Mamon-
tov, had participated in the ‘dummies’ performance, undermining her claims to 
speak for enlightened, ‘liberal’ Russia. Here, the conspirators not only scheme to 
destroy Russia, but unbeknown to their western admirers, align themselves with 
the forces of unenlightened intolerance with which these same admirers identify 
Pussy Riot’s antagonists.
Mamontov’s interpretation of the ‘puppets’ performance wilfully misreads it as 
not a satire on intolerance but an endorsement of it. The misreading was repeated 
by Putin and by Dmitrii Chizhov, Russia’s representative in Brussels, who was 
reported by Vesti as asking:
How would the European Parliament react to one of their [Voina’s] esca-
pades when they organized a public burning (sic) of the dummies of a Jew, a 
homosexual and a Gastarbeiter? How would these opponents of anti-Semi-
tism, and defenders of the rights of minorities and Gastarbeiters, square these 
things?90
Chizhov is guilty of no fewer than four errors (replicated by Putin and Mamon-
tov): the performance involved people rather than dummies; there were five rather 
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than three (the performance was dedicated to the memory of the five Decem-
brists who, in the Soviet historical canon, initiated the movement which led to the 
1917 revolution); they were ‘hanged’, not ‘burned’; the performance was directed 
against intolerance, not liberalism. Deliberate deception aside, such distortions 
occur when an incident circulates across the multiple platforms of a sustained 
media event. Putin and Chizhov are repeating stories generated by that media 
event helpful to their position. The logic of rumour, gossip, subplot, pre-history, 
misinterpretation, over-interpretation, tirade and counter-tirade surrounding 
Pussy Riot tends toward displacement and obfuscation and the scandal’s status as 
media event drives that process.91
Whether or not the disingenuity of Mamontov and others involves calculation 
or immersion in the web of obfuscation, they momentarily occupy the subject 
position of the tolerant liberal, affronted by incitement of anti-minority hatred. 
Their stance is facilitated by the fact that the Decembrist performers temporarily 
adopted the viewpoint of the intolerant extremist precisely to expose the inhuman-
ity that is incited by an atmosphere of hostility to minorities. Voina’s discursive 
strategy – appropriating the mentality of their target in order to mock it – is evi-
dent, too, in the accompanying paraphernalia: a banner reading ‘Siberia for the 
Siberians’, a parody of the anti-migrant ‘Russia for the Russians’.
Rather than appropriating the other’s discourse to ridicule it, the tactical occu-
pation of the ‘liberal’ position transforms anti-Kremlin antagonists into extreme 
versions of the intolerant self, while recasting the latter as a moderate version 
of the other. The fact that Voina adopted the same strategy in reverse indi-
cates a mutual entanglement of discourses, rather than a mere hybrid or a crude 
instrumentalization.
However, the knowing misattribution of referential meaning to a metaphori-
cal hanging occurs at a time when a rampant, and all-too-sincere, new literalism 
was thrusting the Pussy Riot scandal into the orbit of issues of ethnicity, thereby 
highlighting the erosion of the notions of tolerance and multiculturalism within 
official discourse. Mamontov and Putin misread the Voina performance from a 
pseudo-multiculturalist viewpoint mindful of the evils of anti-Semitism. Yet much 
of the official media vitriol derived from a visceral hatred of the very tolerance 
of minorities with which multiculturalism goes hand in hand – a hatred which, 
as the currency of the pun term ‘tolerast’ in Russian xenophobic slang highlights, 
invokes the sexualized disgust we noted earlier. Putin would not have succeeded in 
donning the multiculturalist mask had the rhetoric of tolerance been rooted within 
public discourse (or, in Laclauan terms, had Putin succeeded in inserting his read-
ing of Voina within a hegemonic–populist chain of equivalence).
This veering between pro and anti-tolerance stances illustrates the dynamic of 
identity and abjection. It also points, as we demonstrated earlier, to a consensus 
management strategy on the brink of disintegration. It is significant that as anti-
Pussy Riot sentiment was peaking, the Kremlin began to intimate that the new law 
on offending religious believers was, perhaps, excessive (though the law has since 
been adopted92), and that the amnesty granted to Tolokonnikova and Alekhina on 
23 December 2013 coincided with an intensification of the anti-western paranoia 
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which provided the background to Russia’s widely condemned intervention in 
Ukraine two months later. Such abortive half-gestures appear to have been moti-
vated by a contradictory cocktail of fear and desire that the ‘absolute outsided-
ness’ accumulated by Pussy Riot in the course of its ‘trial by media event’ might 
transfer permanently to other forms of alterity, producing an exclusionary form of 
Holy Russian-ness bearing within it catastrophic potential. Chapter 9 will demon-
strate that the contradiction was to be resolved decidedly in favour of desire.
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9 ‘There is war on our streets...’
The ‘national question’ and 
migration on state-aligned television 
after the 2012 presidential elections
Our previous two chapters appeared to indicate a progressive hardening of the 
authoritarian features of Russia’s political system since late 2011–early 2012. 
During the unfolding of the Pussy Riot scandal examined in Chapter 8, the con-
vergence of Kremlin, Church and state-aligned media in a co-ordinated campaign 
to construct a societal consensus by claiming that the liberal wing of Russian 
society was alien to the nation would appear to offer clear evidence of this phe-
nomenon. In Chapter 7, the struggle to consolidate the consensus by seizing own-
ership of the ideological territory linking corruption and ethnicity from populist 
opponents such as Naval’nyi offered further corroboration of the trend.
The Kremlin did not, however, entirely vacate the territory carved out in Putin’s 
pre-election article and, given the alarming rise in hostilities perceived by the 
public as inter-ethnic, could not afford to do so. Paradoxically, given media–state 
collusion over the Pussy Riot affair and the rise of Naval’nyi, rather than con-
tinuing to endorse this line, since 2012 Rossiia (and to a lesser extent Channel 
1) began systematically to challenge it, departing, often radically, from previous 
interpretations of ethnicity-related issues and going beyond the far more cautious 
recalibration undertaken by the Kremlin. We witnessed this to an extent in Chap-
ter 8 in the scandalizing discourse of Arkadii Mamontov in relation to Pussy Riot. 
Through the prism of television coverage of migration issues, the current chapter 
focuses in more detail on how these challenges have been manifested, on why 
such a development might occur and on what it tells us about the relationship 
between the Kremlin and federal broadcasters.
During the first 18 months of Putin’s third presidency, one of the main issues 
around which the disjunction between the Kremlin’s pronouncements and televi-
sual representations of the issues they address became particularly apparent was 
migration. Coverage of this topic, particularly on Rossiia, changed drastically in 
the post-election period compared to the earlier period. Further analysis of the 
change will enable us to explore the role of the third element in the triangular 
process of circulation within which both state-aligned broadcasters and Krem-
lin officials operate – the public. Over the past 15 years migration has been of 
increasing concern to citizens of most European states, and the European media 
have both reflected and shaped this concern. The same has been true in Russia, 
and this development began to impact significantly on its state-aligned television 
output in 2012.
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Following a discussion of the political context of post-election Russia, the 
chapter will consider how television’s overall treatment of the ‘national ques-
tion’ has shifted following Putin’s re-election. We will argue that heightened 
post-election concern with the issue is not reflected in the actual amount of 
coverage, which remains small within the news agenda as a whole, but is mani-
fested in the regular inclusion in news and non-news programmes of accounts 
of the state of inter-ethnic relations in Russia characterizing it as catastrophic. 
Kremlin-sponsored discourse generally emphasizes positive changes in domes-
tic affairs and foreign policy under Putin relative to the 1990s but in the 
post-election period official media sources, which normally reproduce this line 
of argument, began to make an exception for inter-ethnic relations. Here, the 
focus is on the significant deterioration since 2000. The chapter will then exam-
ine the orchestrated anti-immigration campaign on state television which began 
in the spring of 2012 and intensified further in the spring of 2013, eventually 
subsiding after a series of ethnic riots across Russia in the summer of that year. 
It will be argued that this campaign has been accompanied by a shift in repre-
sentations of the role of Islam in Russia and Europe. Analysing the campaign 
within the broader context of European media reporting on migration, we will 
consider what this campaign tells us about the increasingly contradictory public 
discourse on Russian identity. As a lead-in to the conclusions to our book, the 
chapter ends with discussion of the reasons for the remarkable shift in the broad-
casters’ approach and its potential impact on ethnic cohesion in the country.
A new context
Some liberal Russian observers regard the latest political trends and changes in 
the media discourse during Putin’s third presidency as yet another indication of 
the country’s reverting to the past (vozvrat k proshlomu).1 In contrast, we will 
argue that the three factors shaping state-aligned broadcasting today have devel-
oped after the election in such a way that differences with the Soviet period have, 
if anything, become more pronounced. These factors, which we have been high-
lighting throughout the book, are: the nature of post-Soviet media culture; the 
relationship between the Kremlin, broadcasters and the public; and the regime’s 
lack of consistent ideological underpinnings.
Despite superficial similarities with Soviet propaganda rhetoric about the 
ever-conspiring west and multiple enemies of the state, post-election state-aligned 
television coverage and the official discourse of Putin’s third presidency have 
little in common with their Soviet predecessors. The socialist realist approach, 
representing life as it should be, is rarely adopted. Broadcasters are acutely aware 
that, in contrast to the past, the public now needs to be entertained and that pop-
ular concerns, as well as debates on the Internet and in alternative media, must 
be taken into account. The media first have to win viewers’ trust, even if only to 
exploit it subsequently in order to strengthen the legitimacy of the existing regime. 
This legitimacy is no longer based on a denial of the existence of problems, as 
had particularly been the case during the final 30 years of communism; instead 
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it is founded on reverse tactics, which were further radicalized during the 2012 
presidential election campaign and its aftermath. Today, portrayals of the country 
as following a straight path leading to a bright future have been superseded by 
depictions of a society in deep crisis, faced with multiple and ever growing exter-
nal and internal threats. The television viewer is not placated and comforted, but 
systematically horrified and frightened. If, during the election campaign, the main 
goal of the state-aligned media was to perform societal unity based around Putin, 
in the post-election period the strategy of governing the country, which is inevita-
bly reflected on television, has entailed legitimization of Putin’s regime through 
the constant identification, marginalization and demonization of various groups 
claimed to embrace values conflicting with traditional Russian ones.2 Against the 
backdrop of this discursively constructed reality, the president is depicted as the 
only politician able to protect Russia from imminent collapse. The crudeness of 
these representations has burgeoned during Putin’s third presidency. The shift can 
be partly attributed to the Kremlin’s decision to reject the approach of the former 
chief ideologist, Vladislav Surkov, who promoted a discourse accommodating 
considerable ambiguity about Russia’s relationship with its ‘others’.3
As we have consistently argued, the relationship between the Kremlin, broad-
casters and the public is quite distinct from that of the Soviet era, when the public 
was unable to influence what was broadcast and journalists were clearly subordi-
nated to political power. Today, while responding to the broader political goals of 
the regime, state television journalists have far more leeway when deciding what 
to cover and how to cover it; and one of the essential features of post-1991 media, 
namely the staged pluralism of views, can never be fully controlled.4
The interviews we conducted demonstrate that influential broadcasters, both 
those loyal to the regime and those who expressed sympathy for the opposition, 
frequently articulate xenophobic prejudices. Most of our interviewees manifested 
a hostile attitude towards migrants and certain ethnic minorities. A Rossiia jour-
nalist who was open about his sympathies towards the opposition avowed: ‘One 
can be triple-tolerant towards visitors (priezzhie), towards differences, towards 
Islam, towards Muslims, but this is clearly going too far.’5 In an interview with 
a member of our project team, a pro-Kremlin celebrity journalist from Rossiia 
argued: ‘Would you have wanted Turks to populate the cities of [the Austrian 
provinces] of Carinthia and Tyrol, so that there were only mosques in Inns-
bruck?... Who are educated? The Turks?...’6 In the absence of clear guidelines 
about how to address sensitive and complex issues, journalists have ample space 
within which to indulge their prejudices.7
At the same time, opposition protests of the electoral period have made the 
political establishment and the state-aligned media more sensitive to public 
opinion – particularly, as we saw in relation to corruption in Chapter 7, regard-
ing those issues which are exploited by the opposition. Inter-ethnic relations and 
migration are the primary case in point. The fact that opposition leaders such as 
Naval’nyi were deploying anti-immigration rhetoric undoubtedly began to influ-
ence official discourse in the post-election period.8 Opinion polls demonstrate that 
the Russian public, whose opinions are influenced by the discourses of media 
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and politicians, increasingly views migration as a major concern.9 According 
to Levada Centre surveys conducted in 1996, 2003 and 2012, attitudes towards 
migrants among Russia’s citizens have been getting progressively more hostile. 
According to the October 2012 survey, 71 per cent of those polled believed that 
migrants contributed to the rise of crime in the country, 46 per cent believed that 
they were ‘destroying Russian culture’ (as opposed to 19 per cent who rejected 
such a view) and 65 per cent supported the proposition that migration should be 
reduced.10 It is in this context that the increased attention given by federal broad-
casters to migration issues must be understood.
As we have argued in earlier chapters, Putin’s own pronouncements on the 
‘national question’ during the election campaign remained fluid, as did the 
broader Kremlin-sponsored Russian identity discourse, and both are open to 
multiple interpretations. The hierarchical view of cultures reflected in Putin’s 
article unwittingly encourages the very ethnicization of economic and social 
issues which the Kremlin rhetorically opposes. It is our contention that, during 
Putin’s third presidency, the contradictions between different elements in Krem-
lin-sponsored identity discourse and in the output of broadcasters have become 
even more apparent than before.
Putin himself has proclaimed ‘the preservation’ (sokhranenie) of ‘a new 
pan-Russian identity’ (rossiiskaia identichnost’) and ‘national consolidation’ 
(splochennost’ natsii) to be priorities of his new presidency.11 But what are the 
defining features of this identity? During the elections and in the post-election 
period, three incompatible visions have been prominent: the image shaped by 
isolationist Russian nationalism, which wants to exclude ‘ethnic others’ from the 
national body; Russia as the centre of the Eurasian Union, which includes parts of 
Central Asia and is built on the history of interactions between Orthodox Chris-
tianity and Islam; and Russia as a defender of traditional values at a time when 
they are allegedly being denigrated in the west. The president has himself openly 
endorsed the last two visions. The first one, however, is promoted by elements 
within the opposition as well as by influential politicians, and seems to enjoy 
considerable public support.12 Its co-optation by official discourse, therefore, has 
emerged as a primary goal for state-aligned broadcasters. Let us now examine this 
co-optation process in more detail.
The ‘national question’ reconsidered
The ‘national question’ and the issue of migration were virtually ignored by 
broadcasters at the time of the presidential election campaign. According to the 
journalists we interviewed, this happened in accordance with instructions to 
avoid dwelling on contentious and sensitive issues which the state-aligned media 
received from the authorities.13 With the lifting of this restriction after the elec-
tions, the situation reversed; ethnicity-related issues became a greater focus of 
attention in television talk shows than ever before and also started to feature more 
prominently in the news. The fact that Putin identified the ‘national question’ as a 
key issue facing Russia can explain the broadcasters’ increased attention to it once 
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the elections were over. Yet it does not mean that broadcasters received any clear 
guidelines from the Kremlin about how to cover this complex issue. As our inter-
viewees indicated, whereas those in charge of the two main channels regularly 
liaise with the Kremlin regarding broad strategies of the coverage, rank-and-file 
journalists, in contrast with the case in the Soviet period, do not routinely receive 
specific instructions on what and how to report. In their own words, they are 
expected to be guided by their own adekvatnost, which one interviewee defined 
as ‘the ability to react appropriately to the conditions in which you find yourself’ 
and another simply as a ‘political instinct’.14 In a situation where broadcasts are 
expected to reflect both a certain pluralism of opinion (which, even if it is staged, 
cannot always be fully controlled), as well as the (real or perceived) public mood, 
the coverage of controversial issues can easily conflict with the Kremlin’s pro-
nouncements. As we shall see, in 2012–13, in their interpretation of migration-re-
lated issues, state-aligned broadcasters – particularly Rossiia – radically departed 
from the interpretative framework which was authorized by Putin at the start of 
his electoral campaign.
The first major programme on inter-ethnic relations to be shown on a federal 
television channel in the aftermath of the presidential elections was the 29 March 
2012 edition of Channel 1’s V kontekste talk show. While the 1 March edition did 
not mention the ‘national question’ as an issue confronting Russia’s future new 
president,15 the programme’s presenter, Maksim Shevchenko, devoted his first 
post-election broadcast exclusively to that issue. Centring on the fatal shooting in 
a Jewish school in the French city of Toulouse perpetrated a few days earlier by a 
terrorist of French Algerian origin, the programme was introduced by Shevchenko 
as having ‘the most direct relevance to Russia, as on the territory of our country 
people of completely different (sovershenno razlichnykh) religions, cultures and 
ways of life have been brought together by historical fate’.16 The drawing of such 
direct parallels between Europe’s ‘crisis of multiculturalism’ and the deteriorating 
state of inter-ethnic relations in Russia was in itself unusual for the channel. As we 
saw in Chapter 4, parallels of this sort were drawn only briefly in the immediate 
aftermath of the Manezhnaia riots. On the whole, and as the report on the French 
Roma situation with which we opened this book illustrated, the two main fed-
eral channels tended to follow the line articulated in Putin’s Nezavisimaia gazeta 
article of contrasting the failure of west European multiculturalism with Russia’s 
positive experiences of managing multi-ethnicity.17
Shevchenko’s use of the expression ‘completely different’ in describing Rus-
sia’s cultural diversity is not accidental. As we argued in Chapter 4, it underscores 
an understanding, widespread among Russian elites, of a so-called ‘clash of civili-
zations’ or ‘conflict of cultures’ as an important interpretative lens through which 
current relations between peoples of different ethnic origin should be understood. 
Shevchenko’s overall interpretation of the ‘national question’ through the ‘cul-
ture conflict’ lens was apparent in his relatively carefully managed treatment 
of Putin’s article in the 26 January 2012 broadcast of V kontekste analysed in 
Chapter 7. There it was the Kremlin’s position, not pseudo-academic and demotic 
understandings of ethnicity and race, which framed the show, since it was being 
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broadcast during the election campaign. The 29 March broadcast no longer oper-
ated under such constraints.
All participants in the programme could be described as inter-ethnic relations 
‘experts’ representing different political positions, from the isolationist Russian 
nationalist to the proponent of western-style liberal tolerance. Given that the per-
petrator of the Toulouse shooting was a radical Islamist, the inclusion of a mufti 
as a participant appeared at first glance justified. Yet, as most of the programme 
was actually about Russia, the choice of a Muslim cleric rather than a represen-
tative of any of Russia’s other ‘traditional religions’ implicitly framed Islam and 
the ethnic groups among which it was the dominant religion as the most closely 
associated with ethnic conflict. As we will further show in the present chapter, 
this perception continued to explicitly influence the coverage of ethnicity-related 
issues in the post-election period.
The diversity of the participants’ positions was no barrier to the attainment 
of consensus. This centred on two issues. Echoing Putin’s Nezavisimaia gazeta 
article, all argued that, to some extent, European multiculturalist policy was in cri-
sis.18 As one might expect in a television discussion, no account of this complex, 
polysemic concept was offered. Instead, following the line taken in Putin’s article, 
it was used as a self-evident term describing the post-immigration composition of 
Europe’s urban population.19 However, in contrast to Putin’s largely optimistic 
interpretation of Russia’s ethnic diversity, the participants agreed that the condi-
tion of inter-ethnic relations in Russia was alarming.
Significantly, the position closest to that of the Kremlin was articulated by the 
leading proponent of the rossiiskaia civic nation concept, the liberal ethnogra-
pher Valerii Tishkov, who emphasized that social exclusion and inequalities often 
underpinned conflicts that were popularly perceived as ethnic in nature. Tishkov 
also agreed with Putin that it was imperative for migrants to integrate by adher-
ing to the dominant societal norms. He exhibited more optimism than the others 
regarding the potential success of the pan-Russian (rossiiskii) nation-building 
project which the Kremlin has been championing for over a decade.20 However, 
when Tishkov rejected Putin’s hierarchical prioritization of Russian culture, his 
criticism was cut short by Shevchenko.21
Despite censoring direct criticism of the leader, Shevchenko himself adopted 
a position that deviated from the line taken by the Kremlin during the election 
period. He forcefully projected his own views, exploiting his role as presenter to 
ensure his voice remained dominant, and at times reducing the polysemy of the 
discussion to a singular meaning of his own preference. From the frameworks 
available for discussing inter-ethnic relations he prioritized not those which were 
being promoted by the Kremlin (corruption, social exclusion and social inequali-
ties) but the popular notion of ‘the clash of civilizations’,22 going far further than 
he did in the 26 January edition.
Shevchenko argued that ‘the unifying pan-Russian (rossiiskaia) civilization’ (a 
concept endorsed by the Kremlin) existed only at a rhetorical level, claiming: ‘But 
young people say: “On our streets war is going on.” Young people are organized 
according to their ethnicity...’23 He thus offered a reading of inter-ethnic relations 
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which contradicted the rhetoric of political leaders and that of a certain ‘expert’ 
discourse which, it was argued, had failed to correspond to how ordinary peo-
ple interpreted their social experiences. The notion of street conflicts involving 
people of different nationalities as a ‘war’ had long been evoked on the Internet 
and in alternative media outlets. As we saw in Chapter 4, REN TV’s Nedelia and 
Reporterskaia istoriia were cases in point.24 In contrast, on the two main state-
aligned television channels, references to ‘war’ began appearing only after the 
2012 presidential elections, in the context of the overall dramatization of threats 
allegedly facing Russia.
As if to underscore the heightened importance of the ‘national question’ for 
the Kremlin’s agenda, on the very day that V kontekste was broadcast, Putin pro-
posed the setting up of a Presidential Council for Inter-ethnic Relations (mezhnat-
sional’nykh otnoshenii).25 The proposal raised disturbing questions, implying that 
inter-ethnic relations had deteriorated to such an extent that close monitoring from 
the top governmental level was essential. Coverage on Vremia and Vesti severely 
constrained the discursive space available for this interpretation, refusing to per-
mit the Kremlin’s position to be challenged to the extent that had occurred on 
Shevchenko’s talk show. At the same time, a lengthy report on Vesti and a much 
shorter, but similarly framed, report on Vremia about the first major meeting of 
the Council (on 24 August 2012) indicated that news-writers were struggling 
to reconcile the popular perception that Russia’s inter-ethnic relations were in 
crisis with the Kremlin-endorsed ideal of multi-ethnicity as the country’s major 
strength.26
Russia’s European migrant ‘problem’
Between the spring of 2012 and the autumn of 2013, Rossiia made a concerted 
attempt to resolve the discursive struggle in favour of one interpretation. Media and 
political discourse on migration often reflects broader understandings of national 
identity held by a society’s dominant group.27 Thus, in his pre-election manifesto 
article Putin linked his discussion of migration to the alleged ability of the Rus-
sians, as a nation, to accommodate and integrate the ethnic ‘other’. In 2010 and 
2011, the Kremlin’s view of the importance of migration for the Russian economy 
overtly influenced the stance of both channels, which devoted only a very small 
percentage of news time to the issue.28 Vremia refrained from discussing migration 
in relation to Russia altogether, only occasionally referring to problems arising from 
migration in western Europe and blaming them on the ineffective policies of Euro-
pean governments.29 Vesti paid more attention to the issue. There were occasional, 
though rare, reports on issues involving migrants from Central Asia in Moscow. In 
contrast to coverage of west European affairs, the Russian government was never 
held responsible for the situations that arose; Vesti seemed to imply the problems 
were attributable to the migrants themselves. Yet the appalling conditions in which 
many migrants lived were also mentioned as a root cause of migrant crime, and 
reports displayed some sympathy for them.30 Furthermore, at a time when Russia’s 
multi-ethnicity, with its roots in imperial history, was often celebrated as a major 
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strength, influential broadcasters were able to reiterate the pronouncements of Rus-
sia’s leaders, arguing that Central Asian migrants were ‘our former countrymen’ 
and ‘today’s compatriots’ (sootechestvenniki); following the collapse of the USSR 
they became foreigners in the legal, but not the cultural, sense.31 Until May 2012, 
both channels generally refrained from representing migration as a serious chal-
lenge to Russia’s national identity and security.
In the post-election period, however, the relationship between migration and 
Russian national identity, as well as the assessment of state policies on migration, 
was redefined by state broadcasters. For Rossiia in particular, migration became 
intimately linked with corruption and legal inertia – an issue which the Kremlin 
appropriated from the opposition and turned into a weapon to be used against it. 
Migration also began to be represented as a major threat to the country’s sover-
eignty, security and identity, as well as to the culture and well-being of the Rus-
sian people. The Russian print media and Internet had deployed this frame in their 
coverage of migration-related issues previously,32 but it was only during the first 
year of Putin’s third presidency that Rossiia began to follow this line.
State-aligned broadcasters seem to have been responding to real and perceived 
public concerns. In this regard they can be directly compared to media elsewhere. 
In the context of the growing politicization of migration across Europe, the myths 
about migrants propagated by the Russian media are similar to those disseminated 
by their counterparts in the EU regarding asylum seekers, refugees and labour 
migrants. In both contexts, these people are presented as a threat to European 
cultures and the European way of life, and references to a ‘clash of civilizations’ 
frame many media reports. Migrants and asylum seekers are portrayed as a burden 
on local welfare systems and a threat to security, given their allegedly dispropor-
tionate association with crime. Both Russian media and those of other European 
countries suggest that governments are ineffective in confronting the problems 
posed by migrants and asylum seekers.33 In common with their Russian counter-
parts, broadcasters across Europe indiscriminately use the problematic term ‘ille-
gal migrant’. They share, too, the practice of referring to people born in European 
countries as migrants simply because their parents or grandparents happened to 
have emigrated to Europe.34
Nor is Russia alone in seeing itself as having been historically tolerant towards 
minorities. This self-perception fosters the sense that if complaints about the 
behaviour of ethnic ‘others’ are expressed, there must be good reason.35
At the same time, within the EU, journalistic practices differ between coun-
tries, as well as across media outlets within the same countries. For instance, in 
Greece and Italy it is not uncommon for public service broadcasters to uncriti-
cally reproduce extreme xenophobic and anti-immigrant views; in contrast, in 
Britain and the Netherlands, PSB news coverage diverges sharply from that of 
the tabloid newspapers. Broadcasters such as the BBC are (sometimes justifiably) 
criticized for bias and insensitivity, but they are regulated by a detailed set of 
editorial guidelines aimed at ensuring balanced and impartial reporting.36 The 
BBC is therefore far less likely to uncritically reproduce crude myths and stereo-
types than tabloid newspapers are.37 While it is hard to identify parallels between 
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Russia’s federal broadcasters and leading PSBs in countries like Britain and the 
Netherlands, their approach certainly resembles that of their Greek and Italian 
counterparts and, particularly in the case of Rossiia, of the tabloid press across 
the EU. Moreover, the specificities of official discourse during Putin’s third pres-
idency have also prompted Russian federal channels to develop peculiar interpre-
tations of a range of issues which we find in the media coverage of migration in 
other parts of the world. For instance, in their paranoid adaptation of the western 
media tendency to associate immigration with security threats, they intimate that 
western intelligence services use migration to destabilize Russia.
Russian broadcasters also have a particular perception of the kind of cover-
age the public expects, and their view of what constitutes balanced and impartial 
reporting seems diametrically opposed to that of, say, the BBC. Where ethnicity 
or religion (Islam) is perceived to be a factor, it is common for the British broad-
caster to deploy reporters of non-white background. In contrast, one of our more 
liberally minded interviewees informed us that the policy of his independent news 
channel was never to assign the reporting of ethnicity-related issues to a journal-
ist with an ethnic minority background. In his words: ‘Only journalists with a 
Slavic appearance (slavianskoi naruzhnosti) can cover inter-ethnic relations.’ He 
explained that this policy had been developed to accord with his channel’s under-
standing of viewer expectations.38 That this position had been internalized was 
intimated by the reply given by one of our interviewees from Channel 1; though 
positioning himself as a liberal, he suggested that sensitive issues related to Islam 
could not be covered by a colleague from an ethnic community in which Islam 
was the predominant religion. The interviewee saw no need to exercise such cau-
tion in coverage of issues related to Orthodox Christianity, which was routinely 
assigned to journalists who self-identified as Orthodox.39
Finally, while attributing Russia’s ‘tolerance of ethnic diversity’ to the histori-
cally rooted multi-ethnicity of the Russian and Soviet states, Russian broadcasters 
are less inclined than some of their west European counterparts to acknowledge 
the imperial and, in relation to Central Asia and the Caucasus, colonial nature 
of that state and the negative legacy of the hierarchical relations between ethnic 
groups which it fostered. As we argued in Chapter 6, the Eurasianist ideology, 
which provides the main interpretative framework for Russia’s elites when ana-
lysing Russian ethnic diversity, directs its post-colonial critique at west European 
states rather than Russia.
In the immediate aftermath of the elections, what appears to have been the Krem-
lin’s line on migration was implicitly contradicted in several editions of Rossiia’s 
Spetsial’nyi korrespondent fronted by Mamontov. On the one hand, these editions 
tended to focus on issues which the Kremlin considered particularly important. 
As was evident from his trilogy of programmes on Pussy Riot, Mamontov’s aim 
appears to be to prepare the public to accept controversial action about to be under-
taken by the authorities.40 The sudden heightening of his interest in migration is 
unlikely merely to reflect his personal preferences. On the other hand, the radicalism 
of his views and the crudeness of his reporting methods mean that his output some-
times attracts public criticism even from those loyal to the regime.41
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In May 2012, Mamontov’s programme marked the start of what turned into a 
full-fledged anti-immigration campaign on Rossiia. He returned to the same issue 
in October 2012, and then again a year later. The very titles of the three broad-
casts – ‘Aliens?’(Chuzhie?), ‘Aliens-2’ (Chuzhie-2) and ‘Aliens-3’ – indicate the 
presenter’s propensity for ‘othering’ migrants.42 Significantly, Mamontov first 
selected the title ‘Aliens’ for an edition of his programme broadcast in August 
2010. There, the focus was on foreign ‘mercenaries’ fighting in Chechnia.43 These 
were non-Russian aliens in every sense. In 2012, the same label was applied to 
citizens of former Soviet states who came to work in Russia. Mamontov’s use of 
the German word Gastarbeiter to describe labour migrants further underscores 
their ‘alien’ status. In the Russian context, this term’s foreign origin facilitates the 
discursive construction of migrants as not belonging in Russia.
The ‘Aliens’ series broaches the corruption of law enforcement organs and 
the immigration authorities, as well as the greed of Russian businessmen. This 
is even singled out as a core problem by a minority of participants. Nonetheless, 
ethnicity is placed at the very centre of the discussion, and it is ethnicity which is 
accorded primary explanatory power in the interpretation of various instances of 
violence and other crimes reportedly committed by migrants.44 On this point the 
positions of the presenter, members of the audience who are invited to speak and 
the majority of the participating state officials and experts coincide. The visual 
imagery accompanying the discussion is likewise geared towards underscoring 
the primacy of ethnicity in all types of societal interactions.
Following the standard format of Mamontov’s show, the three programmes 
are each introduced by films about labour migrants in Russia, with scenes from 
these films running as a backdrop during the subsequent discussions. The films are 
presented as carefully researched documentaries, encouraging viewers to regard 
the programmes as belonging to the macro-genre of informational programming 
rather than that of light entertainment. The three films convey somewhat different 
messages. The first highlights the terrible treatment of migrants as modern-day 
slaves (that is, it makes space for their representation as victims); in contrast, the 
second and third films depict them entirely as violent criminals. (The third film 
is dedicated to the issue of ‘ethnic criminality’, in which migrants are the main 
protagonists.)
Despite the difference, all the films portray labour migrants from Central Asia as 
the Russians’ main ethnic ‘other’, emphasizing their distinct racial features through 
close-up filming of the degrading conditions in which they live and their ‘barbaric 
customs’ (e.g. eating food with their bare hands), and thus dehumanizing them.45 
While not giving migrants a voice,46 the producer describes them as an unstoppable 
and therefore threatening force: ‘They are treated as cattle, they are beaten up and 
humiliated, they are burned alive, and yet still they come to Russia.’47
The selection of officials and experts is such that only a minority of the speak-
ers support the Kremlin-endorsed position – namely, that migration is essential 
for the country’s economy and that inter-ethnic harmony can be achieved through 
state-sponsored integration schemes. The ‘experts’ from Moscow-based research 
institutes and think tanks all regularly challenge this position, interpreting the 
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situation primarily through the ‘conflict of culture’ and ‘ethnic criminality’ lenses. 
Even the first deputy chairman of the State Duma Committee for Nationalities 
Affairs, who stresses the problem of corruption, agrees that most migrants are 
of ‘the lowest cultural level’, which engenders anti-social behaviour and deter-
mines their inability to integrate. Throughout the programmes, the participants 
echo the description of the relationship between the local population and migrants 
as a ‘war’. The rise of isolationist ethnic Russian nationalism that is criticized 
in Putin’s article is justified as the local population’s understandable reaction to 
migrant behaviour.48
Mamontov is clearly supportive of what comes across as the majority view and, 
like Shevchenko, calls on participants to ‘take as a starting point the experience 
of ordinary citizens’ when addressing speakers who attempt to deny or downplay 
ethnic factors in the issues surrounding migration. Indeed, the carefully selected 
‘ordinary citizens’ in the audience invited to comment all happen to be victims 
of crimes committed by Central Asians and are convinced that their assailants’ 
nationality is directly linked to their behaviour. Their accounts, as well as refer-
ences to some unspecified statistical data, brazenly challenge the validity of the 
Kremlin-endorsed view that ‘crime has no nationality’, despite being reiterated in 
the discussion by the chairman of the Moscow City Duma.49
Like Shevchenko’s V kontekste of 29 March 2012, Mamontov’s shows depart 
from federal broadcasters’ own previous tendency to contrast Russia’s experi-
ences of managing multiculturalism with those of western Europe. Now a direct 
parallel between Russia and western Europe is drawn. Mamontov gives voice to 
politicians and activists from the west in order to validate the highly negative rep-
resentation of migrants his shows promote.50 Aliens-2 uses the cases of France and 
Switzerland to stress the inability of migrants from non-European societies ever 
to integrate. Reflecting the highly tendentious selection of speakers, the French 
and Swiss ‘official’ positions are articulated by Marine le Pen, the president of 
France’s right-wing Front National, and by a campaigner against the construction 
of mosque minarets in Switzerland. West Europeans, Russian viewers are told, 
‘are horrified by the customs migrants bring with them’.51 Here, Russia is depicted 
as a European nation. Rather than identifying with traditional Islam in opposition 
to degenerate western culture, Mamontov aligns himself with the west against the 
absolute alterity of the Muslim migrant.
Mamontov’s programmes give voice to a new form of Russian nationalism, 
one which is no longer interested in the state’s territorial expansion, but is instead 
isolationist and inward-looking. It is particularly hostile towards labour migrants, 
unless they are Slavs, depicting them as a threat to the very essence of ‘Russian-
ness’. This kind of nationalism is occasionally criticized by the Kremlin. It openly 
clashes with the project of creating an integrated Eurasian Union bringing Russia 
and Kazakhstan closer together, which is personally endorsed by Putin;52 yet Rus-
sia’s leaders seem increasingly to perceive this brand of Russian nationalism as 
an important societal force worthy of being co-opted.53 The co-optation process is 
fraught with danger, particularly as it encourages open questioning of the credi-
bility of some of the government’s own pronouncements.
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Indeed, what Mamontov’s programmes do is to treat performative utterances 
in official discourse, such as claims that Russia’s multi-ethnicity is its major 
strength, as if they were constative utterances capable of subjection to true/false 
assessments. Numerous pieces of ‘evidence’ are then cited in order to expose 
these utterances as empirically false. In Kremlin-sponsored discourse, pronounce-
ments of unity in diversity are intended as performative rebuttals of actions which 
foster disunity. But in the talk shows, the ‘truthfulness’ of these pronouncements 
is instead tested against examples of street conflict and violence.
Significantly, Aliens-2 was broadcast around the time at which, on more than 
one occasion, the Kremlin made gestures that could have been interpreted as 
suggesting a concern with the shift taking place in the discourse about ‘absolute 
otherness’. Developed during the Pussy Riot affair, this attitude was, as we sug-
gested in Chapter 8, now being transposed onto ethnic and other minority groups. 
We pointed out in that chapter that Putin himself articulated his position specifi-
cally in the context of an attempt to justify the harsh treatment meted out to the 
punk group. In the autumn of 2012, positioning himself as a defender of values of 
liberal tolerance and wilfully misrepresenting the Voina group’s earlier satirical 
‘Decembrists’ performance, Putin argued that the Pussy Riot collective consisted 
of racists and homophobes and, for that reason, should have attracted the attention 
of the authorities earlier.54
In another gesture seemingly critical of isolationist Russian nationalism, the 
government publicized a draft of the new strategy document on inter-ethnic rela-
tions, which depicted Russia as a multi-ethnic state of and for all its citizens. 
Significantly, the draft made no reference to ethnic Russians as a ‘state-forming 
people’. The enshrining of such a reference in the constitution is a key demand of 
Russian nationalist leaders.55 As noted in Chapter 8, the Kremlin simultaneously 
suggested that the controversial post-Pussy Riot draft law on offending the feel-
ings of religious believers might be excessive.56 This carefully staged distancing 
from heated public debates and controversies is a typical Putin ploy (we saw it in 
action in relation to the Shkola serial in Chapter 5), and the stance should not be 
interpreted as suggesting that any of these developments take place in defiance of 
the Kremlin’s wishes.57 This approach permits isolationist Russian ethnonation-
alism to be mainstreamed and co-opted into official discourse without the direct 
involvement of the Kremlin, which is then able to portray itself as adopting mod-
erate, balanced positions on the ‘national question’.
Meanwhile, the overall strategy of maintaining the regime’s legitimacy with 
the help of crude discourse about Russia’s multiple ‘enemies’ remained in place. 
This discourse only continued to radicalize, and television coverage remained 
within the broad boundaries of the Kremlin’s agenda. Within this context, the 
anti-immigration campaign also continued to escalate, and it became linked to an 
important element of the nation-building ideology – that of Russia as a European 
nation which experiences similar global pressures to other societies, yet is superior 
to ‘the west’ in upholding traditional values. On its own terms this message has a 
degree of coherence, but the campaign against migration on state-aligned televi-
sion channels unwittingly accentuated the contradictory relationship between this 
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perception of Russian identity and the representation of Russia as the centre of a 
unique Eurasian civilization.
Given the emphasis on the European nature of Russian identity in media dis-
cussions of migration, it is unsurprising that the campaign received a boost in the 
spring of 2013 from two almost simultaneous events in western Europe – rioting 
in Stockholm and the murder of a British soldier in London by two young British 
Islamists of Nigerian descent. These offered both Channel 1 and Rossiia ample 
opportunities for raising migration-related issues. Vesti led the Russia-specific 
aspect of the campaign. Channel 1 continued its pre-election approach of refrain-
ing from covering the migration issue in relation to Russia in its main news pro-
gramme, Vremia, dealing with the topic only in talk shows.58
The events in London and Stockholm were exploited by both Vesti and 
Vremia to advance more forcefully than ever before the claim that migrants 
from non-European, particularly Muslim, societies were in principle incapa-
ble of integrating into Europe because of their cultural differences. Exhibiting 
an unashamedly racializing approach, state-aligned broadcasters began arguing 
that even ‘second-generation migrants’ (immigrant vtorogo pokoleniia) were 
invariably unintegrated, posing a major threat to the well-being of their host 
societies.59 A relentless ‘othering’ strategy was deployed, with people of Middle 
Eastern and African origin, all indiscriminately labelled as migrants, presented 
as violent, unwilling to work or otherwise positively contribute to European 
societies, yet demanding ever greater benefits from European governments. 
‘Indigenous’ (korennye) Europeans were forced to ‘adapt’ to the rules set by 
‘migrants’, a Vremia reporter argued. ‘Ethnic Norwegians’ (etnicheskie norver-
zhtsy), Russian viewers were told, were now ‘refugees in their own countries’.60
In this coverage, what appears to be particularly under threat from the influx 
of migrants is Europe’s Christian identity. Western societies began to be rep-
resented as divided along religious lines, Christianity versus Islam. According 
to the presenter of Vesti nedeli, ‘a cultural transformation (pererozhdenie)’ of 
Europe was taking place under the influence of migrants from Muslim countries.61 
Islam was then depicted as core in the identity of all non-European residents in 
Europe who failed to integrate in their host societies. According to Vremia, while 
Muslim migrants have no desire to integrate, it is ‘the indigenous population that 
is expected to adapt… In London a so-called “Muslim patrol” has appeared… 
“Radically inclined Muslim youths have no fear of European laws” and “they live 
the life of parasites on social security benefits”.’62
Stories covered in the western media were adapted by Russian broadcasters to 
emphasize the connection between the perceived ‘parasitic’ behaviour of unin-
tegrated migrants and Islam. Thus in January 2013, Vesti nedeli recalled a con-
troversial statement by Baroness Shreela Flather who, back in 2011, criticized 
the British Bangladeshi and Pakistani communities for having large numbers of 
children, allegedly in order to claim more benefits.63 In contrast to the BBC, which 
made no reference to the religious beliefs of members of these communities when 
reporting the comment, Vesti nedeli’s favourable assessment of Baroness Flather’s 
statement argued that Muslims practised polygamy and that many Muslim mothers 
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were therefore registered as single, allowing them further to exploit British social 
services. Similarly, the Islamic dimension permeated Russian television cover-
age of the Stockholm disturbances. Minority communities whose members were 
involved in the disturbances were identified by Vremia as Muslims (something the 
BBC pointedly avoided doing).64
The blame for what is described as ‘the failure of multiculturalism’ was laid at 
the door of west European governments, which, having been guided by ‘wrongly 
understood democracy’, demonstrated ‘excessive tolerance’ and political correct-
ness; it was this, broadcasters argued, that had led to the suppression of the rights 
of ‘the Christian majority’ in European states.65 The argument indicated a refram-
ing of the on-going discussion of multiculturalism in Western Europe and Russia. 
In earlier interpretations west European governments were taken to task by Rus-
sian broadcasters for their indifference towards migrants and the lack of will to 
integrate them.66 Now western multiculturalist policy was being criticized above 
all for being too lenient towards the deviant behaviour of non-European minori-
ties and migrants and for its alleged unwillingness to defend European Christian 
values. These dramatic representations of the ‘clash of civilizations’ purportedly 
destroying western Europe seem to serve a double purpose. They were used to 
bolster demands for tougher measures against migration in Russia, ‘before it is too 
late’;67 they also implied that, in contrast to western Europe, the upper echelons of 
the Russian leadership did not suffer from misplaced tolerance and were therefore 
able to govern effectively. Finally, they endorsed a newly invented interpretation 
of Russian identity as conservative European.
The events in Stockholm and London proved convenient for the organizers of a 
campaign against Central Asian labour migrants in Russia. They were used to add 
credibility to anti-immigration measures which some politicians, now backed by 
state-aligned television, began to advocate. The most sustained campaign against 
migrants from Central Asia ever seen began on state-aligned television in April 
2013. It was marked by two new developments. One was that leading politicians, 
such as Moscow mayor Sergei Sobianin, began to be depicted by broadcasters as 
rejecting the ability of migrants with cultures ‘completely different’ from (ethnic) 
Russian norms ever to integrate.68 Significantly, the broadcasters at times tenden-
tiously twisted the politicians’ pronouncements. The second was an attempt by 
state-aligned television directly to link migration to the alleged subversive activi-
ties of foreign intelligence services against Russia.69
The staged nature of the new turn in the anti-immigration campaign became 
particularly apparent when, on 14 April, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitrii Rogozin, 
known for his nationalist views, organized the sudden inspection of a train which 
followed a route between Dushanbe, the capital of Tajikistan, the origin of most 
of Russia’s labour migrants, and Moscow. The presenter reporting the story on 
the Rossiia-24 news channel urged the rapid closure of the border with Tajikistan 
until ‘they [citizens of Tajikistan] grow up’ (poka oni ne podrastut).70 Further 
discussion of the issue, with emphasis on migration from Tajikistan, continued on 
talk shows such as Poedinok, one of Rossiia’s most widely viewed programmes,71 
on which Zhirinovskii called for the deportation of all migrants from Russia, as 
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they ‘bring crime, illness, and reduce the cultural level of our society’.72 Mamon-
tov also intervened in the campaign with a Spetsial’nyi korrespondent edition 
entitled Shaitan-train, which opened with an explanation that the word ‘shaitan’ 
means devil in Tajik.73 Protest against the campaign and its Russian media cover-
age on the part of Tajikistan’s foreign ministry received no mention on either of 
the two federal channels.
During the campaign, Vesti alleged that Putin had promised to introduce a visa 
regime for the Central Asian states as of 2015.74 In fact, this seems to have been 
an inaccurate interpretation of a brief mention, in the presidential address to the 
Federal Assembly in December 2012, of the possibility of introducing the require-
ment that citizens of the CIS states other than Belarus and Kazakhstan enter Rus-
sia on foreign passports, rather than domestic ID cards.75 It is unclear whether 
Rossiia’s report merely demonstrated sloppiness in handling information or was a 
deliberate attempt to add further legitimacy to its anti-migration campaign and to 
represent the president as responsive to popular concerns.
Vesti also publicized a statement made by the deputy head of the Federal 
Security Service to the effect that ‘foreign intelligence services’ used illegal 
immigration to organize ‘subversive activity to the detriment of Russian secu-
rity’, including terrorism.76 FSB officials have in the past attempted to represent 
migrants as a major security threat to the country, but while their statements were 
dramatically reported in 2006 and 2008 by Russian print and online newspapers, 
the two main federal television channels refrained from covering them.77
On the same day, Vesti also tendentiously covered the pronouncements on 
migration made by Sobianin in an interview with the newspaper Moskovskie 
novosti, given during his campaign for re-election as mayor. By focusing exclu-
sively on one statement regarding migration in Sobianin’s interview, which in 
fact covered a wide range of topics, and omitting his qualifying remarks aimed at 
softening the effect of his apparent attack on migrants, Vesti depicted Sobianin’s 
position as more at odds with the Kremlin-sponsored line than was actually the 
case. From a 4,000-word interview, Vesti chose a single provocative remark to the 
effect that ‘people who speak Russian poorly and who have cultures completely 
different [from ours] had better live in their own country’.78 In fact, most of Sobi-
anin’s pronouncements on migration in this interview corresponded to those of 
the Kremlin leaders. Russia’s multi-ethnicity was represented by the mayor as its 
strength, the supposedly welcoming attitude of Russia’s citizens towards ‘guests’ 
was noted, and migrants from Central Asia who knew the Russian language were 
defined as ‘compatriots’.79 All this was omitted by Vesti.
Internal migration’ (Vnutrenniaia migratsiia)
The labels of migrant and even illegal migrant, both loaded with negative connota-
tions, are applied in the Russian media discourse not only to those who come from 
abroad, but also to Russia’s own citizens. These tend to be almost exclusively 
residents of the North Caucasian republics who move into areas of the country 
with a predominantly ethnic Russian majority. In the post-election period, Rossiia 
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has used increasingly dramatic language in representing the so-called ‘internal 
migration’ of North Caucasians as a threat to the very existence of ethnic Russians 
as a national group.
The labelling as ‘migrants’ of bona fide Russian citizens who belong to certain 
ethnic minority groups is a distinct feature of the Russian discourse of migration. 
As we argued in Chapters 1 and 4, the origins of current understandings of ‘inter-
nal migration’ can be traced to the specificity of the Russian imperial state and 
Soviet nationalities policies. Those who call North Caucasians ‘migrants’ (often 
unconsciously) evoke the (former) colonial status of the North Caucasus, which 
has long existed in an unequal power relation with the ethnic Russian core of the 
country.
The occasional application of the term ‘illegal migrant’ to Russia’s own citi-
zens is rooted in the Soviet propiska (residence permit) system, which severely 
restricted people’s freedom to choose their place of residence. In the post-Soviet 
period, the Soviet-type propiska was abolished, but registration of one’s place of 
residence, even if it may now be freely chosen, is still required. The labelling of 
Russia’s citizens as ‘illegal migrants’ then becomes justified by reference to their 
failure to register their residency with the appropriate authorities.
The fact that the North Caucasians are citizens of the Russian Federation had 
until recently placed restraints on how state-aligned television reported popula-
tion movement from North Caucasus to central Russia, which has intensified in 
the post-communist period. Indeed, Putin’s Nezavisimaia gazeta article drew a 
distinction between ‘external’ and ‘internal migration’, stressing the freedom of 
mobility around the country for all its citizens, although Putin’s critics noted a 
certain vagueness in his statement. In response to this criticism, Putin explicitly 
clarified that the term ‘migrant’, which by 2012 had acquired a negative con-
notation in popular usage, should not be applied to any citizen of the Russian 
Federation.80
The most prominent example of past ‘restraint’ in the news coverage of ‘internal 
migration’ by the two main state-aligned channels can be seen in their reporting 
of the Manezhnaia riots. As we demonstrated in Chapter 4, after initially allocat-
ing partial blame for the riots to North Caucasians themselves, and after evoking 
the concepts of the ‘conflict of cultures’ and ‘ethnic criminality’ in discussion of 
the causes of the riots during the week following these events, the final annual 
bulletins of Vremia and Vesti in December 2010 had purged from their reports all 
reference to ‘internal migration’ and threats to Russia’s multi-ethnic ideal arising 
from cultural differences.81
By late 2012 such ‘restraint’ had disappeared from most news reports on Ros-
siia. Vesti nedeli had become especially alarmist. Its editor, Dmitrii Kiselev, 
proudly noted in an interview with our team that, under his leadership, in Decem-
ber 2012 his programme ‘practically staged’ (instsinirovali fakticheski) the topic 
of migration of North Caucasians into the Stavropol’ region in southeast Russia.82 
In particular, the broadcast of 9 December included a series of dramatic represen-
tations of life in Stavropol’. The programme’s presenter spoke about an ‘invasion’ 
(ekspansiia) of North Caucasians into this predominantly ethnic Russian region. 
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The report presented ethnic Russian residents as being systematically victimized 
by North Caucasians, who used violence and even murder to take over their land 
and property. According to the broadcast, the consequence was a mass exodus of 
ethnic Russians from Stavropol’. It was claimed that in the preceding ten years the 
situation had deteriorated to a ‘shocking’ (oshelomliaiushchaia) extent – yet the 
presenter’s reference to the 2002 and 2010 censuses, indicating that the proportion 
of ethnic Russians in the region had decreased by only 1.5 per cent, offered no 
support for this dramatic assessment. Echoing the Kremlin’s line about enemies of 
Russia wanting to bring about its disintegration and evoking the western conspir-
acy frame, the report hinted that western intelligence services had a hand in the 
developments in Stavropol’, as western governments were allegedly interested in 
the separation of Dagestan from Russia.83
As in the coverage of migration-related issues in Europe, (radical) Islam 
emerged as a prominent feature in Vesti nedeli’s depiction of ‘internal migration’ 
in Stavropol’. A local imam was quoted as making an emotional statement: ‘I am 
a lonely warrior [against radical Islam] on a battlefield which is open to enemy 
fire from all sides.’84 Significantly for our understanding of how the media per-
ceive the public mood and of journalists’ own views, in April 2013, REN TV 
offered a similarly alarming depiction of ‘an expansion of Islam and its values’ in 
southern regions of Russia. Arguing that most ethnic Russians in the region were 
understandably ‘very frightened’, the reporter on REN TV’s Reporterskaia isto-
riia was even less inclined to draw any distinctions between the ‘moderate, tradi-
tional Islam’ of Russia and the ‘bad’ radical Islam imported from abroad than was 
the presenter of Vesti nedeli.85 From late 2012 onwards, media outlets of varying 
political allegiances began highlighting, and in some cases fostering, anti-Muslim 
sentiment in Russia’s metropolitan centres too. A mass campaign against plans to 
build a large mosque in Moscow’s Mitino district received extensive and sympa-
thetic coverage from federal channels in the autumn of 2012.86 In February 2013, 
Vesti nedeli reported on the establishment of ‘Muslim patrols’ in St Petersburg 
under the provocative heading ‘Islamic Expansion’.87
The perceived threat to Russia’s large cities posed by Muslims converged with 
that associated with ethnic minorities more broadly. Prior to the ‘staged’ coverage 
of the situation in Stavropol’, in October 2012, Vesti nedeli had also transformed 
a minor incident involving North Caucasians in Moscow into an issue of politi-
cal significance directly relevant to the state of inter-ethnic relations: the firing 
of shotguns at a wedding celebration. Given that no harm seemed to have been 
intended and no one was hurt, the incident could have been categorized simply as 
a human interest story. Those involved were Dagestanis, described in the bulletin 
as ‘guests’ in Moscow, despite their Russian citizenship. Rejecting the Kremlin’s 
unity-in-diversity mantra and the Soviet metaphor of the ‘friendship of the peo-
ples’, the reporter drew on the theory of ethnos developed by late neo-Eurasianist 
ideologist Lev Gumilev, offering viewers a detailed account of Gumilev’s highly 
contentious arguments. Viewers were informed that alongside instances of the 
harmonious co-existence of different ethnic groups there could also be highly 
destructive patterns of co-habitation, in which one ethnic group lived as a parasite 
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(glist) or a cancerous metastasis in the body of another. In the report, in which 
all examples of conflicts involved Caucasians attacking ethnic Russians, there 
was little doubt about who the parasites were. When describing certain people 
as ‘parasites’, however, Gumilev most likely had Jews in mind. The transposi-
tion of his anti-Semitic construct onto Caucasians reflects a new trend in Russian 
ethnonationalism of the past decade. Notwithstanding the lingering presence of 
anti-Semitism identified in our earlier analysis of the Pussy Riot scandal, the Cau-
casian has generally replaced the Jew as the main target of vilification.
In the report it was not Putin but the Russian nationalist film director Nikita 
Mikhalkov who appeared as the ‘master figure’, positioned outside the debate 
yet possessing the superior authority sanctioning him to comment on the matter. 
Mikhalkov’s authority derived from the cinematic warning he had issued in 2007 
about the rise of highly xenophobic Russian nationalism in response to problems 
caused by migrants.88 In his interview with Vesti nedeli, Mikhalkov unreflectively 
promoted a colonial view of power relations between ethnic Russians and North 
Caucasians, attributing current problems to the breakdown of what he called ‘the 
special language of communication between Russia and the Caucasus’. In his 
view, this historically shaped ‘culture of communication’ used to combine ‘the 
languages of force (sila) and of mutual respect’. In a gesture familiar from our 
analysis of Putin’s discourse in Chapter 7, with its seemingly universal applica-
tion, the statement was quickly turned into a reference to an ethnically coloured 
particular. It soon became clear that Mikhalkov accorded the privilege of using 
‘the language of force’ to Russians alone. Although respect was supposed to be 
mutual, in the single example offered by the director, respect flowed in one direc-
tion only: ‘When a Caucasian understands that the one to whom he could be sub-
ordinate can be easily bribed... and will do what you demand of him, what respect 
can be commanded [by the Russians]?’89
Channel 1 took a markedly different line. Featuring no reports at all on the 
Stavropol’ region, it filtered the Moscow wedding incident through the prism of 
the Kremlin’s dominant line. A long quote from Putin, claiming that such inci-
dents had nothing to do with ethnicity but were a symptom of social problems 
which arose as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union, framed the coverage.90
When covering ‘staged’ stories about migration, whether in Russia or in 
Europe, television journalists have a great deal of licence and may offer their own 
interpretations, based on personal beliefs and prejudices. In contrast, the eruption 
of sudden dramatic conflicts inside Russia continues to elicit a more controlled 
approach. This was evident for instance when, in July 2013, a major public pro-
test erupted in the town of Pugachev in central Russia following a murderous 
fight between two youngsters, one of whom happened to be a Chechen. The fight 
had nothing to do with ethnicity, but led to mass demonstrations demanding that 
all North Caucasians be deported from the city. Alarmed by the eruption of major 
public disorder, yet unable to satisfy the unconstitutional demand, the authori-
ties were keen to calm the situation quickly. Under these circumstances, while 
designating Russian citizens from the North Caucasus as ‘migrants’ in its first 
reaction to the protest, Vesti then readopted its pre-2012 ‘restraint’ in relation to 
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Pugachev, omitting all references to ‘conflict of cultures’ and ‘ethnic criminality’ 
and repeatedly insisting that local residents had misunderstood the situation by 
introducing the ethnic factor into an ordinary, albeit unfortunate, incident induced 
by excessive drinking.91 A similarly ‘restrained’ approach was again apparent 
in coverage of anti-Caucasian riots in Moscow’s Biriulevo district four months 
later.92 Following these events, the broad anti-migrant campaign on the two main 
federal channels subsided. In addition, after the end of the election campaign 
for the office of Moscow mayor, during which both Sobianin and his opponent 
Navalnyi turned migration into an important electoral issue, its public discussion 
notably declined.
***
We have shown that, in the post-election period, the Kremlin’s relationship with 
federal broadcasters, particularly the state-owned Rossiia channel, became more 
complex than was previously the case. The distinctive role played by broadcasters in 
shaping (rather than merely reflecting) public discourse paradoxically increased under 
the growing constraints imposed by Putin’s third presidency. Rather than becoming 
more uniform, as the Kremlin’s tightening political control would appear to dictate 
and as many observers have assumed to be the case, public discourse in 2012 and 
2013 became increasingly fragmented and contradictory. Pronouncements by Rossiia 
journalists and reporters on the ‘national question’, migration and (radical) Islam in 
the post-election period were now more rather than less likely to contradict the Krem-
lin’s public pronouncements. Leading media figures such as Kiselev and Mamontov 
promoted an isolationist version of Russian nationalism manifesting overt hostility to 
certain ethnic minorities. This nationalism differs from the vision of Russia endorsed 
by the Kremlin, which persists in seeing Russia’s imperial legacy as a major strength 
and regards the continuation of Russia’s rule over the North Caucasus and its close 
relationship with the Central Asian states as essential for the country’s status as a 
great power.
One of the liberally inclined television reporters whom we interviewed argued 
that in promoting certain official ‘celebrity’ journalists, the Kremlin created ‘pup-
pets’ whom it no longer knew how to control.93 We have argued that this interpre-
tation, too, oversimplifies the situation. It is true that the increased contradictions 
within the official discourse and inconsistencies in the mediation of important 
political issues in the post-election period might be an indication of a particular 
uncertainty of the regime at the time, as it was searching for new approaches 
through which to control society in the aftermath of the mass public protests. But 
even so, the activities of these ‘puppets’ should not be read as attempts to ques-
tion the regime’s legitimacy. In fact, the anti-immigration campaign on state-
aligned television, with its anti-Islamic undertones, broadly followed the logic 
of the Kremlin-sponsored post-election strategy of controlling society through 
polarization and the identification of internal enemies alleged to be collaborat-
ing with western intelligence services. The representation of these ‘enemies’ 
as the Russian nation’s ‘absolute other’ remained at the forefront of the federal 
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broadcasting agenda and the broad, Kremlin-endorsed ideological framework 
to which it continued to adhere accounted for the specificities in its treatment 
of migration.
By articulating ideas which directly address real and perceived public con-
cerns, broadcasters likewise reinforced the Kremlin’s governing strategy, helping 
to foster the impression that national leaders were attentive to the concerns of the 
country’s majority without them having to make pronouncements which other 
citizens and residents might have found offensive. In multi-ethnic, multi-con-
fessional societies such as Russia, the upper echelons of political leadership 
have to be seen as occupying a moderate position on issues such as the ‘national 
question’.
In several ways, post-election reporting of the ‘national question’ and of migra-
tion, represented in its most distilled form in Vesti nedeli, was more internally coher-
ent than the coverage we observed in 2010 and 2011, which struggled to reconcile 
the tensions between Russia as both a multi-ethnic state and the national homeland of 
ethnic Russians. Yet it produced a new set of acute tensions, laying bare the contra-
dictions in the official discourse of the Russian nation as both European and uniquely 
Eurasian and of the west as an evil, conspiring ‘other’, yet also an occasional ally.
To the extent that the contradictions tended to be resolved, it happened 
through reporting which fostered, rather than ameliorated, ethnic tensions. In a 
multi-ethnic, post-imperial society this is a dangerous strategy with the poten-
tial to undermine the country’s stability and territorial integrity, whose mainte-
nance is paramount. The new virulence with which demands to expel ‘the ethnic 
other’ have been expressed throughout Russia’s public sphere, particularly in the 
summer of 2013, bear testament to this danger. In this context, the broadcasters 
decided to return to a more controlled style of reporting. The fact that the highly 
alarmist coverage of migration both started and stopped rather abruptly suggests a 
lack of a coherent government strategy for achieving national cohesion, which the 
Kremlin insists is its main priority.94
The partial convergence of these demands to expel the ethnic ‘other’ with the 
intensified campaign against alterity of other forms, such as that represented by 
Russia’s LGBT community and, as we saw in Chapter 8, by other degenerate 
products of the ‘liberal conspiracy’, complicates the situation in two ways. First, 
by subsuming such campaigns into the wider agenda of ‘traditional, conservative 
values’, responsibility for the ideological direction of government policy was par-
tially ceded to an uncompromisingly anti-western Orthodox Church hierarchy and 
to media demagogues such as Mamontov, Kiselev and Shevchenko. Here, again, 
the triangular relationship between the Kremlin, the public and state-aligned tele-
vision revealed itself to be less than wholly unilinear. Second, and perhaps more 
crucially, by blurring the boundaries between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ ‘others’ it 
risked transforming the ‘war on our streets’ into an autogenous conflict in which 
Russia imploded into itself – a prospect of which the rigidly imposed uniformity 
that was to characterize coverage of the Ukraine conflict is a further harbinger, 
rather than a refutation.
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Conclusion
Difference in the balance
From Boston to Simpferopol
One of the perils of researching the contemporary world is that new events have 
a constant habit of intervening and demanding perpetual re-evaluations of one’s 
analysis. The final year of working on this book was bookended by two world 
events that provided a jolt to our thinking: the Boston Marathon bombing of April 
2013 and the Crimean crisis of spring 2014. However, rather than undermining our 
conclusions, these events – each of which deeply, but rather differently, entwines 
Russia with its various others – enabled us to appreciate their wider significance. 
The Boston bombing coincided with significant new developments on the domes-
tic scene in Russia: the trial for corruption of Aleksei Naval’nyi, finally ‘brought 
to account’ for having pressed his anti-Kremlin agenda a step too far; an explosion 
of anti-migrant rhetoric; and an increase in concern about the threat of radical 
Islamism in the North Caucasus. Ten months later the Ukrainian conflict, which 
administered a dramatic shock to the post-Cold War settlement, followed on the 
heels of Russia’s surreal effort to showcase itself to the world in Sochi, location of 
the 2014 Winter Olympics, a site partly chosen to enable Putin to flaunt Russia’s 
mastery over its ‘Caucasian problem’. Recently re-apprehended for protesting at 
the sentences given to the Bolotnaia protestors, Naval’nyi, meanwhile, spent the 
Crimean crisis under house arrest.
We will organize our final concluding thoughts around these baneful con-
catenations of circumstances, centring them on a tripartite notion of difference: 
(i) the non-sameness (perceived or otherwise) of Russia and the west, brought to 
a head following Russia’s actions in Ukraine, but also of the multiple ‘Russias’; 
(ii) the double ethnic difference represented by the two Boston bombers whose 
parents came from Russia’s North Caucasus and who themselves lived briefly in 
that region, but whose identities were shaped in no small part by their American 
upbringing;1 (iii) difference as the political plurality which, spurred by the ‘new 
cold war’ mood now gripping much of Russia’s media elite, the Putin regime seems 
ever more desperate to suppress. We will begin by briefly re-contextualizing the 
Boston bombing in terms of the concerns addressed in this book, before reassess-
ing their significance in light of Russia’s intervention in Ukraine and considering 
the wider implications for European broadcasters.
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One of the two news reports which provided the basis for our observations in 
the Introduction concerned a Moscow gypsy baron writing to President Sarkozy 
to protest the treatment of Roma in France. It was deployed by way of distinguish-
ing news coverage of domestic issues of inter-ethnic relations from reporting on 
similar issues abroad. We noted that the sharp distinctions between these two 
categories were undermined by the subtext of the gypsy story. The Boston bomb-
ing completes the circle, with the domestic and the international converging. As 
‘warriors’ in the global jihad against western infidels, the Tsarnaev brothers who 
perpetrated the bombing seemed to be willing their insertion into Huntington’s 
notorious ‘clash of civilisations’. But as Chechen Muslims whose anti-Russian 
sentiment provides part of the rationale for their brutal act, they contributed to 
the domestic ‘conflict of cultures’ touched on in the talk show discussion which 
featured in the first story analysed in the Introduction.
The Boston bombing was, as Eliot Borenstein has suggested, troubling for the 
American media, since it disrupted the standard ‘war on terror’ narrative;2 not 
only did the Tsarnaevs fail to conform to the stereotypical image of the crazed, 
brown, US-hating Arab terrorist (the younger Tsarnaev was a well-adjusted, pale-
faced, gifted young American college student; the elder brother had until very 
recently dreamed of representing the US in boxing competitions), but they hailed 
from the same community of brave Chechen independence fighters crushed so 
brutally by their (former) Cold War nemesis. But despite the obvious propaganda 
potential that the story of the bombing offered the Russian state media, its own 
reaction was neither immediate nor entirely consistent. Prominent in initial Vesti 
coverage of the event were statements from the Chechen president Ramzan Kady-
rov disowning the Tsarnaevs, denying that they had anything to do with Chechnia 
(they had, indeed, never lived there). Several Vesti reports followed in which the 
brothers’ radicalization was attributed to their upbringing in a US environment 
that fostered alienation and degeneracy.3 It was not long before such stories were 
supplanted by what came to be the dominant line on the bombing: the connection 
between Russia’s struggle against terrorism in its backyard and the global war 
on terror, and the need to prioritize collaboration over mutual suspicion in the 
Russia–US relationship.4 Bolstering the implied criticism of America’s current 
priorities in that relationship, the ‘war on terror’ angle was supplemented by copi-
ous reminders of warnings about the Tsarnaevs that the FSB had given to the CIA 
a year before the bombing,5 and by an emphasis on the older brother’s admiration 
for the Syrian opposition movement – support shared by the US, of course – as 
revealed by postings on his V kontakte site.6
Inasmuch as it is possible to trace clear lines of causation for the baffling and 
sudden radicalization of the two privileged young immigrants (though the older 
brother, Tamerlan, had begun to express his contempt for and alienation from 
American society some time previously), the global ummah facilitated by the vir-
tual world of the Internet clearly played a prominent role; Tamerlan was reported 
to have been influenced by Sheikh Feiz Mohammed, who was born in Australia, 
and who regularly issues provocative calls to arms on his website.7 What is clear 
is that the multiple and contradictory pathways which led the two brothers to 
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commit their heinous act can be traced as effectively in the Russian mediasphere 
as in its American equivalent. The labyrinthine combinations, however, are dif-
ferent. For example, the emotional defence mounted by the Tsarnaevs’ parents, 
and their accusations of a CIA ‘set-up’, were treated more seriously in the Rus-
sian media than in either the UK or the US.8 The CIA angle accorded with the 
culture of anti-American conspiracy theory encountered in earlier chapters. In 
the multi-faceted Boston bombing narrative, several conflicting axes converge: 
the US as a convenient ally in the common struggle against radical Islam; radical 
Islam as partly a product of western degeneracy; the US as a devious and hostile 
‘cold warrior’. The identification and counter-identification triad (Russia/Islam/
the west) is, as we have seen, subject to perpetual reconfiguration – never more so 
than in the bizarre tale of the two brothers.
There was for a moment the glimmer of a chance that the Boston bombing 
might initiate a realignment of Russian and US interests; Russia’s role in brok-
ering an end to the Syrian chemical weapons crisis which threatened to unleash 
another Middle Eastern war in summer 2013 and the convergence of western and 
Russian views on the challenges posed by jihadism at the heart of the Syrian resis-
tance to Assad pointed fleetingly in that direction, but prospects for such realign-
ment rapidly faded and the aftermath of Kiev’s Euromaidan revolution dealt a 
mortal blow to that faint prospect.
There is thus a multi-level correlation between on one hand the narrowing of 
difference between Russia and its western nemesis and between Russia and its 
internal ‘other’ (as we have repeatedly shown, internal and external ‘others’ are 
themselves prone to move in and out of alignment), and on the other between the 
narrowing of these latter differences and the widening of tolerance of (political) 
heterogeneity within the Russian ‘self’.
With inexorable logic, the same correlation, however, operates in reverse. 
While newly emboldened protestors like Naval’nyi, Tolokonnikova and Alekh-
ina continued to antagonize their Kremlin opponents, anti-migrant discourse was 
attaining unprecedented levels of vitriol, just as Russia rediscovered expansionist 
revanchism. Indications are thus that the spiral effect is unlikely to be of the vir-
tuous kind. Of these developments, the sharp escalation in east–west tensions in 
February–March 2014 was the most dramatic, and we must revisit it. Nonetheless, 
the multiple threads of the earlier Boston story help establish the basis for our 
overarching insistence throughout this book on the ties linking the struggle for 
democracy and respect for the rule of law in Russia, the particularities of Russian 
public discourse and the broader crisis in diversity management. Let us recapitu-
late them.
In sum: Sameness as difference
As our frequent cross-national comparisons indicated, Russia both follows com-
mon European modes of response to the continent-wide crisis in multiculturalism 
and deviates from them, but not in the received sense (that of a state-compliant 
media imposing mono-ethnic order on a heterogeneous population). For in Russia, 
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the Soviet myth of societal unity and an imperial legacy distinctive in both Tsa-
rist and Soviet manifestations encounter a complex and in itself contradictory 
west European heritage, which includes both post-imperial theories of commu-
nity cohesion and practices of social exclusion. Simultaneously, historically 
familiar methods of Russian state control of the media are transformed under 
the impact of global media culture. Thus, the legacies of the Russian and Soviet 
past are not reproduced, but rather reinvented in the context of the transnational 
circulation of concepts and practices of popular and state-sponsored visions of 
community-building and exclusion. It is striking how, in this globalized context, 
post-colonial west European and ‘post-socialist’ representations of the ethnic 
‘other’ both diverge and resemble each other.9
Such resemblances challenge the validity of the very concepts of ‘post-co-
lonialism’ and ‘post-socialism’ as analytical tools for understanding current 
processes in Europe east and west. In fact, the current critique of multicultur-
alism in western European societies and public panics about migration appear 
to suggest a backlash against the burden of post-colonial guilt that those soci-
eties have self-critically borne for decades. In Russia’s case, and indeed that 
of other former Soviet societies, whatever post-socialist guilt had existed was 
already fading fast by the end of the El’tsin presidency. Instead, former com-
munist nations now indulge in representations of the self as prime victim of past 
(or current) injustices. In post-Soviet Russia, the public sense of victimhood has 
acquired historically unprecedented proportions and the ruling elite has actively 
and intentionally sought to draw benefit from it in the new millennium.10 The 
perception of self as victim is particularly strongly manifested in representa-
tions of ethnic Russians as the most exploited and discriminated-against people 
both during Soviet times and at present, by a system allegedly favouring ethnic 
minorities. Confined to extreme nationalist fringes in the past, such perceptions 
have been systematically mainstreamed by intellectuals, media personalities and 
politicians in the past 15 years. In this new context, references to the legacies of 
the Soviet past – a time when public manifestations of Russian ethno-national-
ism were carefully managed and mostly constrained11 – are of limited help for 
the purposes of understanding present discourses of nationhood.
Official discourse and state policy in Russia is neither coherent nor univo-
cal. Given that there is no societal consensus regarding common values, that the 
regime has no clear ideological basis and that, at the same time, it must remain 
sensitive to public opinion and to the global media environment to a much greater 
degree than did its Soviet predecessor, the inconsistencies and splits are hardly 
surprising.12 In common with other scholars, we note a particularly strong con-
tradiction pitting the official rhetoric of a civic pan-Russian nation, embracing 
members of all ethnic groups and nationalities as equal citizens, against the dis-
cursive representation of Russia as above all the nation state of the ethnic Rus-
sian majority.13 But our analysis looks beyond this contradiction for, after all, the 
disjunction between the civic and ethnic conceptions of Russian nationhood is 
acknowledged by Russia’s leaders who, as our analysis indicates, collaborate with 
state-aligned media outlets in deliberately fostering the ambiguity which the dis-
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junction creates in order to render Kremlin-sponsored discourse appealing simul-
taneously to different societal groups and to different television audiences. The 
coexistence within Channel 1’s output of liberally inclined film-makers like Vale-
riia Gai-Germanika on one hand and arch-conservative Kremlin loyalists such as 
Leont’ev on the other testifies to this strategy.14
A potentially more complex fault-line is that between the new rhetoric of Rus-
sian national unity and community cohesion on one hand, and two reinvented 
narratives from the past on the other. The first of these is the highly hierarchi-
cal account of Russia’s diverse cultures which has been shaped and reshaped in 
turn by imperial, Soviet and European New Right legacies. For despite the vision 
of new civic Russian nationhood promoted by state-aligned media in the past 
decade, the rigidity of the hierarchies and of the boundaries between communi-
ties defined by ethno-cultural markers has paradoxically increased by compari-
son with Soviet times and the 1990s; indeed, it has become progressively more 
dominant during the period of our analysis. The second, related, narrative from 
the past is that of the non-Russian nationalities as belonging in their own, clearly 
designated national homelands and sub-state administrative autonomies. This 
narrative limits the propensity for representatives of ethnic minorities to identify 
with the Russian Federation as a whole. Equally detrimental to national cohesion, 
both narratives have been internalized by contemporary elites, including political 
leaders and media personalities, and by the broader public (Russian majority and 
minorities alike). As our analysis of the reporting of the Manezhnaia disturbances 
suggests, these narratives tend to supplant the discourse of Russia as a unified 
nation in furnishing the default analytical framework within which to interpret 
tensions and conflicts when they erupt. The significance of this second fault-line 
lies in its under-appreciation both by the Kremlin and by analysts of Russian soci-
etal and political developments.
A troubling parallel appears here with the late Soviet period, when the impor-
tance of the ethnicity factor was equally underestimated by Soviet leaders and 
external observers. The Gorbachev leadership appeared to be completely unpre-
pared for the upsurge of nationalist activism during perestroika, just as, on the 
very eve of the dramatic eruption of ethno-national activism in the late 1980s, 
influential scholars of Soviet politics argued that the Soviet state was sufficiently 
successful in managing ‘the national question’ to make ethno-national political 
mobilization unlikely.15 In effect, both parties became hostages to a discourse 
which was capable merely of simulating the effective management of inter-ethnic 
problems. Today, the Kremlin is likewise the hostage to a discursive version of 
reality it has co-constructed with a state television colossus which, despite the tight 
control to which it remains subject, has acquired its own momentum and its own 
internal logic of development. Meanwhile many external observers, academic and 
non-academic, continue unwittingly to be influenced by the transition paradigm, 
which prioritizes the electoral and party politics of the federal centre and measures 
the progress made by that centre against the normative model of a mature repre-
sentative democracy. Adherents to the paradigm thus understate complex societal 
processes arising from the ethnic diversity in a country for which representative 
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democracy of the strictly western type may not be the ultimate, or even the most 
appropriate, destiny. It is the same blind spot which causes them to oversimplify 
the relationship between the Kremlin and the state-aligned media, and to privilege 
transitive meaning (that conveyed from the state to the media) over transactional 
meaning (that arising from multi-directional interactions involving state, media, 
popular and other discourses). Despite the interrogation and criticism to which 
the paradigm has been subjected for more than a decade, it retains an influential 
position within scholarship across multiple disciplines.16
The compelling significance of the ethnic diversity factor lies in the fact that it 
introduces into post-Soviet official discourse three related sets of tensions (divergent 
interpretations of the notions of ‘tolerance’ and community cohesion; difficulties in 
establishing the statuses of ethnic Russians, as well as other nationalities, within the 
multi-ethnic Russian Federation; the absence of a broader set of consensual values). 
Television, the main source of information for the Russian public, is the primary 
site of enactment of these tensions. In managing them, television must simultane-
ously implement a nation-building strategy, performatively instate the boundaries of 
the ‘imagined community’ implied by that strategy and provide a gateway through 
which more extreme variants might enter the public arena and voices hostile to it 
be expunged. Our account of the abject failure of the recently instituted Day of 
National Unity as a ‘media event’ offered one vivid illustration of how acute the 
difficulties that the nation-building strategy must overcome are. Nor, as the incon-
sistently framed interventions of both liberal oppositionists and representatives of 
nationalist fringes into the pre- and post-electoral political fray indicates, does state 
television fulfil its filtering function in a convincing way (Chapter 3).
We traced the problematic nature of television’s discursive struggles not only 
in news bulletins but across a wide range of genres, and via a broadcasting sphere 
in which centre (most typically represented by Channel 1’s Vremia) and periphery 
are sharply differentiated and the geo-cultural margins are at times the locus for 
bold challenges to the orthodoxies of the centre (fictional genres aimed at youth 
audiences on mainstream and specialist channels), and at others an embodiment 
so quintessential that it, paradoxically, reinforces their peripheral status (coverage 
of ethnic cohesion on Buriat state television). In another paradox, as we saw in 
Chapter 9, the more constraints are placed on freedom of speech, the further the 
prospect of official discourse speaking from the centre point of a stable consensus 
recedes and the weaker that discourse becomes. In such a situation, television’s 
role in influencing the discourse can become greater.
Alternatives for resolving the tensions depend on the appropriation of new 
sources of legitimacy. One is represented by a powerful populism centring on wide-
spread revulsion at corruption. A struggle to claim ‘ownership’ of the anti-corrup-
tion platform and establish it as the core of a ‘chain of equivalences’ pits Putin 
and the Kremlin against the liberal opposition on one hand and the nationalist right 
on the other. The bitterness of the struggle leads to the subliminal – and at times 
overt – ethnicization of corruption and of Russian political discourse more gen-
erally. In Chapter 7 we observed in this context a bi-directional inversion of rela-
tions between the ethnic and particular and the universal and general (Russo-centric 
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particularism is imposed as the universalist glue binding the Russian Federation; 
the universal evil of corruption acquires the ethnically particular tint of anti-migrant 
xenophobia). The second source of legitimacy derives from a revivalist religious 
traditionalism founded on a rejection of liberal values and a belief in the unify-
ing force of Orthodox Christianity. The influence of this source grew significantly 
during the course of the period we analysed, as indicated by the shift in the Church’s 
status from a centre of power competing with that of the Kremlin (early celebrations 
of Day of National Unity; the Church’s stance on the Manezhnaia riots) to that of 
the Kremlin’s preeminent discursive tool (later celebrations of the Day of National 
Unity; the response to the Pussy Riot affair).
We demonstrated that the growing prominence of both sources of legitimacy 
intersected with a burgeoning state media focus on two related dangers. These 
are Islamist radicalism (bolstered by world events such as the Syrian crisis, the 
Boston Marathon bombing and the transnational influence of European ‘media 
panics’ about the building of mosques and the wearing of hidjabs in public 
places) and North Caucasian separatism (news stories concerning the constant 
drip of low-level terrorist activities in Dagestan and Ingushetia). The dangers are 
themselves increasingly subsumed into two ‘master threats’ which converge in 
an inflammatory dynamic: that of the (illegal) migrant incapable of conforming 
to appropriate behavioural norms, and that of an ever-present, ever-scheming, 
hostile west. Russian nationalist tendencies of all hues, from the extremist, far-
right anti-immigration movement (DPNI) to the democratic opposition leader 
Aleksei Naval’nyi, have been revitalized by this explosive mix.17 For this reason, 
both sources of legitimacy represent a potent challenge to the position of ethnic 
minorities. The incipient and fluid status of post-Soviet Russian nationhood – 
highlighted in television’s intensive mediation of the Pussy Riot crisis – only adds 
to the challenge.
The most striking development we observed was the ratcheting up of 
anti-migrant rhetoric in 2012–13, accompanied by an increase in the coverage of 
migration-related issues across different television genres, with the inflammatory 
conflation of ‘internal’ and ‘external’ migrant contributing to the promotion of a 
deeply ethnocentric version of Russian national identity. The trend was appar-
ent in its early stages in coverage of the Manezhnaia riots, which proved to be 
a touchstone in the recent history of public discourse on inter-ethnic relations 
in Russia. The period following the 2012 presidential elections saw that trend 
intensify in a manner which rendered Putin’s carefully balanced, if ultimately 
contradictory, pre-election article on ‘the national question’ obsolete. Ironically, 
in the post-election period, an ever more heavy-handed approach to freedom 
of expression seems to have been accompanied by the initial uncertainty of the 
regime over how to re-establish control over society following mass public pro-
tests. In this period, the fallacy that state television functions solely as a passive 
instrument of control in the hands of an all-powerful authoritarian regime was 
revealed particularly clearly. In fact, at the time critics of the official mantras 
on ethnic cohesion and multi-faith harmony felt emboldened rather than cowed 
by the changing political environment. Here television served actively to shape 
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official discourse rather than be shaped by it. For example, Vladimir Putin’s Sep-
tember 2013 annual address to the Valdai Forum marked an unmistakable shift in 
the Kremlin’s political rhetoric toward adoption of a viewpoint that had long been 
articulated by public intellectuals and television personalities such as Channel 
1’s Maksim Shevchenko: that of Russia’s leading role in promoting the ‘tradi-
tional moral values’ of family, church and nation over the degradation to which 
those values were being subjected throughout the west.18 The appointment of the 
arch-conservative Kiselev to head Rossiia Segodnia hinted that the building of 
allegiances with social conservatives in the west may have been intended to sup-
plement the current strategy of international broadcaster Russia Today: that of 
targeting ethnic minorities and other groups with an ingrained hostility to western 
political hegemony. Given the crucial role television continues to play in mediat-
ing the struggle for popular legitimacy within Russia, its propensity to articulate 
the struggle in covertly ethnicized terms has profound implications for the con-
dition of domestic public discourse, for prospects for democratic renewal and 
for Russia’s very future as a multi-ethnic federation, not to mention its currently 
virtually broken relationships with other, western, nations.
Our analysis identified the discursive production, witting and unwitting, of 
inter-ethnic relations through multiple sub-genres of media event, each reveal-
ing the circulatory logic simultaneously binding, and dividing, television, state 
and society. The first sub-genre we explored – the openly ‘co-operative’ type 
– revealed that the fragile vehicle intended to enact the state mantra of ‘unity in 
diversity’, Russia’s new Day of National Unity celebration, collapsed under the 
pressure of its own contradictions, leaving a hollow shell of unconvincing ritual. 
In television’s coverage of the Manezhnaia riots, an example of the ‘crisis man-
agement’ sub-genre, we witnessed the same process in reverse: divergent news 
accounts of an event which exposed the profound inter-ethnic tensions destabiliz-
ing the media–state–society relationship eventually converge in a narrative whose 
brittle, congealed nature points to the restricted logic of the conceptual apparatus 
they share. The Shkola and Nasha Russia phenomena, by contrast, provided exam-
ples of the ‘endogenous’ variety of media event in which outputs at the margins of 
television itself (with the state’s ambivalent involvement) catalyse both broader 
societal fractures, and a muted struggle by liberal tolerance discourses to pluralize 
the public sphere. The strangling at birth of the very notion of a second series of 
Shkola, and the fact that the liberally inclined makers of Nasha Russia and repre-
sentatives of Central Asian minorities were at odds over the programme, indicated 
the struggle’s failure to make headway. Finally, the ‘collusive’ sub-genre was 
exemplified in the co-ordinated manufacture of a xenophobic, exclusionary form 
of unity from the divisions and antagonisms of the Pussy Riot scandal.
The outcome of the developments traced by the media events is difficult to 
determine. The current pall of ‘new cold war’ sentiments pervading both Russia 
and the west do not bode well. On one hand, as we suggested in Chapter 7, the 
temptations of the opposition’s campaign against corruption to appropriate pop-
ular xenophobia may prove too great to resist, even assuming that progressive, 
liberal elements in the campaign are capable of regaining the momentum they 
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acquired in 2012 in the face of the ratcheting up of constraints on free speech 
and constant state media denigration that followed the Ukraine crisis of 2014. 
As Emil’ Pain, one of the more astute commentators on inter-ethnic relations in 
Russia, observed in 2013:
the cumulative mass discontent expressed in political protest a year ago has 
now taken an ethnic turn … For many, the [nationalist] slogans are much more 
satisfying to yell than the opposition’s rallying cries, which were obscure and 
generally unrealistic. The simplicity of today’s public demands also has its 
attraction for the regime: ‘throw out’ and ‘don’t let in’ are concepts close to 
the Russian apparatchik’s heart – much sweeter to their ears than words like 
‘modernisation’ or ‘reform’.19
In the same context, and echoing our discussion of the logic of populism in Chap-
ter 8, Pain refers to the possibility of ‘a new electoral balance in Russia’, a dis-
position of forces in which certain ‘democratic’ critics of the Putin regime make 
common cause with its mainstream nationalist opponents.20
The dangers that this scenario holds for the future of the Russian Federation are 
exacerbated by the fact that even the simulated management of tensions referred 
to earlier has been performed only sporadically, usually in response to the eruption 
of conflicts. The central task of television news in the simulation process has been 
to hide the state’s inability to manage such conflicts, either by under-reporting 
relevant developments or by diverting criticism away from the Kremlin.21 As a 
result, public phobias and prejudices are not simply given a voice in the coverage 
in order to show that the leadership is responsive to the popular mood; they are 
also actively manufactured, particularly within talk shows, with their highly par-
tial selection of evidence, experts and audiences.
The failure of ‘the simulation approach’ became apparent when the announce-
ment of Putin’s decision to run for a third term as president was met with mass 
public protest. In this context, state-aligned television’s attempt to perform 
national unity via the Pussy Riot affair in fact exposed the fragmented nature of 
the community which it was exhorting to unite, the absence of societal consensus 
and the failure of the Kremlin to facilitate its development. The relentless anti-
Pussy Riot campaign combined antipathy to west European liberalism with an 
endorsement of traditional Russian Orthodox values, which it aligned with those 
of Islam within a shared, and unique, Eurasianist identity. As we argue in Chapter 
9, a by-product of this campaign has been the occasional transposition of the mark 
of absolute difference from the western ‘other’ to post-Soviet migrants (particu-
larly, and paradoxically, those from Muslim societies) during Putin’s third presi-
dential term. Conversely, the figure of the liberal intellectual has become subject 
to a covert and indirect racial profiling different from, but allied to, the more 
overt racism suffered by the North Caucasian migrant or the Central Asian Gas-
terbeiter; the use of anti-Semitic motifs in Arkadii Mamontov’s diatribe against 
the westernizing liberals responsible for the ‘punk prayer’ ‘outrage’ (Chapter 8) 
confirms that anti-Semitism is far from eradicated from Russian public discourse. 
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National television serves as a key facilitator of the process, both aspects of which 
were epitomized in Mamontov’s Spetsial’nyi korrespondent series on Pussy Riot 
and migrant workers respectively.
We have, however, eschewed portraying Russian television as systematically 
‘racist’, taking care not to conflate racism with other, non-biological, forms of 
prejudice, despite the fact that in practice it often overlaps with them – particularly 
in the guise of the ‘new’ or ‘cultural’ racism at work in the post-Manezhnaia 
prominence of the ‘conflict of cultures’ notion. Moreover, we have distinguished 
between the presence of prejudicial voices and statements on Russian television 
(they are multiple, and often inadvertent), the adoption of racist or ethnically prej-
udiced positions by Russian television journalists, commentators and newsreaders 
(more prevalent than in the past but hardly endemic) and ethnic/racial prejudice 
as an impersonal effect of the structures of Russian television news discourse (it is 
this which has preoccupied us most). It would seem perverse to place within the 
same category as racism attitudes as diverse as homophobia, ideological hostility 
to western liberalism, visceral disdain for Central Asian migrants, Islamopho-
bia, antipathy to the cultural ‘behaviour’ of North Caucasian diasporas, ethnically 
tinged resentment at the corruption and criminality afflicting the Russian state and 
subliminal anti-Semitic tropes.
Nor, however, is the broader, generalized term ‘xenophobia’ adequate to the 
task of accounting for the dizzying plurality of prejudices. Lev Gudkov’s problem-
atic if suggestive notion of a post-Soviet Russian ‘negative identity’, meanwhile, 
errs both by equalizing the prejudices and by locating them on one side of an 
antinomy in which the other side is occupied by a falsely unified sense of Russian 
selfhood.22 Fully accounting for the multi-directional articulations between these 
xenophobias, their mutual contaminations, convergences, fragmentations and 
realignments – and for the complex negotiation of Russian statehood across the 
boundaries of the civic, the ethnic, the national and the transnational, the Soviet 
past and the post-Soviet present – is beyond the scope of the media discourse 
analysis we have undertaken. It would require us to disentangle the complex net-
work of threads linking ideological conflict (anti-liberalism), cultural antagonism 
(hostility to the traditions and rituals of Roma communities), the clash of faiths 
(opposition to mosques or to the hidjab), resentment at behavioural traits and 
practices (state corruption and criminal collusion) and biological difference (of 
race; of sexual orientation) – a task worthy of an entire career! Suffice it to say 
that our analysis has vividly illustrated the unusual extent of their intertwinement 
in Russian media discourse.
To turn full circle and re-situate our discussion in the present context, the 
intertwinement of domestic themes is, at another level, itself imbricated with the 
mutual predication of domestic and international media perspectives. Through-
out the book we have pointed to ways in which trends in reporting issues of 
inter-ethnic conflict in western Europe have been transposed, re-interpreted, 
exploited, cross-fertilized, reversed, intensified and transformed in the very dif-
ferent Russian media environment to which, in the global era, they now invari-
ably migrate. Reporting of the European ‘Roma crisis’ as alternatively a useful, 
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polemical counterpoint to the relative inter-ethnic harmony prevailing in the 
homelands and a dire warning of what might await those homelands should they 
adopt the liberal, European multicultural model purportedly responsible for the 
problems provides one of several examples of the acute and anxious ‘dialogism’ 
pervading Russian news discourse. There is no better illustration of that dialo-
gism than the confused Schadenfreude with which the Boston Marathon bomb-
ing was met by the journalists and commentators of Russian state television.
The interlocking of domestic and international themes and media perspectives 
attained its apotheosis, however, a year after the Boston bombing, in the events 
of early spring 2014. The Sochi Winter Olympics provided a symbolic foretaste 
of what was to unfold within days when, in one of the most bizarre scandals 
surrounding the controversy-ridden event, a group of Kuban Cossacks brutally 
horse-whipped Nadezhda Tolokonnikova and Mariia Alekhina as they performed 
their latest anti-Putin protest song on the outskirts of Sochi, watched and filmed 
by a gaggle of gawping cameramen. As the metaphorical Cossack beating with 
which the women were threatened during the ‘punk prayer’ affair (see Chapter 8) 
was realized in the form of actual bodily violence, the category confusion beset-
ting Russia’s official media suddenly became rather more than a discursive aber-
ration. Violence against the internal ‘otherness’ represented by Tolokonnikova 
and Alekhina was about to mutate into the deployment of physical force in Rus-
sia’s encounter with ‘otherness’ in an external context: that of a western-backed, 
‘illegitimate’ Ukraine.
The obsessive manner in which the Russian media narrative of the Sochi games 
centred on paranoid rebuttals of western ‘denigration’ of the host nation provided 
a further insight into the context in which the Crimean intervention took place. 
The Ukrainian crisis thus returns us to the heart of the same dynamic of multiple 
alterities that the Boston bombing brought to light. In so doing, it illuminates the 
inextricable ties linking the issues we have discussed in this book to Russia’s dys-
functional political culture, and to its increasingly aberrant international posture.
The pretext for Russia’s actions in Crimea, and later for its support both tacit 
and explicit for the separatist rebels in Eastern Ukraine, focused on the protection 
of its ‘compatriots’ (sootechestvenniki), a term whose arbitrary conflation with 
‘ethnic Russians’ (etnicheskie russkie) and ‘Russian speakers’ (russkoiazychnye) 
was replicated uncritically by many western commentators, who also failed to 
distinguish the latter terms from the quite distinct notion of ‘Russian citizens’ 
(rossiiskie grazhdane). There can be no more graphic illustration of the conse-
quences of the confused ethnicization of national identity that our book has traced.
Nor would the bemused alienation expressed in western media outlets at the 
sight of jubilant crowds welcoming Putin’s Crimean annexation have surprised 
readers of a book which has charted the progressive subjugation of state-aligned 
Russian broadcasters less to the Kremlin itself than to a Kremlin-endorsed ideo logy 
of Russian national pride that has at times threatened to break free from the control 
of its instigators. The fact that it is an empty, short-circuited ideology whose lack of 
viable content means that it ultimately has nothing to fill its hollow shell other than 
an intensified version of itself makes it no less dangerous. The core ideological 
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concepts with which broadcasters frame their news and current affairs programmes 
are in a state of permanent flux, including, in the period under review in this book, 
such disparate and often incompatible ideas as Russia’s unity in diversity; Rus-
sia as a defender of traditional values, interpreted either as exclusively European 
and Christian or as encompassing Islam and other ‘traditional religions’; Orthodox 
Christianity as the primary pillar of Russian nationhood; and the ‘Muslim migrant’ 
as a threat to Russian identity. Against the backdrop of this ideological eclecticism, 
two currents, both dating back to the 1990s, have been constantly present in the 
public discourse – Russia as a protector of its ‘compatriots’ abroad and the west as 
Russia’s perennial foe.23 Since 2012, the likes of Kiselev have ensured that such 
ideological frames have been utilized in a particularly confrontational and crude 
manner by state-aligned broadcasters.
Indeed, Kiselev was at the centre of a frenzy of anti-western Cold War rhetoric 
that gripped Russian state broadcasters following the imposition of punitive sanc-
tions on Russia. Kiselev used the platform of his Vesti nedeli programme to point 
out that Russia alone among nations has the capacity to turn the US into ‘radio-
active dust’.24 He was echoed by Aleksandr Prokhanov, like Kiselev a frequent 
presence in this book, who announced that his 15-year-long dream of a return to 
the Cold War had been fulfilled.25 The two commentators, both close to Putin’s 
inner circle, offer a sobering demonstration of the dependency of Russian national 
pride, in its distortive, Putinesque manifestation, on the role of the ‘treacherous, 
conspiratorial west’ that is Russia’s nemesis.
The third corner of the familiar triadic dynamic, Russia’s internal ethnic other, 
was supplied by the Crimean Tatars, coverage of whose predicament by Russian 
federal television contained its own set of contradictions. A Vesti nedeli bulletin 
of 2 March, for example, acknowledged the Tatar community’s unease about the 
possibility of a Russian takeover. The 9 March Vesti broadcast developed this 
theme further and included an open admission that many Crimean Tatars were 
not pro-Russian. Other reports, however, echoed Putin’s triumphal annexation 
speech, which insisted (against all the evidence) that most Crimean Tatars sup-
ported reunification with Russia.26 In this representation, the Crimean Tatars were 
used as a symbol of Crimea’s and Russia’s unity in diversity.27 This ambivalent 
recognition and simultaneous denial of the ‘Crimean Tatar problem’ exposes the 
influence of another theme touched upon in earlier chapters: the tension between 
Putin’s neo-imperialist/Eurasianist variant on Russian patriotism (one which, like 
its nineteenth and twentieth-century predecessors, aspires to square the need for 
inclusivity and inter-ethnic harmony with the imperative to maintain the domi-
nant ethnic group’s power) and the isolationist nationalism of media figures like 
Kiselev, for whom ‘Muslim minorities’ constitute a problem.
Euromaidan, Euromedia and the mutuality of responsibility
The symbiosis of national self and antithetical western ‘other’ in the Russian 
patriotic imagination, and the fragile condition in which free expression – and 
with it the future of Russian civil society, and of the Federation – finds itself place 
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great responsibility on European broadcasters when reporting events in Russia. 
In a globalized news environment, that responsibility extends to their coverage of 
inter-ethnic encounters in their own, domestic contexts. On one hand, there is a 
propensity for selective vision in relation to Russia on the part of outlets which, 
like the BBC, are admirably perspicacious in their treatment of other regions and 
issues: their blindness to the significance of the Manezhnaia riots contrasted with 
their blanket coverage of the anti-Kremlin protests of 2011–12; their reluctance 
to acknowledge the ethnocentrism of some of those protests’ leading figures or 
the degree of societal support that the Orthodox position on the Pussy Riot epi-
sode elicited; their denigration of genuine, if exaggerated, Russian anxieties over 
the xenophobic extremism prevalent in elements within Ukraine’s Euromaidan 
movement. Such omissions evidence the stubborn endurance of Cold War visions 
of Russian elites as defined entirely, and all too simplistically, by their paranoid 
aversion to democracy.28 As it feeds the fires of the anti-western conspiracy the-
ories ravaging large sections of the Russian public sphere, this reductionism is 
eventually revealed as a self-fulfilling prophecy. The Cold War hysteria of Kiselev 
and Prokhanov found its match in some of the more extreme pronouncements 
issuing from the pens of certain western commentators.
On the other hand, Russian broadcasters have much to learn from the sensi-
tivity with which public service broadcasters like the BBC approach controver-
sies surrounding race, ethnicity, public order and security. Only weeks after the 
Boston Marathon bombing, the UK was shocked when a British soldier’s brutal 
slaying in cold blood on the streets of London’s Woolwich district turned out to 
be the work of two radical Islamists of Nigerian Christian heritage. During the 
tense period that followed their arrest, there was a fear that a far-right backlash 
would plunge the country into an abyss of vengeance-seeking crime. That this 
fear proved largely unfounded but for an initial wave of anti-Islamic protests (and 
isolated cases of violence) owes something at least to the scrupulous efforts of 
broadcasters to distinguish the distorted, radical version of Islam pursued by the 
Woolwich murderers from the mainstream beliefs of the overwhelming majority 
of British Muslims, to follow strict codes of impartiality and balance and to avoid 
inflammatory conflations of criminality and ethno-cultural identity.
Russian broadcasters displayed no such restraint. The reporting of the Wool-
wich incident was cynical and shocking in its inaccuracies, in the unmistakable 
ethnic profiling it applied to accounts of the two suspects and in its multiple con-
flations (of foreign worker with British citizen, of ethnicity and nationality with 
faith, of migration with crime and terrorism, of misplaced resentment against 
British involvement in Muslim countries with socio-economic unrest in Stock-
holm). Ironically, Channel 1’s coverage of the Woolwich incident proved to be 
a milestone in the long retreat of the Kremlin-sponsored discourse from its ear-
lier, albeit partial, adherence to the norms and practices of European ‘tolerance’ 
(Chapter 9).29
At one level, the divergence in Channel 1 and BBC coverage of the Woolwich 
murder reflects the distinction between reporting on events in one’s own vicinity 
(when remaining alert to community sensitivities is crucial for societal cohesion) 
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and reporting on events that occur at a ‘safe’ distance (when those events can be 
conveniently re-construed for domestic consumption). On another level, Russian 
state television’s implicit willingness to equate the crazed actions of two British 
citizens of Nigerian descent with the purported misdemeanours of Central Asian 
and North Caucasian migrants in Moscow represents a misperception of similarity 
between two radically different situations.
On both levels we are dealing with the interplay of sameness and difference 
which provides our central trope. For what is the dilemma faced by contemporary 
states everywhere – indeed, by the nation state per se – if not that of achieving 
the impossible balance of recognizing the reality of increasing rates of global 
population movement and the value of the ‘otherness’ that it brings while instill-
ing a shared sense of national sameness across host and migrant communities, 
and doing so without detriment to the political and ideological pluralism which 
is both the corollary of that task and its mode of accomplishment? The challenge 
is that of overcoming the paradox entailed in imagining a cosmopolitan model of 
citizenship applicable to multiple national contexts. Nowhere is that challenge 
greater than in Russia, which now experiences rates of migration second only 
to the United States and which, as a result of imperial Russian and Soviet lega-
cies, is imagined as a society with close to 200 different indigenous ethnic groups 
across which national ‘sameness’ is still to be realized.30 If it has not now aban-
doned diversity management altogether, Russia still oscillates hesitantly in turn 
between a model designed to conserve the ‘sameness’ of its Soviet residue (itself 
the ideological product of an Enlightenment project shared across many nation-
alities, cross-fertilized with the specificities of a Russian historical tradition) and 
one embracing the ‘difference’ embodied in the principles of European tolerance.
The two key centres of focus of our project converge in the trope of what Roger 
Silverstone terms the ‘dialectic of sameness and difference’: where television rep-
resentation (of the distant other to the intimate self) meets inter-ethnic cohesion 
(of ethnic self and ethnic other).31 Silverstone’s reference to television’s ‘capacity 
to bring people together while simultaneously keeping them apart’ overlaps with 
what Lilia Chouliaraki calls ‘the ambivalence of mediation’, of ‘constantly hover-
ing between closeness and difference’, and together they provide the basis for an 
ethics of mediation.32 For in bringing dramatic, live images of distant places and 
people into the proximity of the domestic setting, the television screen retains its 
status as a privileged and supremely paradoxical tool for experiencing the ethnic 
‘other’ as intimately similar, yet unique and distinct.
It is for this reason that US viewers were so disoriented by the images of the 
Tsarnaev brothers and their naturalized American relatives which flooded their 
screens in the aftermath of the Boston Marathon bombing. For here the dialectic 
is short-circuited: rather than the ‘other’ being made ‘same’ via the magical logic 
of the television screen, that ‘other’ is disconcertingly revealed to be nothing other 
than the ‘same’ from its inception.
Whether Russian television viewers experienced the same disorientation in 
reverse, of course, is doubtful: their North Caucasian names, origins and demean-
ours, combined with their American upbringing, meant that the Tsarnaevs would 
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hardly have elicited any sense of proximity among most Russians. Rather, 
they offered a means of equalizing (‘making same’) two radically different 
‘others’ (US and Chechen), thereby also reinforcing, rather than disrupting or 
counter-balancing, the distancing effect. By juxtaposing American and Russian 
perceptions of the Tsarnaev brothers, we arrive at the outermost layer of the 
sameness–difference trope: that of the very purpose of this book. For in studying 
media representations of ethnic difference in Russia from a perspective which 
reflects the western academic context in which it was developed, we are wil-
ly-nilly entering the sameness–difference dynamic with all its twists and turns: 
attempting to make sense of the peculiarly Russian variant of the crisis in national 
diversity management strategy that has been induced by the gathering pace of 
globalization. In doing so, we are making comparisons, both implicit and explicit: 
drawing parallels with situations in the UK and elsewhere, and noting sharp con-
trasts. We are providing the grounds for readers to assimilate phenomena to their 
own experience, or to attribute them to recognizable, specifically Russian and 
conveniently alien, paradigms. In a paradoxical twist all of its own, readers are in 
fact grasping at two forms of sameness in which one is the inverse of the other. To 
identify similarities in the ways that the BBC and Channel 1 discuss multicultural-
ism, for example, is, in the context of common assumptions about the constraints 
on the Russian media, to experience the surprise that comes when reality is proven 
to shatter or break free from its prior conception. Equally, to point to differences 
between the nuances and balance in BBC reporting of ethnic violence and the 
crude, univocal prejudices that emerge in NTV coverage of the same issues is ulti-
mately (and, no doubt, correctly in this instance) to see ‘sameness’: to assimilate 
Russian television to ‘safe’, established templates relating to media systems that 
have yet to shed the shackles of their repressive totalitarian pasts.
As the two final examples illustrate, achieving the appropriate balance of dif-
ference and sameness in such contexts is difficult and carries a heavy burden of 
responsibility. Overstating the parallels between media practices in the UK and 
Russia – or ‘excusing’ particularly reprehensible Russian variants, such as the 
overwhelming tide of distorted half-truths peddled by federal broadcasters while 
Russia marched roughshod over international law into a sovereign Ukraine, as 
unavoidable Soviet residues – is tantamount to apologia for a paranoid regime in 
denial of its desperate need of transformation and renewal;33 during this period 
programmes like Vesti nedeli and Voskresnoe Vremia took the conspiratorial, 
anti-western bias to hitherto unprecedented levels of intensity.34 However, to err 
in the opposite direction of failing to acknowledge western equivalents to Russian 
media biases, of indulging in reductive, complexity-blind critiques or of refusing 
to accept the role played by cultural difference in shaping current practice, is to 
indulge in a form of cultural imperialism, thereby reinforcing anti-western pho-
bias and contributing to the New Cold War dialectic we are currently witnessing.
Above all, it is surely vital to avoid becoming trapped in a hall of mirrors in 
which difference is merely the other side of sameness: the alien. The appreciation 
of true difference lies in the delicate balance between accepting alterity in all its 
strangeness and acknowledging the common humanity that impels us to embrace 
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it. In a spiritual formulation seemingly far removed from his later Marxist sensi-
bility, the great aesthetician Georg Lukacs argued:
The world is wide, and yet like a home, for the fire that burns in the soul is 
of the same essential nature as the stars; the world and the self, the light and 
the fire are sharply distinct, yet they never become permanent strangers to 
one another, for fire is the soul of all light and all fire clothes itself in light.35
Failure to recognize the truth of Lukacs’s soaring insight may intensify the post-
Ukraine spiral of mutual mistrust and misunderstanding, unleashing a new wave 
of domestic xenophobia and political repression and transmitting further shock-
waves across the external geopolitical landscape.36 In Russia too, difference is in 
the balance.
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Bibliography
Agamben, Giorgio, State of Exception, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008.
Akturk, Sener, Regimes of Ethnicity and Nationhood in Germany, Russia and Turkey, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
Alia, Valeria and Bull, Simone, Media and Ethnic Minorities, Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2005.
Alvarez, Robert R. and Collier, George A., ‘The Long Haul in Mexican Trucking: Tra-
versing the Borderlands of the North and the South’, American Ethnologist, 21/3, 1994, 
606–27.
Anderson, Benedict, Imagined Communities: Reflection on the Origins and Spread of 
Nationalism, London: Verso, 1991.
Anderson, Bridget and Blinder, Scott, ‘Who Counts as a Migrant? Definitions and Their 
Consequences’, Migration Observatory Briefing, COMPAS, University of Oxford, UK, 
September 2013.
Appadurai, Arjun, Fear of Small Numbers: An Essay on the Geography of Anger, Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2006.
Arnold, Richard, ‘Visions of Hate. Explaining Neo-Nazi Violence in the Russian Federa-
tion’, Problems of Post-Communism, 57/2, 2010, 37–49.
Austin, J. L., How to Do Things With Words, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962.
Badmatsyrenov, Timur B., ‘Sangkha i politika: politicheskie aspekty funktsionirovaniia 
buddiiskogo dukhovenstva Mongolii i Buriatii’, Vestnik Buriatskogo gosudarstvennogo 
universiteta, 14, 2012, 137–43.
Bagdasarian, V. E., Teoriia zagovora v otechestvennoii istoriografii vtoroi polovini 19–20 vv., 
Moscow: MSU, 1999.
Bakhtin, Mikhail, The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, Austin: University of Texas 
Press, 1981.
Bancroft, Angus, Roma and Gypsy Travellers in Europe: Modernity, Race, Space and 
Exclusion, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2005.
Barker, Martin, New Racism: Conservatives and the Ideology of the Tribe, New York: 
Junction Books, 1981.
Bazarov, B. V. and Zhabaeva, B. V., Buriatskie natsional’nye demokraty i obshchestven-
no-politicheskaia mysl mongolskikh narodov v pervoi treti XX veka, Ulan-Ude: Izdatel-
stvo BNTs SO RAN, 2008.
Beers, Daniel, Renovating Russia. The Human Sciences and the Fate of Liberal Modernity, 
1880–1930, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008.
266 Bibliography
Beissinger, Mark R., ‘The Persisting Ambiguity of Empire’, Post-Soviet Affairs, 11/2, 
1995, 149–84.
Benhabib, Seyla, The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era, Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 2002.
Bennet, Samuel, Ter Wal, Jessika, Lipinski, Artur, Fabiszak, Malgorzata and Krzyzanowski, 
Michal, ‘The Representation of Third-Country Nationals in European News Discourse. 
Journalistic Perceptions and Practices’, Journalism Practice, 7/3, 2013, 248–65.
Bernstein, Anya, ‘Remapping Sacred Landscapes: Shamanic Tourism and Cultural Pro-
duction on Olkhon Island’, Sibirica: Journal of Siberian Studies, 7/2, 2008, 23–46.
Bernstein, Anya, ‘More Alive than All the Living: Sovereign Bodies and Cosmic Politics 
in Buddhist Siberia’, Cultural Anthropology, 27/2, 2012, 261–85.
Billig, Michael, Banal Nationalism, London: Sage, 1995.
Brandenberger, David, National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of 
Modern Russian National Identity, 1931–1956, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2002.
Brubaker, Rogers, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the 
New Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Brubaker, Rogers, ‘Ethnicity Without Groups’, Archives Européennes de Sociologie, 
XLIII, 2, 2002, 163–89.
Brubaker, Rogers, Ethnicity Without Groups, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004.
Brudny, Yitzhakh M., Reinventing Russia. Russian Nationalism and the Soviet State 
1953–1991, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998.
Burlakov, V. N., Kriminologiia. Uchebnik dlia vuzov, St. Petersburg: Izdatel’skii dom 
Piter, 2004.
Burrett, Tina, Television and Presidential Power in Putin’s Russia, London: Routledge, 2010.
Bushkovitch, Paul, ‘The Formation of a National Consciousness in Early Modern Russia’, 
Harvard Ukrainian Studies, 10, 3/4, 1986, 355–76.
Campani, Giovanna, ‘Migrants and Media. The Italian Case’, in King, Russell and Wood, 
Nancy (eds.), Media and Migration. Construction of Mobility and Difference, London: 
Routledge, 2001, pp. 38–52.
Carlson, Maria, ‘No Religion Higher Than Truth’: A History of the Theosophical Move-
ment in Russia, 1875–1922, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993.
Carothers, Thomas, ‘The End of the Transition Paradigm’, Journal of Democracy, 13/1, 
2002, 5–21.
Cere, Rinella, ‘Globalization vs. Localization: Anti-Immigrant and Hate Discourses in 
Italy’, in Ardizzoni, M. and Ferrari, C. (eds.), Beyond Monopoly: Contemporary Italian 
Media and Globalization, Lanham: Lexington Books, 2010, pp. 225–44.
Cere, Rinella and Brunt, Rosalind (eds.), Postcolonial Media Culture in Britain, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.
Chebankova, Elena, ‘Contemporary Russian Multiculturalism’, Post-Soviet Affairs, 28/3, 
2012, 336–7.
Chouliaraki, Lilie, The Spectatorship of Suffering, London: Sage, 2006.
Cohen, Robin, ‘The Incredible Vagueness of Being British/English’, International Affairs, 
76/3, 2000, 575–82.
Condee, Nancy, The Imperial Trace. Recent Russian Cinema, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009.
Cottle, Simon, Ethnic Minorities and the Media: Changing Cultural Boundaries, Buckingham: 
Open University Press, 2000.
Couldry, Nick, Media Rituals. A Critical Approach, London: Routledge, 2003.
Bibliography 267
Couldry, Nick, Hepp, Andreas and Krotz, Friedrich (eds.), Media Events in a Global Age, 
London: Routledge, 2010.
Dagbaev, Erdem D., Agvan Dorzhiev v istorii Rossiiskogo gosudarstva, Ulan-Ude: Belig, 
2005.
Dagbaev, Erdem D., Institutsional’nyi dizain politicheskikh protsessov v rossiiskikh 
regionakh Vnutrennei Azii i Mongolii, Uland-Ude: Izdatel’stvo BNTs SO RAN, 2011.
Daniliuk, A. Iu., Kondakov, A.M. and Tishkov, V. A., Kontseptsii dukhovno-nravstven-
nogo razvitiia i vospitaniia lichnosti grazhdanina Rossii, Moscow: Prosveshchenie, 
2009.
Dayan, Daniel and Katz, Elihu, Media Events: The Live Broadcasting of History, Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1992.
De Benoist, Alain and Champetier, Charles, ‘The French New Right in the Year 2000’, 
Telos, 115, 1999, 117–44.
Dijk, Teun van, Racism and the Press, London: Routledge, 1991.
Douglas, Mary, Purity and Danger, London: Routledge, 1984.
Downing, John and Husband, Charles, Representing ‘Race’: Racisms, Ethnicities and the 
Media, London: Sage, 2005.
Ducrot, Oswald and Todorov, Tzvetan, Encyclopaedic Dictionary of the Science of Lan-
guage, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1979.
Dunn, John, ‘Humour and Satire on Post-Soviet Russian Television’, in Milne, Lesley 
(ed.), Reflective Laughter: Aspects of Humour in Russian Culture, London: Anthem 
Press, 2004, pp. 181–92.
Durkheim, Emile, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, New York: The Free Press, 
1995 [1912].
Ellinas, Antonis, The Media and the Far Right in Western Europe: Playing the Nationalist 
Card, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
Ellis, John, ‘Television as Working-through’, in Gripsrud, Jostein (ed.), Television and 
Common Knowledge, London: Routledge, 1999, pp. 55–71.
Erikson, E. V., ‘Ob ubiistvakh i razboiakh na Kavkaze’, in Avdeev, V. B. (ed.), Russkaia 
rasovaia teoriia do 1917 goda, vyp. 2, Moscow: FERI-V, 2004.
Erjavec, Karen, ‘Media Representation of the Discrimination against the Roma in Eastern 
Europe: The Case of Slovenia’, Discourse Society, 12/6, 2001, 699–727.
Evans, Alfred, ‘Putin’s Legacy and Russia’s Identity’, Europe-Asia Studies, 60/6, 2008, 
899–912.
Fiske, John and Hartley, John, Reading Television, London: Routledge, 1996.
Fitzpatrick, Sheila, The Cultural Front: Power and Culture in Revolutionary Russia, 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992.
Flood, Christopher, Hutchings, Stephen, Miazhevich, Galina and Nickels, Henri, ‘Between 
Impartiality and Ideology: The BBC’s Paradoxical Remit and the Case of Islam-related 
Television News’, Journalism Studies, 12/2, 2011, 221–38.
Flood, Christopher, Hutchings, Stephen, Miazhevich, Galina and Nickels, Henri, Islam, 
Security and Television News: A Comparative Study, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmil-
lan, 2012.
Foxall, Andrew, ‘Discourses of Demonisation: Chechens, Russians, and the Stavropol’ 
Riots of 2007’, Geopolitics, 15/4, 2010, 684–704.
Fredrickson, George, Racism. A Short History, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2002.
Genette, Gerard, Narrative Discourse: An Essay in Method, Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1983.
268 Bibliography
Gerasimov, Ilya, Glebov, Sergey and Mogilner, Marina, ‘The Postimperial Meets the Post-
colonial: Russian Historical Experience and the Postcolonial Moment’, Ab Imperio, 2, 
2013, 97–135.
Gigliotti, Simone, ‘Unspeakable Pasts as Limit Events: The Holocaust, Genocide, and the 
Stolen Generations’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, 49/2, 2003, 164–81.
Gramsci, Antonio, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, New York: International Pub-
lishers, 1971.
Gray, Herman, Watching Race: Television and the Struggle for Blackness, Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1995.
Gudkov, Lev, Negativnaia identichnost’. Stat’i 1997–2002 godov, Moscow: Novoe litera-
turnoe obozrenie, 2004.
Gudkov, Lev (ed.), Obraz vraga, Moscow: OGI, 2005.
Hafez, Kai (ed.), Islam and the West in the Mass Media: Fragmented Images in a Global-
izing World, Cresskill: Hampton Press, 2000.
Hall, John A., ‘Nationalisms: Classified and Explained’, Daedalus, 122/3, 1993, 1–28.
Haywood, Susan, Cinema Studies: The Key Concepts, London: Routledge, 2000.
Hechter, Michael, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Develop-
ment, 1536–1966, Berkley: University of California Press, 1975.
Herman, Edward and Chomsky, Noam, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of 
the Mass Media, New York: Pantheon Books, 1988.
Hirsch, Francine, Empire of Nations. Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the 
Soviet Union, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005.
Hobsbawm, Eric and Ranger, Terence (eds.), The Invention of Tradition, Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1993.
Horowitz, David, The Deadly Ethnic Riots, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001.
Humphrey, Caroline, Marx Went Away but Karl Stayed Behind, Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1998.
Humphrey, Caroline, ‘“Eurasia”. Ideology and the Political Imagination in Provincial Rus-
sia’, in Hann, Christopher M. (ed.), Postsocialism. Ideals, Ideologies and Practices in 
Eurasia, London: Routledge, 2002, pp. 258–76.
Hunter, Shireen, Islam in Russia: The Politics of Identity and Security, New York: M.E. 
Sharpe, 2004.
Hutchings, Stephen, Screening Intercultural Dialogue: Russia and its Other(s) on Film, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
Hutchings, Stephen, ‘The Gypsy as Vanishing Mediator in Russian Television Coverage of 
Interethnic Tension’, Nationalities Papers, 41/5, 2013, 1–17.
Hutchings, Stephen, Miazhevich, Galina, Flood, Christopher and Nickels, Henri, ‘The 
Impact of “Islamic Extremism” on TV News Representations of Multiculturalism, 
Intégration and Mnogonarodnost: A Comparative Analysis’, Russian Journal of Com-
munication, 1/1, 2008, 43–70.
Hutchings, Stephen and Rulyova, Natalia, Television and Culture in Putin’s Russia: 
Remote Control, London: Routledge, 2009.
Hutchings, Stephen and Rulyova, Natalia, ‘Commemorating the Past/Performing the Present: 
Television Coverage of the Second World War Victory Celebrations and the (De)construc-
tion of Russian Nationhood’, in Beumers, Birgit, Hutchings, Stephen and Rulyova, Natalia 
(eds.), The Post-Soviet Media: Conflicting Signals, London: Routledge, 2009, pp. 137–57.
Hutchings, Stephen and Tolz, Vera, ‘Fault Lines in Russia’s Discourse of Nation: Television 
Coverage of the December 2010 Moscow Riots’, Slavic Review, 71/4, 2012, 873–99.
Bibliography 269
Ivakhnyuk, Irina, Russian Migration Policy and Its Impact on Human Development, 
Human Development Reports Research Paper, New York: United Nations Develop-
ment Programme, 2009.
Jackson, Richard, Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter-terrorism, 
Manchester: Manchester University Press 2005.
Jackson, Richard, ‘Constructing Enemies: “Islamic Terrorism” in Political and Academic 
Discourse’, Government and Opposition, 42/3, 2007, 394–426.
Jacobs, Ronald and Townsley, Eleanor, The Space of Opinion: Media Intellectuals and the 
Public Sphere, New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.
Jameson, Fredric, ‘Imaginary and Symbolic in Lacan: Marxism, Psychoanalytic Criticism, 
and the Problem of the Subject’, Yale French Studies, 55/56, 1977, 338–95.
Johnson, Douglas, ‘The New Right in France’, in Cheles, Luciano, Ferguson, Ronnie 
and Vaughan, Michalina (eds.), Neo-Fascism in Europe, London: Longman, 1991, 
pp. 234–44.
Johnson-Cartee, Karen S., News Narratives and News Framing: Constructing Political 
Reality, Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005.
Jusic, Tarik, ‘Media Discourse and the Politics of Ethnic Conflict: The Case of Yugoslavia’, 
in Kolstø, Pål (ed.), Media Discourse and the Yugoslav Conflicts. Representations of 
Self and Other, Farnham: Ashgate, 2009, pp. 24–38.
Kelly, Catriona, Children’s World: Growing Up in Russia, 1890–1891, London and New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2007.
Kelly, Raymond, ‘Witchcraft and Sexual Relations: An Exploration in the Social and 
Semantic Implications of the Structure of Belief’, in Brown, Paula and Buchbinder, 
Georgeda (eds.), Man and Woman in the New Guinea Highlands, Washington DC: 
American Anthropological Association, 1976, pp. 36–53.
Khalid, Adeeb, ‘The Soviet Union as an Imperial Formation: A View from Central Asia’, 
in Stoler, Ann, McGranahan, Carole and Perdue, Peter (eds.), Imperial Formations, 
Santa Fe: SAR Press, 2007, pp. 123–51.
Khamutaev, V. A., Natsional’nyi vopros v Buriatii. 1980–2000-e gody, Ula-Ude: Izda-
tel’stvo BNTs SO RAN, 2008.
King, Russell and Wood, Nancy (eds.), Media and Migration. Construction of Mobility 
and Difference, London: Routledge, 2001.
Kirill, the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia, Freedom and Responsibility: A Search for 
Harmony, London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 2011.
Klandermans, Bert and Mayer, Nonna, Extreme Right Activists in Europe: Through the 
Magnifying Glass, London: Routledge, 2006.
Knight, Peter, Conspiracy Nation: The Politics of Paranoia in Postwar America, New 
York: New York University Press, 2002.
Knox, Zoe, Russian Society and the Orthodox Church: Religion in Russia after Commu-
nism, New York: Routledge, 2005.
Knox, Zoe, ‘The Watch Tower Society and the End of the Cold War: Interpretations of the 
End-Times, Superpower Conflict, and the Changing Geo-Political Order’, Journal of 
the American Academy of Religion, 79/4, 2011, 1018–49.
Knox, Zoe, ‘Preaching the Kingdom Message: The Jehovah’s Witnesses and Soviet Secu-
larization’, in Wanner, Catherine (ed.), State Secularism and Lived Religion in Russia 
and Ukraine, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 244–71.
Knox, Zoe, ‘Church, State, and Belief in Post-Soviet Russia’, The Russian Review, 71/1, 
2012, 122–7.
270 Bibliography
Kolstø, Pål (ed.), Media Discourse and the Yugoslav Conflicts. Representations of Self and 
Other, Farnham: Ashgate, 2009.
Koltsova, Olessia, New Media and Power in Russia, London: Routledge, 2006.
Kornblatt, Judith, The Cossack Hero in Russian Literature: A Study in Cultural Mythology, 
Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1992.
Krastev, Ivan and Holmes, Stephen, ‘An Autopsy of Managed Democracy’, Journal of 
Democracy, 23/3, 2012, 33–45.
Kristeva, Julia, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, trans. Leon Roudiez, New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1982.
Kroz, Mikhail, ‘Ksenofobiia v rossiiskikh SMI kak proiavlenie ekstremizma’, in Laruelle, 
Marlène (ed.), Russkii natsionalizm. Sotsial’nyi i kul’turnyi kontekst, Moscow: Novoe 
literaturnoe obozrenie, 2008, pp. 425–44.
Laclau, Ernesto, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Poli-
tics, London: Verso, 1985.
Laclau, Ernesto, On Populist Reason, London: Verso, 2005.
Lapidus, Gail Warhofsky, ‘Ethnonationalism and Political Stability. The Soviet Case’, 
World Politics, 36/4, 1984, 555–80.
Laruelle, Marlène, Russian Eurasianism: The Ideology of Empire, Baltimore: Johns Hop-
kins University Press, 2008.
Laruelle, Marlène, In the Name of the Nation. Nationalism and Politics in Contemporary 
Russia, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.
Laruelle, Marlène, ‘The Ideological Shift on the Russian Radical Right. From Demonizing 
the West to Fear of Migrants’, Problems of Post-Communism, 57/6, 2010, 19–31.
Laruelle, Marlène, ‘Alexei Navalny and Challenges in Reconciling “Nationalism” and 
“Liberalism”’, Post-Soviet Affairs, 30/4, 2014, 276–97.
Laryš, Martin and Mareš, Miroslav, ‘Right-Wing Extremist Violence in the Russian Feder-
ation’, Europe-Asia Studies, 63/1, 2011, 129–54.
Layton, Susan, Russian Literature and Empire: Conquest of the Caucasus from Pushkin to 
Tolstoy, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
Lemon, Alaina, Between Two Fires: Gypsy Performance and Romani Memory from Push-
kin to Post-Socialism, Durham: Duke University Press, 2000.
Lentin, Alan, ‘Imagining the West, Perceiving Race: Social Sciences and Political Imag-
ination’, in Bottici, Chiara and Challand, Benoit (eds.), The Politics of Imagination, 
Abingdon: Birkbeck Law Press, 2012, pp. 109–23.
Lentin, Alan and Titley, Gavan, The Crises of Multiculturalism: Racism in a Neoliberal 
Age, New York: Zed Books, 2011.
Lloyd-Jones, Gaynor, ‘Design and Control Issues in Qualitative Case Study Research’, 
International Journal of Qualitative Methods, 2/2, 2003, 1–20.
Lockyer, Sharon (ed.), Reading Little Britain: Comedy Matters on British Television, Lon-
don: I.B. Tauris, 2010.
Lotman, Yurii, Universe of the Mind: A Semiotic Theory of Culture, Indianopolis: Indiana 
University Press, 2001.
Lucacs, Georg, Theory of the Novel, trans. Anna Bostock, London: Merlin Press, 1971.
Lucas, Edward, Deception: Spies, Lies and How Russia Dupes the West, London: Blooms-
bury Publishing, 2013.
MacFadyen, David, Russian Television Today: Primetime Drama and Comedy, London: 
Routledge, 2007.
Maiorova, Olga, From the Shadow of Empire: Defining the Russian Nation through Cul-
tural Mythology, 1855–1870, Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2010.
Bibliography 271
Malakhov, Vladimir, ‘“Natsional’naia politika” kak fenomen politicheskoi, rechi’, in Mal-
akhov, V. S., Ponaekhali tut: Ocherki o natsionalizme, rasizme i kul'turnom pliural-
izme, Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2007.
Malakhov, V. S., Ponaekhali tut… Ocherki o natsionalizme, rasizme i kul’turnom pliural-
izme, Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2007.
Martin, Terry, ‘The Origins of Soviet Ethnic Cleansing’, The Journal of Modern History, 
70/4, 1998, 813–61.
Martin, Terry, The Affirmative Action Empire. Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet 
Union, 1923–1939, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001.
Martin-Barbero, Jesus, Communication, Culture and Hegemony: From the Media to Medi-
ations, London: Sage, 1993.
McCombs, Maxwell, ‘Building Consensus: The News Media’s Agenda-Setting Roles’, 
Political Communication, 14/4, 1997, 433–43.
McCrone, David and McPherson, Gayle (eds.), National Days. Constructing and Mobilis-
ing National Identity, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.
Meer, Nasar and Modood, Tariq, ‘How Does Interculturalism Contrast with Multicultural-
ism?’, Journal of Intercultural Studies, 33/2, 2012, 175–96.
Melvin, Neil, Russians beyond Russia. The Politics of National Identity, London: Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, 1995.
Mickiewicz, Ellen, Split Signals: Television and Politics in the Soviet Union, New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1988.
Mickiewicz, Ellen, Changing Channels: Television and the Struggle for Power, Durham: 
Duke University Press, 1999.
Mickiewicz, Ellen, Television, Power, and the Public in Russia, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008.
Miller, Aleksei, ‘The Empire and the Nation in the Imagination of Russian Nationalism’, in 
Miller, Aleksei and Rieber, Alfred J. (eds.), Imperial Rule, Budapest: Central European 
University Press, 2004, pp. 9–26.
Miller, Aleksei, ‘Istoricheskaia politika v Rossii: novyi povorot?’, in Miller, A. and 
Lipman, M. (eds.), Istoricheskaia politika v XXI veke: sbornik statei, Moscow: Novoe 
literaturnoe obozrenie, 2012, pp. 334–7.
Miller, Aleksei, ‘Istoriia poniatiia natsiia v Rossii’, in Sdvizhkov, D. and Schirle, I. 
(eds.), Poniatiia o Rossii, vol. 2, Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2012, 
pp. 7–49.
Mogilner, Marina, Homo imperii. Istoriia fizicheskoi antropologii v Rossii (konets XIX- 
nachalo XX vv.), Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2008.
Moore, Kerry, Gross, Bernhard and Threadgold, Terry (eds.), Migrations and the Media, 
New York: Peter Lang, 2012.
Morozov, Evgenii, The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom, New York: 
Public Affairs, 2011.
Mukomel’, V. I., ‘Rossiiskie diskursy o migratsii’, Vestnik obshchestvennogo mneniia, 1, 
2005, 48–58.
Nora, Pierre, ‘Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire’, Representations, 
26, 1989, pp. 7–24.
Nora, Pierre and Kritzman, Lawrence D. (eds.), Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French 
Past, vol. 1, New York, Columbia University Press, 1996.
Nordstrom, Carolyn, Shadows of War: Violence, Power and International Profiteering in 
the Twenty-First Century, Los Angeles: University of California Press 2004.
Oates, Sarah, Television, Democracy and Elections in Russia, London: Routledge, 2008.
272 Bibliography
Osipov, Alexander, ‘Minority Questions: Ethnicity, Discrimination, and Extremism in 
Russia’, Problems of Post-Communism, 57/2, 2010, 50–60.
Oushakine, Serguei, Patriotism of Despair: Nation, War, and Loss in Russia, Ithaca: Cor-
nell University Press, 2009.
Oushakine, Serguei, ‘V poiskakh mesta mezhdu Stalinym i Gitlerom: o postkolonial’nykh 
istoriiakh sotsializma’, Ab Imperio, 1, 2011, 209–33.
Park, Robert E., ‘Human Migration and the Marginal Man’, The American Journal of 
Sociology, XXXIII/6, 1928, 881–93.
Pavlinskaia, L. R., Buriaty. Ocherki etnicheskoi istorii, St. Petersburg: Evropeiskii dom, 
2008.
Philo, Greg, Briant, Emma and Donald, Pauline, Bad News for Refugees, London: Pluto 
Press, 2013.
Platonov, Rachel, Singing the Self: Guitar Poetry, Community and Identity in the Post-Stalin 
Period, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2012.
Poole, Elisabeth, Reporting Islam: Media Representations of British Muslims, London: 
I.B. Tauris, 2002.
Poole, Elisabeth and Richardson, John, Muslims and the News Media, London: I.B. Tauris, 
2006.
Popescu, Nicu, ‘The Strange Alliance of Democrats and Nationalists’, Journal of Democ-
racy, 23/3, 2012, 46–54.
Postill, John, Media and Nation Building. How the Iban Became Malaysian, New York: 
Berghahn, 2006.
Prokhorova, Elena, ‘Can the Meeting Place Be Changed? Crime and Identity Discourse in 
Russian TV Series of the 1990s’, Slavic Review, 62/3, 2003, 512–24.
Rogers, Douglas, ‘Postsocialisms Unbound: Connections, Critiques, Comparisons’, Slavic 
Review, 69/1, 2010, 1–15.
Roth-Ey, Kristin, Moscow Prime Time: How the Soviet Union Built the Media Empire That 
Lost the Cultural Cold War, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011.
Roudometof, Victor, ‘Toward an Archaeology of National Commemoration in the 
Balkans’, in Geisler, Michael E. (ed.), National Symbols, Fractured Identities: Con-
testing the National Narrative, Hanover: University Press of New England, 2005, 
pp. 35–59.
Rulyova, Natalia and Zagibalov, Taras, ‘Blogging the Other: Construction of National 
Identities in the Blogosphere’, Europe-Asia Studies, 64/8, 2012, 1524–45.
Ryazanova-Clarke, Lara, ‘The “West” in the Linguistic Construction of Russianness in 
Contemporary Public Discourse’, in Alapuro, Risto, Mustajoki, Arto and Pesonen, 
Pekka (eds.), Understanding Russianness, London: Routledge, 2012, pp. 3–18.
Said, Edward, Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the 
Rest of the World, London: Vintage, 1997.
Sakwa, Richard, The Crisis of Russian Democracy: The Dual State, Factionalism and the 
Medvedev Succession, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
Sarsenov, Karin, ‘Televising Soviet Tropes: Reforging a Supraethnic Cultural Identity’, 
Slavica Lundensia, 24, 2009, 257–77.
Schain, Martin, Zolberg, Aristide and Hossay, Patrick (eds.), Shadows over Europe: the 
Development and Impact of the Extreme Right in Western Europe, New York: Palgrave, 
2002.
Schenk, Caress, ‘Nationalism in the Russian Media: Content Analysis of Newspaper Cov-
erage Surrounding Conflict in Stavropol, 24 May–7 June 2007’, Nationalities Papers, 
40/5, 2012, 783–805.
Bibliography 273
Schimpfossl, Elisabeth and Yablokov, Ilya, ‘Coercion or Conformism? Perceptions of 
Censorship and Self-Censorship among Russian Television Reporters in the 2010s’, 
Demokratizatsia. The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, 22/2, 2014, 295–311.
Shevel, Oxana, Migration, Refugee Policy, and State Building in Postcommunist Europe, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
Shevel, Oxana, ‘Russian Nation-building from Yel’tsin to Medevdev: Ethnic, Civic or 
Purposefully Ambiguous?’, Europe-Asia Studies, 63/2, 2011, 179–202.
Shevtsova, Lilia, ‘Putinism under Siege. Implosion, Atrophy, or Revolution?’, Journal of 
Democracy, 23/2, 2012, 19–32.
Shevtsova, Lilia, ‘Russia under Putin: Titanic Looking for Its Iceberg?’, Communist and 
Post-Communist Studies, 45, 2012, 209–16.
Shlapentokh, Dmitry (ed.), Russia between East and West: Scholarly Debates on Eurasian-
ism, Leiden: Brill, 2007.
Shnirel’man, Viktor A., ‘Porog tolerantnosti’. Ideologiia i praktika novogo rasizma, 2 
vols., Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2011.
Shohat, Ella and Stam, Robert, Unthinking Eurocentrism: Multiculturalism and the Media, 
London: Routledge, 1994.
Silverstone, Roger, ‘Proper Distance: Toward an Ethics for Cyberspace’, in Liestøl, Gunnar, 
Morrison, Andrew and Rasmussen, Terje (eds.), Digital Media Revisited: Theore-
tical and Conceptual Innovations in Digital Domains, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003, 
pp. 469–90.
Silverstone, Roger, Media and Morality: On the Rise of the Mediapolis, Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2007.
Simon, Vera, ‘Reunification Day – Day of German Unity?’, in McCrone, David and 
McPherson, Gayle (eds.), National Days. Constructing and Mobilising National Iden-
tity, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, pp. 151–65.
Skrynnikova, Tatyana and Amogolonova, Darima, ‘Symbols of Post-Soviet Buriat Consol-
idation’, Zhurnal Sibirskogo Federalnogo Universiteta, 4/6, 2011, 797–8. 
Slezkine, Yuri, ‘The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted 
Ethnic Particularism’, Slavic Review, 53/2, 1994, 414–52.
Sonneman, Toby, ‘Dark Mysterious Wanderers: The Migrating Metaphor of the Gypsy’, 
The Journal of Popular Culture, 32/4, 1999, 119–39.
Stroganova, E. N., Buriatskoe national’no-kulturnoe vozrozhdenie, Moscow-Irkutsk: 
Natalis, 2001.
Strukov, Vlad, ‘Russia’s Internet Media Policies: Open Space and Ideological Closure’, 
in Beumers, Birgit, Hutchings, Stephen and Rulyova, Natalia (eds.), The Post-Soviet 
Russian Media: Conflicting Signals, London: Routledge, 2009, pp. 208–23.
Suny, Ronald G., The Revenge of the Past. Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of 
the Soviet Union, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993.
Suny, Ronald G., ‘The Empire Strikes Out: Imperial Russia, “National Identity”, and Theo-
ries of Empire’, in Suny, Ronald G. and Martin, Terry (eds.), A State of Nations. Empire 
and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin, New York: Oxford University Press, 
2001, pp. 23–66.
Thussu, Dayan, News as Entertainment: The Rise of Global Infotainment, London: Sage, 
2007.
Tishkov, Valerii, Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict In and After the Soviet Union, 
London: Sage, 1997.
Tishkov, Valerii, ‘Samoopredelenie rossiiskoi natsii’, Mezhdunarodnye protsessy, 3/2, 
2005, 17–27.
274 Bibliography
Tishkov, Valerii, ‘Nationalism i vybornye kampanii’, Vestnik rossiiskoi natsii, 2–3, 2012, 
72–90.
Todorov, Tzvetan, On Human Diversity: Nationalism, Racism and Exoticism in French 
Thought, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993, pp. 57–60.
Tolson, Andrew, Media Talk: Spoken Discourse on TV and Radio, Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2006.
Tolz, Vera, ‘The Radical Right in Post-Communist Russian Politics’, in Merkel, Peter H. 
and Weinberg, Leonard (eds.), The Revival of Right-Wing Extremism in the Nineties, 
Portland: Frank Cass, 1997, pp. 177–202.
Tolz, Vera, Russian Academicians and the Revolution: Combining Professionalism and 
Politics, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997.
Tolz, Vera, ‘Conflicting “Homeland Myths” and Nation-State Building in Post-Communist 
Russia’, Slavic Review, 57/2, 1998, 267–94.
Tolz, Vera, ‘Forging the Nation: National Identity and Nation Building in Post-Communist 
Russia’, Europe-Asia Studies, 50/6, 1998, 993–1022.
Tolz, Vera, Russia: Inventing the Nation, London: Arnold/Hodder, 2001.
Tolz, Vera, ‘A Future Russia: A Nation-state or a Multi-national Federation’, in Slater, 
Wendy and Wilson, Andrew (eds.), The Legacy of the Soviet Union, Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, pp. 17–38.
Tolz, Vera, ‘Russia’s Own Orient’. The Politics of Identity and Oriental Studies in the Late 
Imperial and Early Soviet Periods, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
Treisman, Daniel, The Return: Russia’s Journey from Gorbachev to Medvedev, New York: 
Free Press, 2011.
Trenin, Dmitri, ‘No Return to the Past for Russia’, The International Spectator, 47/3, 2012, 
8–12.
Triandafyllidou, Anna, ‘Migrants and the Media in the Twenty-First Century. Obstacles 
and Opportunities for the Media to Reflect Diversity and Promote Integration’, Jour-
nalism Practice, 7/3, 2013, 240–7.
Umland, Andreas (ed.), Theorizing Post-Soviet Extreme Right: Comparative Political, 
Historical and Sociological Approaches, Armonk: M. E. Sharp, 2008.
Umland, Andreas, The Nature of Russian “Neo-Eurasianism”: Approaches to Aleksandr 
Dugin’s Post-Soviet Movement of Radical Anti-Americanism, Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 
2009.
Urban, Michael, ‘Remythologising the Russian State’, Europe-Asia Studies, 50/6, 1998, 
969–92.
Volkov, Denis, ‘The Protesters and the Public’, Journal of Democracy, 23/3, 2012, 55–62.
Voloshinov, Valentin, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1986.
Weisberger, Adam, ‘Marginality and Its Directions’, Sociological Forum, 7/3, 1992, 
425–46.
Weitz, Eric D., Hirsch, Francine, Weiner, Amir and Lemon, Alaina, ‘Discussion of Eric 
D. Weitz’s “Racial Politics without the Concept of Race: Reevaluating Ethnic and 
National Purges”’, Slavic Review, 61/1, 2002, 1–65.
White, Hayden, ‘The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality’, in Mitchell, 
W. J. T. (ed.), On Narrative, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1981, pp. 1–23.
White, Richard, ‘National Days and the National Past in Australia’, Australian Cultural 
History, 22, 2003, 55–72.
Wikan, Unni, Generous Betrayal: Politics of Culture in the New Europe, Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 2002.
Bibliography 275
Wilson, Andrew, Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World, New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2005.
Wolchik, Sharon, ‘Putinism under Siege: Can There Be a Color Revolution?’, Journal of 
Democracy, 23/3, 2012, 63–70.
Wolfsfeld, Gadi, Media and the Path to Peace, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004.
Yablokov, Ilya, ‘Conspiracy Discourse in Post-Soviet Russia: Political Strategies of Cap-
ture of the Public Sphere’, PhD thesis, Russian and East European Studies, University 
of Manchester, UK, 2014.
Yemelianova, Galina (ed.), Radical Islam in the Former Soviet Union, London: Routledge, 
2010.
Ytreburg, Espen, ‘Moving out of the Inverted Pyramid: Narratives and Descriptions in 
Television News’, Journalism Studies, 2/3, 2001, 357–71.
Zaslavsky, Victor and Brym, Robert, Soviet-Jewish Emigration and Soviet National Pol-
icy, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983.
Zassoursky, Ivan, Media and Power in Post-Soviet Russia, Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2004.
Žižek, Slavoj, The Ticklish Subject, London: Verso, 1999.
Žižek, Slavoj, Living in the End Times, London: Verso, 2010.
Zuev, Dennis, ‘The Russian Ultranationalist Movement on the Internet: Actors, Communi-
ties and Organization of Joint Actions’, Post-Soviet Affairs, 27/2, 2011, 121–57.
Zuev, Dennis, ‘The Russian March: Investigating the Symbolic Dimension of Political 
Performance in Modern Russia’, Europe-Asia Studies, 65/1, 2013, 102–26.
Zvereva, Vera, ‘“Zakon i kulak”: Rossiiskie militseiskie serialy’, Novoe literaturnoe oboz-
renie, 78, 2006, 305–25.

9/11 attacks 66, 87, 202, 204, 213
‘abjection’ 196–7, 208–12
Academy of Culture and Arts (Buriatiia) 164
Adventists 58
Agvan Dorzhiev Foundation 164
aims/objectives of study 11–12
Alekhina, Mariia 194, 207, 215, 257
Aleksei, Patriarch 77
Aliens (television series) 230–2
Anderson, Bridget 60




Arig Us (commercial channel) 155
Aushev, Ruslan 111
Austin, J. L. 13
‘authoritative discourse’ 25, 106, 175–7
Bagirov, Eduard 204
Baker, Tom 138
Bakhtin, Mikhail 13, 14, 212
‘banal nationalism’ 30
Baptists 58
Basaev, Shamil 183 
Bastille Day (France) 80, 81
‘Battle with the Forces of Darkness’ 108
BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation) 
30–1, 69, 88, 89, 228–9, 259–61
Belov, Aleksandr 180
Berezovskii, Boris 88, 111, 203–4, 213
Beslan school hostage crisis (2004) 176
Biriulevo market (Moscow) 114–15
Blair, Tony 87
‘blasphemy’ 194, 196, 197, 200, 202–5, 
207, 211–12, 214
Blinder, Scott 60
blood donation programmes 78–9, 87
BNP (British National Party) 30, 88, 89




‘borderland zones’ 156, 157
Borenstein, Eliot 248
Boston Marathon bombing (2013) 247, 
248–9, 257, 259, 260




Brubaker, Rogers 14, 23, 43, 114
Buchanan, Pat 190
Buddhism: and Buriatiia republic 18,  
149, 150, 152, 153, 157, 158, 159–61, 
164–5; marginalisation of 68; news 
coverage of 57; as traditional Russian 
religion 59, 78 
Buranovsk Grannies 203
Buriatiia republic 148–51; as ‘borderland 
zone’ 156, 157; and Buddhism 18, 
149, 150, 152, 153, 157, 158, 159–61, 
164–5; and Eurasianism 163, 166; and 
marginality theory 151, 156–7; history 
of 151–2, 157–8, 166; and ‘hybrid 
identities’ 158–62, 167; political and 
media environment 152–5; relationship 
with Mongolia and Tibet 157, 158, 
163–5, 166, 167
Buriatiia: The Chronicle of the Centuries 
(television  programme) 166
Cameron, David 54, 89
Cathedral of Christ the Saviour (Moscow) 
3, 41, 57, 92, 186, 194, 205, 206, 207–8
Catholicism 58
Centre for Political Technology 179
Index
278 Index
‘chain of equivalences’ 191, 252
Channel 1 (broadcaster): anti-Islamist line 
66–7; and Day of National Unity 75, 
78, 81, 87–8, 90–1, 93; and Manezhnaia 
Square riots 100, 103–6, 111–12, 113; 
and migration coverage 233, 238; 
and Naval’nyi 186; and presidential 
elections (2012) 177, 178–82, 183, 
184–5, 188; and Pussy Riot scandal 1, 
196, 199; relationship with Kremlin 
4–5, 32, 68, 221, 251; as source 17; and 
televised drama 122–3, 130–1, 135–6, 
137, 141, 143; and theory/method of 
study 15; trans-border reach of 32; and 
Woolwich murders 259–60
Chaplin, Father Vsevolod 83





Chubais, Anatolii 25, 33
CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) 248–9
‘clash of civilizations’ 2, 202, 225, 226, 
228, 234, 248
coding system 42–4
‘compatriots’ 32, 85, 228, 235, 257–8
‘compound identity’ 25
Concept of the State Nationalities Policy 
(2007) 153, 158–9
Condee, Nancy 24
‘conflict of cultures’ 2, 101, 102–3, 105, 
106, 109–10, 112, 113–14, 153, 225, 
236, 239, 248, 256
‘conspiracy of power’ 101, 103, 107, 111, 
113
Constitution Day (Norway) 80
Cossacks 127–8, 151, 152, 166, 257
Couldry, Nick 16, 89–90, 131, 135
Crimea annexation (2014) 9, 24, 25, 247, 
257
‘crowdsourcing’ 33
‘cultural circulation’ 12–13, 122
‘cultural code’ 177, 178, 182, 185




‘Day of Accord and Reconciliation’ 74
‘Day of Good Deeds’ 78, 81
‘Day of National Unity’ (DNU): 2012 
event 90–4; absence of metalanguage 
86–8; and ‘apartness’ 80–8; comparative 
context 88–90; divisiveness of 74; 
and ‘ethnic cohesion’ 52; fractured 
nationhood narrative of 82–6, 97; and 
good deeds 78–9; introduction of 73–4; 
as ‘invented tradition’ 75, 76, 88; lack 
of public adoption 75, 80–2; as ‘media 
event’ 75, 76–88, 89–90, 252; and 
non-participation 80–2; opolchentsy 
narrative 74, 76, 77–8, 83, 84, 87, 90–1, 
106, 114; and ‘Russian March’ 74, 
75, 84, 85–6, 88, 91, 92; and Russian 
Orthodox Church 74–5, 77–8, 82–3, 84, 
90, 91–3
‘Day of the Constitution’ 74
‘Day of the Kazan Mother of God Icon’ 
74, 77, 80, 84, 92
‘Day of the October Revolution’ 74






Domodedovo airport (Moscow) 41–2,  
66, 68
Dorzhiev, Agvan 164, 165
Dostoevskii, Fyodor 178, 190
‘double ambivalence’ 156
Dozhd’ TV (Rain Television) 33, 207–8
DPNI (far-right anti-immigration 
movement) 180, 253
drama, televised: and ‘media events’ 121; 
mediation process 122, 123–5, 128–30, 
143, 144; modalizing process 122, 123, 
137–44; moderating process 122, 130, 
143; Nasha Russia 122, 123, 137–42, 
143, 144; and North Caucasians 121, 
123–4,139, 142; and ‘otherness’ 122, 
132, 135, 143; portrayal of ‘gypsies’ 
122–3, 123–30, 142–3; representation 
of inter-ethnic relations 121–3, 133–7; 
Shkola 121, 122–3, 130–7, 142–3
Druzhba narodov (sit-com) 144
Ducrot, Oswald 123
Dugin, Aleksandr 178, 182
Durkheim, Emile 74, 205–6
Dzhemal, Geidar 179
El’tsin, Boris 25, 74
English Defence League 31
‘ethnic cohesion’ (coding system category) 
42, 43, 49–51, 52–4, 154
Index 279
‘ethnic criminality’ 101, 102, 103, 106–7, 
113–14, 153, 230–1, 236, 239
Eurasianism 162–3; and historical legacy 
of Soviet Russia 29; and Islam 68; and 
post-election media discourse 229; 
support for 10; and Vesti-Buriatiia 151, 
163, 166, 167
Euromaidan movement (Ukraine) 249, 259
Everyone Dies but Me (film) 130
Evkurov, Iunus-Bek 110
‘external migration’ 178, 179, 236, 253
Fiske, John 90
Flather, Baroness Shreela 233–4
free speech 30–1, 89, 177, 188, 201, 252, 
255
frequency of ethnicity-related news 45–9, 
52, 55, 57, 60–2, 65, 154
‘friendship of the peoples’ 101–2, 105, 
106, 109, 112, 113, 115, 153–4, 167
FSB (Federal Security Service) 235, 248
Gai-Germanika, Valeriia 130, 131, 132, 
134, 136, 137, 142, 143, 251
Galustian, Mikhail 138, 141–2
Gastarbeiter (migrant workers) 138–9, 
140–2, 189, 197, 214, 230
Gazprom (energy firm) 32
Gazprom-Media 137
Gel’man, Marat 1, 199, 206, 207
genealogical prism 13–14
Genghis Khan 163




global financial crisis (2008) 9
Gol’dfarb, Aleksandr 204
Gorbachev, Mikhail 102, 251
Govorukhin, Stanislav 178, 182
Griffin, Nick 30–1, 88, 89
Gudkov, Lev 256
Gumilev, Lev 237–8
Guy Fawkes Day (England) 85







historical legacy of Soviet Russia 24–9
Hobsbawm, Eric 75, 76, 88
Humphrey, Caroline 152
Huntington, Samuel 2, 202, 248





‘imagined communities’ 24–5, 30, 73, 252
‘imitative democracy’ 184
‘imperial particularity’ 24
Independence Day (USA) 77, 80
Ingushetia (Russian republic) 65–6
intensity of ethnicity-related news 45–8, 
50, 52–3, 55, 56, 57, 65
‘inter-ethnic conflict’ (coding system 
category) 42, 43, 49–51, 53, 62–4
‘inter-ethnic strife’ 6, 7–8, 101, 103, 108, 
113
‘internal migration’ 178, 179, 235–8, 253
‘inter-nationality strife’ 6
Inter-Religious Council of Russia 78
interviews 15
intratextual modalizers 140–1
‘invented traditions’ 75, 76, 88
Isaev, Aleksandr 131
Islam: and Boston Marathon bombing 
248, 249; and Eurasianism 68; and 
‘internal migration’ 237–8; and 
Manezhnaia Square riots 98–9; and 
media approaches to religion 197; news 
coverage of 31, 57–8, 64, 66–7, 68; and 
post-election media discourse 226, 229, 
233–4, 237; and Pussy Riot scandal 
201–2; and Russian Orthodox Church 
57–8; and ‘separatist violence in the 
North Caucasus’ 64–7; as traditional 
Russian religion 9, 59, 78; and 
Wahhabism 64; and Woolwich  
murders 259
Izvestiia (newspaper) 185
Jameson, Fredric 210, 211
Jehovah’s Witnesses 58, 59




Katz, Elihu 16, 75–6, 89–90
Keosaian, Laura 128–9
Khambo-Lama Itigelov, Pandito 161
280 Index
Khodorkovskii, Mikhail 2, 88, 194
Kholmogorov, Egor 204
Kirill, Patriarch: and cincture of the 
Theotokos 197–8, 207; and Day of 
National Unity 78, 82, 83, 84, 85, 90, 
91–3; and Manezhnaia Square riots 
104–5; and prayer vigil ‘of Orthodox 
believers’ 57; and Pussy Riot scandal 
92, 93, 204, 205; support for Putin and 
the state 55, 198–9
Kiselev, Dmitrii 15, 35 54, 64, 210–11, 
236–7, 239, 254, 258, 259




Komsomol’skaia Pravda (newspaper) 185
Kondopoga riots (2006) 26
Kostina, Ol’ga 1, 5, 199, 201
Kozlov, Maksim 1–2, 3, 45, 199–200, 
202–3, 207, 214
Kristeva, Julia 196, 208–10
Ku Klux Klan 74
Kurginian, Sergei 198
Kvachkov, Anatolii 106, 114
KVN (television series) 137–8, 140, 141, 142
Laclau, Ernesto 13, 122, 177, 188, 190, 191
Leont’ev, Mikhail 88, 186, 196, 201, 202, 
251
Levada Centre surveys 183, 199, 224
lezginka (traditional dance) 84
‘liberal empire’ 25
‘limit events’ 195
Little Britain (television series) 137, 138, 
139, 142
LiveJournal (blog host) 186, 189
‘localism’ 34
‘locution’ 13
Lombroso, Cesare  102
London riots (2011) 114, 191






Maksimovskaia, Marianna 110, 111
Malakhov, Andrei 200–201
Mamontov, Arkadii 15, 203–4, 205, 206, 
208, 211, 212–14, 215, 229–32, 239, 
255–6
Manezhnaia Square riots (Moscow) 
27; and corruption 182; coverage of 
16, 99–101, 103–11, 176, 254; and 
establishment of Presidential Council on 
Inter-ethnic Relations 34; and fractured 
national identity 113; and ‘internal 
migration’ 236–7; interpretative lenses 
101–3, 111–12, 113–15; and Islam 
98–9; media reaction to 42, 46, 98–9, 
176; and neo-Nazi extremism 98, 104–5, 
109–11; and North Caucasians 98, 104–5, 
107–8, 109–10, 112–13; provocation for 
98, 114; and ‘Russian March’ 91
marginality theory 151, 156–7
Markelov, Stanislav 62–3
Martin, Terry 27




‘maturing consensus’ 3, 5, 200
‘media events’: Day of National Unity 75, 
76–88, 89–90, 252; defining 16; Pussy 
Riot scandal 195, 196, 199–202, 216; 
and televised drama 121
mediation process 122, 123–5, 128–30, 
143, 144
Medvedev, Dmitri 32, 54, 77, 84, 98, 104, 
107, 110, 176
Memorial (human rights organization) 179
Merkel, Angela 54
metalanguage 86–8
metro system bombings (Moscow, 2010) 
41, 68
‘migration’(coding system category) 42, 
43–4, 49–51, 53, 59–62, 68, 154
Mikhalkov, Nikita 238
Minin, Kozma 74, 77–8, 90, 91
miracles 160, 199, 211 
Mirzaev, Rasul 63–4
miscegenation 126, 129
modalizing process 122, 123, 137–44
moderating process 122, 130, 143
Mohammed, Sheikh Feiz 248
Molodaia gvardiia (youth movement) 79
Mongolia 157, 158, 163–4, 165, 166, 167
Mormonism 58
Morozov, Evgenii 5
Moscow Echo radio station 136, 178, 187, 
189, 202
Moscow riots see Manezhnaia Square riots 
Moscow Times (newspaper) 202
Moskovskie novosti (newspaper) 235
Index 281
Movement Against Illegal Immigration 74
multi-confessionalism 2, 4, 26, 57, 59, 68, 
82, 152, 197, 240
‘multi-ethnic regime’ 26
Mustafi, Nail 202
Musul’mane (television programme) 197
Nagovitsyn, Viacheslav 152–3
‘Narod’ (The People) 187
‘narrowcasting’ 30
Nasha Russia (television series) 122, 123, 
137–42, 143, 144, 188–9, 254
Nasha Russia: Balls of Fate (film)  
137, 139
Nashi (youth movement) 79, 81, 82–3, 84, 
85–6, 87, 111
‘national values’ 30, 55, 92
Naval’nyi, Aleksei 4, 177, 180, 185–90, 
196, 204, 239, 247, 253
Nedelia (news programme) 100, 108–11, 
112, 113–14, 184, 208
‘negative identity’ 256
neo-imperial nationalism 9–10
neo-Nazi extremism 62–4, 98, 104–5, 
109–11
‘new cold war’ 247, 254–5, 258, 259, 261
‘new racism’ 9, 101, 110
Nezavisimaia gazeta (newspaper) 176–7, 
225, 236
Nizhnii Novgorod (Russia) 90
Nora, Pierre 80
Nordstrom, Carolyn 66
North Caucasus: and Boston Marathon 
bombing 247; and ‘internal migration’ 
235–9; Kislovodsk forum 178, 180–1; 
and Moscow riots 98, 104–5, 107–8, 
109–10, 112–13; ‘separatist violence in’ 
42, 43, 46, 49–51, 53, 64–7, 154; and 
televised drama 121, 123–4, 139, 142
NTV (independent broadcaster) 15, 32, 33, 
66, 92, 100, 106–8, 111–12, 143–4
Odnako (opinion programme) 186, 196, 
201, 202
Oliphant, Roland 138
opolchentsy narrative 74, 76, 77–8, 83, 84, 
87, 90–1, 106, 109, 114
Orlov, Gleb 137 
Orlov, Oleg 179, 180
‘other religions’ (coding system category) 
42, 43, 49–51, 53, 57–9, 154
‘other/miscellaneous’ (coding system 
category) 42, 43, 49–51, 53, 154
‘otherness’: and community cohesion 
11; and ‘conflict of cultures’ 110; and 
‘ethnic criminality’ 103; and ‘inter-
ethnic strife’ 7–8; and legacy of empire 
25; and metalanguage 87; and migration 
260; and post-election media discourse 
230, 231–2, 233, 240; and Pussy Riot 
scandal 196–7, 201, 205, 208–12, 255, 
257; and televised drama 122, 132, 135, 
143; and the West 249




Park, Robert E. 156
Pentecostalism 58
People’s Party (Mongolia) 165
‘Peoples of Russia are Moscow’s 
Treasure’ 83
performative community-building 142–4
‘performativity’ 13, 91, 114
‘peripheral voice’ 34
‘perlocutionary effect’ 13
Poedinok (talk show) 99, 112, 196, 204–5, 
206, 234–5
Political Class (journal) 179
‘political correctness’ 137, 234
‘politics of (in)visibility’ 66
‘post-colonialism’ 29, 151, 162, 166, 229, 
250
‘post-socialism’ 250
Pozharskii, Dmitrii 74, 77–8, 84, 90, 91
Pozner, Vladimir 189
pragmatic criteria 76, 80–1
Presidential Council on Inter-ethnic 
Relations 34, 227
presidential elections (2012): media 
coverage 177, 178–85, 188, 190–1; post-
election media discourse 221–3; protests 
over Putin’s re-election 41, 175, 186; 
and Pussy Riot scandal 41, 175, 195–6; 
Putin’s campaign articles 176–9, 181–2, 
185, 190, 200, 221, 224, 225, 236, 253; 
Putin’s re-election 2, 41, 93, 175, 191, 
222; and ‘state-forming’ people 178–84
priezzhie (visitors) 28, 105, 107, 109–10, 
112, 223
Prilepin, Zakhar 181
Prokhanov, Aleksandr 25, 180, 258, 259




Provokatory (documentary series) 203–4, 
205, 206, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212–14, 
229–30
ProzhektorPerisHilton (talk show) 141
PSBs (public service broadcasters) 30–2, 
69, 228–9
Pugachev (North Caucasus) 238–9
‘punk prayer’ 3, 194, 195, 199, 200, 202, 
203, 204, 205–6, 207, 211, 213
Pushkin Square protest (2012) 186
Pushkin, Alexander 73, 108, 124, 133
Pussy Riot scandal: and ‘abjection’ 196–7, 
208–12; arrest of members 194, 195; 
and ‘blasphemy’194, 196, 200, 202–5, 
207, 211–12, 214; conspiracy narratives 
195, 202, 204–5, 214; imprisonment 
of members 194, 203; as ‘media event’ 
199–202, 216; and media reaction 68, 
195–6, 199–202, 207–9, 212–14; and 
‘otherness’ 196–7, 201, 205, 208–12, 
255, 257; and ‘physical retribution’ 
200–1, 257; and ‘punk prayer’ 3, 194, 
195, 199, 200, 202, 203, 204, 205–6, 
207, 211, 213; and Putin 41, 175, 194, 
195–6, 202, 232; release of members 
194, 215; and Russian Orthodox 
Church 1–2, 3, 55, 57, 92, 93, 186, 194, 
195–6, 199–200, 203–8, 210–11; and 
sacred/profane boundary 205–8; trial 
of members 194, 195, 201; and Voina 
protest 214–15
Pust’ govoriat (talk show) 196, 199, 
200–201
Putin, Vladimir: and alignment of 
television with the Kremlin 30; and 
‘authoritative discourse’ 175–7; 
Bolotnaiia Square protests 93; campaign 
articles 176–9, 181–2, 185, 190, 
200, 221, 224, 225, 236, 253; and 
‘compound identity’ of Russians 25; 
and constraints on news broadcasting 
7; and corruption 182, 185–6, 187, 191; 
and ‘crisis of multiculturalism’ 27; and 
Day of National Unity 74, 77, 83, 84, 
93; and importance of television 35; 
and Kislovodsk forum 178, 180–1; and 
Manezhnaia Square riots 98, 104, 106, 
107, 108, 110, 111, 114; and media 
coverage of migration issues 62;  
and ‘national dilemma’ 177–8;  
nation-building of 17, 25, 30, 73, 226;  
neo-imperial nationalism of regime 9–10; 
and pan-Russian national community 52; 
and patriotic rhetoric 73; post-election 
media discourse 221–3, 224, 226–7, 232, 
238, 239, 255; protests over re-election 
41, 175, 186; and Pussy Riot scandal 41, 
175, 194, 195–6, 202, 232; re-elected 
as president (2012) 2, 41, 93, 175, 191, 
222; and rossiiskaia nation goal 159; 
and Russia’s ‘insecurity’ 28; Russian 
Orthodox Church support 55, 198–9; 
and Shkola series 131, 143; and social 
media 2; and ‘state-forming’ people 
178–84; support amongst ‘ordinary 
Russians’ 4; and tolerance 51, 54; and 
Valdai Forum 254; and Voina protest 
214–15
Question Time (discussion programme) 
88, 89
rationale of the study 8–11
REN TV (independent broadcaster):  
and Day of National Unity 81; 
independent stance of 33; and 
Manezhnaia Square riots 100, 108–12, 
113–14; migration coverage 237; and 
presidential elections (2012) 184; and 
Pussy Riot scandal 208
Reporterskaia istoriia (news programme) 
237
researcher-generated meanings 44
RIA-Novosti (news agency) 33
Robinson, Tommy 31
Rogozin, Dmitryi  203, 234
Roma communities 5–6, 7–8, 60, 123–4, 
123–30, 142–3, 248, 256–7
Romantic nationalism 23
Rossiia (broadcaster): anti-Islamist line 66; 
and Day of National Unity 74, 78, 81, 
88, 90–1; and Manezhnaia Square riots 
99–100, 103–4, 105–6, 111–12, 113, 
114; migration coverage 6, 221, 223, 
225, 227–8, 229–30, 233; and Pussy 
Riot scandal 196, 200, 203, 204–5; 
relationship with Kremlin 68, 221, 239; 
as source 17; state-ownership of 32; and 
televised drama 122, 123, 125, 142–3; 
and theory/method of study 15; and 
Vesti-Buriatiia programme 148
rossiiskaia nation 29, 52, 82–4, 89, 112, 
159, 163, 176, 226–7
‘Russia Day’ 74
‘Russia for the Russians’ campaign 4, 134, 
140, 183, 187, 188, 215
Index 283
Russia Today (international broadcaster) 
15, 33, 202, 254
‘Russian March’ 74, 75, 84, 85–6, 88, 91, 
92, 187
Russian Orthodox Church: and cincture of 
the Theotokos 57, 197–8, 207; and Day 
of National Unity 74–5, 77–8, 82–3, 84, 
90, 91–3; ethnicity-related news data 42, 
43, 49–51, 53, 54–7, 68, 154; and Islam 
57–8; and media approaches to religion 
197–8; and ‘other religions’ 58–9; 
primacy of 26; and Pussy Riot scandal 
1–2, 3, 55, 57, 92, 93, 186, 194, 195–6, 
199–200, 203–8, 210–11; and sacred/
profane boundary 205–8; as source of 
legitimacy 11; support for Putin and  
the state 55, 198–9; and ‘traditional 
Russian cultural values’ 2, 3, 4; and 
Vesti-Buriatiia 158, 159–60
‘Russian Spring’ 2, 175
sacred/profane boundary 205–8
Sagra riots (2011) 27
Said, Edward 14
salience of ethnicity-related news  
51, 65
Samutsevich, Ekaterina 194, 203
Sarkozy, Nicolas 5–6, 248
Scientology 58
‘securitization’ of democracies 9
Segodnia (news programme) 106–7, 111
self-censorship 15
‘separatist violence in the North Caucasus’ 
(coding system category) 42, 43, 46, 
49–51, 53, 64–7, 154
shamanism 159–60
Shenderovich, Viktor 198, 199
Shevchenko, Maksim 1–2, 5, 15, 52,  
182, 197, 198, 199–200, 204–5, 212, 
225–7, 254
Shkola (television series) 121, 122–3, 
130–7, 142–3, 254
Shuiskii, Vasilii 88
Silverstone, Roger 12, 260
‘sites of memory’ 80
Slepakov, Semion 138
‘small homeland’ 158, 162
Smuta (Time of Troubles) 74, 77, 80, 83, 
85, 88, 91, 92–3
Snow, Jon 81
Snow, Peter 82
Sobchak, Kseniia 1–2, 3, 4, 139, 199, 201, 
202, 203
Sobianin, Sergei 186, 189, 234, 235, 239
Sochi Winter Olympics (2014) 67, 139, 
247, 257
social media 2, 5, 33
sources used 17–18
Spaso-Evfimiev monastery (Suzdal) 84
Spetsial’nyi korrespondent (news 
programme) 196, 203, 229, 256
spontaneous representation 30
St George’s Day (England) 88
Stalin, Joseph 101, 103, 158, 160, 204
‘state multiculturalism’ 89
‘state of exception’ 9
‘state-forming’ people 178–84, 232
Stavropol (North Caucasus) 67, 236–7,  
238
‘Stop Feeding the Caucasus’ campaign 4, 
180, 186, 188
Sudite sami (discussion programme) 136
Surkov, Vladislav 110, 198, 223
Svanidze, Nikolai 104, 105, 178, 182, 206
Svetlakov, Sergei 141–2
Sviridov, Egor 98, 103, 107, 109
syntactic criteria 76, 80–1
Tajik people 138–9, 142
Tatar community 58, 80, 258 
telenovela format 130, 143
The Enigmatic Tomorrow of Fate 
(televised drama) 125, 127–8
The Gypsy Girl with the Way Out 
(televised drama) 125, 128–9
‘The Russian Time of Troubles: History of 
a Disease’ (documentary) 93
thematic preponderance 42
theory/method of study 12–17
Theotokos (Virgin Mary’s belt) 57, 197–8, 
207
Tibet 157, 158, 164–5, 166, 167
Time of Troubles (Smuta) 74, 77, 80, 83, 
85, 88, 91, 92–3
Tishkov, Valerii 226
TNT (commercial channel) 123, 137, 144
Todorov, Tzvetan 123
‘tolerast’ 215
Tolokonnikova, Nadezhda 194, 200–201, 






Tsarnaev brothers 248–9, 260–1
284 Index
Ukraine crisis (2014) 1, 4, 85, 240,  
247, 257
‘Ukrainian Nazis’ 62
‘Unity in Diversity’ 78, 79, 86, 87, 89, 
180, 232, 254
universal empathy 134
V kontekste (discussion programme) 1–2, 
3, 4–5, 178, 182–3, 196, 199–200, 201, 
202, 205–6, 212, 225–7
Vaenga, Elena 201, 211
Valdai Forum (2013) 254
Vartanova, Elena 34
Vedomosti (newspaper) 185
Venediktov, Aleksei 136, 178, 182
Verzilov, Petr 211, 213
Vesti (news bulletin): and Biriulevo 
market disturbance 114–15; and Boston 
Marathon bombing 248; and Crimean 
Tatars 258; and Day of National Unity 
78, 79, 80, 81, 83, 84, 85–6, 87, 88, 
90–1, 92; ethnicity-related news data 
44–5, 46, 48–51, 52–8, 60–5, 67; 
and migration coverage 233, 235; 
and Naval’nyi 188; post-election 
media discourse 227, 233, 235; and 
presidential elections (2012) 185; and 
religious relics 197–8, 211; and Roma 
community 5–6, 7–8; as source 17, 18; 
and Voina protest 214–15
Vesti nedeli (news programme): anti-
western rhetoric 258, 261; format of 45; 
and Islam 57–8; and Manezhnaia Square 
riots 103–4, 105–6, 236–7; and migration 
coverage 233–4, 236–8, 240; popularity 
of 15; and Pussy Riot scandal 205
Vesti-Buriatiia (news broadcast): audience 
148; autonomy over content 148–9, 166, 
167; and Buddhism 149, 150, 152, 153, 
158, 159–61, 164–5; centring Buriatiia’s 
experience 163–6; and Eurasianism 151, 
163, 166, 167; and ‘hybrid identities’ 
158–62, 167; and political environment 
of Buriatiia 153–4, 155; relationship 
with Moscow 150–1, 152, 161–2, 164, 
166; representational strategies 158–66; 
and Russian Orthodox Church 158, 
159–60; as source 17–18; and Soviet 
legacy 150, 159, 161, 166, 167; tone of 
broadcasts 149–50
‘Victory Day’ 73, 81, 82, 85–6, 161
Vladikavkaz (Russia) 65, 68
Voina (protest group) 195, 213, 214–15, 
232
Voskresnoe Vremia (news programme) 
44–5
Vremia (news bulletin): anti-western 
rhetoric 261; and Day of National Unity 
77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 83, 84, 85–6, 88, 
90–1; ethnicity-related news data 44–5, 
46–7, 49–51, 52–8, 60–2, 65, 67; and 
Manezhnaia Square riots 103–6, 236; 
migration coverage 233, 234; post-
election media discourse 227, 233; and 
presidential elections (2012) 178–82, 
183, 185, 188; and Pussy Riot scandal 
68, 196, 201, 207; as source 17, 18
Wahhabism 64
Walliams, David 139
‘war on terror’ 64, 66, 248
Weisberger, Adam 156
Wilson, Andrew 184





Zhamtsarano, Tsyben 164, 165
Zhirinovskii, Vladimir 74, 87, 88, 99, 112, 
183–4, 234–5
Žižek, Slavoj 3, 210
